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[1980] SLR (HC) 36High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

OKWAN AND OTHERS vs. AMANKWA [1981] GLR 417

1 April 1980 · OKUNOR J · ≈ 17 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 36
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OSCOLAOKWAN AND OTHERS v AMANKWA [1981] GLR 417 [1980] SLR (HC) 36
APAOKWAN AND OTHERS v AMANKWA [1981] GLR 417, [1980] SLR (HC) 36 (Ghana).
BluebookOKWAN AND OTHERS v AMANKWA [1981] GLR 417, [1980] SLR (HC) 36 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Omanhene of Sefwi Wiawso v. Donkor [1965] G.L.R. 462.

(2) Badu v. Ababio [1967] G.L.R. 1.

(3) Bekoe v. Serebour [1977] 1 G.L.R. 118.

(4) Concession Enquiry No. 1118 (Accra) [1961] 1 G.L.R. 448.

(5) Tijani v. The Secretary, Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 A.C. 399; 90 L.J.P.C. 236, P.C. (6) Gambra v. Ewear (1892) 1 Ren. 93.

(7) Dugbartey v. Narnor (1925) D.Ct. ‘21-’25, 182.

(8) Akyirefie v. Breman-Esiam Stool (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 331.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

MOTION challenging capacity of a chief to sue for an account of revenue collected from stool family lands. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

James Mercer for the defendants-applicants.

Agadzi for the plaintiff-respondent.

JUDGMENT OF OKUNOR J.

On 14 November 1979, the plaintiff in this case sealed a writ in this court directed against the defendants herein indorsed as:

“(a) The plaintiff as Chief of Brako and of the Kona family of Brako claims against the defendants jointly and severally, an order for accounts of all moneys collected by the defendants from the sale of palm trees and from cocoa abusa tenants on Kona family lands in the Central Region which moneys the defendants have refused or neglected to account to the plaintiff after repeated demands.

(b) An order for perpetual injunction against the defendants, their servants or their agents from any further interference with the collection of moneys aforesaid.”

[p.419] of [1981] GLR 417 The plaintiff filed on the same day, his statement of claim, the relevant portions of which, were formulated in the following terms:

“(1) The plaintiff is the Chief of Brako near Breman-Asikuma in the Central Region and also the Akyempenhene of Breman-Asikuma Traditional Area.

(2) The plaintiff comes from the Kona Family of Brako and is the elected chief thereof.

(3) As the chief, the plaintiff is the custodian of all the family lands in the Central Region and particularly in the Breman-Asikuma Traditional Area.

(4) As the custodian of the said family lands, the plaintiff or through his agents is the person entitled to collect abusa dues from cocoa abusa tenants on the said family lands granted to the said tenants by the plaintiff personally and others by the predecessors of the plaintiff.”

The defendants in their statement of defence admitted paragraphs (1) and (2) of the statement of claim but “vehemently denied” paragraphs (3) and (4); and in further answer to the averments therein contained, pleaded in paragraphs (3) and (4) of the statement of defence:

“(3) Further to the paragraphs denied, the defendants aver that, the first defendant, as head of the family to which the plaintiff belongs, is according to the custom prevailing in that area, and indeed all Akan society, the custodian of all the family lands in the Central Region and the Breman-Asikuma lands in particular.

(4) Thus the first defendant as the head and custodian of the family lands is entitled to collect all dues, be they abusa, abunu or otherwise accruing from the family lands for or on behalf of the family.”

It would appear that at some stage of the proceedings, the court albeit differently constituted, ruled on the nature of the lands, the subject-matter of the suit, and although neither counsel has attached a copy of that ruling to this application, counsel agreed that the court ruled that the lands concerned are stool family lands and consequently I proceed on that basis.

Then on 29 January 1980, counsel for the defendants, amended his statement of defence, having obtained leave so to do, by the insertion of the following additional paragraph:

“(30A)The defendants will contend further and in the alternative that if the land of the Brako Kona Family is stool and then

[p.420] of [1981] GLR 417 the plaintiff’s action contravenes section 17 of the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123), and further that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff’s suit.”

This amendment was filed as an additional issue formulated on the same day as:

“Whether the plaintiff’s action contravening section 17 of the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123) as it does, is maintainable and whether the court has jurisdiction to entertain it.”

Having thus raised in their pleading a point of law, the defendants availed themselves of the opportunity open to them and the plaintiff as well under Order 25, r. 2 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), which reads:

“2. Any party shall be entitled to raise by his pleading any point of law, and any points so raised shall be disposed of by the Judge who tries the cause at or after the trial, provided that by consent of the parties, or by order of the Court or a Judge on the application of either party, the same may be set down for hearing and disposed of at any time before the trial.”

The defendants consequently moved for and obtained on the same day:

“an order setting down for hearing and disposal before the trial of this action, the point of law raised by the defendants’ statement of defence to the effect that the plaintiff’s action contravenes section 17 of the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123), and that it is therefore void and unmaintainable and that this honourable court has no jurisdiction to entertain it.”

It is this motion which is before me by virtue of a transfer order made under the hand of the Chief Justice dated 13 March 1980.

Before examining the legal point raised, I cannot resist the temptation to re-emphasise that I am proceeding on the basis which both counsel agree on, i.e. that the court as constituted before the transfer to this court, has ruled that the lands involved were stool family lands.

I must first dispose of one matter of procedure raised by Mr. Agadzi, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to simply as the plaintiff). It was counsel’s contention that this application under Order 25, r. 2 was prematurely brought because there is in the suit a triable issue, the resolution of which would necessitate the hearing of evidence, namely, that there is an issue as to whether or not the lands involved are stool family lands as the court had indicated or whether they were something else and that the ruling

[p.421] of [1981] GLR 417 of the court was only interlocutory, and did not settle the matter finally. That being the case, the motion for the determination of the legal point raised in the defendants’ pleading was premature.

I accept Mr. Agadzi’s contention that where a party sets down a point of law, the issue can properly be taken when the contention does not rest on evidence or where the evidence necessary may perhaps be heard and dealt with easily and conveniently in the course or the consideration of the point of law involved. In this case, it would appear from the plaintiff’s own pleadings, particularly in paragraphs (3) and (4) of his statement of claim, which I have reproduced (supra), that it is the plaintiff’s own case that the lands involved are stool family lands. It is not readily discernible to me therefore why the plaintiff would want to alter his stand. Secondly, it is my view that his objection should have been raised when the motion under Order 25, r. 2 came up for hearing. This was obviously not done, or if it was, it was overruled; it is too late to raise it now; that would amount to ignoring an order of the High Court even though that order has not been successfully appealed against. The objection was not raised before me at the commencement of arguments. I was of the view therefore that the Order 25 motion which had already been set down ought to proceed.

And now to the merits. The issue between the parties in this motion is straightforward. It is the contention of the defendants-applicants (who hereinafter shall be simply referred to as the defendants) that the ruling of the court being what it is, the action is not maintainable by the plaintiff having regard to the provisions of section 17 (1) and (2) of the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123), which reads:

“17. (1) All revenue from lands subject to this Act shall be collected by the Minister and for that purpose all rights to receive and all remedies to recover that revenue shall vest in him and, subject to the exercise of any power of delegation conferred by this Act, no other person shall have power to give a good discharge for any liability in respect of the revenue or to exercise any such right or remedy.

Revenue for the purposes of this Act includes all rents, dues, fees, royalties, revenues, levies, tributes and other payments, whether in the nature of income or capital, from or in connection with lands subject to this Act.”

Learned counsel for the defendants argues that by virtue of the ruling of the court on 27 November 1979, the lands in respect of which the plaintiff claims “moneys” and “an order for accounts” are of such a nature that only the minister can claim such reliefs having regard

[p.422] of [1981] GLR 417 to the wide definition of “revenue” in section 17 (2) and consequently the only person, unless the plaintiff can show that the minister has delegated his rights to him to institute an action for these reliefs.

There is no doubt that if the lands involved are “lands subject to Act 123 “ the plaintiff has no locus standi and cannot maintain this action unless he does so as an agent of the minister, a capacity which his pleadings do not disclose: see Omanhene of Sefwi-Wiawso v. Donkor [1965] G.L.R. 462 at p. 465 where Koranteng-Addow J. (as he then was) concluded his judgment dealing with whether or not a local council had capacity to collect moneys which fall within the definition of “revenue“ as formulated in section 17 (2) of Act 123, said:

“Section 17 (1) of the Act couched in such mandatory terms makes it abundantly clear that it is only the minister or his nominee who can bring an action like this to enforce the payment of revenue. It thus leaves no room even for an ‘interested party’ to enforce directly the payment of any revenue. He may do so indirectly perhaps by resorting to a prerogative writ directed against the minister. This action instituted by the traditional council is therefore illegal as offending against the Administration of Lands Act, 1962, and should have been dismissed on that ground alone. The council had no locus standi.”

See also Badu v. Ababio [1967] G.L.R. 1 where the late Sampson Baidoo J. (as he then was) said at p. 8:

“The plaintiff is in effect still claiming to be entitled to collect rents from lands which he claims to be attached to his stool. The action contravenes section 17 of the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123), which prohibits such claims.”

In Bekoe v. Serebour [1977] 1 G.L.R. 118, Mensa Boison J. (as he then was) said at p. 123:

“The authorities are numerous and certain that where the land is stool land the person who has capacity to institute action to recover any revenue is the Minister as defined under the Act, as provided by section 17 (1).”

The crucial issue to resolve in this case is “are the lands involved in this suit subject to the Act?” Act 123 is described in its title as “AN ACT to consolidate with amendments the enactments relating to the administration of Stool and other lands.” (The emphasis is mine.) This immediately puts us on our guard; the Act is not confined only to the administration of stool lands. It goes beyond stool

[p.423] of [1981] GLR 417 lands, and it becomes necessary to investigate what other lands, outside stool lands properly so-called, are affected by the Act and how “stool land” is defined in the Act. Section 31 of the Act defines “stool land” as:

“ ‘Stool land’ includes land controlled by any person for the benefit of the subjects or members of a stool, clan, company or community, as the case may be and all lands in the Upper and Northern Regions other than land vested in the President and accordingly ‘stool’ means the person exercising such control.”

This definition of “stool land“ is strikingly similar to that given to the same expression in section 2 of the Local Government Ordinance, Cap. 64 (1951 Rev.). That Ordinance defined “stool land” as:

“ ‘Stool land’ includes any land or interest in land controlled by a Stool, head of a tribe or company captain for the benefit of the subjects of the Stool, tribe or company, as the case may be, and ‘stool’ means the person or body of persons having such control.”

It only substituted “clan” for “tribe” and “company or community” for “company captain.” It is obvious that clan, tribe, company captain, company and community belong to a category, which by reference to the ejusdem generis rule, “family” does not belong. They are all sub-divisions of the state or oman or small recognised divisions of the oman as distinct from the family which is only a private blood group; members of which are linked together by consanguinity. The late Adumua-Bossman J. (as he then was) had occasion to examine and determine the scope of this definition of “stool land“ i.e. in section 2 of Cap. 64 in the case of Concession Enquiry No. 1118 (Accra) [1961] G.L.R. 448. Comparing this with the definition given of “stool land” in section 2 of the State Councils Ordinance, 1952 (No. 8 of 1952), namely, “land declared as stool property to a chief on his installation,” the learned judge at p. 453 adopted, with approval, Lord Haldane’s comments in the case of Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 A.C. 399 when the learned law lord said at p. 410, P.C.:

“Their Lordships doubt whether any really definite distinction is connoted by the expression ‘stool lands’. It probably means little more than lands which the chief holds in his representative or constitutional capacity as distinguished from land which he and his family hold individually.”

(The emphasis is mine.) This distinction is significant. The learned judge then continued at pp. 453-454;

[p.424] of [1981] GLR 417

“In the definition of ‘stool land’ under the Local Government Ordinance which speaks of control by the agencies mentioned, i.e. ‘a Stool, Head of a tribe, or Company Captain’, as the criterion for determining whether land is a ‘Stool Land’ or not, the respective instances of the ‘Head of a tribe’ and ‘Company Captain’ are clear enough and free from any ambiguity or doubt. Unfortunately the same cannot be said of the case of the ‘Stool’; and the use of the word ‘Stool’ simpliciter without any qualifying word to indicate clearly the particular type of stool which is meant, cannot be said to be entirely satisfactory.”

Stools, we are all aware, are of two kinds; private or family stools on the one hand, and public or state (also called oman) stools on the other hand. Moreover, all who are under or subservient to either kind of stool, may be and are usually referred to as “subjects of so and so stool.” This clear distinction between oman stool and family stool was brought out in 1892 in the case of Gambra v. Ewear (1892)1 Ren. 93 in which the distinction between a family stool and a public stool was in issue. Redwar J. delivering the judgment of the Full Court said at p. 94:

“I am of opinion that the only just conclusion which can be arrived at is that the deposal was rightly made in the case of this stool, which I am satisfied upon the evidence was a town stool. The cases cited relate to ‘family property stools,’ and are therefore no authorities in the case of a ‘town stool,’ which appears to be one of a different description and subject to different rules as to succession and deposal.”

(The emphasis is mine.) Perhaps just one more case will illustrate the point vividly—the case of Dugbartey v. Narnor (1925) D.Ct. ‘21-’25,182. The stool involved in that suit was a family stool and in the course of the proceedings, a letter dated 3 August 1923, from the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, was received by the court and it reads (as stated at p. 183): “the head of the Tettey Ga family, and occupant of the Tettey Ga family stool, did not come under the provisions of the Chiefs Ordinance.” The Chiefs Ordinance referred to, was passed in 1904 and introduced official confirmation of the election and installation of chiefs, and was limited to public (or oman) chiefs. It came thereafter, to constitute the most reliable basis for the distinction of oman chief from family chiefs.

After examining the overwhelming evidence in support of a distinction between oman or public chief and family chief, Adumua-Bossman J. (as he then was) in the Concession Enquiry case (supra)came to the conclusion that the stool referred to in the definition in the Local Government Ordinance, Cap. 64 (quoted above) (which I

[p.425] of [1981] GLR 417 submit, is in effect, similar to “stool” referred to in section 31 of Act 123) can only refer to public or oman stool and not to family or private stool, and the disabilities specified only attach to oman stool lands and not stool family lands. Indeed, lands in the possession of a chief may be of three kinds: land attached to the stool, lands owned by the chief for himself and the members of his immediate family and land which belongs to him personally. I am of the view, and I so hold that the disabilities placed upon him with regard to the collection of revenue from stool land can only apply to stool property properly so-called and not to the latter two. I am fortified in this view by the two cases of Bekoe v. Serebour (supra) and Akyirefie v. Breman-Esiam Stool (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 331.

In the earlier case decided in 1977 Mensa Boison J. was at pains to distinguish stool family land from stool land and it was only after he was satisfied that the land involved was stool land that he non-suited the plaintiff. He said at p. 121.

“It is a common notion that the ruling family of any community or tribe in Ghana like other individual families of the community may themselves possess lands in their private capacity as members of the ruling family; in which case the land is family property of the stool family. This will be distinct from the communal land of the entire community properly called stool land of which the occupant of the stool is head.”

The learned judge then went on to inquire into whether the land in question was stool family land or stool land, and he said at p. 122:

“Now the land in question appears from paragraph (3) to have been acquired by the Seikwa Stool as a result of litigation with the Suma Stool, and the grant to Nana Kofi Tano of Buni, was from the Seikwa Stool. On this premise I hold that the land is such land as defined in section 31 of the Act as stool land.”

And it was after the learned judge had held that the land was stool land that he held that the plaintiff had no locus standi. If section 17 applies to both stool land and stool family lands, there would have been absolutely no need for the judge to have decided which one it was before making his order. A reverse state of affairs occurred in the Akyirefie case (supra). Coussey J., as he then was, investigated the nature of the lands involved and came to the conclusion that it was stool family land; consequently instead of throwing out the plaintiff as not having locus standi, he, suo motu, amended the capacity of the plaintiff to enable him collect revenue.

I think it is quite clear that by Act 123, government considers oman stool lands as national assets and the principal aim of Act 123, as is evident in sections 17-23, is to control revenue accruing from

[p.426] of [1981] GLR 417 such national assets and run the budget of the traditional areas within which such national assets occur. It would be ridiculous for government to attempt to run the budget of members of the chief’s immediate family.

I did say, though, that Act 123 dealt with lands other than stool lands properly so-called. Section 8 of the Act provides:

“8. (1) Any disposal of any land which involves the payment of any valuable consideration or which would, by reason of its being to a person not entitled by customary law to the free use of land, involve the payment of any such consideration, and which is made,

(a) by a stool;

(b) by any person who, by reason of his being so entitled under customary law, has acquired possession of such land either without payment of any consideration or in exchange for a nominal consideration, shall be subject to the concurrence of the Minister and shall be of no effect unless such concurrence is granted.”

This means that if the stool itself should grant stool land to a person who has to pay for it. e.g. to a stranger or where a person who is entitled to receive stool land free of charge and who has, in fact, been granted such stool land free of charge or in exchange for a nominal consideration, decides to dispose of such land which is no longer stool land since it is, for all practical purposes, his personal property, the disposal can only be validated by a concurrence granted by the minister. Consequently, to the extent that such a concurrence from the minister is necessary for the disposal of land which is not in fact, stool land, the Act can claim to regulate transactions in respect of lands other than stool lands. It is to be noted, however, that where the land disposed of is stool land, then in addition to the concurrence prescribed in section 8, there is also the requirement of section 17 that the consideration is collectable only by the minister since it is revenue under section 17. Consideration for land sold by the holder of stool land obtained free of charge from the stool, however, is not required by the Act to be turned over to the minister.

Taking all the circumstances into consideration therefore, I am of the view, that the plaintiff’s action does not contravene section 17 of the Act and consequently is maintainable by him. Case to take its normal course.

DECISION Motion overruled.

K. A. A. M.

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