SESE vs. SESE AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 166
4 December 1986 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 15 min read
[1986] SLR (CA) 23Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASE REFERRED TO
Kwantreng v. Amassah [1962] 1 G.L.R. 241, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against a judgment of the High Court, Accra dismissing the plaintiff’s claim to a declaration of title to a piece of land allegedly given him under a customary gift evidenced in writing by a deed of gift duly executed and registered. The facts are fully set out in the judgment of Abban J.A.
COUNSEL
W. A. N. Adumua-Bossman for the appellant.
E. D. Kom for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.
The appeal is from the judgment of the High Court, Accra dated 25 November 1983. The appellant (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) had claimed a declaration of title, recovery of possession,
[p.168] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 166 damages for trespass and an order for perpetual injunction in respect of a piece of land situate at Kokomlemle, Accra.
The plaintiff and the first respondent (hereinafter referred to as the first defendant) were brothers. They were the children of the same father but had different mothers. The disputed land was the self-acquired property of their father, the late Evans Kofi Sese, who died at the ripe age of about 90. The late father acquired the land by purchase in August 1952. He built a one-storey house called an out-house on a portion of the land and lived in it.
The father later permitted the plaintiff to build on the remaining portion of the land. In consequence of the said permission the plaintiff put up a two-storey building on that portion. The late father however, continued to live in his said out-house with his wife (the mother of the first defendant), the first defendant himself as well as the first defendant’s two sisters of the same mother and father. The late father occupied the out-house with those persons until he became so old that he had to be conveyed to his hometown, Peki Dzake, to spend his last days.
In his lifetime the father rented some rooms in the out-house to tenants and collected rents from them. The last tenant of the late father was the present second respondent (hereinafter referred to as the second defendant). The father passed away on 25 November 1980 at Peki Dzake, and nine months later, on 13 August 1981, the plaintiff caused letters to be written to the defendants by his solicitor asking them to pay rents for occupying the out-house on the ground that he was the owner of the said out-house.
The defendants disputed the plaintiff’s claim to the out-house and refused to accede to his request. So on 24 August 1981 they also caused a fitting reply to be sent by their solicitor to the plaintiff, and within two weeks of the receipt of the said reply from the defendants, the plaintiff resorted to court action.
The basis of his action was that during the lifetime of the late father, the latter made a customary gift of the out-house to him and the gift was evidenced in writing by a deed of gift dated 25 August 1976 and registered as No. 321/1977. In their defence the defendants disputed the alleged customary gift and put the plaintiff to strict proof thereof. In addition, the first defendant averred that before the death of their late father, the latter made a will in which he devised the out-house to him and that he had been living in it with his mother and his two sisters of the same father and mother. The first defendant put in a counterclaim for a declaration of title to half portion of the land on which the out-house was built. The second defendant also denied that the plaintiff was his landlord, contending that the rooms he was occupying in the
[p.169] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 166 out-house were rented to him by the old man during his lifetime and he paid rents to the old man until his death; and since then he had been paying his rents to the old man’s widow.
At the end of the day, the learned High Court judge came to the following conclusion:
“in all the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff’s action must fail because (a) the aseda or consideration to support the gift has not been proved, (b) the father never intended to dispose of his house or if he did dispose of the land, he remained a licensee by implication; and (c) the gift, if it was perfected, was recalled by his will.”
The learned High Court judge therefore dismissed the plaintiff’s claim and entered judgement for the first defendant on his counterclaim. In this appeal only one ground of appeal was argued, namely the judgment was against the weight of evidence. I may observe that, apart from the general attacks made on the judgment, learned counsel for the plaintiff confined his submissions to the intention to make a gift; the aseda; the failure of the trial judge to apply the maxim quicquid plantatur solo solo cedit; and the revocation of the deed of gift by the will of the late father. The first submission of learned counsel for the plaintiff was that the learned trial judge having accepted that the deed of gift was not a forgery and that it was in fact executed in favour of the plaintiff on the occasion the plaintiff needed to raise money from the bank, could not conclude that there was no intention to make an absolute gift.
With due respect to learned counsel, the submission was without merit. The way and manner in which the said deed of gift, exhibit B, came into existence was a clear indication that the plaintiff’s father did not at any time evince an intention of making any customary gift so as to part with the disputed out-house and the land to the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s own evidence vividly brought out the circumstances and the real purpose for which the father executed the said deed of gift, exhibit B, in his favour. The plaintiff in his evidence-in-chief said:
“Q How did your father come to give you this land?
A In 1974 when I was living at Nsawam, I started putting up a two-storey building at Nsawam. By 1976 I ran into difficulties with respect to building materials. I approached my bankers for a loan to enable me complete the building and I wanted to secure myself with my two-storey building in Accra. My bankers enquired whether the land on which the building stood was mine and I said it was for my father. My bankers asked if my father could transfer the whole land to
[p.170] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 166 me in my name. I approached my father as a result. My father agreed and gave me the indenture, exhibit A. A document was executed in respect of the gift dated 25 August 1976 and registered as No.
321/77 (tendered as exhibit B).”
Under cross-examination the plaintiff gave the following answers:
“Q According to the document you have exhibited this house became absolutely yours in 1976?
A Yes.
Q And so from that time onwards your father had nothing to do with the house?
A He had something to do with it. He was collecting the rents from the tenants who occupied part of it . .
. from the time of the conveyance, I never collected the rent. I allowed him to do so.
Q Who were the tenants when the house was conveyed to you?
A The first defendant and one Tei Doku.
On the second day of his cross-examination these very questions were repeated probably for the sake of emphasis and the plaintiff gave practically the same answers as follows:
“Q Since 1976 when you alleged you became owner of the house by gift you never collected rents?
A No.
Q Even after the death of your father you have never collected rents from the second defendant?
A No.”
Thus going by the plaintiff’s own evidence the purpose for executing the deed of gift in his favour was not to give the disputed out-house to the plaintiff as a gift inter vivos. The purpose was to transfer the whole land into the plaintiff’s name so that the plaintiff could use the document of transfer to secure a bank loan to enable him to complete his building project at Nsawam. It was as simple as that; and the father’s conduct of continuing to be in full occupation and control and collecting and enjoying the rents from tenants occupying part of the out-house was a clear manifestation that he never intended to divest himself of his ownership of the house to the plaintiff. The learned trial judge was therefore right when he made the following finding:
“From the plaintiff’s own showing I have no doubt that his father never evinced any intention to make any absolute gift of his self-
[p.171] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 166 acquired house to him in addition to his own bigger house which he erected on his father’s land.”
The plaintiff’s admission that he never collected any rent from any tenant or occupant of the disputed house throughout the time his father was alive even after the execution of the so-called deed of gift was very significant. In Kwantreng v. Amassah [1962] 1 G.L.R. 241, S.C. the plaintiff in that case seemed to have laid claim to her late father’s house (the subject matter of dispute in that case) on similar grounds as those put forward by the present plaintiff. At 243-244 of the report the learned judge stated:
“The writ of summons was accompanied by a statement of claim which contained the following material allegations:
‘The subject-matter of this claim which is fully described in the writ of summons, was the self-acquired property of late Kwamla Armah Kwantreng (deceased) and was conveyed to the plaintiff by her late father by way of absolute gift, by a deed of gift executed by her said father Kwamla Armah Kwantreng (now deceased) on 8th June, 1955.
The defendant who had been living in the said house during her father’s life-time and since his decease with the plaintiff’s consent, has been exerting rights which are inconsistent with and amount to a denial of that plaintiff’s title.
The plaintiff therefore claims as per her writ of summons.’
These allegations in the statement of claim were traversed with the same counter-allegations set out in three separate statements of defence filed on behalf of the defendant and the two co-defendants, as follows:
‘In answer to paragraph 3, the defendant says that by a deed of gift dated 8th June, 1955 the property was conveyed to the plaintiff by the said Kwamla Armah Kwantreng; but the defendant says that the said conveyance was made for the purpose of enabling the plaintiff to borrow money for the said Kwamla Armah Kwantreng who needed the money to complete the building on the very same land the subject-matter of the said conveyance.
The defendant says that there was a parol collateral arrangement between the deceased Armah Kwantreng and the plaintiff that the said plaintiff should hold the said premises in trust for him the said Kwamla Armah Kwantreng, and should re-convey the said property to him upon the repayment of the
[p.172] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 166 bank loan, such repayment to be made from the rents of the stores already on the said land.
That the plaintiff duly mortgaged the said property to the Ghana Commercial Bank, and paid to the deceased moneys wherewith deceased continued, as owner, to extend the buildings on the land the subject matter of the alleged absolute gift.
The defendant denies as alleged in paragraph 4 of the statement of claim that she has been living in the said house with the plaintiff’s consent since their father’s death and says that the dispute between her and the plaintiff has arisen because the plaintiff since the deceased’s death, has presumed to assert an absolute title to the said property in breach of her trust, and has proceeded with the completion of the deceased’s buildings, despite requests that she should desist until the position in regard to the whole estate had become more fully appraised.
By way of counterclaim, the defendant claims a declaration that the plaintiff is a trustee of the said property for all the beneficiaries thereof named in the deceased’s will.”
I have intentionally quoted these passages from that judgment in order to bring to focus the exact claim which was made in that case and also to show how close the present case under consideration resembled that of the Kwantreng case (supra). It was no wonder that learned counsel for the defendant in his submission before us, seemed to have staked all his fortunes on that case. Several issues arose in that case for consideration, but the most important issue was whether or not the execution of the deed of gift by the late father Armah Kwantreng in favour of the daughter was for the special purpose of enabling her to use the property in her own name to secure a loan of money from the bank for her father to use the borrowed money to complete the construction of the building comprised in the said deed of gift.
The then Supreme Court held that the evidence as a whole did not disclose any intention on the part of the late Armah Kwantreng to make an absolute gift to the daughter. At 253-254 of the report, Adumua-Bossman J.S.C. who read the brilliant judgment of the court and in which van Lare and Sarkodee-Adoo JJ.S.C. concurred said:
“….that it appears unnecessary to review in any detail other pieces of material evidence which also tend, . . . to discredit the definite assertion which the plaintiff made in the course of her evidence that her father intended and meant to benefit her and expressly declared the transaction embodied in exhibit A to be an
[p.173] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 166 absolute gift to her… Such other evidence need only be mentioned cursorily and that is the circumstance that, firstly, her father in the interval between the execution of the deed of gift on the 8th June, 1955, and the execution of the mortgage to the bank on 22nd August, 1955, collected the rents of the premises; and secondly, he continued in complete control of the premises occupying it with his other daughters, dependents and the nephew Quist, and also directing the occupation and use of the premises in exactly the same manner as prior to the execution of the deed of gift and as though it had not been made at all. This state of affairs the plaintiff not only accepted, but confirmed as being the true state of things … In these circumstances I am quite satisfied, … that the deed of gift, exhibit A, was made for the plaintiff only for the … sole purpose of using the property in her name to raise the loan primarily for the completion of the buildings on the land…. I therefore find the main contention of counsel for the defendants-appellants that the evidence as a whole does not support an intention of a gift to the plaintiff, clearly and well established, and I would uphold the same.”
In my view, the facts in the present case as found by the learned trial judge justified the firm reliance which learned counsel for the defendants placed on the Kwantreng case (supra); and I do not see why the present case should not end in the way the Kwantreng case ended. However, learned counsel for the plaintiff still undaunted made further submissions. He contended that the maxim quicquid plantatur solo solo cedit should have been applied in this case by the learned trial judge. But unfortunately the evidence on record did not admit the application of the maxim and so no useful purpose would be served in discussing it.
Learned counsel also criticised the way the learned trial judge dealt with and rejected the aseda which was supposed to have been offered in acknowledgment of the gift. Again, there was no substance in the criticism. There was sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion of the learned judge on the issue, namely the plaintiff failed “to prove satisfactorily the alleged consideration or aseda in exhibit B.”
Learned counsel for the plaintiff made a last minute rescue attempt by submitting that the deed of gift, exhibit B, having been couched in absolute terms and not in any conditional terms, could only be revoked by a deed of conveyance executed by the father to that effect; and not only that, the said deed must contain clear words of revocation and in strong terms before it could effectively revoke exhibit B; and that the provision in the late father’s will which was inconsistent with the deed
[p.174] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 166 of gift, exhibit B, was not enough proof of the revocation of the said gift.
It may be recalled that the learned trial judge held in the alternative that assuming there was even a customary gift, that gift was revoked by the will of the plaintiff’s late father, exhibit F4. It was this holding which learned counsel for the plaintiff complained about in his last submission.
I think it ought to be made clear that what was contained in the deed of gift, exhibit B, was only the record of a transaction appertaining to a customary gift from father to son. That is, a customary gift which had been evidenced in writing. Thus, the mere recording of the gift in writing could not affect its customary nature. It still remained a customary gift and it continued to be subject to the incidents of customary law. Some of such incidents being that:
“Every gift when completed is irrevocable, except in gifts between parent and child, which can be recalled or exchanged at anytime by the parent in his or her lifetime, or by his will or dying declaration.”
See Sarbah’s Fanti Customary Laws (3rd ed.) at 80-82. In the circumstances, the so-called gift, even if it was valid, could still be revoked by the plaintiff’s late father by adopting one of the means stated above. The father did not need any special deed of revocation, specially prepared and couched in any strong language as advocated by learned counsel, before the gift could be revoked. So long as the intention to revoke is clearly and unequivocally expressed by the parent, be it orally or in writing or in a will, the revocation would be effective and would be in accord with customary law. The plaintiff’s late father could therefore revoke the supposed deed of gift by his will; and in my opinion he effectively did so in clause 3 of his will dated 22 July 1979 and admitted to probate by the High Court, Ho on 25 January 1982.
Consequently, as I have said, even if it had been held that there was an intention to make an absolute customary gift and the transaction which took place between the plaintiff and his late father was a valid customary gift, that gift was effectively and decisively revoked by the father by his said will.
On the whole, the case depended largely on questions of fact and since the learned trial judge’s conclusions on them were supportable by evidence, and were, in fact, arrived at after a reasoned appreciation of the case put forward by either side, this appellate court would not be justified in disturbing those findings.
In the circumstances, I would dismiss the appeal.
[p.175] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 166
JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.A.
I agree that on the facts there was no intention to make a gift to the plaintiff and that the appeal ought to be dismissed.
JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH J.A.
I also agree.
DECISION Appeal dismissed.
