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[1979] SLR (HC) 74High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

TURKSON vs. ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1980] GLR 361

14 June 1979 · QUASHIE-SAM J · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 74
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OSCOLATURKSON v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1980] GLR 361 [1979] SLR (HC) 74
APATURKSON v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1980] GLR 361, [1979] SLR (HC) 74 (Ghana).
BluebookTURKSON v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1980] GLR 361, [1979] SLR (HC) 74 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) West African Bakery v. Miezah [1972] 1 G.L.R. 78, C.A.

(2) Amakom Sawmills & Co., Ltd. v. Mansah [1963] 1 G.L.R. 368, C.A.

(3) Malomo v. Olushola (1955) 15 W.A.C.A. 12.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the plaintiff claiming loss of earnings from and cost of repairs of his vehicle damaged in a motor accident as a result of the negligent driving of the defendant’s driver. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

F. C. Kharsa for the applicant.

Avornyotse, Senior State Attorney, for the Republic.

JUDGMENT OF QUASHIE-SAM J.

The plaintiff’s claim is for ¢20,534 of which ¢2,534 represents the cost of repairs to his vehicle No. AT 3269, which was damaged in a road traffic accident as a result of the negligence of the defendant’s driver, servant or agent or both and ¢18,000 represents loss of earnings from the said vehicle for a period of 300 days at ¢60 per day.

[p.363] of [1980] GLR 361

On 13 February 1978, the plaintiff obtained interlocutory judgment against the defendants in default of appearance. I now proceed with the assessment of damages.

On the evidence of the plaintiff the accident occurred on 5 March 1974. To have the vehicle repaired, he bought certain spare parts, namely, an axle for the sum of ¢430 as evidenced by a receipt, exhibit E; frame and cawel ¢460 as evidenced by exhibit F; headlight switch, wiper blades, etc. ¢257.75 as evidenced by exhibit G; batteries, etc. ¢463 as evidenced by exhibit H; he paid ¢120 for electrical workmanship as evidenced by exhibit D; he paid ¢160 to the fitters as workmanship as evidenced by exhibit C; rebuilding the body of the vehicle and spraying the same cost him ¢1,100 as evidenced by exhibits A and B. The arithmetical total of these figures is ¢2,990.75.

It is also the case of the plaintiff that before the accident, the vehicle earned him about ¢60 per day and since it took 300 days to have it put on the road again, he is claiming loss of earnings at the rate of ¢60 per day for 300 days, that is ¢18,000.

The only point raised by learned defence counsel in this assessment is that the 300 days was too long a period and that if the plaintiff had sent the vehicle to a reputable garage such as C.F.A.O. who are the dealers of that vehicle it would have taken a much shorter time to effect the repairs, there being a duty on the part of the plaintiff to mitigate damages. Relying on West African Bakery v. Miezah [1972] 1 G.L.R. 78, C.A. he invited the court to limit the period of repairs from 300 days to six weeks at the most, that is 42 days. On this issue, the evidence of the plaintiff in cross-examination was that the dealers, C.F.A.O., could not have done better than his fitters because they had not even got the spare parts to undertake the repairs at the time. Learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that West African Bakery v. Miezah (supra) relied on by defence counsel is irrelevant to the present case since the circumstances in that case were a total loss of the vehicle in question as against the present case, where the vehicle was not beyond repair and has in fact been repaired.

Upon a careful consideration of West African Bakery v. Miezah, its circumstances and facts, I do not think it is applicable to the present case. In that case the court had to consider what would be a reasonable period for which the successful plaintiff would be entitled to damages for loss of earnings in a case where an income-earning vehicle was damaged beyond economic repair. In that case the court had to resort to the principle of reasonableness because of the particular circumstance of the possibility of replacement of the vehicle concerned within a reasonable time. That case must be distinguished

[p.364] of [1980] GLR 361

from the present case where the relevant period is a matter of fact and not what would be reasonable.

In the instant case, the accident occurred on 5 March 1974. It is evident from exhibit G that the plaintiff started working towards its repairs on 5 April 1974 and thereafter continued to do so as evidenced by the dates of the rest of the exhibits. Making allowance for the difficulty in obtaining spare parts, etc., a situation which I consider is common in Ghana without exception and considering the dates on the exhibits, I do not think that the plaintiff has been guilty of unreasonable delay in the course of the repairs.

I therefore consider the period of 300 days not unreasonable. I allow loss of earnings at the rate of ¢60 per day for 300 days. This is ¢18,000 which I will scale down by ¢2,000 to ¢16,000 by reason of possible contingencies in the transport business, the vehicle itself being second-hand. For loss of earnings therefore I award the plaintiff ¢16,000.

As regards the cost of repairs, it has already been observed that the total amount of the plaintiff ‘s expenditure on the evidence is ¢2,990.75 as against his claim of ¢2,534. Normally the plaintiff will be bound by his claim on the writ, the principle being judex non reddit quam quod petens ipse requirit. A judge does not give more than that for which the plaintiff asks. However, this principle seems to have been exploded by the then Supreme Court in Amakom Sawmills & Co., Ltd. v. Mansah [1963] 1 G.L.R. 368 at pp. 375-376 where that court reviewed that principle in the following statement by Akufo-Addo J.S.C. (as he then was):

“There is a point of procedure to which I would like to avert. It will be observed that the learned trial judge assessed the damages at £3,100, but felt obliged to enter judgment for £3,000 because the respondents claimed £3,000 on their writ. The practice in this country is that in all money claims, whether they be for liquidated or unliquidated amounts, a specific figure must, for revenue purposes, be claimed. It seems such a pity that a plaintiff in the circumstances of this case should be awarded less damages than a court has found to be due, merely because of the technicality of having claimed a lesser figure on the writ. In such circumstances the ends of justice will be much better served if the court exercises its powers under Order 28, r. 12 of the Supreme [High] Court (Civil Procedure) Rules to amend the figure claimed to coincide with the figure to which in its view the plaintiff is entitled.”

[p.365] of [1980] GLR 361

In adopting this criterion for amendment I have addressed my mind to the case of Malomo v. Olushola (1955) 15 W.A.C.A. 12 which in my view is distinguishable from the present case. In that case a party who had omitted to plead specifically the Statute of Frauds as a defence in the court below raised it for the first time in the appellate court through counsel who had made no application in the court below to amend the defence to enable the statute in question to be invoked. When counsel’s omission was commented upon, he made the submission that the trial judge ought, suo motu, to have directed the necessary amendment to be made, in the absence of which the appellate court should so direct. The appellate court rejected those submissions stating that it was a course which it was not prepared to follow, nor did it think that it was incumbent upon the learned trial judge to do so in the absence of an application in that behalf.

It is obvious in that case that for a judge to descend into the pleadings on his own to direct an amendment on certain lines of law to the benefit of a party without an application from that party would prejudice the other party; hence the court’s decline. But in the instant case this court has properly received evidence which it is bound to consider to do justice akin to Amakom Sawmills & Co., Ltd. v. Mansah where a mere technicality of procedure and not fundamental procedural irregularity was the issue.

On the authority of the Amakom Sawmills & Co., Ltd. v. Mansah therefore I amend the figure in the plaintiff ‘s claim from ¢2,534 to ¢2,990.75 to coincide with the evidence. In the result the plaintiff is entitled to ¢2,990.75 as special damages which I award him together with the ¢16,000 for loss of earnings with costs of ¢800.

DECISION

Judgment for the plaintiff.

D. R. K. S.

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