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[1986] SLR (CA) 4Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

ASARE AND OTHERS vs. APPAU II [1984-86] 1 GLR 599

12 June 1986 · AMUA-SEKYI JA · ≈ 11 min read

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OSCOLAASARE AND OTHERS v APPAU II [1984-86] 1 GLR 599 [1986] SLR (CA) 4
APAASARE AND OTHERS v APPAU II [1984-86] 1 GLR 599, [1986] SLR (CA) 4 (Ghana).
BluebookASARE AND OTHERS v APPAU II [1984-86] 1 GLR 599, [1986] SLR (CA) 4 (Ghana Ct. App. 1986).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Kodilinye v. Odu (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 336.

(2) Frempong II v. Brempong II (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 13.

(3) Archibong v. Ita (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 520 (4) Abakam Effiana Family v. Mbibado Effiana Family [1959] G.L.R. 362, C.A.

(5) Azagba v. Negov [1964] G.L.R. 450, S.C.

(6) Dua III v. Tandoh (1927) P.C. ‘74-’28, 109.

(7) Ebu v. Ababio (1956) 2 W.A.L.R. 55 P.C.

(8) Kwesi Yaw v. Kwaw Atta [1961] G.L.R. Pt. 11 513.

(9) Ricketts v. Addo; Ricketts v. Borbor (Consolidated) [1975] 2 G.L.R. 157, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against the decision of the High Court, Kumasi finding for the plaintiff stool in an action for declaration of title to a tract of land. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Amua-Sekyi J.A.

COUNSEL

Nana Akufo-Addo (with him Kuntunkunuku Ampofo) for the appellants.

Totoe for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.A.

In the vicinity of the town of Pankrono, there is a tract of land which the parties to this suit call Domi. Each side claims it by original settlement of their ancestors some three hundred years ago. The appellants, who were the defendants in the court below, are Nana Brobbey Kwakye Asare, Odikro of Pankrono, and Nana Owusu Afriyie II, Ohene of Nkwantakese. The stool of Pankrono is a sub-stool of that of Nkwantakese. The respondent, who was the plaintiff in the court below, is Nana Kwabena Kuffour II, Ohene of Nkawie.

The action was commenced in or about 1954 by Nana Twum Barima Appau II, the then Ohene of Nkawie, in the Kumasi Municipal Court. After two abortive trials, the case was sent to the High Court, Kumasi for yet another retrial. Hearing started before Roger Korsah J

[p.601] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 599 but was concluded before Anterkyi J. who entered judgment for the plaintiff.

By the time the case came up for trial in the High Court the original parties and most of the witnesses who gave evidence before the Kumasi Municipal Court were dead. At the request of the parties the court adopted some of the evidence adduced in the earlier trials and made them part of the proceedings in the High Court.

Each of the parties traced his ancestry to Denkyira. According to the Nkawiehene, his forbears migrated to Ashanti during the reign of Osei-Tutu and were settled at Domi. After some years they moved to their present abode, leaving behind some of their subjects under Safohene Gyamfi as caretakers of the land. He asserted that the people now in occupation of the land still owed allegiance to him.

The forebears of the Nkwantakesehene also migrated to Ashanti during the reign of Osei-Tutu. They were first settled at a place called Doti, but afterwards moved to the Pankrono area and, according to the defendants, founded a number of villages, including Domi. It was admitted that the disputed land is in the occupation of subjects of the Nkawie stool; but the defendants explained that Gyamfi was the son of Owurasie (or Wadiesie), the first odikro of Domi, who permitted the said Gyamfi to live off the land, in other words the descendants of Gyamfi and the Nkawie stool subjects on the land are there by the leave and licence of the Nkwantakese stool.

The Nkawiehene did not rely solely on the traditional history to support his claim to the land. He led evidence that Gyamfi came to Domi on his own, that he brought a fetish called Tano Bodom from Denkyira and that a grant of land had been made to another fetish called Tano Bekoe. In more recent times, the people of Atimatim, a nearby village, had asked for, and had been granted, land for the extension of their village. A road had also been constructed through the land to link Atimatim with other villages. The predecessor of the second defendant admitted the Denkyira origin of Tano Bodom and agreed it is on the land to this day. He, however, disputed the right of the Nkawiehene and his caretakers to make grants of the land.

The ground on which the decision of Anterkyi J. has been challenged is that on the evidence as a whole, the plaintiff failed to prove title. As in many cases before our courts, reliance was placed on Kodilinye v. Odu (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 336 where Webber C.J. said at 337-338.

“The onus lies on the plaintiff to satisfy the Court that he is entitled on the evidence brought by him to a declaration of title. The plaintiff in this case must rely on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defendant’s case. If this onus is not discharged, the weakness of the defendant’s case will not help

[p.602] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 599 him and the proper judgment is for the defendant. Such a judgment decrees no title to the defendant, he not having sought the declaration. So if the whole evidence in the case be conflicting and somewhat confused, and there is little to choose between the rival traditional stories the plaintiff fails in the decree he seeks, and judgment must be entered for the defendant.”

Two cases in the same vein are Frempong II v. Brempong II (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 13 and Archibong v. Ita (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 520.

It is not quite correct for counsel for the defendants to say that the defendants did not ask for any relief in the High Court. In the appeal record there will be found a defence and counterclaim filed on behalf of Obaapanin Akua Abrafi, a predecessor of the Nkwantakesehene on 17 April 1963. This counterclaim for declaration of title, recovery of possession and injunction was among the issues set down for trial in the summons for directions filed on 27 November 1963. If it was ever withdrawn, the record does not show it. In any case, when the plaintiff filed fresh summons for directions in 1974, the defendants filed additional issues asking the court to determine whether or not they are the owners of the land.

Apart from the matter of the counterclaim, it is important to observe that throughout the proceedings it was admitted that the descendants of Gyamfi and other subjects of Nkawie have been in undisturbed occupation of the land for nearly three hundred years. Oheneba Kwaku Duah, spokesman for the Nkwantakese stool in the abortive trials, admitted this, and so did counsel in this appeal. More damaging is the evidence of Yaw Frimpong and Kwabena Poku who were called by the plaintiff. Frimpong, a former odikro of Pankrono, was positive that the disputed land belongs to the plaintiff, and disclaimed any right, title or interest therein for either the stool of Pankrono or of Nkwantakese. Poku who, as odikro of Domi, was supposed, to be the successor of Owurasie testified that Gyamfi had already settled on the Domi land when his and the defendants’ ancestors moved from Doti to live in the neighbourhood. He gave the boundary between Pankrono-Domi where he was odikro under the Nkwantakesehene and Twenedurase-Domi where the descendants of Gyamfi live.

The reaction of the predecessor of the second defendant to the evidence was predictable but unfortunate. He suggested to Frimpong that his great-grandmother was bought as a slave and that he had been appointed only as a regent. As for Poku, he paid for what counsel calls his rebellion by being destooled. In the High Court, the defendants

[p.603] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 599 called Poku’s successor to give evidence to contradict the testimony given by him in 1956.

The common run of land suits in our courts has as the plaintiff, a person who claims title to land, suing, as the defendant, a person in possession of the land. Such a defendant need not, and usually does not, seek any relief in the proceedings, being content with things as they are. Kodilinye v. Odu (supra) says that in that event the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own case, i.e. prove his title and not rely on the weakness of his opponent’s, i.e. lack of title in the defendant; so that if the plaintiff fails to prove that he is entitled to have a declaration made of his title to the land, the action ought to be dismissed, leaving the defendant in possession of the land. Thus, in Abakam Effiana Family v. Mbibado Effiana Family [1959] G.L.R. 362, C.A., the plaintiff family sought to prevent the defendant family from rebuilding a house which had fallen into ruins, claiming that the land belonged to them. Delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, van Lare J.A. said at 364:

“On the plaintiff’s own admission it was established that the defendants had been in long undisturbed possession and occupation of the land, including that portion of the land on which the controversial house had been built, and were therefore entitled to the full protection of the law against anyone except a person who could affirmatively prove a better title. It is clear that the onus upon the plaintiffs in this case was heavy in the extreme.”

The court accordingly restored the decision of the trial native court dismissing the action. Again in Azagba v. Negov [1964] G.L.R. 450, S.C. where the plaintiffs claimed that their ancestors had put the ancestors of the defendants on the land as caretakers some 500 years before the suit, the action for a declaration of title failed.

The difference between these two cases and that now before this court is that here it is the party in possession who sues. This does not, however, place on the plaintiff any greater burden of proof than would have been the case if the proceedings had been initiated by the defendants. In Dua III v. Tandoh (1927) PC ‘74-’28, 109 where the stool of Sefwi-Bekwai, which was in possession, sued the stool of Sefwi-Wiawso for declaration of title to land, the Privy Council had this to say at 110 on the burden of proof.

“Their Lordships are clearly of opinion that the facts proved and admitted establish that the Bekwai people are in possession of the disputed land, and this fact throws upon the respondent the burden of proving his title. The trial did not proceed strictly upon

[p.604] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 599 this line, but the plaintiff in the first instance called evidence to support the right of the Bekwais, and the defendant answered; this is, however, immaterial. The real question is, did the evidence rebut the prima facie title of the Bekwais shown by possession?”

Conformably with this view, the West African Court of Appeal and the Privy Council in Ebu v. Ababio (1956) 2 W.A.L.R. 55, W.A.C.A. affirmed the decision of the Land Court in favour of a stool in possession for a declaration of title to land, even though the traditional evidence adduced on its behalf was unsatisfactory. Again, in Kwesi Yaw v. Kwaw Atta [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 513, when it was suggested that the traditional story of the plaintiff who was in possession, required corroboration by other witnesses to be acceptable, Adumua-Bossman J. (as he then was) answered at 517, “for what stronger corroboration can you have than the concrete and cogent fact that the plaintiff and his people are in effective occupation and control at the date thereof?” And, finally, in Ricketts v. Addo; Picketts v. Borbor (Consolidated) [1975] 2 G.L.R. 157, C.A., where the title of the plaintiff’s family to a portion of the land was held to be good, but defective as to the rest, a declaration of title to the whole was made in their favour upon proof of long possession.

The real question, therefore, is did the evidence rebut the prima facie title of the Nkawiehene shown by possession or, to put it another way, did the Nkwantakesehene affirmatively prove a better title? Having read the record, I answer both questions in the negative. It is idle to speculate whether Owurasie migrated to Ashanti before his son Gyamfi, or Gyamfi arrived before his father. Either seems possible because on the evidence Gyamfi must have been an adult when he migrated from Denkyira to live in Ashanti.

Apart from the traditional story, the defendants led evidence in the High Court on two matters with a view to showing title. First, it was said that a grant of land had been made to the Atafoahene for his subjects to settle on. The importance of this evidence was nullified when the Atafoahene said he did not know if the land given to him and his subjects by the odikro of Pankrono-Domi fell within the area in dispute. Secondly, it was said that when Abena Kwabena, the plaintiff’s caretaker at Domi, died she was buried at the Pankrono cemetery after fees had been paid to the second defendant. However, in the next breath the second defendant admitted that Domi and Pankrono have a common cemetery and that the land on which it is situated lies outside the area now in dispute. The evidence of Frimpong and Poku is clear that no tribute of any kind has ever been paid by the subjects of the plaintiff to the defendants for anything done on the disputed land.

[p.605] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 599

To sum up, even though there is little to choose between the rival traditional stories, the plaintiff showed that his ancestors and their subjects have been in possession of the land for several generations. The evidence offered by the defendants to persuade the court that in spite of the possession by the plaintiff they are the owners of the land, was discredited by those who had a common interest with them in the action. In my view, the learned judge was right in the decision he arrived at and, accordingly, this appeal ought to be dismissed. Further, a formal order ought to be made dismissing the counterclaim.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.A.

I also agree.

DECISION Appeal dismissed S. Y. B. – B.

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