ASUMADU-SAKYI II vs. OWUSU AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 201
20 November 1980 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 10 min read
[1980] SLR (CA) 12Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Clements, In re; Clements v. Erlanger Costa Rica Republic v. Erlanger (1877) 46 L.J.Ch. 375; 36 L.T. 332, C.A.
(2) Maria Annie Davies, In re (1888) 21 Q.B.D. 236; 37 W.R. 57.
(3) Barrell Enterprises, In re [1973] 1 W.L.R. 19; [1972] 3 All E.R. 631, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for release from imprisonment for contempt of court in respect of failure to fully pay judgment debt into court as earlier ordered by the High Court, Kumasi. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling of the court.
COUNSEL
Adumua-Bossman for the applicant.
Asumadu-Sakyi (with him Kodua) for the respondents, [p.203] of [1981] GLR 201
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
Apaloo C.J. delivered the ruling of the court. The applicant invokes the inherent jurisdiction of this court to order his release from prison where he is at present incarcerated for contempt of court. The applicant seems to have had in connection with this matter, two spells of imprisonment. At first, he was imprisoned on 30 March 1979. On 6 November of that year, he was released on certain conditions which he failed to meet. He was again imprisoned on 12 February 1980 and is still in prison now. He has been in prison for seven months on the first spell and just over nine months on the second. Accordingly, in connection with this matter, he has been in prison for an aggregate period of over sixteen months.
The reason proffered for the present application, is that he should be released from prison to enable him raise the necessary funds so he can comply with the order for whose disobedience he was incarcerated. It was also alleged, in effect, that having been in prison for over twelve months, the purpose of his punishment for contempt has been duly served.
The respondents dispute that this court has an inherent jurisdiction to entertain this matter and argues that it is incompetent. At all events, the respondents say the applicant has not met the condition imposed for his release and is in no position to meet it now and could not properly be released. The respondents say the applicant should remain in prison, at least until his appeal on the substantive matter has been disposed of but that if the court should feel disposed to order his release, it should be on very stringent conditions.
The facts which prompted the order for his imprisonment are not in dispute. Judgment for a large amount of money was given against him by the High Court, Kumasi, on, 19 October 1978. He was ordered to pay the judgment debt of just over one million cedis within ten days of the judgment. As a result of the applicant’s failure to make this payment, the respondents applied to the court to have him committed for contempt. By an order dated 13 March 1979, the court ordered the applicant to pay the sum of just over ¢776,000 on or before 27 March 1979. He was unable to do so. Accordingly, on 30 March, he was committed to prison for an indefinite period for contempt of court—the sting of the contempt being the disobedience of the court’s order.
It would seem that at some time subsequent to his imprisonment, he caused to be paid just over ¢354,000. That payment fell short of the court’s order. After a number of intermittent applications, this court, by order dated 29 October 1979, ordered his release on certain conditions. The conditions were that he should pay ¢100,000 within two weeks of his release and the balance of the judgment debt of
[p.204] of [1981] GLR 201
just over ¢571,000 within two months thereafter. As he was released on 6 November 1979, the two months deadline expired on 5 January 1980. According to this court’s order, he was to be recommitted to prison if he made default in payment. He did so default and that was why he was returned to prison on 12 February 1980.
As we said, the respondents object that this court has an inherent jurisdiction to entertain this matter. We do not think it can be disputed that this is a superior court or what in English terminology would be a court of record. Such a court has, in England, an inherent jurisdiction to punish for contempt, and one of the punishments normally used is committal to prison. A court of record which commits a person to prison for contempt, has an inherent jurisdiction to release that person from prison.
It is common knowledge that the superior courts of this country have always had the power to commit for contempt. That power has now been put on a firm basis by the Constitution, 1979, art. 114 (6) which provides:
“(6) The Superior Court of Judicature shall have the power to commit for contempt to themselves and all such powers as were vested in a court of record immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution.”
The power to commit for contempt and the power to release or otherwise pardon the contemnor was one of the inherent powers of a court of record. That inherent power to release, passed to the superior courts of this country by the clear provisions of the Constitution, 1979. It is hardly necessary to point out that article 114 (5) expressly designates this court as one of the three “superior courts of record.” We think this court has an inherent jurisdiction to release a person committed to prison for contempt of its orders. In our opinion, the objection to the jurisdiction of this court was not well founded. Whether a contemnor has purged his contempt or circumstances arose which justified an order for his release, depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. It should be borne in mind that this is discretionary jurisdiction.
That being so, the real point of this case is, whether the circumstances justify the applicant’s release. There can be no question that in re-committing the applicant to prison, the court below merely carried out this court’s order and there is no suggestion that that court was in error in ordering the contemnor back to prison. He had failed to observe one of the conditions imposed by this court for his release, namely, to pay ¢571,000 within two months of his release.
[p.205] of [1981] GLR 201
Ordinarily, a person against whom judgment is given for money payment and who defaults in meeting the judgment debt would not be committed to prison for contempt. The judgment creditor would be left with the legal remedies available to execution creditors to enforce his judgment. The assumption in this case was that the applicant was in possession of the judgment debt or at least that part of it that he was ordered to pay into court by 27 March 1979. He was adjudged guilty of contempt because he was thought wilfully to have disobeyed that order. If it was shown that he did not at that date have that money, then there could be no case of wilful disobedience meriting attachment for contempt. Mere inability to pay would not ground the penal proceeding for contempt.
Having considered the circumstances of this case, we are led to the conclusion that a fair view to take is that the applicant was not, or at any rate not in funds now to meet the payment of the sum ordered by the court. We think what he has been able to pay into court, so far, was all that he had or could raise. The suggestion that he was in possession of the funds and was merely refusing to pay it in order that it may be available for his enjoyment on his release, is a speculation which hardly sounds reasonable. In view of the applicant’s background, training and social position in his community, it does not make sense that he would elect to continue to suffer the opprobrium of continued indefinite incarceration only to enjoy money which he would in any event be bound to pay afterwards. It should not be forgotten that an order for his release will not extinguish the respondents’ right to the money.
The question that we have put to ourselves is: Having been in prison for just over sixteen months for defaulting in obeying the court’s order, would any object be served in keeping him there? The respondents expressly disavowed any suggestion that in arguing for the applicant’s continued incarceration, they wished in any way to be vindictive. It should be borne in mind that contempt of court is a criminal offence, punishable in England as a misdemeanour by fine or imprisonment or both. The punishment should be commensurate with the offence. In In re Clements, Costa Rica Republic v. Erlanger (1877) 46 L.J.Ch. 375, the Master of the Rolls observed at p. 383:
“. . . it seems to me that this jurisdiction of committing for contempt being practically arbitrary and unlimited should be most jealously and carefully watched, and exercised . . . with the greatest reluctance and the greatest anxiety on the part of Judges to see whether there is no other mode which is not open
[p.206] of [1981] GLR 201
to the objection of arbitrariness and which can be brought to bear upon the subject.”
Two cases decided in 1888 and as recently as 1973, typify English judicial approach to the question. In Maria Annie Davies, In re (1888) 21 Q.B.D. 236, the defendant was committed to prison for contempt. She had brought unfounded and vexatious suits to establish her title to property and having failed to show title, sought to obtain possession by force. She disobeyed an injunction made to restrain her from committing the acts complained of. She was committed to prison but told that she would be released if she gave an undertaking to abandon her claim and abstain from further acts to take possession. She refused to give this undertaking and was wholly unrepentant. Having been in prison for eighteen months, the court thought that she had been there long enough and ordered her release. And in the comparatively recent case of Barrell Enterprises, In re [1973] 1 W.L.R. 19, C.A., B. failed or refused to hand to the official receiver certain valuable securities which were believed to be in her possession. She was accordingly committed to prison for contempt. Having been in prison for six months, she applied to the court for her release. Upon failing to obtain an order for her release in the High Court, she appealed. The Court of Appeal thought that the six months she spent in prison was not excessive but was sufficient and ordered her release even though she did not then obey the court’s order to give up the securities and remained defiant. In the course of the judgment Russell L.J. who spoke for the court said, inter alia, at p. 27:
“We cannot accept a proposition that a person committed for failure to obey a mandatory order should never be released so long as he continues in disobedience . . . It is inconceivable that with a view to enforcement of its order the court should keep a man or woman in prison for life or for a long term of years.”
These cases are instructive. Although in neither case did the contemnor show remorse or attempt to obey the court’s order, she was ordered to be released. In the instant case, it seems whatever may have been the applicant’s attitude before, there is now an apparent genuine inability to comply with the court’s order. In those circumstances, we think no object is served by his continued detention in prison. Indeed vis-a-vis the Davies and Barrell Enterprises cases, this case is an a fortiori. Accordingly, we propose to order the applicant’s release.
[p.207] of [1981] GLR 201
But the respondents argued that if we were minded to so order, we should impose on him stringent conditions to ensure compliance with the order of payment. We have given this plea prolonged consideration. If we ordered his release conditional on his paying the money on a date or time certain, he would be returned to prison if he made the utmost effort but failed to get the money. In that manner, the applicant will be going to and out of prison even if he had the best intention of complying with the order but could not genuinely do so. We think it would not be right to re-impose such a condition.
The real object of the applicant’s imprisonment, was to punish him for failing to obey the order of the court, and thus assert the supremacy of the law. That has been done. The respondents should now be enabled to take the ordinary steps to realise the fruits of their judgment by the known process of execution. They will be able to do this if the appeal, which is already ripe for hearing, is expeditiously heard and the judgment in their favour is affirmed. If the judgment is vacated on appeal, there would have been no just basis for the order on the applicant to pay the money into court or his consequential commitment to prison for contempt.
We think therefore that the sixteen months he spent in prison is sufficient to vindicate the court’s power and supremacy but that the ends of justice would be met if we ordered an expeditious disposal of his appeal. We accordingly order that the applicant be released from prison forthwith and that the substantive appeal be listed for hearing before this court on 1 December next. In all the circumstances, we make no order as to costs on this motion.
DECISION
Applicant ordered to be released from prison.
E. P.-T.
