SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1980] SLR (HC) 61High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

NAJAT METAL ENTERPRISES LIMITED vs. HANSON AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 81

14 November 1980 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 61
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLANAJAT METAL ENTERPRISES LIMITED v HANSON AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 81 [1980] SLR (HC) 61
APANAJAT METAL ENTERPRISES LIMITED v HANSON AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 81, [1980] SLR (HC) 61 (Ghana).
BluebookNAJAT METAL ENTERPRISES LIMITED v HANSON AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 81, [1980] SLR (HC) 61 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Davies v. Elsby Brothers Ltd. [1961] 1 W.L.R. 170;[1960] 3 All E.R. 672, C.A.
(2) Whittam v. W.J. Daniel & Co., Ltd., [1962] 1 Q.B. 271; [1961] 3 All E.R. 796; [1961] 3 W.L.R.

1123, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION for a declaration that the plaintiff was not the company listed as confiscated to the State in a directive by the government. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Alhaji Kwaw-Swanzy for the plaintiff.

Gloria Minta (Mrs.), State Attorney, for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF KORANTENG-ADDOW J.

The plaintiff-company seeks a declaration that it has never been confiscated to the State. It is not challenging the authority which caused the confiscation, but it is saying that the company which was confiscated to the State is not the same as the plaintiff-company.

It is the defendants’ case that in September, 1979, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council directed the second defendant, Management Development and Productivity Institute (MDPI), to re-organise the Aschkar and Dakmak group of companies. Pursuant to this directive, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council by a letter dated 23

[p.83] of [1982-83] GLR 81

September 1979, addressed to the Commissioner of Industries, directed that certain companies including “Najat Company” should become part of the National Industrial Company. Since this is the letter upon which the whole defence turns, it will be necessary to quote the whole letter which reads:

“A.F.R.C /IND/Vol.1 23 September, 1979.

TRANSFER OF FIVE COMPANIES TO NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COMPANY Following the A.F.R.C ‘s directive that the Management Development and Productivity Institute should re-organise the Aschkar and Dakmak group of companies into a National Industrial Company (NIC) the Council has decided that the following companies:

(a) Textiles Trico Manufacturing Company (b) Nsawam Foam (c) City Commercial (d) City Auto Parts Supplies (e) Najat company originally to have been taken over by the Ministry of Industries should also become part of the National Industrial Company.

This supersedes A.F.R.C. directive of effective date 13 August, 1979. The office of the Attorney-General is by a copy of this directive hereby directed to reconcile the various Decrees affecting the following groups, i.e., GIHOC, Aschkar, Dakmak and the above to reflect the present position.

(Sgd.) Flt.-Lt. J.J. Rawlings CHAIRMAN, A.F.R.C.

The Commissioner for Industries, Ministry of Industries, Accra.

cc: Management Development & Productivity Institute.

Attorney-General.

Principal Secretary, AFRC Secretariat, The Castle, Osu.”

[p.83] of [1982-83] GLR 81

All the companies mentioned in the letter except Najat Company had been taken over by the Transfer of Shares and Other Proprietary Interests (Specified Companies) Decree, 1979 (AFRCD 15). “Najat Company” was not confiscated by any Decree, it was done by executive action. But there is no dispute about that; whether the takeover was by legislation or executive action, it would equally be an act of the A.F.R.C.

The only issue is whether the Najat Company which was confiscated is the same as the Najat Metal Enterprises Ltd. The defendants caused a search to be made at the Registrar-General’s Department and the result shows that there was no Najat Company, the nearest to that name is the plaintiff-company. There is no other company registered in the country whose name is even similar to the name “Najat Company” except the plaintiff. The people who were directed to take over the company never had any doubt about the identity of the company they were to take over.

They entertained no doubt that “Najat Company” was the same as Najat Metal Enterprises Ltd. They were to take over Dakmak group of companies. The searches made at the office of the Registrar of Companies showed that Fouad Dakmak was a director and Wassef S. Dakmak was a director up to 1 August 1978. It seems quite clear to me that the plaintiff was intended but obviously a mistake has been made. If the mistake is a mere misnomer, then I would say that the plaintiff has no cause to complain but if the mistake is such that it raises doubts about the identity of the company intended the name “Najat Company” cannot be construed to refer to the plaintiff’s company.

I have not been referred to any authority bearing directly upon the question, and I have not found any in my own research. However, I have been referred to cases on misdescription of parties in a suit by counsel for the defendants, viz Davies v. Elsby Brothers Ltd. [1961] 1 W.L.R. 170, C.A. and Whittam v. W.J. Daniel & Co., Ltd. [1962] 1 Q.B. 271, C.A. In each of these cases it was held that where the defendant is not accurately described in a writ and the mistake is a mere misnomer, it will not be fatal to the writ and an amendment will be allowed to correct the name. But where the inaccuracy about the name raises doubt about the entity of the person sued, then the mistake is fatal and it cannot be cured by amendment.

In resolving the issue in this case, one may draw an analogy from the principle underlying those cases, because a misdescription whether it appears in a letter, a writ, or even in an Act of Parliament, still remains a misdescription, and the same rules of construction should apply to determine the meaning of the matter in which the mistake occurs. The defendants contend that the name Najat Company stated in the letter exhibit 2 is a mere misnomer and that it can only refer to the plaintiff. The plaintiff says if it did, a Decree would have been

[p.85] of [1982-83] GLR 81

enacted to that effect. I am persuaded by the argument by counsel for the defendants; it has force in it. There is no entity other than the plaintiff to which the description Najat Company might refer. The search made at the Registrar-General’s Department showed clearly that there is no other company bearing the least resemblance to the company description except the plaintiff.

It was suggested to the witness from the Registrar-General’s Department that there might be another company whose particulars might not easily be traced from the search. There was no basis for such a suggestion. No other company answers to that description, nor does the name confuse with the name of any other entity. The test which was applied in Davies v. Elsby Brothers Ltd. (supra) is applicable to this case. Devlin L.J. said at p. 176:

“In English law as a general principle the question is not what the writer of the document intended or meant but what a reasonable man reading the document would understand it to mean; and that, I think, is the test which ought to be applied as a general rule in cases of misnomer – which may embrace a number of other situations apart from misnomer on a writ, for example, mistake as to identity in the making of a contract. I think that the test must be: how would a reasonable person receiving the document take it? If, in all the circumstances of the case and looking at the document as a whole, he would say to himself `Of course it must mean me, but they have got my name wrong’ then there is a case of mere misnomer. If, on the other hand, he would say: `I cannot tell from the document itself whether they mean me or not and I shall have to make inquiries,’ there it seems to me that one is getting beyond the realm of misnomer.”

The defendants in receiving the letter did not have to make a search or inquiries for the company. They went straight for the plaintiff. It was only as a result of this case that it became necessary to make the search at the Registrar-General’s Department. I am satisfied that the name Najat Company as appearing in exhibit 2 can only be referable to the plaintiff and no other company. Any other interpretation would not give effect to the expressed intention of the maker of the document. Although the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179) allows directors of a company to be appointed from outside the membership of the company and the fact of being a director per se does not necessarily determine the question of ownership of the company, the fact of the involvement of the Dakmaks in the running of the company for the same period buttresses the view I hold that that “Najat Company” referred to in this matter is Najat Metal Enterprises Ltd. The argument of the plaintiff that the directive was not backed by a Decree is neither

[p.86] of [1982-83] GLR 81

here nor there. I do not think that the legality of the confiscation can be challenged in any proceedings before the court, whether it was done by an executive act or by legislation. In the circumstances there is no basis to make the declaration sought. The action should be dismissed; and I do so order.

DECISION

Order accordingly.

M. C. N. -N.

Scroll to Top