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[1986] SLR (CA) 3Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

ASAHIN INDUSTRIES LTD. vs. KOFIFOH BOATBUILDING CO. LTD. [1984-86] 1 GLR 453

4 March 1986 · FRANCOIS JSC · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (CA) 3
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OSCOLAASAHIN INDUSTRIES LTD. v KOFIFOH BOATBUILDING CO. LTD. [1984-86] 1 GLR 453 [1986] SLR (CA) 3
APAASAHIN INDUSTRIES LTD. v KOFIFOH BOATBUILDING CO. LTD. [1984-86] 1 GLR 453, [1986] SLR (CA) 3 (Ghana).
BluebookASAHIN INDUSTRIES LTD. v KOFIFOH BOATBUILDING CO. LTD. [1984-86] 1 GLR 453, [1986] SLR (CA) 3 (Ghana Ct. App. 1986).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Little v. Spreadbury [1910] 2 K.B. 658.

(2) United Engineering Workers’ Union v. Devanayagam (KW), President Eastern Province Agricultural Co-operative Union Ltd. [1968] A.C. 356; [1967] 3 W.L.R. 461; sub nom United Engineering Workers’ Union v. Devanayagam [1967] 2 All E.R. 367, P.C.

(3) Gwira v. State Insurance Corporation [1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 132, C.A.

(4) Baiden v. Solomon [1963] 1 G.L.R. 488, S.C.

(5) Owusu v. Kumah [1984-86] 2 G.L.R. 29, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for a stay of execution of a judgment of the High Court. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling of the court.

COUNSEL

Dr Daniels (with him Kwesi Spio) for the applicants.

Ayisi for the respondents.

[p.455] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 453

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.S.C.

Francois J.S.C. delivered the ruling of the court. The defendant-applicants move for a stay of execution “of the order made by the High Court that a 50-footer fishing vessel be delivered to the plaintiff-respondents on or before 31 December 1985.” The facts averred in support of the application disclose an original agreement between the parties whereby the applicants would build a 50-footer fishing vessel for the respondents at the price of ¢458,150. It appears that by 31 August 1979, the respondents had made deposits totalling ¢358,150 for the said boat. Apparently the difference of ¢100,000 unpaid, represented fishing tackle that could either be supplied and paid for later or dispensed with altogether. By 28 August 1984, a period of about five years, the applicants had not discharged their part of the obligation to supply the fishing vessel, so the respondent sued for recovery of their deposit of ¢358,150, with interest on the said sum, and ¢10 million damages.

Moves to settle the dispute were initiated, the applicants engaging counsel to promote their interest. The net result was an agreement embodied in a settlement dated 14 December 1984, and entered as a judgment of the court below which is recapitulated hereunder as follows:

“TERMS OF SETTLEMENT The parties have agreed to settle the above-named suit as follows:

1. The defendants should complete and deliver to the plaintiffs a 50-footer fishing vessel within six (6) months from 1 January 1985.

2. The said 50-footer fishing vessel should be delivered to the plaintiffs by the defendants at Tema Harbour on or before 30 June 1985.

3. The plaintiffs shall be at liberty either by themselves or their agents to visit the workshop of the defendants to view the condition or progress of the work on the 50-footer fishing vessel.

4. The defendants shall pay to the plaintiffs or their counsel ¢50,000 as costs on or before the execution of these presents.

5. These terms of settlement shall be recorded as judgment of the court.

Dated at Accra, 14 December 1984.”

When the last day of June 1985 slipped by without a 50-footer fishing vessel being supplied, the respondents brought contempt proceedings against the applicants herein. We do not wish to pronounce

[p.456] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 453 on the merits of the recourse adopted; this would be purely academic as the application in any case failed. It is significant, however, to observe that the applicants contended there and have repeated those arguments forcefully before us that (1) they were not aware of the consent judgment (see paragraph 16 of their affidavit); (2) the settlement did not include all the terms agreed upon; and (3) counsel for the applicants in accepting the terms was either indolent or negligent in not protecting their principals’ interests.

As to the first ground pleading ignorance of a settlement or of the consent judgment the less said about it the better. Where parties are attempting a compromise and in pursuit of that objective have obtained an adjournment of the trial of a suit and nominated counsel to protect their interests at an arbitration, it is ridiculous to urge an unawareness of the result of that attempt at settlement. If true, it shows a lamentable lack of interest that can hardly advance the applicants’ cause. But the terms of settlement were signed by the managing directors of the respective firms, the parties herein, as well as their solicitors. Again a letter, exhibit F, from the respondents reminding the applicants of their obligation under the settlement and demanding implementation thereof had drawn no response. Finally the record of the court below shows that a representative of the defendants, the applicants herein, not counsel, had been present and had confirmed the settlement before judgment was given thereon. The first ground of objection is a palpable falsehood; its repetition before us can only amount to irresponsible advocacy.

The second ground urged that an essential term had been left out of the agreed settlement. This was that the respondents (the plaintiffs) should pay one-third of the total cost of the vessel. On this, the court below found decisively against the applicants with its firm pronouncement that that had been rejected and was not part of the settlement. Indeed, in a settlement many irons are thrown into the melting pot and the amalgam resulting is the agreed compromise. For instance, interest on ¢358,150 paid as long ago as 1979 would be taken into account to enhance the payments made towards the purchase of the vessel by the respondents. The credit side of the account would not remain pegged at ¢358,150. The claim for ¢10 million damages though unproved, was still a claim on the writ and would enter into the equation as a simple entitlement to damages which had to be quantified. The demand for one-third payment by the respondents would also be set on the debit side against the conduct of the applicants in not fulfilling their obligation on time. If it was found that the price escalation occurred while the applicants lethargically dragged their feet, then the appropriate door at which the price increases should be thrown would present

[p.457] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 453 no difficulty. On the facts therefore it cannot be optimistically urged that a term had been omitted in the settlement by oversight.

The last ground for rejecting the settlement is in effect a criticism of the applicants’ own counsel for ineptitude. But there is good sense and good reason for the rule that you take your counsel as you find him. At law, where a client induces by his conduct, his solicitor to believe that he is authorised to make a compromise on his behalf, he is bound by it: see Little v Spreadbury [1910] 2 K.B. 658. Also illustrative of the principle is the passage from the dissenting joint judgment of Lord Guest and Lord Devlin in United Engineering Workers’ Union v. Devanayagam [1968] A.C. 356 at 390, where their lordships stated:

“A court of law has no doubt the formal power of refusing to make an order in accordance with a settlement reached by the parties, but it is a power which is exercised only in exceptional cases, as, for example, when one of the parties is under the protection of the court. Otherwise the court does not inquire whether the proposed settlement achieves a just result; it assumes that it does. It assumes also that counsel has authority to make a settlement on behalf of his client; if he has not, it is a matter that they must settle between themselves.”

In our own domestic forum, there have been decisions protecting counsel from the ill-advised and unwarranted attacks that losing parties unleash on them: see Gwira v. State Insurance Corporation [1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 132, C.A.; Baiden v. Solomon [1963] 1 G.L.R. 488 at 493 and Owusu v. Kumah [1984-86] 2 G.L.R. 29, C.A.

The opening paragraph of this ruling quoted ipsissima verba the object of this application, namely the stay of delivery of a 50-footer fishing vessel by 31 December 1985.

The respondents counter the application by demonstrating its lack of merit. They urge first, that the order sought to be stayed appears in a ruling of the lower court of 31 October 1985. That ruling was merely concerned with the dismissal of a contempt application. The actual judgment incorporating the settlement was given on 19 December 1984. If the applicants were dissatisfied with it on any viable grounds they should have appealed against it. Counsel for the applicants concedes that there was no appeal against the judgment of 19 December 1984 but urges that since the court extended the delivery date to 31 December 1985, in the ruling on the contempt application of 31 October 1985, the extended date had reviewed an aspect of the earlier judgment to clothe his present application with some legitimacy.

We do not share this view. The extension of the delivery date from 30 June 1985, as appears in the settlement, to 31 December 1985, in the court’s ruling, was clearly suo motu by the judge and contrary to

[p.458] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 453 the agreed settlement embodied in the judgment of 19 December 1984, and was without jurisdiction. As soon as judgment was delivered as aforesaid on 19 December 1984, it assumed the features of a consent judgment, and the court became functus officio thereof. Since no appeal was filed on the consent judgment, and the time limited for appealing has elapsed, there is no basis for this application, which could not even succeed on the merits.

The application for stay is consequently refused. To promote amity there will be no order as to costs. DECISION Application dismissed J. A. A.

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