ASOMAH vs. SERVORDZIE [1981] GLR 152
9 July 1980 · ARCHER JA · ≈ 18 min read
[1980] SLR (CA) 10Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Malm v. Lutterodt [1963] 1 G.L.R. 1, S.C.
(2) Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide v. Mansah (1947) D.C. (Land) ‘38-’47, 263.
(3) Mansah v. Asamoah [1975] 1 G.L.R. 225, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a judgment of a High Court dismissing the appellant’s claim for a declaration of title to land. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Archer J.A.
COUNSEL
Ahenkorah for the appellant.
M. Atadika (with him Oppong) for the respondent.
[p.154] of [1981] GLR 152
JUDGMENT OF ARCHER J.A.
The appellant claimed against the respondent declaration of title to a cocoa farm at Nsuopriho on Dormaa stool land, ¢200 damages for trespass and perpetual injunction.
In support of his claim, he testified at the trial at the High Court, Sunyani, that in 1966, the then Odikro of Asikasu and Safohene of Dormaa-Ahenkro granted him 40 acres of land for farming purposes. One Nana Kojo Addo, the first plaintiff witness, demarcated the land for him and as consideration for the grant, he paid ¢140 to the Asikasuhene. Thereafter the appellant’s name was recorded in the books of the Dormaa State Council as a tenant of the stool. He has since cultivated nine seasonal farms consisting of cocoa, foodstuffs, i.e. cocoyam, cassava and plantain. After four years of cultivation, he was able to commence paying tribute to the Dormaa stool. He maintained that the land granted him was virgin forest and he employed labourers to clear the land and fell trees before planting his crops. He was in possession and actively worked on the farm from 1966 until 1974 when the respondent came to the farm and claimed the whole farm cultivated by him.
The respondent in his defence and counterclaim testified that before 1960, he was a preventive customs officer stationed at Dormaa-Ahenkro. In 1960, the preventive customs officers were absorbed into the Ghana Police Service and in 1964 he was transferred to take charge of Nkrankwanta Police Post. Before then, he knew Nana Oppong Kwabena, the Asikasuhene and also Nana Kwabena Yeboah, the then Ankobeahene. In that year, both the Asikasuhene and the Ankobeahene reported a case at the Nkrankwanta Police Post and, as a result of the report, the respondent made an arrest. While handling the case the respondent requested the two chiefs for land on which to farm. The two promised to consult the Dormaahene. Three days later, they returned to inform him that the Dormaahene had agreed to his request for land on which to farm. He presented them with four bottles beer and schnapps for libation. The next day, one Kwasi Anin was instructed by the two chiefs to show the respondent the land to be granted. Three days later Anin took him to the land and demarcated the land with one Addo’s farm, the Ayensu and the Asuopri streams as boundaries. After the demarcation, the respondent presented six bottles beer, one bottle schnapps and £G4.4s. which were accepted by the two chiefs confirming the grant. However, the two chiefs made it clear to the respondent that if after two or three years the respondent failed to cultivate the land then the two chiefs would be entitled to take back the land from the respondent. Furthermore, if the respondent cultivated the land and the farm started to yield, then he would be taken to the paramount chief at Dormaa-Ahenkro where he would provide sheep and com-
[p.155] of [1981] GLR 152 mence to pay the yearly tribute. These express terms and conditions were accepted by the respondent. After the grant, the respondent with the assistance of about hundred men cleared in one day, the whole forest demarcated by Anin. Later the respondent hired men to fell the trees. He himself burnt the whole farm and started planting cocoa, plantain suckers and yam. In 1965, the respondent was transferred to Half-Assini. In his absence, his wife, Beatrice Geraldo, continued with the planting until July 1966 when she also left Nkrankwanta. His other wife, Cecilia Yeboah, the niece of the Asikasuhene, also accompanied him on transfer to Half-Assini. The respondent further revealed that while he was stationed at Half-Assini, neither of his two wives visited the farm but the farm was left under the care of the local chief of the Ewe community, one Kojo Ntiforo.
In 1970, the respondent was transferred from Half-Assini to Hamile in the Upper Region. While he was stationed there he had information that his farm had been trespassed upon. He came down to see the Asikasuhene, his grantor, who denied having sold the farm to the appellant. The respondent lodged a complaint with the Dormaahene in 1974. As a result of the complaint, the appellant sued for declaration of title and the respondent also counterclaimed for a similar declaration of title to the farm in dispute .
The learned trial judge found that the respondent had a prior grant from the Asikasuhene in 1965 and the earlier grant must prevail over the subsequent grant to the appellant. He therefore dismissed the appellant’s claim and pronounced judgment in favour of the respondent on his counterclaim.
Before this court, the original and various additional grounds of appeal were argued to demonstrate that the judgment of the court below was untenable. In this judgment, it will not be necessary to deal with each ground separately as the gist of these grounds can fairly be summarised in the following three main grounds:
(1) Did the respondent obtain a valid grant from the Dormaa stool?
(2) Did the respondent abandon the farm to cause it to revert to the Dormaa stool?
(3) Did the respondent’s utter neglect of the farm make it possible for subsequent grant to be made to the appellant?
It will be convenient to dispose of the second ground first. Learned counsel for the appellant argued very strongly before us that there was evidence of abandonment and the learned trial judge should have granted the appellant’s claim. Perhaps, at this stage it should be stated that nowhere in the judgment did the court below make a specific finding that the respondent abandoned the farm. There is no
[p.156] of [1981] GLR 152 doubt that in his judgment the learned trial judge stated, “if anything I find that the ¢140 was drink money for sale of ‘abandoned’ farm.” The word abandoned is surrounded by inverted commas as if the word was being quoted. However, the judgment further explained that “the plaintiff’s case does not turn on the issue of abandonment.”
Nevertheless, the issue of abandonment appears to have been raised for the first time in this court. It was not pleaded by the appellant as a triable issue and no evidence was adduced to show that the appellant’s case rested on the issue of abandonment. Is learned counsel for the appellant at liberty to raise this issue in this court? It seems to me that the contention of learned counsel for the respondent that the issue of abandonment should not be countenanced by this court is supported by authority: see Malm v. Lutterodt [1963] 1 G.L.R. 1, S.C. The appellant did not plead abandonment, and the court below could not have made it a triable issue. As such, learned counsel cannot in this appellate court raise the matter for argument. The grounds filed and the arguments in respect of the issue of abandonment are therefore dismissed.
Did the respondent have a prior valid grant ? In his judgment, the learned trial judge stated :
“It is also agreed that Nana Oppong Kwabena, the second plaintiff witness, as Asikasuhene was the immediate stool occupant in control of the lands at Nkrankwanta and in particular at Asuopriho. He it was who could make valid grants of land to tenant-farmers. It is common ground also that his stool was under the Ankobea division of Dormaa State, and consequently he acts for and accounts to the Ankobea stool in respect of the lands over which he is caretaker. I find, however that the consent of the Ankobeahene and more so is the consent of the Dormaahene or the State Council.”
The respondent’s evidence on the grant has already been referred to but the grant has been disputed by the Asikasuhene, the second plaintiff witness. The Ankobeahene on the stool in 1964 (Charles Yeboah) is dead and his successor, Nana Amponsah Appiah, the sixth plaintiff witness, came to the stool in 1966 and could not have known of the grant. However, the evidence of Anin, the first plaintiff witness, lends support to the respondent’s case that the land was demarcated for him by Anin at the request of the Asikasuhene and the Ankobeahene both of whom received the drinks and the money presented. The Asikasuhene has maintained that he deputed Anin to show the respondent the land only. In other words Anin had no mandate to demarcate the boundaries of the land.
[p.157] of [1981] GLR 152
The court below found as a fact that Anin did demarcate the boundaries upon the instructions of the Asikasuhene and that finding in my view should not be disturbed. But then, is the demarcation plus the presentation of the customary drinks enough to validate the grant? There is no evidence that the respondent’s name as a tenant appears in the records of the Dormaa stool. If the Asikasuhene and the Ankobeahene had informed the Dormaahene in order to obtain his consent, perhaps, the respondent’s status as a tenant farmer of the stool would have been recorded. Opanyin Ankama, the sixth defendant witness explained that:
“a grantee does not go to the Dormaahene. It is the Ankobeahene who goes to him. Whether Nana Dormaahene or the State was to be informed of a grant made to the tenant, it is Ankobeahene and the Asikasuhene; it is not the concern of the tenant and grantee.”
It seems that the responsibility of introducing a new tenant farmer to the Dormaa stool for the purpose of concluding a tenancy agreement rests with the Asikasuhene and the Ankobeahene when the tenant-farmer has cultivated the farm and whatever has been planted commences to yield. This is confirmed by the evidence of Mr. Nketia, the Registrar of the Dormaa Traditional Council (the seventh plaintiff witness) when he stated:
“The practice is that tenants will first obtain the land from the local stool and start farming. After about three years the chief will bring the tenant to the council if the farm thrives …
The chief brings the tenant-farmer to the council to enter into agreements when the state of the farm cultivated shows that the farm will not fail, i.e. when it starts ‘blooming well’.”
There is no doubt that until the respondent had cultivated the land and the farms had started yielding, a formal tenancy agreement could not be executed by the Dormaa stool in his favour. But the absence of this formal execution does not obliterate any rights which the respondent (once in possession of the land) can have against third parties. It seems to me therefore that in 1964 the Asikasuhene and the then Ankobeahene through Anin, put the respondent in possession of the area demarcated for him.
Nevertheless his possessory right to the land in dispute was conditional upon his cultivating the land within two or three years of his taking up possession. Did the respondent comply with this condition? His evidence has already been referred to. The learned trial judge found that he could not have cultivated the whole forest area demarcated for him. I think this is a reasonable inference from
[p.158] of [1981] GLR 152 the primary facts established. I am convinced that hundred labourers with cutlasses cannot clear a piece of forest land measuring 40 acres in one working day. A few acres could have been cleared within that short space of time.
The respondent’s witnesses testified that the land was cleared and some trees felled by the respondent with hired labour. There is also evidence that the respondent planted some crops including cocoa before he was transferred to Half-Assini in 1965. The respondent claims to have left his wife, Geraldo in charge of the farm before she herself joined the respondent in Half-Assini in July 1966. What happened from 1966 onwards is not certain. Where was the Ewe chief, Kojo Ntiforo, who was requested to look after the farm? The evidence clearly demonstrates that the two wives of the respondent did not visit the farm for nearly five years and there is no indication that Ntiforo worked on the farm after the departure of the respondent’s wife, Geraldo. If someone had been working on the farm between 1966 and 1970 on behalf of the respondent, that person would no doubt have noticed the presence of the appellant working on the land, clearing the forest, felling trees, burning and thereafter planting.
It is settled law that an appellate court should not disturb the findings of facts of a trial court provided the evidence supports the findings. However, the appellate court is not prevented from making its own inferences from these findings if the inference drawn by the court below appear to be unreasonable or contrary to the evidence on record. The impression one gets from the whole evidence is that the respondent cleared only a portion of the area demarcated for him by Anin and left a substantial area uncleared. After his transfer, the respondent did not take adequate steps to maintain the farm and as such the whole area became overgrown with the result that there was no difference between the cleared portion and the uncleared forest. Therefore, when the appellant was put into possession he had to clear an extensive area before planting his nine seasonal farms.
The trial court found that the respondent left the area in utter neglect. The question that comes to mind is whether the respondent carried out satisfactorily his contractual obligation, admitted by himself, to cultivate the land within two or three years as demanded by his grantors, the Asikasuhene and the Ankobeahene? Cultivation of a farm does not mean simply, the clearing of land and planting of crops. It involves also good husbandry and constant maintenance to enable the farm to flourish and bloom. Mere token
[p.159] of [1981] GLR 152 cultivation to assert one’s occupation is not enough. A purchaser of forest land for consideration is at liberty to bide his time and to cultivate the land whenever he wishes because he is the owner. However a tenant who has been granted farming rights is under an obligation to comply with any conditions stipulated by his grantors as to the time limit within which to cultivate and what tribute is exigible annually. In the present case, one is tempted to agree with the learned trial judge’s observation that the initial enthusiasm of the respondent must have waned after his transfer to Half-Assini.
There is abundant evidence that the appellant exerted himself strenuously from 1966 onwards to transform this forest area into a flourishing farm. From 1966 to 1970 when the appellant was exerting himself in the area, the alleged caretakers of the respondent did not complain or challenge him. It seems to me unfair to allow the appellant to spend much energy, time and money for nearly ten years in cultivating land from which the Dormaa stool is exacting tribute and then to assert in a court of law that the ownership of the whole farm should be declared in favour of the respondent. The truth appears to be that the respondent did not cultivate the land within the two or three years agreed by the parties. In this context cultivation does not mean token clearing, felling of trees and planting of cocoa seeds in the cleared portion. Cultivation connotes further the constant maintenance of the farm to ensure its continued existence. The respondent was on the land working himself from December 1964 to the middle of 1965 when he was transferred to Half-Assini. The probability is that whatever was cleared or planted by the respondent fell into neglect after his transfer and thus he was unable to carry out his contractual obligation to cultivate the land within the period agreed by the parties. When the appellant was later on put into possession, there must have been no difference between what the respondent allegedly cleared and the uncleared forest land. The appellant had to start from scratch and perhaps it would be grossly unjust to dispossess the appellant of his ownership of this farm.
The established principle of law is that so long as a tenant farmer is in occupation and has not abandoned the land, his grantor cannot derogate from his grant and admit a new tenant on the same land to the prejudice of the earlier tenant. It seems to me, however, that the established law cannot overrule contractual obligations voluntarily agreed upon by the parties. In the present case, the parties agreed that the respondent should cultivate the land within two or three years otherwise the land would be taken away from
[p.160] of [1981] GLR 152 him. There is no evidence that after the initial planting, the respondent took steps to maintain the farm so that two or three years afterwards the farm yielded fruit. His stay at Nkrankwanta after the initial cultivation was curtailed by his transfer to Half-Assini and as a result of his utter neglect, the area cleared by him must have reverted to bush.
Nevertheless, the law is established. The grantors cannot maintain that the respondent abandoned the land before they made the subsequent grant to the appellant. But the evidence clearly demonstrates that whatever grant was made initially to the respondent was an inchoate grant conditional upon the respondent’s ability to cultivate the land within two or three years. Cultivation in simple language means development of a farm.
Unfortunately, the appellant’s case is not based on the fact that his grantors re-granted the disputed land to him on account of the respondent’s failure to cultivate the land within two or three years. Indeed, the Asikasuhene from whom the respondent derived his title maintained throughout his evidence at the trial, that he only instructed Kwasi Anin to show the land to the respondent and no more. He further contended that the area had not been granted to the respondent and that when the appellant took his grant, the respondent had no farm there. Briefly, there was no contract between him and the respondent and therefore there could not have been any breach of contractual obligation either on the part of the respondent or his Asikasuhene. In view of the stand taken by the Asikasuhene, it is not open to the appellant through his learned counsel to argue in this court that because the court below found as a fact that the respondent did not maintain the farm, the court below should have dismissed the respondent’s counterclaim for breach of his contractual obligation to cultivate the farm within two or three years. To buttress his submission, learned counsel for the appellant cited the case of Sacred Congregation of Paganda Fide v. Mansah, (1947) D.C. (Land) ‘38-’47, 263 where Korsah J., as he then was, held that according to Akan custom permission to build on land within twelve months lapsed if no building was started within the period. The principle also applies to land for farming purposes. The principle in the Propaganda Fide case is good law. But it seems to me that the principle in that case is clearly inapplicable to the present appeal. In that case the Omanhene of New Juaben had in 1937 granted permission to the defendant to build within twelve calendar months. She failed to do so and in 1945, the omanhene re-granted the land to the plaintiff.
[p.161] of [1981] GLR 152
It is obvious that there was an admitted express permission or licence which later lapsed by non-performance of a contractual obligation on the part of the grantee. In the present appeal, the Asikasuhene, the plaintiff’s grantor, has emphatically denied that he ever permitted the respondent to go into possession. It would, in such a case, be very curious indeed for the Asikasuhene to say in one breadth that there was no contract between himself and the respondent, and in another breadth to assert that there had been a breach of contract which enabled him to re-grant the land to the appellant. The finding of the court below that the respondent left the farm in utter neglect does not in any way assist the appellant.
The evidence of the respondent’s witnesses demonstrates clearly that the respondent was in lawful possession of the area in dispute before the appellant entered the land. As such it was not open to the Asikasuhene to grant the same land to the appellant without the consent of the respondent: see Mansah v. Asamoah [1975] 1 G.L.R. 225, C.A. and the earlier cases cited in that judgment. Moreover the findings of the court below are based not only on convincing evidence on record but also on the credibility of the witnesses—a matter within the exclusive purview of the learned trial judge who gave reasons for believing or disbelieving a particular witness. I think the findings should not be disturbed by this court.
Although it was not pleaded by the appellant, his learned counsel submitted that the learned trial judge should have applied the provisions of the Farm Lands (Protection) Act, 1962 (Act 107), in favour of the appellant. Section 1 of the Act reads:
“1. Where a person, in this Act referred to as a farmer, acquires land after the commencement of this Act for the purposes of farming and does not farm a part or the whole of that land for a period of eight years from the date of the acquisition, his title to the whole of the land or that portion that has not been farmed shall be deemed for all purposes to have been extinguished.”
The evidence establishes that the respondent did farm a portion of the land from December 1964 onwards and left a portion unfarmed. As far as the farmed portion is concerned his title remained intact. But learned counsel for the appellant has argued that his title to the unfarmed portion should be deemed to have been extinguished. Of course, this submission is untenable in view of the express words of section 1. His title to the unfarmed portion becomes
[p.162] of [1981] GLR 152 extinguished only eight years after the date of acquisition, i.e. after December 1972. But the evidence indicates that the appellant took possession of the unfarmed portion even before 1972 when the respondent’s title had not been extinguished under section 1 of the Act.
Section 2 (1) of the Act also provides:
“2. (1) Where a farmer has, in good faith, at any time after the thirty-first day of December, 1940, and before the commencement of this Act, acquired any land by customary law or otherwise in a prescribed area for purposes of farming and has begun farming on that land within eight years from the date of such acquisition, this section shall, notwithstanding any defect in the title to the contrary, operate to confer valid title on such farmer:
Provided that the land in question had not been farmed by any other person for a period of eight years previous to the acquisition by the farmer.”
The evidence on this statutory point proves that the respondent farmed a portion of the land in dispute from December 1964 onwards. When the appellant went to the land in 1966 that portion was currently being farmed by another person, that is, the respondent. Therefore the proviso to section 2 (1) also disqualifies the appellant from claiming the benefit of Act 107.
In conclusion, I think the evidence supports the respondent’s counterclaim and I would therefore dismiss the appeal.
JUDGMENT OF SOWAH J.A.
I agree.
JUDGMENT OF CHARLES CRABBE J.A.
I also agree.
DECISION Appeal dismissed.
E. P. T.
