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[1979] SLR (HC) 65High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

REPUBLIC vs. NAGA [1980] GLR 356

13 June 1979 · ABBAN J · ≈ 9 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 65
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v NAGA [1980] GLR 356 [1979] SLR (HC) 65
APAREPUBLIC v NAGA [1980] GLR 356, [1979] SLR (HC) 65 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v NAGA [1980] GLR 356, [1979] SLR (HC) 65 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) R. v. Bedingfield (1879) 14 Cox C. C. 341.

(2) R. v. Christie [1914] A.C. 545; sub nom. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Christie 83 L.J.K.B.

1097; 111 L.T. 220; 78 J.P. 321; 30 T.L.R. 471; 58 S.J. 515; 24 Cox C.C. 249; 10 Cr. App. R. 141, H.L.

(3) R. v. Thomson [1912] 3 K.B. 19.

(4) R. v. Gloster (1888) 16 Cox C.C. 471.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

RULING on a submission of no case in the trial of the accused for murder. The facts are sufficiently set out in the headnote.

COUNSEL

Miss Rose Owusu, Senior State Attorney, for the Republic.

A. K. Adu-Amankwah for the accused.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.

The accused is standing trial on a charge of murder, contrary to section 46 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). In the particulars of offence, it has been alleged that the accused who is a police constable, murdered his wife, one Asibi Musah on 23 February 1977 at Koforidua, in the Eastern Region.

[His lordship hereafter stating the facts as summarised in the headnote of the case continued:]

It has to be borne in mind that the burden of proof on the prosecution is heavier in murder cases and the standard of proof is also higher. My duty at this stage therefore is to decide whether or not the prosecution has been able to prove all the essential ingredients of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. There is no doubt that the prosecution was able to establish that the deceased, Asibi Musah, mentioned in the particulars of the offence is dead and that she died as a result of spinal injuries caused by a heavy impact to the region of the neck. The question then is who was responsible for the heavy impact to the neck which, according to the evidence of the doctor, brought about the spinal injuries. The evidence of the doctor as to the cause of death clearly showed that a mere slap as described by the first prosecution witness could not have caused that heavy impact. As a matter of fact the prosecution is not relying on the so-called slap as constituting the heavy impact. The prosecution is relying on some heavy impact which might have been caused to the deceased when the deceased repaired to the room after bathing the children. But then who brought about that heavy impact when the

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deceased was in the room? There was no eye witness to the incident, if any, in the room. Whatever took place in the room could only be known by the deceased and the accused who followed the deceased to the room after the deceased had finished bathing the children.

But the accused in his cautioned statement exhibit A stated that it was the deceased who called him to the room and told him that when she went to the room, she felt dizzy and fell down; but whilst falling down she hit her neck on the edge of the wooden bed in the room, a wooden bed on which there was no mattress. It would be recalled that the doctor in his evidence conceded that the hitting of her neck against a wooden bench in the process of falling could cause that heavy impact which could produce spinal injuries to the neck as described by him.

There is therefore a serious doubt here as to what caused that heavy impact. Was the heavy impact caused by the accused or was it due to a fall on the edge of a wooden bed? This doubt was never cleared by the prosecution.

Learned senior state attorney relied on what the deceased told the second prosecution witness, namely: “See what my husband has done to me” to prove that it was the accused who caused that heavy impact; because that portion of the evidence of the second prosecution witness, “See what my husband has done to me,” by implication meant that it was the accused who inflicted that heavy impact on the deceased. It seems to me that the statement: “See what my husband has done to me” originated from the imagination of the second prosecution witness. She first said when she went to the room the deceased simply said: “See the condition in which I am.” And thereupon the second prosecution witness said she questioned the deceased as to what she meant by that statement. But the deceased did not say anything. As learned senior state attorney conceded, it was after the second prosecution witness had been prompted that she changed her evidence on that issue, by saying that in the room the deceased said: “See what my husband has done to me.” She was obviously being inconsistent, to use a very mild word.

Even assuming that the deceased made this statement to the second prosecution witness that statement having been made in the absence of the accused is inadmissible in law. Neither can it be said that that statement constituted a dying declaration. I have carefully considered the circumstances in which this alleged statement was supposed to have been made by the deceased. The second prosecution witness said when she was invited by the deceased to go to the room she delayed for some time. She did not go at once. And what was more, the incident which was supposed to have brought about

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the injury to the deceased had already taken place and some time had, in fact, elapsed. So that the period of time which elapsed between the incident and the making of that statement was such that it cannot be said that the statement was made spontaneously or contemporaneously. It was a statement made by the deceased after it was all over, whatever it was, and after the incident had already taken place.

In other words, the alleged statement made by the deceased was so separated by time and circumstances from the actual commission of the act that it was not admissible as part of the res gestae. Res gestae are facts constituting or bound up with facts in issue or facts relevant to the facts in issue, and they are admitted as exception to the rule against hearsay. In order to admit such statements as part of res gestae the statement in question must be nearly contemporaneous with the facts in issue. For example, the statement should have been made immediately upon receiving the hurt and before the maker has had time to devise or contrive anything to his or her own advantage. In R. v. Bedingfield (1879) 14 Cox C.C. 341, a woman rushed out of her room with her throat cut almost through. She made a statement to this effect, “See what Harry has done” to some women she met; and she expired in a very short time. The accused was found in that room with his throat cut also and was charged with murder. The question at issue was murder or suicide. It was held that that statement was not admissible either as a dying declaration or as part of the res gestae. In the course of his judgment, Cockburn C.J. said at p. 342:

“ . . . it was not part of anything done, or something said while something was being done, but something said after something done. It was not as if, while being in the room, and while the act was being done, she had said something which was heard.”

The learned lord in refusing to admit the statement then said at pp. 342-343: “it was something stated by her after it was all over, whatever it was, and after the act was completed.” R. v. Bedingfield (supra) was cited with approval by the House of Lords in R. v. Christie [1914] A.C. 545, H.L. In the latter case, the accused was convicted of indecently assaulting a little boy aged five. At the trial, the boy’s mother stated in evidence that as she and her son came up to the accused shortly after the act complained of, the little boy said to the hearing of the accused: “That is the man” and he went on and described what the accused did to him. The House of Lords held that the statement of the mother was inadmissible. Lord Reading in his judgment said at p. 566:

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“The statement under review formed no part of the incidents constituting the offence. It was not made whilst the offence was being committed or immediately thereafter. It took place after Christie had left the boy … In my view it was not so immediately connected with the act of assault as to form part of the res gestae.”

Another case of interest is that of R. v. Thomson [1912] 3 K.B. 19, C.A. Here the appellant was charged with having used an instrument on the deceased in order to procure miscarriage. His defence was that he did nothing to the deceased but that the deceased had performed such an operation upon herself. The defence sought to ask questions of a witness for the prosecution as to statements made by the deceased some time before the miscarriage. The statements were to the effect that the deceased intended to operate upon herself and shortly after her miscarriage she had operated upon herself. But the learned trial judge refused to permit those questions. It was held that those statements by the deceased being mere hearsay were not admissible in evidence for the defence. Lord Alverstone C. J. said at p. 22:

“In this case it cannot be argued that the statements were admissible as part of the res gestae; the statements sought to be proved were not made at the time when anything was being done to the woman.

In our opinion the ruling of the learned judge in rejecting this evidence was correct.”

Again in R. v. Gloster (1888) 16 Cox. C.C. 471, the accused was charged with having caused the death of the deceased by an illegal operation and it was sought to give in evidence statements made by the deceased a few days after the operation as to who had caused the injuries from which she died. Charles J. in refusing to admit the evidence said at p. 473:

“Mr. Poland proposes to ask the witness what the deceased said as to her bodily condition and what had been done to her. My judgment is this: that the statements must be confined to contemporaneous symptoms, and nothing in the nature of a narrative is admissible as to who caused them, or how they were caused.”

In my view the circumstances in which the deceased in the present case was supposed to have made the so-called statements are not very much different from the circumstances in the cases I have cited above. I therefore hold that the statement: “See what my husband

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has done to me” cannot be admissible as part of the res gestae as it was not part of the act. But it was just a narrative of past events if that statement was ever made at all.

Having excluded this portion of the evidence of the second prosecution witness, the court is left with no other evidence to connect the accused with the heavy impact which was the cause of the spinal injury and which spinal injury, in fact, brought about the death. In other words, the prosecution has not been able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the condition of the deceased was caused by the act of the accused. That is to say, no prima facie case has been established against the accused to call upon him to answer. The objection is therefore upheld. The jury is accordingly directed to return a verdict of not guilty.

DECISION Jury directed to return verdict of not guilty. D. R. K. S.

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