SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1980] SLR (CA) 11Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

ASSAD FAKHRY AND SONS vs. GHANA UNION ASSURANCE CO., LTD. [1981] GLR 163

4 July 1980 · JIAGGE JA · ≈ 17 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (CA) 11
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAASSAD FAKHRY AND SONS v GHANA UNION ASSURANCE CO., LTD. [1981] GLR 163 [1980] SLR (CA) 11
APAASSAD FAKHRY AND SONS v GHANA UNION ASSURANCE CO., LTD. [1981] GLR 163, [1980] SLR (CA) 11 (Ghana).
BluebookASSAD FAKHRY AND SONS v GHANA UNION ASSURANCE CO., LTD. [1981] GLR 163, [1980] SLR (CA) 11 (Ghana Ct. App. 1980).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Griffiths v. Fleming [1908-10] All E.R. Rep. 760; [1909] 1 K.B. 805; 78 L.J.K.B. 567; 100 L.T.

765; 25 T.L.R 377; 58 S.J. 340, C.A.

(2) Collett v. Morrison (1851) 9 Hare 162; 21 L.J. Ch. 878; 68 E.R. 458.

(3) Motteux v. London Assurance (1739) 1 Atk. 545; 26 E.R. 343.

(4) Tex-Springfield Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Whatley, Civ. App. 1926, 279 S.W. 287.

(5) Lucena v. Craufurd (1806) 2 Bos & P.N.R. 269; (1808) Taunt 325; 127 E.R. 858, H.L.

[p.165] of [1981] GLR 163

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the judgment of the High Court in an action brought by the appellants, the insured, against the respondents, the insurers, claiming indemnity under a fire policy. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Jiagge J.A.

COUNSEL

Dr. Obed Asamoah for the appellants.

Gbeho for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF JIAGGE J.A.

The appellants in this case took an insurance policy against fire from the respondents in respect of two different consignments of textiles imported into the country. The goods were stored in the premises of Rubber Products Limited under an arrangement made by the plaintiffs-appellants. According to the insurance policy, “the basis of the value for declaration shall be the market value and any loss hereunder shall be settled on the basis of the market value immediately anterior to the loss.” On the proposal form, exhibit A, the appellants declared the market value or the sum to be insured as ¢2,500,000. The respondents were satisfied that the declaration was correct and the insurance policy was issued accordingly.

In the schedule of the policy was the following indorsement, “The property insured is in accordance with the proposal dated 6 April 1977 and lodged with this company.” In the proposal dated 6 April 1977, the property to be insured was described as “stock or material in trade the property of the proposer or held by him in trust or on commission for which he is responsible.” And the market value of the stock was given as ¢2,500,000. In the same schedule of the policy, however, the appellants were named as the insured and words “held by him in trust or on commission for which he is responsible” as stated in the proposal, were omitted.

Counsel for the appellants applied in the court below for rectification of the policy on the ground that the property was not insured in accordance with the terms set out in the proposal dated 6 April 1977 and that the words “held by him in trust or on commission for which he is responsible” were omitted. The application for rectification was vigorously resisted in the court below. Counsel for the defendants (the respondents in this court) submitted that the plaintiffs, the appellants herein, having filled in the claim form, exhibit D, with the words “we are the owners” could not claim rectification of the policy to show that the goods were held in trust or on commission.

The trial court put the issue clearly this way:

“It is the case of the plaintiffs that they insured the goods as

[p.166] of [1981] GLR 163

owners and holders in trust or on commission; that of the defendants, that the plaintiff insured them as owners only. The plaintiffs rely on the proposal form, the defendants, on the policy.”

The trial judge then went on to add:

“The rule is that although the subject-matter of the insurance must be properly described, the nature of the interest may be in general left at large…It follows therefore that in the absence of specific inquiry, a proposer of insurance need not state the nature or extent of his interest in the subject-matter of the insurance…I have therefore first to consider whether in the proposal form the plaintiffs were required to do more than describe the subject-matter of the insurance.”

He went on to say that he did not find on the proposal form any inquiry directed to the plaintiffs as proposers asking them to state either the nature or extent of their interest in the stock of textiles and that the inquiry “stock or material in trade, the property of the proposer or held by him in trust or on commission for which he is responsible” was seeking information only as to the sum insured and not the interest insured. The trial judge in effect held that the words on the printed proposal form indicating the interest of the proposer should be ignored as the information sought by the inquiry was the declaration only of the sum insured.

This, however, does not seem to be the intention of the insurer for paragraph 10 of the indorsement on the policy provides “This insurance is subject in all respect to the printed conditions of the policy except in so far as they may be varied by these special conditions.” The insurer made sure that the printed words mean just what they say. This must be applicable also to the printed proposal form on which the policy was based. There was no variation of the property to be insured. It was described as “stock or material in trade, the property of the proposer or held by him in trust or on commission for which he is responsible.” There was no justification for the trial judge’s attempt to discredit the printed words relating to the nature of the interest of the proposer.

One of the grounds of appeal argued by counsel for the appellants was, “The learned trial judge erred in considering that the information sought in the proposal form was only the sum to be insured and not the nature of the interest of the proposers.” Counsel submitted that the justification for rectification was that the policy itself declared that it was made in accordance with the proposal and yet interests declared in the proposal were omitted. There was obviously an error in the policy and that it should be rectified.

[p.167] of [1981] GLR 163

Counsel for the respondents repeated most of his submissions in the court below: that the appellants having declared on the claim form, exhibit D, that they were owners could not seek rectification to show that they held in trust or on commission. Further that the appellants in their evidence-in chief and under cross-examination in the court below, asserted that they were owners and that they could not be owners and at the same time be holding the same goods in trust or on commission.

The claim form, exhibit D, was filled in after the fire outbreak, long after the proposal was accepted by the respondents and long after the premium had been paid and the insurance issued. The question is whether the declaration on the claim form can have a retrospective effect on an agreement completed long before the claim came into existence. I think not. The appellants had completed their part of the agreement by filling in the proposal form and paying the premium calculated and demanded on the basis of the proposals they had made. The respondents accepted the proposals and the premium paid but failed to make the correct entries on the policy. Even though the respondents claimed that the policy was made in accordance with the proposal, entries on the proposal showing the appellants’ interest were omitted. The respondents cannot take advantage of their own error. The policy must be rectified on the basis of the terms of the proposals. Although the proposals “could not be used in an action on the policy in order to construe the policy, they could, of course, be used in an action to rectify…” Per Farwell L.J. in Griffiths v. Fleming [1908-10] All E.R. Rep. 760 at p. 764, C.A. And in Collett v. Morrison (1851) 68 E.R. 458, Lord Turner V.C. after citing Lord Hardwicke’s decision in Motteux v. London Assurance Co. (1739) 26 E.R. 343, said at p. 463:

“ . . . if there be an agreement for a policy in a particular form, and the policy be drawn up by the office in a different form, varying the right of the party assured, a Court of Equity will interfere and deal with the case upon the footing of the agreement and not the policy.”

The subject-matter of the insurance policy was made up of two separate consignments of textiles. The way-bill indicates that there were 80 bales of printed polyester stock in the first consignment from Concord Yarns Ltd., London to Tema on the SS Ilorin Palm. The supplier’s name was Ribbletex Ltd. of Bradford, England. The shipper consignor was Concrod Yarns Ltd. of Manchester. “Consignee to notify: Sally Trading Enterprise, Accra.”

[p.168] of [1981] GLR 163

The C.I.F. value invoiced to Sally Trading Enterprise and sent by Concord Yarns Ltd., was £56,784.97. Sally Trading Enterprise took delivery of the goods.

The second consignment was covered by bill of lading No. 9954/5 which indicates that there were 366 bales of printed material in the second consignment. The carrier-vessel was Hiddensee. The supplier was Mousa of Manchester. “Consignee to notify: To order.” The C.I.F. value was given as DM 425,417.73. Again Sally took delivery of the goods.

The two consignment of textiles were stored in the warehouse of Rubber Products Ltd., under arrangements made by the appellants, who also took a policy of insurance against fire covering them. Fire broke out in the premises where the goods had been stored and the appellants put in a claim to their insurers, the respondents. An adjuster was appointed by the respondents to investigate and report. Exhibit 4 was the report of the adjuster.

According to the adjuster’s report, the C.I.F. value of the 80 bales of printed knitted materials in the first consignment was £56,784.97 (¢118,680.08 equivalent). However, Sally Trading Enterprise entered the C. and F. value as ¢49,406.75 and the C.I.F. value as ¢49,839.10 The customs duties paid on the under-invoiced sum was ¢24,919.55 which was 50 per centum of the C.I.F. value. A further ¢24,703.36 import levy which was 50 per centum of the C. and F. value was paid. The total amount paid as customs duty and import levy on the first consignment of 80 bales was ¢49,622.91. The C.I.F. plus duty and import levy amounted to ¢99,462.01. In addition, an amount of ¢821,73 was paid in respect of harbour dues, landing charges, transport, warehouse and handling charges. The landed cost was ¢100,283,74. The adjuster’s report stated further that Sally Trading Enterprise also took delivery of the 366 bales of textiles in the second consignment and that there was a total of 167.781.41 yards in the second consignment. The C. and F. value declared was ¢115,687.27. The C.I.F. value was ¢116,697.51. Customs and Excise import duty was ¢58,348.75. Import levy was ¢57,842.63. Total C.I.F. value plus duty and import levy was ¢232,888.89. An additional sum of ¢1,690 was paid for landing charges, harbour dues, transport, warehouse and handling charges making a gross total of ¢234,578.89. The adjuster found during his investigations that the cost and freight were DM 425,415.71 equivalent to ¢217,048.84.

The appellants in their evidence alleged that their company bought the goods in question from merchants in England: “They are H. Mousa and a company called Concord Yarns Limited in

[p.169] of [1981] GLR 163

England. The sister company of Concord Yard is Spatoinik also of England. The owners of these companies frequently came to Ghana.” The appellants alleged further that there were 71,655.9 yards of materials in the first consignment of eighty bales and that they paid ¢10.50 per yard for them. That there were 167,781.41 yards in the second consignment of 366 bales. The appellants alleged that the second consignment of goods was cleared by Parkobi Clearing Agencies on behalf of the buyers. The documents, however, indicate that both consignments were cleared from the harbour by Parkobi Clearing Agency on behalf of Sally Trading Enterprise.

The appellants further told the lower court that they handed all the documents covering the second consignment to the adjuster at his request after the fire. That the adjuster inspected all their books and the damage done to the goods after the fire. At the request of the adjuster they handed the damaged textiles left after the fire to Janet Trading.

Giving evidence on the stock of goods in the warehouse before the fire, the appellants told the court they had sold part of the stock and that out of 446 bales only 275 were left before the fire which destroyed a total of 160,771.93 yards of textiles.

The appellants alleged in the court below that they purchased the 80 bales of textiles from Concord Yarns and Spatoinik, a sister company for ¢752,386.95 and the second consignment of 366 bales from Mousa for ¢1,761,704.80. The adjuster stated in his report that during his investigations, the appellants “presented to him an overseas invoice issued to his company by Messrs. Spatoinik of Manchester in a value of ¢752,386.95 for the consignment of 80 bales of printed knitted materials.” The report stated further, “We found ourselves that H. Mousa forwarded an overseas invoice to the insured at the value of ¢1,761,704.80.” It was obvious from the evidence that two sets of invoices were used to cover the stock in question. The C. and F. value of the stock on the set of invoices sent to Sally Enterprises for the purposes of clearing the goods from the harbour and for paying the necessary customs duties, levies and all the other charges was much lower than the C. and F. value appearing on the invoices sent direct to the appellants by the consignor.

The invoices with the higher C. and F. value were those used by the insured to support the insurance claim. This evidence of higher value than the one declared for customs purposes was available to the adjuster at the beginning of his investigations soon after the fire.

[p.170] of [1981] GLR 163

The first defendant witness, an officer of the Department of Customs and Excise, worked out the difference in duty paid and what should have been paid. There was short payment of ¢71,428.52 on one consignment and ¢309,169.11 on the other. The appellants made good the short payment in each case. When the appellants’ attention was called to this offence, they said per their witness: “When I brought the invoices I discovered a discrepancy which showed that the duty had been under-paid. I told Concord and Mousa to rectify the position.”

The adjuster in his report observed, “Messrs Sally Trading Enterprise, when obtaining the special unnumbered licence from the Ministry of Trade under-invoiced the goods.” Counsel for the appellants on the same issue said, “It is conceded that the value declared on Sally’s bill of lading was for under-invoicing purposes. The price on the manufacturer’s invoice was even higher than the price quoted on Sally’s papers.” Counsel submitted that Sally Trading Enterprise was acting for Mousa —when it took delivery of the two consignments of textiles. But on the 171 yards of textiles sold to G.N.T.C. from the stock, counsel submitted that Sally Trading Enterprise was acting as an agent of the appellants.

The appellants gave evidence in the court below that out of the total of 446 bales only 275 were left in the warehouse before the fire outbreak and that the fire destroyed a total of 160,771.93 yards of textiles. In exhibit 5, the appellants declared that the value of the stock in the warehouse as at 30 June 1977 was ¢1,870,000. The respondents in the court below said per their witness, “I accept the figure of ¢1,870,000 as the value of the stock in the warehouse at the time the declaration was made.” The adjuster observed in his report, “As the insured themselves informed us that Sally Trading Enterprise were the agent of H. Mousa, we concluded that they have no insurable interest in the goods.”

The learned trial judge after reviewing the evidence in support of the appellants’ claim that they were the owners ruled, “I find that the defendants’ adjusters were right in coming to the conclusion that at the time of the loss the plaintiffs were not owners of the goods.” The learned trial judge also found that:

“Apart from the way-bills which the plaintiffs issued when Sally Trading Enterprise sold part of the goods to the Ghana National Trading Corporation there is nothing to connect them with custody of the goods. The stock book, exhibit R, does not bear their name; it was tendered in evidence during the cross-examination of a witness for the defendants who naturally, could not vouch for the truth of its contents. The

[p.171] of [1981] GLR 163

evidence does not satisfy me that the plaintiffs held the goods in trust or on commission, since the claim for rectification is on the supposition that the plaintiffs so held the goods, that claim must necessarily fail.”

As earlier held in this judgment, there was justification for rectification of the policy to agree with the terms of the proposal. The printed proposal form provided by the respondents excluded sole or unconditional ownership and described the goods to the insured as “stock or material in trade the property of the proposer or held by him in trust or on commission for which he is responsible.” The insurer did not seek sole ownership of the property to be insured. “Where the insurer knows that the interest of the insured is not sole and unconditional, it is precluded from relying upon a condition requiring sole and unconditional ownership.” See Tex-Springfield Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Whatley, Civ. App. 1926, 279 S.W. 287.

The pertinent question, however, is what constitutes an insurable interest? “To be interested in the preservation of a thing, is to be so circumstanced with respect to it as to have benefit from its existence, prejudice from its destruction.” See Lucena v. Craufurd (1806 2 Bos & P.N.R. 269, H.L. cited in Ivamy on General Principles of Insurance Law (3rd ed.) at p. 18. A bailee who is responsible for the safety of the goods of another has an insurable interest. In this case, the appellants took a policy of insurance for the safety from fire of goods “held by him in trust or on commission for which he is responsible.” In other words, the appellants entered into a contract with the respondents to ensure the safety of goods belonging to others for which they had responsibility. Even quite apart from the question of contract the mere fact of lawful possession is sufficient to found insurable interest.

Two of the grounds of appeal argued before this court were: (1) the learned trial judge erred in law in holding that the plaintiffs had not shown that they had a pecuniary or insurable interest in the goods they had insured, and (2) the learned trial judge failed to consider admissions made by the agent of the defendants which established that the plaintiffs had an insurable interest.

Counsel for the appellants submitted that the evidence before the court showed quite clearly that the insured had an insurable interest even if they were not the owner of the goods. According to the evidence the goods were in the warehouse of Rubber Products Ltd. under arrangements made by the appellants. The adjuster in his report stated: “. . . the goods were deposited in Ghana Rubber Products warehouse on arrangement by the insured.” In

[p.172] of [1981] GLR 163

his evidence before the court, the adjuster admitted, “I did make inquiries to ascertain if Sally Trading Enterprise had insured the goods. I found that there was no insurance by Sally.” There was evidence before the court that when 171 yards of textiles from the stock in question were sold to G.N.T.C., the numbers of the appellants’ way-bills were inserted on the invoice of Sally Trading Enterprise. The adjuster admitted asking the appellants to salvage and dispose of the damaged goods after the fire outbreak. There was evidence also that Janet Trading took delivery of the damaged goods. The adjuster gave evidence that he offered the proceeds of the damaged goods to the appellants but that they refused to accept them.

The learned trial judge failed to give adequate consideration to the evidence before the court that the appellants were in possession of the goods. The court held erroneously that there was no insurable interest. The learned trial judge held:

“In assessing how much was recoverable under the policy, I would accept the original documents as stating the truth as to the prices paid by the importers. These are ¢49,839.10 C.I.F. for the 80 bales and ¢116,698.51 C.I.F. for the 366 bales. I have already rejected exhibits J and J1 which gave the purchase prices of the 80 bales and 366 bales as ¢752,286.93 and ¢1,761,704.80 respectively.

However, there is evidence distinct and quite apart from exhibits J and J1 that the appellants paid the higher sums for the goods in question. The adjuster in his report stated, “During our initial investigation into the loss, the insured presented to us an overseas invoice issued to them by Messrs. Spatoinik of Manchester in the value of ¢752,386.95 for the 80 bales of printed knitted materials.” Again he wrote in his report, “We found ourselves that H. Mousa forwarded an overseas invoice to the insured at the value of ¢1,761,704.80.”

The adjuster’s report was dated 30 November 1977; exhibit J was dated 13 January 1978. Long before exhibits J and J1 came into existence, the overseas invoices stating the higher prices were made available to the adjuster. Even if exhibits J and J1 were excluded from record, the evidence on the higher prices as given by the adjuster could not be ignored.

I do not think the assessment of the damages should present any difficulty in view of the evidence before the court. In exhibit 5 the appellants declared the value of the stock covered by the insurance policy in question as ¢1,870,000. This declaration was dated 30 June 1977. The date of the fire was 25 August 1977. There was no evidence that any part of the stock was disposed of in the interval between the declaration and the destruction of the goods.

[p.173] of [1981] GLR 163

The respondents in the court below stated under cross-examination per their witness, “I accept the figure ¢1,870,000 as the value of the goods in the warehouse at the time the declaration was made.” In the absence of any other evidence of disposal apart from the sale to the G.N.T.C. on 22 June 1977, the market value of the goods destroyed was the sum agreed on by the parties as ¢1,870,000.

For the reasons stated above, I would allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the lower court. I give judgment to the appellants in the sum of ¢1,870,000.

Costs in the court assessed at ¢1,000. Costs in the court below to be refunded is paid.

JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.

I also agree.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

J. K. E. E.

Scroll to Top