SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1980] SLR (HC) 52High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL II)

DEEPSEA DIVISION OF NATIONAL UNION OF SEAMEN AND OTHERS vs. TRADES UNION CONGRESS OF GHANA AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 941

4 July 1980 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 16 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 52
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLADEEPSEA DIVISION OF NATIONAL UNION OF SEAMEN AND OTHERS v TRADES UNION CONGRESS OF GHANA AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 941 [1980] SLR (HC) 52
APADEEPSEA DIVISION OF NATIONAL UNION OF SEAMEN AND OTHERS v TRADES UNION CONGRESS OF GHANA AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 941, [1980] SLR (HC) 52 (Ghana).
BluebookDEEPSEA DIVISION OF NATIONAL UNION OF SEAMEN AND OTHERS v TRADES UNION CONGRESS OF GHANA AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 941, [1980] SLR (HC) 52 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

(5) Churchman v. Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee of the Workers of the Port of London [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1094; [1972] 3 All E.R. 603; 116 S.J. 617; [1972] 1 C.R. 222; 13 K.I.R. 123, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for an order for committal or attachment for contempt of court against the respondents. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Tsatsu Tsikata for the applicants.

J. K. Agyemang for the first three respondents.

R. Kakraba-Quarshie for the fourth respondent.

John Boateng, State Attorney, for the Ghana Seamen Employment and Welfare Board.

JUDGMENT OF KORANTENG-ADDOW J.

On 19 November 1979, my noble and learned brother, Amua-Sekyi J., granted an application by the plaintiffs herein, and made certain mandatory and prohibitory orders against the defendants; they were interim orders made pending the determination of the suit. The orders were as follows:

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Maritime and Dockworkers Union, its servants, agents or other persons whomsoever be and are hereby restrained from acting or holding itself out in any manner whatsoever as representing the National Union of Seamen (NUS) or any of the Deepseas, Coastwise and Fisheries Division thereof:

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants be and are hereby ordered to restore forthwith to the plaintiffs upon trust for their respective divisions the collective bargaining certificate of the National Union of Seamen which the defendants

[p.945] of [1982-83] GLR 941 withdrew on or about 3 June 1978 pending the hearing and determination of this suit; AND THAT the Maritime and Dockworkers Union do pay into the court within seven days by way of interim preservation thereof all dues so far collected by them from persons who were members of the said divisions of the National Union of Seamen as at 30 May 1978 and further to stop collecting dues from members of the said divisions until the final determination of this suit.”

The first plaintiff is the Takoradi branch chairman of the Deepseas Division of the National Union of Seamen (hereinafter called N.U.S.); the second plaintiff is the Tema branch chairman and the third plaintiff is the chairman of the Coastwise Division of N.U.S. They sued in their representative capacities on behalf of the members of the Deepseas and Coastwise Divisions N.U.S. The second defendant is the General Secretary of N.U.S. and the third defendant is the National Chairman of the N.U.S.

The fourth defendant is a trade Union, i.e. the Maritime and Dockworkers Union (MDU) established for the welfare of dock workers on the seafront of Ghana. So the M.D.U. and N.U.S. are both member unions of the Trades Union Congress (T.U.C.). Some time in 1978, an agreement was reached between the executives of N.U.S., M.D.U. and the T.U.C. whereby the Coastwise and Deepseas Divisions of N.U.S. were merged with M.D.U. A faction of the N.U.S. obviously dissatisfied with this arrangement took out summons asking for a declaration that the agreement is null and void; an order for restoration of the collective bargaining certificate of N.U.S. which the T.U.C. withdrew; a refund of all dues collected by the fourth defendant and an order perpetually restraining the M.D.U and T.U.C. from enforcing the agreement.

Pending the hearing of the case, the plaintiffs applied and obtained interim orders against the defendants in respect of these reliefs. In this application they complain that the Acting General Secretary of the T.U.C. is in breach of these orders because he did not personally see to it that the court’s orders were carried out; in particular it was deposed to in the affidavit in support that when the second plaintiff approached him about the court’s orders the acting general secretary retorted he did not care about the orders of the court. Mr. Tsikata contended that the plaintiffs were put to expense in getting the Chief Labour Officer to restore their collective bargaining certificate, and that it was after this motion had been filed that the T.U.C. wrote to the Chief Labour Officer to restore the certificate. No act of disobedience was alleged against the second and the third defendants.

In respect of the fourth defendant, it is alleged that on 21 November 1979, its general secretary signed a collective bargaining agreement with the Black Star Line purporting to affect the plaintiffs’

[p.946] of [1982-83] GLR 941 section of the N.U.S. It was further alleged that the general secretary at a meeting in Tema on 22 November 1979 represented to the seamen that he had authority to act on their behalf and that he deliberately gave a false account of the court proceedings culminating in the orders for interim injunction. That on 26 November 1979 at a meeting with seamen in Takoradi he again claimed he had authority to act on their behalf. And that the M.D.U. assumed responsibility of supervising allocation of seamen to Black Star Line ships. The plaintiffs also complain that the non-compliance with the order for payment into court of all dues collected within seven days is a contempt of court by the General Secretary of M.D.U.

The act of disobedience alleged against the executive officer of the Ghana Seamen Employment and Welfare Board is that he aided and abetted the M.D.U. to flout the orders of the court. The Welfare Board is a creature of statute set up by the Ghana Seamen’s Employment and Welfare Board Instrument, 1968 (EI 28), with definite functions. One of such functions shall be “to exercise control over the recruitment, training, employment, welfare and discipline of Ghanaian seagoing labour.” When the board was set up, it had three representatives of the N.U.S. but this was reduced after the alleged merger.

When the interim orders were made, counsel for the applicants considering the Welfare Board as a body likely to be affected by the orders, notified it of the orders on 23 November 1979. The executive secretary replied to the letter informing counsel that the board’s decision that only seamen employed with the M.D.U. would be employed on board Black Star Line vessels had been suspended temporarily. Then on 12 December the executive secretary wrote again to counsel for the plaintiffs, informing him of the board’s decision that only seamen registered with M.D.U. should be submitted for employment. The plaintiffs contend that the board has colluded with the M.D.U. to deny the members of N.U.S. of their lawful rights of employment. They also contend that their conduct has wilfully undermined the order of the court in aiding and abetting the M.D.U. to act for the members of N.U.S.

All the parties cited for attachment or committal deny the acts of disobedience alleged against them. No affidavit was sworn to by the General Secretary of the T.U.C. But speaking from the Bar, Mr. Agyemang, counsel for the T.U.C., did state that the Acting General Secretary of the T.U.C. denied there was any meeting with the second plaintiff at which he showed any disrespect to the court orders or declared an intention to disobey the orders. Still speaking from the Bar, counsel said the acting general secretary consulted him with a view to filing an affidavit to refute the wild allegation made against him, but in his capacity as his solicitor, he advised that since he was

[p.947] of [1982-83] GLR 941 not a party, it was not necessary for him to swear to an affidavit. The advice to the acting general secretary not to file an affidavit because he was not a party to the proceedings is unfortunate, because it is not in accordance with the law. Any order against a corporation which is wilfully disobeyed may be enforced by attachment against the directors or officers of the corporation: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed.) Vol. 9, p. 33, para. 52; see also Nene Dugbartey Tetteyga II v. Sappor [1973] 2 G.L.R. 277 at p. 282, C.A. where Azu Crabbe C.J. stated:

“Where the contemnor is a corporation, the contempt is punished by the sequestration of its property, but the officers of the corporation responsible for the contempt and capable of remedying it may be committed, or the corporation, such officers, or both may be fined and ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings.”

The T.U.C. is a limited liability congress. The acting general secretary is an officer of the congress. It is alleged that as general secretary he ought to have seen that the collective bargaining certificate of the N.U.S. was restored by the Chief Labour Officer, but he refused to take any steps until this motion was filed. Therefore if the order that the certificate should be restored “forthwith” was possible of being carried out within the specified time, i.e. “forthwith” or immediately, and the T.U.C. did not carry it out, it would have amounted to disobedience, and the board members or any officer purporting to act for the T.U.C. may be cited for contempt. In this case where the plaintiffs allege that the acting general secretary was responsible for the contempt, he is a proper person against whom the order may be enforced. In Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed) Vol. 9, at p. 37, para. 61 appears this statement of the law.

“Where the order is made against a company, the order may only be enforced against an officer of the company if the particular officer has been served personally with a copy of the order; and in the case of an order requiring the company to do an act within a specified time, the copy must be served on the officer before the expiration of that time. Benabo v. William Jay & Partners Ltd. [1941] Ch. 52.”

The contention that the acting general secretary is not a party to the action and therefore cannot be cited for contempt is untenable. There is no evidence that the acting general secretary was personally served with the order of interim injunction, but it cannot be gainsaid that he knew of the order, so what would have been the purpose of serving it on him when he was aware of it. On failure to effect personal service on a person who is in fact aware of the order of the court, see Republic v. Moffat; Ex parte Allotey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 391, United [p.948] of [1982-83] GLR 941

Telephone Co. v. Dale (1884) 25 Ch.D. 778 and Balogun v. Edusei (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 547.

All the conditions necessary for the enforcement of the order against the acting general secretary had been fulfilled and he was properly cited for contempt. Continuing his statement from the Bar, Mr. Agyemang said that after the court made the interim orders, his clients, the T.U.C. depended and waited upon him for advice, but he fell ill soon after the order was made. He said he accepted responsibility for failing to advise his clients as to what course of action they should take after the court had made the orders.

But on the receipt of the motion for contempt, he called Mr. Tsikata and explained his own position to him. As soon as he got well and resumed work, he advised the T.U.C. and they wrote to the Chief Labour Officer, asking for the withdrawal of the variation of the collective bargaining certificate of the M.D.U. A copy of this letter dated 22 January 1980 was shown to the court. This motion was filed on 18 January 1980. The Industrial Relations Act, 1965 (Act 299), prescribes the procedure whereby a collective bargaining certificate may be withdrawn. The T.U.C. has no power by itself to do the actual withdrawal; it can only apply to the Chief Labour Officer to withdraw it. Therefore the certificate could not have been restored “forthwith” to the plaintiffs in terms of the order.

On 14 February 1980, the T.U.C. followed up its letter of 22 January 1980 by another letter to the Chief Labour Officer reminding him of the earlier application to withdraw the certificate of the M.D.U. As a result of these actions taken by the T.U.C., the certificate of M.D.U. was restored. The withdrawal of the certificate of M.D.U. was published in the Commercial and Industrial Bulletin No.6 of 28 March 1980.

From the affidavit of the plaintiff, and statement made from the Bar, there can be no wilful disobedience to the court’s order. The order was not directed at the T.U.C. specifically, it was to “the defendants” generally, but because the TUC was the party who was in a position to carry out that order, it took steps to have the certificate of the M.D.U. withdrawn. The court will only punish as a contempt a breach of injunction if it is satisfied that the terms of the injunction are clear and unambiguous, that the defendant had proper notice of the terms and that the breach of the injunction has been proved beyond reasonable doubt: see Churchman v. Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee of the Workers of the Port of London [1972] 3 All E.R. 603. Where the disobedience is unintentional or accidental, the court will not issue a writ for attachment. In this case, I would say that there was a disobedience in the sense that the certificate was not restored “forthwith,” or immediately. But this is not an order which could be carried out within the time specified in the order. The T.U.C. did not have the

[p.949] of [1982-83] GLR 941 certificate of the M.D.U. in their possession to be able to surrender it forthwith. All it could do was to cause it to be withdrawn. After it had written to the Chief Labour Officer, there was nothing else the acting general secretary could do to comply with the order. The order was made on 19 November 1979 and the first letter was not written until 22 January 1980. On this basis, it could be said that there was disobedience because he did not act immediately after the order. Since there was delay in sending the letter for the withdrawal, I would say that technically there was disobedience. But I am not satisfied that there was fault or misconduct on the part of the acting general secretary for the delay. As soon as the T.U.C. was advised by their solicitor of what steps to take, it caused the necessary withdrawal to be made. In the circumstances, I hold the view that there was no contumacious disregard of the order to justify sequestration or committal. But since as it were, it was this motion which jolted the T.U.C. to comply with the order, it should be ordered to pay the plaintiffs’ costs for the motion.

Regarding the disobedience by M.D.U., their answer to the first charge, i.e holding themselves out as representing the N.U.S. is that the General Secretary of M.D.U. has not done anything in breach of the court’s order. In his affidavit in opposition, J. R. Baiden, the General Secretary of M.D.U. denied emphatically that since the court order, the M.D.U. had signed any collective bargaining agreement which affected any section of the N.U.S. All the allegations of acts engaged in by the general secretary were denied by the general secretary and the plaintiffs made no effort to substantiate them. The plaintiffs filed a copy of a resolution purporting to come from the representatives of the Deepseas-farers and Coastwise Seamen. This document draws attention to the court’s order for interim injunction, and then virtually resolved that the members who passed the resolution, i.e. the executive of the Deepseas-farers and Coastwise Divisions of M.D.U., would not be bound by the court’s order. The General Secretary of M.D.U. deposed that the meeting at which this resolution was passed was called by the executive of N.U.S. who are not affected by the orders of the court. But however the contemptuous manner in which the document is drafted, there is no evidence that it was acted upon. But by merely threatening to act in breach of a court’s order does not amount to disobedience of the order of the court. More importantly, the people who purported to have passed these resolutions are not parties who have been cited for contempt in this application. The M.D.U. denies holding the meetings which the plaintiffs complain about. It maintains they were organised by the other faction of N.U.S. which does not represent M.D.U. nor acts on its behalf. M.D.U. also denies collusion with the Welfare Board. On the present

[p.950] of [1982-83] GLR 941 state of the affidavits, I do not find that there is any act of disobedience to justify punishment. On the payment of dues collected, no account was taken before the order was made to determine the amount which the M.D.U. holds as dues from N.U.S. members. But the general secretary filed an account and he deposed that the M.D.U. collected ¢10,000 but this has been expended on the N.U.S. Mr. Tsikata submitted, that once the order was made and the defendants having admitted some amount was collected, it is binding upon the M.D.U. to pay what they collected into court whether or not the money is intact. The contempt which the plaintiffs allege is a civil contempt. It is a refusal or neglect to do an act required by a court order within a specified time; or disobedience to an order requiring a person to abstain from doing a specified act.

Therefore if there is no unwillingness or deliberate neglect to do the act required, or abstain from the doing of it, there would be no basis for punishment. It is not a matter of course that a person who has failed to comply with an order of the court shall be committed automatically. If he gives an explanation which is reasonable the contemnor should not be punished. But where is a difficulty for complying with the order, the proper course would be to apply to the court for suspension of the order. The instant application would have been unnecessary if they had applied for suspension. If the accounts presented by the M.D.U. are correct, and there is no challenge to them, then it cannot be said that there is a deliberate disobedience to the order.

One cannot be punished for a technical disobedience. The applicant must show that the refusal to comply with the order is deliberate. It has not been done in this case. I cannot commit the General Secretary of the M.D.U. but he should pay the costs of the application with the first respondents.

Regarding the Welfare Board, Mr. John Boateng has submitted that they were not parties to the application for the injunction, for if the board were, he would have pleaded the State Proceedings Act, 1961 (Act 51). He contends that the executive secretary of the board is a servant of the State, so he could not be restrained by injunction.

The position of the law is that where an order has been made which originally ought not to have been made, the order must be obeyed. Disobedience to such an order, even though irregular, constitutes contempt. But in such a case, if the person for whose benefit the order was made applies to enforce it, the respondent will be given the benefit of the fact that the order is irregular. The order in the case was not irregularly obtained. It was not directed against the board which is a stranger to the action. But a stranger who aids and abets the breach of a court’s order obstructs the course of justice, and is guilty of contempt punishable by committal.

[p.951] of [1982-83] GLR 941

What happened in this case is that after the court ordered the M.D.U. to refrain from holding itself as representing the N.U.S., the Welfare Board took a decision which was communicated to counsel for the plaintiffs-applicants. This decision in effect was that the board would accept for employment persons who held M.D.U. cards. This decision was taken after the court’s order had been served on the secretary of the board.

I agree with Mr. Tsikata that this decision encouraged the M.D.U. in setting the court at defiance. I concede Mr. Boateng’s submission that the board was merely performing its statutory functions, but the court’s order was to preserve the status quo pending the determination of the case. On the face of the court’s order, the board’s decision amounted to abetting and aiding the M.D.U. to disregard the court’s order. But I am not satisfied that the M.D.U did anything pursuant to the board’s decision.

It was alleged they issued certificates to some seamen for employment on Black Star Line vessels, but this could not be substantiated. I am also informed by Mr. Boateng that following the withdrawal of the collective bargaining certificate, the board’s decision has been rendered nugatory, for M.D.U. cards will not be a requisite for a job either on a foreign vessel or on a Black Star Line vessel. Under the circumstances, the executive secretary of the board should not be liable for committal.

I order the General Secretary of M.D.U. to pay the costs of this application.

DECISION

Application dismissed.

J. A. A.

Scroll to Top