ASARE vs. OFOSUHENE [1980] GLR 366
15 June 1979 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 7 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Cassell & Co., Ltd. v. Broome [1972] A.C. 1027; [1972] 2 W.L.R. 645; [1972] 1 All E.R. 801; 116 S.J. 199, H.L. affirming sub nom. Broome v. Cassell & Co. [1971] 2 Q.B. 354; [1971] 2 W.L.R.
853; [1971] 2 All E.R. 187; 115 S.J. 289, C.A., affirming [1971] 1 All E.R. 262.
(2) Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129; [1964] 2 W.L.R. 269; [1964] 1 All E.R. 367; 108 S.J. 93;
[1964] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 28, H.L. reversing [1963] 1 Q.B. 623; [1962] 3 W.L.R. 260; [1962] 2 All E.R. 579, C.A.; 106 S.J. 371, restoring [1961] 3 W.L.R. 438; [1961] 2 All E.R. 825; 105 S.J. 530.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION for damages against a soldier for assault committed on the plaintiff in the course of his duties. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Agyare Koi-Larbi for the plaintiff.
JUDGMENT OF CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J.
The plaintiff claims ¢250,000 damages for assault committed on him on the premises of the National Investment Bank at Koforidua on 28 December 1978.
The plaintiff is a deputy manager at the National Investment Bank, and the defendant is a warrant officer in the Ghana Army. During the period when the government embarked upon distribution of textiles by sale from office to office, a Ghana National Trading Corporation salesman accompanied by two soldiers went to the premises of the National Investment Bank at Koforidua in a pick-up vehicle with textiles to sell to the employees of the bank. When the plaintiff in his position as deputy manager was informed of the arrival of the mobile textiles shop on the premises, he went outside to find out from the salesman the prices and quantity of textiles he had to sell to the bank. After he had been supplied with this information and the plaintiff turned to go to the office, the salesman told him to hurry up because they had other places to go to. The plaintiff told him that they had come at the wrong time. The defendant cut in and told the plaintiff it was not for him to tell them when they should come. The plaintiff replied that as a manager of the bank, it was he who would know the best time for the sales. At this, the defendant became vituperative and started abusing the plaintiff; he told the plaintiff he was stupid. When the plaintiff retorted, the defendant attacked him. He rushed on the plaintiff and assaulted
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him with a cane. He hit him at various parts of his body. He held the plaintiff at his tie and squeezed the tie against his neck, while the cane went up and down each stroke landing on the plaintiff. The defendant then called the private soldier with whom he came to assist. The private came to the scene and started raining blows with his fist at the plaintiff’s head. All this took place in the precincts of the bank, in full view of the plaintiff ‘s junior officers and passers-by. The incident naturally attracted a crowd. Some of the people intervened to rescue the plaintiff. Particularly the policeman posted on duty at the bank came to the plaintiff ‘s rescue. Because he had a gun in one hand, it was difficult retrieving the plaintiff from the grip of the defendant with the free hand, but with effort the plaintiff was pulled free from his assailants. The plaintiff suffered abrasions from the caning on his left upper arm and at his back.
As if the brutal attack inflicted on the plaintiff, for no just cause, was not enough, the defendant threatened to bring reinforcement and left the bank premises. A little later he returned with four soldiers. By this time the plaintiff had settled at his office, but from there he heard the defendant in the corridor (at the bank outside the plaintiff ‘s office), demanding to see him. To divert his anger and attention from the plaintiff, the defendant was told by the staff at the bank that the plaintiff had gone out with the manager. The defendant threatened that he would make room-to-room search until he found the plaintiff. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the defendant was in fact standing outside his door and the first door the defendant opened, in his attempt to search all the offices, was the plaintiff’s office door. He found the plaintiff at his desk. The defendant and his men pounced on him again; they beat him up, pulled him from his chair and dragged him to the corridor. They beat him and bashed him about in their attempt to take him to what the defendant described as their club. The incident drew a large crowd from the bank and the public at large, and the crowd attracted the attention of a senior army officer who was passing by. He came and ordered the defendant and his men to stop their wanton attack on the defenceless plaintiff. The plaintiff said he reported the matter to the police, Koforidua, but no action was taken, so he took this action.
He complains that apart from physical damage he endured, he suffered humiliation and indignity, and that his feelings have been hurt and for these he claims ¢250,000 compensation. The physical injuries which the plaintiff suffered from this attack were not serious. They were one small cut at the left arm and another at his back. The medical report which the plaintiff tendered referred to them as abrasions. The plaintiff also said he suffered severe bodily pain and he
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had to stay away from work for two days. One of the soldiers kicked him at the right leg and he limped on the leg with pain. In calculating his damages, account should be taken of personal injuries and the injury to his feelings. As I said his physical injuries were slight and that should not attract substantial damages. For the injuries I have described above, I think ¢300 will be a fair compensatory sum to the plaintiff.
With regards to the indignity, disgrace and humiliation which the plaintiff suffered, I think he should be entitled to aggravated damages. Taking into consideration, the conduct of the soldier in this case, I had considered if this was not a proper case to award exemplary damages. In fact this was what both the plaintiff and counsel had intimated should be awarded. Exemplary damages are awarded to vindicate the strength of the law and not to justify such awards as a liberal measure of compensation to the plaintiff. In Cassel & Co., Ltd. v. Broome [1972] 1 All E.R. 801, H.L. confirming Rookes v. Barnard [1964] 1 All E.R. 367, H.L. the award of exemplary damages was limited to three categories of cases, viz. (1) where there has been oppressive, arbitrary, or unconstitutional action by servants of the government; (2) where the defendant’s conduct has been calculated by him to make profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff; and (3) where statute expressly authorises such an award.
The facts of this case would not admit the application of the third or second categories. It is only the first category which would seem to apply to this case, but analysis of the law would clearly exclude the application of the first category also. In Rookes v. Barnard (supra) Lord Devlin had this to say on the first category at p. 410:
“The first category is oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants of the government. I should not extend this category,—I say this with particular reference to the facts of this case,—to oppressive action by private corporations or individuals. Where one man is more powerful than another, it is inevitable that he will try to use his power to gain his ends; and if his power is much greater than the other’s, he might perhaps be said to be using it oppressively. If he uses his power illegally, he must of course pay for his illegality in the ordinary way; but he is not to be punished simply because he is the more powerful. In the case of the government it is different, for the servants of the government are also the servants of the people and the use of their power must always be subordinate to their duty of service. It is true that there is something repugnant about a big man bullying a small man and very likely the bullying will
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be a source of humiliation that makes the case one for aggravated damages, but it is not in my opinion punishable by damages.”
In the present case, the defendant was a soldier and he committed this assault in the course of his duties while supervising the sale of textiles, but his conduct was still the act of an individual and his conduct cannot be punished by exemplary damages. The plaintiff is entitled to a compensatory award.
Aggravated damages will be adequate to soothe the injured feelings of the plaintiff who was distressed by the arrogance, insolence and the impunity with which the assault was committed. To be treated the way that has been described before his colleagues and subordinates is most humiliating and insulting to his dignity. I award the plaintiff ¢5,000 for the indignity, disgrace and humiliation he was made to suffer at the hands of the defendant. I award him ¢400 costs.
DECISION
Judgment for the plaintiff.
D. R. K. S.
