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[1980] SLR (HC) 49High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

BOATENG vs. GYAMFUAA [1982-83] GLR 547

11 November 1980 · APATU-PLANGE J · ≈ 8 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 49
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OSCOLABOATENG v GYAMFUAA [1982-83] GLR 547 [1980] SLR (HC) 49
APABOATENG v GYAMFUAA [1982-83] GLR 547, [1980] SLR (HC) 49 (Ghana).
BluebookBOATENG v GYAMFUAA [1982-83] GLR 547, [1980] SLR (HC) 49 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the plaintiff, the sister and customary successor of a deceased intestate soldier, against the defendant, the widow of the intestate, for a declaration that she (the sister) is entitled to the service estate of the intestate. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Addo-Aikins for the plaintiff.

Captain Darteh for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF APATU-PLUNGE J.

In this case the plaintiff is claiming against the defendant ownership and recovery of possession of the personal effects of one late Private Hayford Boateng and general damages for trespass to these personal effects.

The defendant resisted the claim by contending that as the lawful wife of the Late Private Hayford Boateng and according to the existing law governing the disposal of service estate of servicemen who died intestate in Ghana, she is the person entitled to the ownership of the personal effects of her late husband.

This case appears to fall within a very narrow compass and involves the construction and applicability of section 5 of the Armed Forces (Special Provisions) Act, 1964 (Act 234). The facts which are wholly agreed are these: The plaintiff is the customary successor and administrator of the estate of one Private Hayford Boateng formerly of the 2BN, Takoradi and who died intestate in February 1977. At the time of his death the said late Private Boateng was a serviceman. The defendant was the wife of the said late Private Hayford Boateng with whom she had two issues, all minors.

After the death of the said Private Hayford Boateng, the Army authorities checked his personal effects, took them over and later handed them over to the defendant in accordance with the Army regulations. The plaintiff on the other hand contended that she in her capacity as customary successor and administrator of the intestate estate of her deceased brother Private Hayford Boateng, is the one entitled to the ownership and possession of the said personal effects.

The plaintiff, however, later amended her claim as regards her capacity by substituting the following: “Ownership and recovery of possession of the late Private Hayford Boateng’s service estate in her capacity as a nominee and in her capacity as a representative of the other family nominee of the late Private Hayford Boateng of 2BN, Takoradi.” The plaintiff therefore commenced this present action for a determination as to whether she or the defendant is the proper person to be entitled to the service estate of the late Private Hayford Boateng.

Now the evidence of the plaintiff and her only witness that on the death intestate of the said Private Hayford Boateng, she, the plaintiff, was appointed the customary successor and administrator of the estate

[p.549] of [1982-83] GLR 547

of her deceased brother was not challenged and, indeed, the defendant did not dispute this fact. The plaintiff has therefore based her claim to the properties of the deceased on the fact of her being the customary successor and administrator of her late brother. She, however, amended her statement of claim by including the fact that she was also a nominee by the deceased to take his personal effects if he died intestate while in the Army.

The defendant relied on the fact that she was the wife of the said Private Hayford Boateng at the time of his death and had two children with him at the time and that she was the one nominated by the said late Private Hayford Boateng to take over his personal effects in the event of his death. She called the second defendant witness, one Major Charles Tachie-Menson, as her witness. The second defendant witness is the Assistant Director of Legal Services of the Ministry of Defence, Accra.

He explained that in that capacity he also acts as director of service estate and is therefore responsible for the administration of the estate of deceased servicemen. He tendered in evidence the Armed Forces Regulations (Vol. 1), art. 25.03 in support of his case and this is exhibit 4. He also explained that their functions are governed by the Armed Forces Act, 1962 (Act 105). He explained further that service estate means all personal effects of the deceased servicemen found in the military quarters, and nomination papers are normally in respect of gratuities for which every service personnel is expected to nominate his beneficiaries.

He contended that if a person’s name appears on the nomination paper then it is only in respect of financial benefits. He admitted working on the estate of the said Private Hayford Boateng. He tendered in evidence exhibit 5 which is Private Hayford Boateng’s nomination paper. He further explained that in military language family means the wife and all unmarried children of the deceased under the age of 18 and he quoted article 102, at p.3 of exhibit 4. He added that the late Private Hayford Boateng had a wife who is the defendant and children under the age of 18 and therefore they were those entitled to the personal effects of the deceased serviceman found in his quarters. He tendered in evidence exhibit 6 which is the inventory taken of the personal effects found in the deceased’s premises at the military quarters after his death.

His evidence was supported by that of the third defendant witness, one Asante Annor of the Records Office of the Ministry of Defence. He tendered the originals of the nomination papers and explained the discrepancy between these papers, exhibit 7 and exhibit 5. His explanation was that at the time the said Private Hayford Boateng filed the first one, i.e. exhibit 7, he was having only one son, but when later he had another daughter, he completed another nomination paper including this daughter among his nominee and that new one is exhibit 5.

[p.550] of [1982-83] GLR 547

In dealing with this case, it seems to me that this court cannot overlook the provisions of Act 105 and any regulations made thereunder. It seems to me therefore that the issue to be tried falls within a very narrow compass and involves the construction and applicability of Act 105, s. 98 and articles 1.02 and 25.03 of the Armed Forces Regulations, Vol. 1.

Now section 98 of Act 105 provides:— “ `service estate’ means the following parts of the estate of a deceased officer or man in the Armed Forces:

(a) pay and allowances in respect of his service in such Forces;

(b) personal equipment that such officer or man is permitted, under regulations made under this Act, to retain; and (c) personal belongings, including cash, found on such officer or man or in camp, quarters or otherwise in the care or custody of such Forces”.

Now it will be seen from exhibits 5 and 7, the nomination papers made by the late Private Hayford Boateng, that the plaintiff is, admittedly, one of the nominees in the said exhibit. But the heading of exhibits 5 and 7 reads: “Nomination paper for payment of gratuity under section IX of the Armed Forces Regulation (Finance) Vol. III, article 206. 86 (2).”

This clearly means that the nomination paper relied on by the plaintiff is only in respect of his payment of the gratuity of the said Private Hayford Boateng to the nominees and no more. In these two nomination papers the said late Private Hayford Boateng also indicated what properties or percentage of his gratuity should be paid to those he nominated and the plaintiff’s percentage as contained in exhibit 5 was ten per centum. I hold therefore that the nomination paper in which the plaintiff’s name appears as one of the nominees is in respect of Private Hayford Boateng’s gratuity or financial benefits alone and no more. It seems to me that if the Armed Forces authorities intended to include the personal effects of a deceased soldier in the nomination paper, the said nomination paper would have stated so expressly.

Now the articles which form the subject-matter of this suit were all said to have been found to be the personal property of the late Private Hayford Boateng at the time of his death. They are therefore his personal effects which, admittedly, form part of his service estate

According to the evidence of the second defendant witness he was responsible for the distribution of the service estate of Private Hayford Boateng in his capacity as director of estate. Now article 25.03 (2) of their service regulations, exhibit 4, provides:

[p.551] of [1982-83] GLR 547

“The Director of Estates shall, in the exercise of his powers, duties and functions under these Regulations, to the exclusion of all other authorities and persons, have the same rights and powers in respect of a service estate as if he had been appointed as executor or administrator of that estate by a court of competent jurisdiction.”

This provision clearly gave authority to the second defendant witness to take over the administration of the late Private Hayford Boateng’s service estate. According to him, such service estates are always handed over to the family of the deceased serviceman and he quoted article 1.02 (xxvii) (a) of their Regulation which described what family means within the Armed Forces: see exhibit 4. In it family has been defined as “the wife and unmarried children under the age of 21 of an officer or man.” It is not in dispute that at the time of the late Private Hayford Boateng’s death, the defendant was his wife and had two children with him who were all under 21 years of age. Consequently, I hold that under the Armed Forces Regulations the director of estates acted within his lawful rights in handing over the late Hayford Boateng’s personal or service estate to the defendant and her two children.

The plaintiff who relied on the fact of her being the customary successor of the deceased and a nominee can only take under the nomination paper in respect of Private Hayford Boateng’s gratuity and no more. She therefore has no claim to the service estate of her late brother and her claim must therefore fail. It is accordingly dismissed and judgment is entered for the defendant. I therefore order that the items belonging to the late Private Hayford Boateng which were desposited with the registrar of the High Court on 16th May 1978 be discharged. I further order that the registrar should therefore release the said items to the defendant forthwith.

I make no order to costs since this case is an estate matter.

DECISION

Action dismissed.

D. R. K. S.

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