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[1986] SLR (HC) 6High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

ASAMOAH vs. THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 769

2 December 1986 · MENSAH AG J · ≈ 9 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (HC) 6
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OSCOLAASAMOAH v THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 769 [1986] SLR (HC) 6
APAASAMOAH v THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 769, [1986] SLR (HC) 6 (Ghana).
BluebookASAMOAH v THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 769, [1986] SLR (HC) 6 (Ghana High Ct. 1986).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Mensuo v. The Republic [1971] 2 G.L.R. 30.

(2) Alpha Zabrama v. The Republic [1976] 1 G.L.R. 291.

(3) Yakubu v. The State,High Court, Tamale, 17 November 1966, unreported.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against conviction and sentence by a trial magistrate grade II on a plea of guilty with explanation on a charge of defrauding by false pretences contrary to the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), s. 131. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Okofo Darteh for the appellant.

Owoo for the Republic.

JUDGMENT OF MENSAH AG. J.

This is an appeal lodged against the conviction and sentence by the appellant. The appellant was convicted after pleading guilty with explanation to a charge of fraud by false pretences contrary to section 131 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), and was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment with hard labour. The appellant was said to have obtained the sum of ¢3,400 from the complainant under the pretext of supplying her with beans which he failed to do.

Arguing the appeal for the appellant counsel submitted in the main that since the appellant pleaded guilty with explanation but the trial magistrate failed or refused to record the explanation of the appellant, then the trial magistrate grade II violated the statutory duty imposed on him by section 171 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), and consequently the trial is a nullity and the conviction and sentence should be set aside by this appellate court. Counsel referred to Mensuo v. The Republic [1971] 2 G.L.R. 30. Counsel further submitted in the alternative that since the appellant is a young first offender, the sentence of nine months’ imprisonment with hard labour was harsh and excessive.

In reply counsel for the respondent submitted that the mere omission of the explanation of the appellant, does not negate the

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conviction. Counsel referred to section 4 (a) of Act 29 and section 415 of Act 30 and added that both sections should be construed amply and beneficially to give effect to the purposes thereof. Counsel for the respondent further submitted that since the order made by the trial court showed that the magistrate recorded the sum and substance of the appellant’s explanation and this has not been challenged by affidavit then the appellant cannot be heard to say a substantial miscarriage of justice has been occasioned, and referred to section 406 of Act 30. Finally counsel referred to section 26 (12) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372) and argued that the point raised by counsel for the appellant was technical and should not be allowed to disturb the said conviction.

I have carefully read the record of proceedings and I have also patiently read the written submissions made by both counsel and it is my candid and considered opinion that, plausible as the submissions made by counsel for the respondent may seem, they do not find favour with the court.

In the first instance the submission that the trial magistrate recorded the sum and substance of the explanation of the appellant is not tenable, having regard to the record of proceedings forwarded to this court. Nowhere in the record of proceedings did the trial magistrate record the explanation of the appellant, although the record of proceedings abundantly and apparently indicated that the appellant pleaded guilty with explanation. If after pleading guilty with explanation with the appellant desired not to offer any explanation the trial court should have made a record to that effect.

If the trial magistrate had recorded any explanation of the appellant at all then this court would have ascertained from the recorded explanation whether it formed the sum and substance of the said explanation; but here, no explanation was recorded at all. How then can one ascertain whether it was the sum and substance of the explanation of the appellant and therefore the appellant cannot be said to have suffered substantial miscarriage of justice?

If the record of proceedings did not show that the appellant pleaded guilty with explanation and the appellant is now challenging the record, then an affidavit would have been necessary for the trial magistrate to submit his views. Or if the trial court recorded the explanation which the appellant is challenging on grounds that portions of his explanation were not recorded or portions had been extracted, then an affidavit would have been necessary.

In this particular appeal, the magistrate himself recorded that the appellant pleaded guilty with explanation but no explanation is found in the record of proceedings. This is the gravamen of the argument of counsel for the appellant; and for a trial court to record that an accused has pleaded guilty with explanation, and the explanation is not

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recorded, this abundantly shows that the record is incomplete and, therefore there is a serious omission on the face of the record which is a direct violation of section 171 (2) of Act 30. Surely such an omission cannot and ought not be described as technical because if the explanation of the appellant had been recorded, it would have helped this court to determine whether or not the appellant intended to plead guilty or not guilty to the charge. This is the only procedure by which justice can be said to have been done in this case. If the explanation was not recorded, it cannot be said that the trial court recorded the plea of the appellant as nearly as possible as envisaged by section 171 (2) of Act 30. By this omission, the trial court has deprived the appellate court of the opportunity of reading the explanation of the appellant to enable it to determine whether or not the appellant intended to plead guilty to the charge or intended to plead not guilty by his explanation. Surely such an omission amounts to a substantial miscarriage of justice.

It is therefore the considered view of this court that section 171 (2) of Act 30 imposes a statutory duty on trial courts to record as nearly as possible the plea of an accused person and an omission or failure to do this amounts to a breach of statutory duty and a conviction based on non-compliance with such duty amounts to a nullity. It is to be noted that the operative word in section 171 (2) of Act 30 is “shall” which is mandatory.

The principle in Mensuo v. The Republic (supra) was that since there was no plea taken, the trial was a nullity because the omission violated section 171 (2) of Act 30. But a distinction should be drawn between the Mensuo case and the present appeal. In the Mensuo case there was no plea at all but in this present appeal, there was a plea with explanation which was not recorded, and since both infringed section 171 (2) of Act 30, then the trial amounts to a nullity because the trial magistrate grade II failed or omitted to record the explanation of the appellant and therefore did not record the plea of the appellant as nearly as possible within the framework of section 171 (2) of Act 30. The trial court’s own record of proceedings shows that the appellant pleaded guilty with explanation and this explanation was not recorded and therefore section 171 (2) of Act 30 has not been complied with, and this being a breach of statutory duty, conviction based on such a breach should not be allowed to stand. If the explanation has been recorded it would have afforded the whole world an opportunity to ascertain from the recorded explanation whether the appellant intended to plead guilty or did not intend to plead guilty.

If the recorded plea was guilty simpliciter there would have been nothing wrong in law with the conviction but since the magistrate’s record of proceedings indicated that the appellant pleaded guilty with

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explanation but the explanation was not recorded, this infringes section 171 (2) of Act 30 and therefore a substantial miscarriage of justice has been occasioned because it is after the court had read the recorded explanation that it can conclude in law and in fact whether the appellant intended pleading guilty or not guilty.

Further, the non-recording of the explanation of the appellant, though the record showed that he pleaded guilty with explanation, has brought out some serious doubts as to whether the appellant pleaded guilty or did not intend to plead guilty. The said doubts became more obvious when the trial magistrate in his sentencing order said, inter alia, “He has confirmed the facts of the prosecution and still he has the money as well as the beans which has not been returned to the complainant.” All these show that the appellant might have given an explanation which the trial court failed or refused to record in direct violation of section 171 (2) of Act 30.

As already stated the record of proceedings shows that the explanation of the appellant was not recorded. Where then did the trial magistrate get the facts from which he stated in his sentencing order that the appellant has confirmed the facts of the prosecution? Where in the record of proceedings did the appellant confirm the facts of the prosecution? Or where in the record did he tell the trial magistrate that he still has the money as well as the beans? These obviously had created serious doubts as to the intended plea of the appellant and the justice of the matter demands that such a conviction should not be made to stand since obviously it amounts to a substantial miscarriage of justice as envisaged by section 26 (12) of Act 372. In Alpha Zabramah v. The Republic [1976] 1 G.L.R. 291 at 301, Taylor J. (as he then was) referred to the case of Yakubu v. The State, High Court, Tamale, 17 November 1966, unreported and stated, inter alia:

“Annan J. (as he then was) subjected many of the English authorities to close scrutiny and came to the conclusion that even if it is accepted that section 324 (3) denies a right of appeal to appellants who have pleaded guilty, nevertheless an appeal will be successful and the provision defeated where the accused in fact did not plead guilty or where there is a doubt as to whether or not he in fact pleaded guilty.”’

The whole record of proceedings especially the facts as recorded and the order made by the trial magistrate, abundantly showed serious doubts as to whether the appellant pleaded guilty or did not intend to plead guilty, having regard to the reasons stated in this judgment, and consequently putting aside the violation of section 171 (2) of Act 30 by the trial court, this court is of the view that the trial is a nullity which warrants the setting aside, of the conviction and sentence.

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In the result, I would set aside the conviction and sentence for the reasons I have canvassed in this judgment. The appeal is allowed. Since the trial is a nullity it means the appellant has not been tried and it is usual for the appellant to be discharged, or for the court to order a retrial. However this court has further discretionary powers under section 26 (12) and 13 (b) of Act 372 to allow the appeal and to make orders as may appear just and proper. The appellant in this case, was convicted and sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment with hard labour on 23 October 1986 and has served an unlawful sentence of about 45 days in prison and the offence cannot in any way be described as serious—the amount involved being ¢3,400. In the circumstances, and in the interest of justice, I would quash the conviction and set aside the sentence and order that the appellant be acquitted and discharged.

DECISION

Appeal allowed

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