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[1986] SLR (CA) 15Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL, AGOGO vs. BOATENG [1984-86] 2 GLR 381

4 March 1986 · OSEI-HWERE JA · ≈ 6 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (CA) 15
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OSCOLAPRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL, AGOGO v BOATENG [1984-86] 2 GLR 381 [1986] SLR (CA) 15
APAPRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL, AGOGO v BOATENG [1984-86] 2 GLR 381, [1986] SLR (CA) 15 (Ghana).
BluebookPRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL, AGOGO v BOATENG [1984-86] 2 GLR 381, [1986] SLR (CA) 15 (Ghana Ct. App. 1986).

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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against the decision of the Circuit Court, Juaso wherein the plaintiff was awarded damages for wrongful dismissal. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court delivered by Osei-Hwere JA.

COUNSEL

S D Addai for the appellants.

No appearance by or for the respondent.

JUDGEMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.A

The subject matter of the action that gave birth to this appeal is simple and it did not involve any difficult questions of fact and of law. The plaintiff-respondent (to be described hereinafter as the plaintiff) sued out a writ at the Circuit Court, Juaso and claimed: (a) damages for wrongful dismissal; and (b) an order of perpetual injunction restraining the hospital authorities, their servants, agents and workmen from forcibly removing the plaintiff’s personal belongings from the nurses’ quarters.

Until the date of her dismissal, the plaintiff was employed by the appellants (hereafter called the defendants) as a senior nurse-midwife. On the night of 17 January 1981 the scene was set for a calamity in the defendants’ hospital. The plaintiff was on night duty, assisted by a nurse, the first defendant witness, when at about 9 p.m. a pregnant woman called Abiba Busanga, the second defendant witness, came there to deliver. The first defendant witness carried out the preliminary

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preparations in anticipation of her delivery and put her to bed. The second defendant witness felt like visiting the toilet and got out of bed for that purpose. She felt it was rather the baby which was descending and she called the plaintiff for assistance but the plaintiff told her that her time was not due. As she was plodding towards her bed, she delivered the baby onto the floor and called once again for the plaintiff’s help. The plaintiff and the first defendant witness rushed to the scene. Instead of the necessary sympathetic and professional assistance requested of her, the plaintiff abused her and followed this with slaps. The plaintiff cut the umbilical cord and left the baby in the pool of blood and fluid until the first defendant witness took charge of the baby. Apparently still bereft of any touch of humane feeling, she ordered the patient to wipe off the blood and remove the placenta from the floor. The trial judge found these facts as proved.

Following this incident the plaintiff was invited the following Monday, 19 January 1981, to the matron’s office and interrogated. The trial judge also accepted as proved that the plaintiff here behaved insultingly to the authorities. The defendants followed with a query that same day and she failed to answer it. The trial judge considered that her refusal to answer the query was deliberate and that, in all the circumstances, her conduct “was to show naked defiance to the authorities.” The end result of all these was the defendants’ prompt reaction in dismissing the plaintiff by their letter dated 20 January 1981, exhibit B. The letter of dismissal spelt out the plaintiff’s remissness and then went on to charge her under article 24, para (a) (i) and (iii) of the conditions of service on discipline for insubordination and gross negligence of duty.

It would have been a matter of great surprise if the plaintiff’s conduct, such as was proved against her, could not invite her instant dismissal without any prior investigative proceedings. But the trial circuit judge thought otherwise. For, although he was in no doubt that “the plaintiff’s inhuman treatment of the patient, the first defendant witness, and her impertinence to the authorities” fell squarely under article 24 (a) (i) and (ill) of the collective agreement between the Church Hospitals Association of Ghana and the Health Service Workers Union of the Trades Union Congress of Ghana (exhibit D1) yet he held that before an employee could be dismissed summarily for gross insubordination and gross negligence of duty under the above-mentioned article or under article 29 of exhibit D1, proper proceedings should be conducted in terms of what exhibit D2 captions, “Proceedings in Disciplinary Matters.”

Exhibit D2 appears to be a directive issued by the medical superintendent of the defendant’s hospital on disciplinary matters. He

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assigns to the matron and the heads of department the respective areas over which they are responsible for discipline. He then directs that in cases where disciplinary actions above the grade of a warning letter (e.g. suspension or dismissal) is required then the following applies:

“(a) In very clear cases the matron or head of department can decide and act in co-operation with the medical superintendent.

(b) In less clear situations a disciplinary committee is convened….”

The directive then lays down the composition of the committee where disciplinary action concerns a nursing staff. Exhibit 1 is also the conditions of service for nurses and midwives employed by member institutions of the Church Hospitals Association of Ghana. Article 29 of the conditions of service also provides for summary dismissals in cases of gross insubordination and gross negligence or committing deliberate acts likely to cause danger to the lives or safety of other people.

Exhibit D2 must, indeed, not be read in isolation but as if it were an integral part of exhibit 1 which conferred the plaintiff’s conditions of service. The trial circuit court held that her dismissal was wrongful because the proceedings which culminated in her dismissal were null and void. He held that the plaintiff could have been entitled to reinstatement but that as she prayed for damages he awarded damages made up of the sum total of all her net salary from the date of her dismissal (20 January 1981) up to the date of judgment, I February 1983. It is against this decision that the defendants have appealed.

The court below found for the plaintiff because the acting matron Mr Owusu, had said in court that he was investigating the complaint about the patient’s ill-treatment under paragraph (b) of exhibit D2. Accordingly, the failure to convene the disciplinary committee was said to have struck down the legality of the dismissal. This conclusion was against the weight of evidence found by the court. The plaintiff stood condemned for instant dismissal either on account of gross insubordination or of gross negligence. Surely it did not require the setting up of a committee to determine her gross insubordination when the plaintiff by insults posed a defiant attitude before her authorities. She also put herself outside the pale of any investigative disciplinary committee by her deliberate refusal to answer the query so as to put forward her version of the incident reported against her. In these circumstances it was wrong for the circuit judge to have had any truck with the provisions of paragraph (b) of exhibit D2 to invalidate the dismissal. The gross insubordination was a clear case and so was her inhuman and dangerous treatment of Busanga. The trial court ought to [p.385] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 381 have recalled paragraph (a) of the said exhibit for his consideration in pronouncing for the validity of the dismissal.

In the result the appeal ought to succeed and the judgment of the court below together with the damages and costs awarded set aside and judgment entered for the defendants.

DECISION Appeal allowed M.C.N.N

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