ASIEDUA vs. KORANTENG AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 512
30 October 1980 · APATU-PLANGE J · ≈ 8 min read
[1980] SLR (HC) 17Other citation styles and permanent link
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION to an application by a widow under the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), Order 54, r. 15 for determination of her interest in the estate of her late husband. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.
COUNSEL
Agyare Koi Larbi (with him Asante-Tannor) for the plaintiff-applicant.
Kofi Acquaah for the defendants-respondents.
JUDGMENT OF APATU-PLANGE J.
On 18 September 1980, the plaintiff herein who claims to be the widow of the late Geofrey Francis Djomoah applied
[p.514] of [1981] GLR 512 by originating summons for the determination of the following questions:
(1) That by virtue of article 32 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, the plaintiff who is the widow of the deceased is entitled to one-third of the estate of the said Geofrey Francis Djomoah, being a reasonable share of the said estate.
(2) By virtue of the attached regulations of the Presbyterian Church which was subscribed to by the deceased, the plaintiff is entitled to one-third of the estate upon the inventory of the estate of the deceased.
The plaintiff in her application stated clearly that the originating summons has been taken under Order 54, r. 15 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A).
Before this originating summons could be heard, the defendants filed a motion asking this court to strike out the said originating summons as being inappropriate in the circumstances. This motion was supported by a five-paragraph affidavit. Counsel for the defendants in moving the motion sought to rely on Order 54A, rr. 1 and 2 which provide:
“1. Any person claiming to be interested under a deed, will, or other written instrument, may apply by originating summons for the determination of any question of construction arising under the instrument, and for a declaration of the rights of the persons interested.
2. Any person claiming any legal or equitable right in a case where the determination of the question whether he is entitled to the right depends upon a question of construction of a statute, may apply by originating summons for the determination of such question of construction, and for a declaration as to the right claimed.”
Counsel for the defendants submitted that the gist of the whole case presently before this court is whether or not the plaintiff was married to the deceased, and that being the case, this issue cannot be settled by originating summons but by a substantive suit. Counsel therefore invited this court to strike out the originating summons as being misconceived.
In reply counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff’s originating summons has not been taken under Order 54A, rr. 1 and 2 but rather under Orders 54, r. 15 and 60, r. 35, and therefore the plaintiff being a person claiming to be interested as a beneficiary
[p.515] of [1981] GLR 512 in the estate of the late Geofrey Francis Djomoah is entitled under Order 54,r. 15 to take out originating summons for the determination of any question affecting her right or interests as such beneficiary arising in the administration of the estate of her late husband.
Now Order 54A, rr. 1 and 2 under which counsel for the defendants based his objections and arguments clearly cannot be said to be applicable to the plaintiff ‘s originating summons presently before this court. I say so because a careful study of the provisions of Order 54A, rr. 1 and 2 will reveal that they deal with the determination of any questions of construction arising under a deed, will or other written instrument. The combined effect of Order 54A, rr. 1 and 2 is that where there is a will, deed or written instrument and there is a dispute as to the question of construction arising under the said document or the construction of a statute affecting the rights of any person claiming under the said document, then any such person can apply by originating summons for the determination of the question of the construction under the instrument or statute as the case may be.
In the instant case, there is no will, deed or instrument under which the plaintiff is claiming to be interested and which document has presented any dispute as to the construction of it or any statute affecting it. That being the case, counsel for the defendants’ objection taken under Order 54A, rr. 1 and 2 is clearly misconceived. Indeed, this is borne out by the fact that the plaintiff’s application clearly stated that the originating summons in question is being brought under Order 54, r. 15 and this court has to confine itself to the provisions of the said Order 54, r. 15 and find out whether by a proper interpretation of this provision, the plaintiff is entitled to take out the present originating summons for the determination of her alleged interest or whether she ought to have commenced her action by a substantive suit.
Now Order 54, r. 15 (a) and (g) provides:
“15. The executors or administrators of a deceased person or any of them, and the trustees under any deed or instrument or any of them, and any person claiming to be interested in the relief sought as creditor, devisee legatee, next-of-kin, or heir-at-law or customary heir of a deceased person, or as cestui que trust under the trust of any deed or instrument, or as claiming by assignment or otherwise under any such creditor or other person as aforesaid, may take out, as of course, an originating summons returnable in the chambers of a Judge for such relief of the nature or kind following, as may by the summons be
[p.516] of [1981] GLR 512 specified and as the circumstances of the case may require (that is to say), the determination, without an administration of the estate or trust, of any of the following questions or matters:—
(a) any question affecting the rights or interests of the person claiming to be creditor, devisee, legatee, next-of-kin, or heir-at-law, or cestui que trust . . .
(b) the determination of any question arising in the administration of the estate or trust.”
It is not in dispute that the defendants herein are the administrators of the estate of the late Geofrey Francis Djomoah, they have been granted letters of administration to administer the said estate on 8 July 1980. It is also not in dispute that Philip Owusu Koranteng and Stephen Amankwaa, the first and second defendants respectively, in this case have also been appointed customary successors to the estate of the late Geofrey Francis Djomoah. Consequently, the defendants derive their right to administer the estate of the late Geofrey Francis Djomoah from the said letters of administration granted to them by this court.
In Ollennu’s Law of Testate and Intestate Succession in Ghana at p. 229, the learned author stated:
“It cannot be over emphasised, that it is the family and not an individual who inherits and becomes owner of self-acquired property of a deceased member of the family, and that upon such inheritance the family appoints one of their members as successor and entrust him with the administration, control and management of the estate and all the property which has become family property. The appointment constitutes the successor a representative of the family, and a trustee or caretaker of the property … But the successor is not just a trustee or caretaker in the ordinary sense of the word; he is a person who has a beneficial interest in the property jointly with the other members of the family.”
The effect of this is that the customary successors and administrators of the estate of a deceased person hold the deceased’s property in trust for themselves and the beneficiaries of the estate.
Now article 32 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, provides, “No spouse may be deprived of a reasonable provision out of the estate of a spouse whether the estate be testate or intestate.”
By virtue of the said article 32 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, therefore every spouse becomes entitled in law to a reasonable provision out of the estate of the other spouse whether the said spouse
[p.517] of [1981] GLR 512 dies intestate or testate. That being the case a spouse becomes a beneficiary out of the estate of his or her deceased spouse.
However, Order 54, r. 15 gives the category of persons who may take out originating summons for the determination of any question affecting their rights or interests under a deceased’s estate. These are: creditor, devisee. legatee, next-of-kin or heir-at-law, or customary heir of a deceased person or cestui que trust under a trust instrument.
What this court has to find now is whether, the plaintiff who claims to be a widow of the deceased falls under any of the above categories of persons who can take out originating summons as of right.
Now who is a cestui que trust? The Osborne Concise Law Dictionary describes him as “A person for whom another is a trustee, a beneficiary.” In Strouds Judicial Dictionary (3rd ed.), Vol. 1 at p. 438, cestui que trust is described as “includ[ing] an implied trust just as much as an express Trust.”
I have already dealt with the position of a customary successor and an administrator appointed to administer the estate of a deceased person, for the appointment constitutes such a person a trustee and under such circumstances, it can safely be said that an implied trust is created, for the benefit of all those who claim to have an interest in the intestate’s estate.
In the same Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 1 at p. 286, a beneficiary is described as:
“one who is BENEFICIALLY ENTITLED to, or interested in, property; i.e. entitled to it for his own benefit, and not merely as TRUSTEE or executor, holding it for others. The word is nearly equivalent to CESTUI QUE TRUST.”
I hold therefore that a cestui que trust is a beneficiary under any trust express or implied. That being the case the plaintiff who claims to be the widow of the late Geofrey Francis Djomoah is by virtue of article 32 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, a beneficiary under the implied trust created when the defendants were appointed to administer the estate of the said late Geofrey Francis Djomoah. Consequently, the plaintiff can safely be described as a cestui que trust and accordingly, she is presently entitled by virtue of Order 54, r. 15 to take out the present originating summons for the determination of any question affecting her right or interest arising out of the administration of the estate of the late Geofrey Francis Djomoah.
[p.518] of [1981] GLR 512
I hold therefore that the originating summons taken by the plaintiff in the instant case is proper as it is fully supported by Order 54, r. 15. The motion by the defendants that the originating summons be struck out as inappropriate is therefore dismissed as being misconceived. No order as to costs.
DECISION
Preliminary objection to application for originating summons dismissed.
D. R. K. S.
