REPUBLIC vs. JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE WESTERN REGIONAL HOUSE OF CHIEFS; EX PARTE EDURO AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 350
12 June 1979 · EDUSEI JA · ≈ 8 min read
[1979] SLR (CA) 10Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASE REFERRED TO
Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against the decision of the High Court, Sekondi, wherein an order of certiorari to quash the ruling of the judicial committee of the Western Regional House of Chiefs was granted. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Edusei J.A.
COUNSEL
Gaisie for the appellants.
Blay for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.
On 1 November 1977, the Sekondi High Court presided over by Quashie-Sam J. quashed by an order of certiorari the ruling of the judicial committee of the Western Regional House of Chiefs, dated 28 October 1976, and also by means of an order of prohibition restrained the judicial committee of the said house from hearing the matter before it either on appeal or de novo.
It is against the decision of the Sekondi High Court that this appeal was lodged. The history of the case may briefly be stated thus: On 20 March 1969, the Western Nzima Traditional Council gave judgment in favour of the respondents herein who were defendants in the original suit before the traditional council. The plaintiffs in that suit who were dissatisfied with the decision filed a notice of appeal on 1 December 1969 and when the matter came up for hearing before the judicial committee of the Western Regional House of Chiefs, counsel for the respondents herein raised two preliminary objections to the appeal, namely, that: (a) the Western Nzima Traditional Council had no power to review its own decision and what it purported to do on 6 November 1969 was a nullity, and (b) the appeal against the decision of 20 March 1969 was filed out of time, and therefore it had no jurisdiction to hear it. The ruling of the judicial committee of the Western Regional House of Chiefs dated 2 November 1973 completely ignored the objections raised and concluded thus: “in view of the conclusion arrived at the committee finds it unnecessary to discuss the question as to whether or not the appellants were or were not out of time.” The committee proceeded to make an order to hear the matter de novo. However, when the appeal came on before another panel of the judicial committee of
[p.352] of [1980] GLR 350 the Western Regional House of Chiefs, counsel for the respondents again contended that the committee had no jurisdiction to hear the matter since the appeal was filed out of time. The committee, like the first panel of the judicial committee of the house refused to consider this matter of great legal importance but simply contended itself by relying on the ruling of 2 November 1973. This second ruling is dated 28 October 1976.
The respondents then applied to the High Court, Sekondi, to have the ruling of 28 October 1976 quashed by means of certiorari proceedings and on this they were successful.
On appeal before this court the main contention of counsel for the appellants centred around the proper interpretation of section 48 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1961 (Act 81). This section reads:
“48. (1) Any party to a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy who is dissatisfied with the decision of a Traditional Council thereon may, with the leave of the Minister, appeal against the decision by initiating proceedings before a Judicial Commissioner under section 35 of this Act within two months after the giving of the decision, or such extended period as the Minister may allow.”
The argument of Mr. Gaisie, counsel for the appellants, was that the appellant should appeal within two months after grant of leave by the minister and, according to him, leave was so granted on 28 April 1970. With this interpretation of counsel I disagree. The only reasonable interpretation of section 48 (1) of Act 81, in my view, is that leave to appeal is to be applied for “within two months after the giving of the decision.” If counsel’s interpretation were to be accepted it would mean that an aggrieved person, after judgment, could wait for any length of time before applying for leave to appeal, and this no doubt would make nonsense of the judgment given for the victorious party. The proper interpretation as stated is that leave to appeal must be sought within two months from the date of the judgment. I am fortified in this view if reference is made to the Third Schedule in the Chieftaincy Regulation, 1961 (L.I. 320). The Third Schedule is in this form:
“PRESCRIBED FORM OF NOTICE OF APPEAL UNDER SECTIONS 35 AND 47 OF THE CHIEFTAINCY ACT, 1961 (ACT 81)
A.B. ………………………………………………………………………………Appellant versus C.D. ………………………………………………………………………………Respondent
[p.353] of [1980] GLR 350
NOTICE OF APPEAL 1. Take Notice that the Judicial Commissioner will be moved so soon as the appellant can be heard, on appeal from the decision of the Traditional Council (Joint Traditional Council) given at ……………………………… on the ………… day of ……………………………… 19 ………… for an order that the said decision be set aside and a new decision be made in favour of the appellant.
2. And further Take Notice that the grounds of this appeal are:
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
3. A copy of the said decision is attached hereto and marked “A”.
4. The appellant on the day of ……………….. 1963 obtained the leave of the Minister responsible for Justice to appeal against the said decision of the Traditional Council (Joint Traditional Council).
Dated the ………… day of ……………………………… , 19 ………… Signature of Appellant ……………………………… Address …………………………………………… ………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………… TO: THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF CHIEFS.”
It is quite clear from paragraph 4 of the notice of appeal set out in the Third Schedule that the day leave to appeal was granted by the minister must be stated thereon and this supports my interpretation of section 48 (1) that leave must first be obtained before filing the notice of appeal. If leave is not obtained the date of such leave cannot appear on the notice of appeal.
From the record of proceedings it is stated that notice of appeal was filed on 1 December 1969; that leave to appeal was applied for on 24 November 1969. Proceedings on the assumption that leave to appeal was applied for on 24 November 1969 I can only say that it was done after the two-month period stipulated by section 48 (1) of
[p.354] of [1980] GLR 350
Act 81 had elapsed. Indeed, leave to appeal was, if at all, applied for eight months after the judgment. This was hopelessly out of time. It is correct, however, that the minister could grant an extension of time within which to apply for leave to appeal after the two-month period had elapsed. The burden to establish this fact is squarely on the appellants, but nowhere in their affidavit opposing the respondents’ application in the High Court did they state the date of any such application for an extension of time to the minister. The solicitor of the appellants, according to the ruling of the judicial committee of the Western Regional House of Chiefs, informed the President of the Western Nzima Traditional Council that leave had been granted by a letter dated 28 April 1970. If this assertion were true I am unable to understand the failure of the applicants to exhibit the said letter at the hearing of the application in the Sekondi High Court when he was very much aware that this point had been canvassed by the respondents’ counsel before the judicial committee of the Western Regional House of Chiefs, and also undoubtedly in their application before the Sekondi High Court. If any application for extension of time to apply for leave was made to the minister, subsequent legislation shows the manner of establishing such fact clearly: vide section 67 (8) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), as amended by the Chieftaincy (Amendment) Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D. 166), which states:
“(8) A certificate issued in writing under the hand of the Commissioner responsible for chieftaincy matters or under the hand of any public officer authorised by him to the effect that—
(a) an application for leave to appeal was pending before the Minister under subsection (1) of section 48 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1961 (Act 81) immediately before the commencement of this Act, or (b) an application for extension of time within which to appeal was pending before the Minister immediately before the commencement of this Act shall be conclusive evidence for the purposes of subsections (6) and (7) respectively.”
Section 67 (6) stipulates that an application for leave pending before the minister shall be deemed to be an appeal pending before the appropriate regional house of chiefs and section 67 (7) says that an application for an extension of time within which to appeal pending before the minister shall be deemed to be pending before the appropriate regional house of chiefs and shall be proceeded with and determined by that house. N.R.C.D. 166 came into force on 23 [p.355] of [1980] GLR 350
March 1973 but the appellants did not procure the required certificate from the authorised officer of the chieftaincy secretariat to exhibit it during the hearing of the application in 1976 and 1977 before the Sekondi High Court. If, indeed any application for extension of time was made by the appellants to the minister as they contended then I am at a loss to appreciate their failure to procure the required certificate in proof of their contention. I could not agree more with the trial judge when he stated that no such application was ever made. The learned trial judge was also right when he said if indeed an extension of time for leave to appeal was granted on 28 April 1970 it would have been reflected in the ruling of 2 November 1973. There is no admissible evidence on record that extension of time for leave was granted by the minister on 28 April 1970 as the trial judge found, and there was no certificate from the minister or an authorised public officer either.
It is eminently evident that at the time the judicial committee of the Western Regional House of Chiefs gave its ruling on 2 November 1973 there was no appeal pending before it because leave had not been sought, and therefore the committee had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter before it. The ruling of 2 November 1973, was therefore a nullity: see Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C. Since such order, decision or judgment is a nullity there is no need to appeal against it. It is void ab initio. The effect is that such an order or decision had never existed at all. When the question of jurisdiction was raised by Mr. Blay before the second panel of the judicial committee of the house it was their bounden duty to consider the objection and give a ruling on it. Instead the judicial committee completely abdicated its judicial function and contented itself by resting its decision on the ruling of 2 November 1973 which was itself a nullity. In any case there was no appeal pending before it either for the same reasons, and it also lacked jurisdiction to entertain it, let alone to give a ruling on 28 October 1976.
The judgment of the Sekondi High Court in my view is not open to attack; it is impeccable. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed.
JUDGMENT OF JIAGGE J.A.
I agree.
JUDGMENT OF SOWAH J.A.
I also agree.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
D. R. K. S.
