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[1980] SLR (HC) 60High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

JAPAN MOTORS TRADING CO., LTD. vs. RANDOLPH MOTORS LTD. [1982-83] GLR 536

26 November 1980 · ABBAN J · ≈ 19 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 60
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OSCOLAJAPAN MOTORS TRADING CO., LTD. v RANDOLPH MOTORS LTD. [1982-83] GLR 536 [1980] SLR (HC) 60
APAJAPAN MOTORS TRADING CO., LTD. v RANDOLPH MOTORS LTD. [1982-83] GLR 536, [1980] SLR (HC) 60 (Ghana).
BluebookJAPAN MOTORS TRADING CO., LTD. v RANDOLPH MOTORS LTD. [1982-83] GLR 536, [1980] SLR (HC) 60 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Scarf v. Jardine (1882) 7 App. Cas. 345.

(2) Urquhart v. Macpherson (1878) 3 App. Cas. 831, P.C.

(3) Allen v. Robles [1969] 3 All E.R. 154.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION to claim outstanding balance of the purchase price of items sold which was met with a counter-claim of alleged fraudulent misrepresentation of the actual value of items. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

J. B. A. Chinnery for the plaintiffs.

A. A. Ayisi (Miss) for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.

The claim of the plaintiffs is for ¢14,620. The amount is made up of the balance of purchase price of ¢12,920 plus interest of ¢1,700.

The parties are motor dealers. In or about October 1970, the plaintiffs intending to sell their motor workshop consisting of

[p.538] of [1982-83] GLR 536 showrooms, spare parts store, parking space, office machinery and equipment all situated at house No. C.920/3, Asylum Down, Accra, entered into negotiations with one Mr. Jonas Kwamina Randol who was interested in the said property. The negotiations ended up in the signing of the deed of agreement, exhibit A, between the plaintiffs on one hand and the said Mr. Jonas Kwamina Randolph on the other hand. The agreement was dated 15 October 1970. The purchase price agreed upon and which was to be paid by Mr. Randolph within three months from 15 October 1970 was ¢122,000.

At the time of the agreement, the plaintiffs were in the process of putting up another motor workshop at the Industrial Area of Accra and it was envisaged that the construction would be completed within three months from the date of the agreement. Consequently, it was agreed under clause 3 of the agreement that the plaintiffs were to remain in occupation of the premises for three months and to pay to Mr. Randolph ¢1,020 a month as rent. It was further agreed in clause 14 of the agreement that if for any cause, not due to any wilful default, the full purchase price of ¢122,000 could not be paid within the three months, that is by 15 January 1971, the said Mr Randolph was to pay to the plaintiff ¢5 per cent per annum on any outstanding balance until the full purchase price of ¢122,000 was paid.

Mr. Randolph failed to pay the purchase price or any part thereof within the stipulated period. And in January 1971 or thereabout he approached the plaintiffs and asked them to allow him more time, for he was trying to negotiate for a loan from the National Investment Bank to pay for the full purchase price and that further extension of time would enable him to complete the loan transaction with the said bank. The plaintiffs agreed to accommodate him.

However, in his negotiation with the said bank, Mr. Randolph came against another obstacle. The bank, not being disposed to granting huge loans of this nature to individuals, insisted that Mr. Randolph should float a limited liability company to take over the negotiation from him. Mr. Randolph readily complied with the bank’s request. Hence he formed the defendant-company with Mr. Randolph himself as the managing director.

Following the formation of the defendant-company (which will hereinafter be referred to simply as the defendants), Mr. Randolph in his capacity as the managing director and on behalf of the defendants entered into another agreement in respect of the premises with the plaintiffs. This new agreement was embodied in a second document described as the deed of conveyance, exhibit D. It is interesting to note that the latter agreement, exhibit D, adopted the whole transaction including the terms and conditions as agreed upon in exhibit A. In effect, the defendants took over the benefits and liability of Mr. Randolph in exhibit A.

[p.539] of [1982-83] GLR 536

On the execution of the deed of conveyance, exhibit D, by the plaintiffs and the defendants on 8 March 1971, Mr. Randolph, acting on behalf of the defendants, got the loan transaction with the bank through; and the bank paid greater part of the purchase price to the plaintiffs on behalf of the defendants.

According to the plaintiffs, the purchase price of the building itself agreed upon was ¢100,000 and the value of “chattels and things” agreed to be supplied was ¢22,000. The case of the plaintiffs was that the amount paid by the bank on behalf of the defendants together with payment made by the defendants themselves was ¢105,000, leaving a balance of ¢17,000. This balance of ¢17,000 was to be paid within 12 months by instalments of ¢1,020 a month for the first four months and ¢1,625 a month for the next eight months. But the defendants paid a total instalment of ¢4,080 for the first four months and failed to pay any more instalments and the outstanding balance of the purchase price up to date is ¢12,920. The plaintiffs are therefore claiming this amount plus interest of ¢1,700.

The defendants were represented by Mr. Randolph in this action. He said at the time he entered into the deed of agreement, exhibit A, the defendants had not come into existence. But when the defendants came into existence, they took over the transaction in exhibit A and consequently, the subject-matter of the sale in exhibit A was conveyed to them by the plaintiffs by a deed of conveyance, exhibit D. And upon the execution of the said exhibit D, the National Investment Bank paid to the plaintiffs ¢96,060 on behalf of the defendants and the defendants themselves paid to the plaintiffs ¢4,860 making a total of ¢100,920. Mr. Randolph said even though the defendants paid this amount of ¢100,920 to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs, apart from the premises, did not supply the defendants with the said “chattels and things.” He averred that the only equipment which the plaintiffs supplied was a used service lift instead of a brand new one which was agreed upon.

Mr. Randolph further stated that the defendants were entitled under the deed of conveyance, exhibit D, to go into occupation of the premises three months after execution of the said agreement. But the plaintiffs refused to vacate the premises after the stipulated three months and over-stayed for another one month. This prevented the defendants from making use of the premises with the result that the defendants had to pay the wages and salaries of their employees who had been engaged to work at the premises but could not do so due to the fault of the plaintiffs. In other words, the defendants, even though they had no benefit of the service of those employees, were compelled to pay those employees. For it was not the fault of the said employees that they were idle for the one month that the plaintiffs over-stayed in

[p.540] of [1982-83] GLR 536 the premises. The wages, the salaries and other expenses incurred by the defendants for the said one month amounted to ¢3,246.36.

The defendants in their amended statement of defence and in the evidence of their representative, Mr. Randolph, made a very serious allegation of fraud against the plaintiffs. They contended that the actual value of the building was ¢75,000 but the plaintiffs deliberately and fraudulently misrepresented to the defendants that the value was ¢100,000. Similarly, the actual value of the “chattels and things” the plaintiffs were to supply was only ¢10,778.85; but hitherto, the plaintiffs fraudulently inflated it to ¢22,000.

The defendants therefore counterclaimed for the rescission of the contract; or alternatively ¢50,000 damages inclusive of special damages of ¢36,221.25. This amount is made up as follows: ¢25,000 over and above the ¢75,000 which according to them was the true value of the building, ¢11,221.25 over and above the ¢10,778.85, then the difference between ¢2,460 which the defendants contended was the true value of a new service lift and ¢4,990 which the defendants said they paid for the alleged old service lift; and finally an amount of ¢4,080 being the rent for the four months the plaintiffs over-stayed in the premises.

I will first dispose of the issue raised in connection with the first agreement, exhibit A. There was the contention to the effect that the agreement was not binding as it was null and void so far as the defendants were concerned. It is clear from the evidence that the parties based their claim and counterclaim on exhibit D and not on exhibit A.

So that the further argument as to whether or not exhibit A was still binding on Mr. Randolph or on the defendants does not arise in the circumstances. What took place looked like a kind of novation. That is, a transaction by which, with the consent of all the parties involved, a new contract is adopted in place of another which is already in existence: see Scarf v. Jardine (1882) 7 App. Cas. 345. At p. 351 Lord Selborne explained novation as follows:

“In the Court of first instance the case was treated really as one of what is called ‘novation,’ which as I understand it means this – the term being derived from the Civil Law – that there being a contract in existence, some new contract is substituted for it, either between the same parties (for that might be) or between different parties; the consideration mutually being the discharge of the old contract.”

So that novation primarily involves the discharge of the original obligation under an existing contract and the creation of a new one in its place.

[p.541] of [1982-83] GLR 536

In the present case, on the showing of the parties themselves, I find that they agreed to substitute the deed of conveyance, exhibit D, for the deed of agreement, exhibit A. Here with the consent of all the parties, the transaction in exhibit A was incorporated in the new deed of conveyance, exhibit D: and the defendants were substituted for Mr. Randolph, thereby discharging Mr. Randolph from his obligation under the said exhibit A. It was therefore, as I have said, a kind of novation since it was clearly the intention of the parties that the liability of Mr. Randolph under the original agreement to the plaintiffs was to be discharged in consideration of the defendants performing the same obligation in favour of the plaintiffs.

Consequently, the rights and the liability of Mr. Randolph under exhibit A became extinguished when exhibit D was substituted for exhibit A. In the circumstances, I hold that the only transaction which was binding on the parties herein was the one as contained in the deed of conveyance, exhibit D.

The next issue is whether the plaintiffs fraudulently misrepresented the value of the property to the defendants and whether the defendants were induced by that fraud to enter into the said contract.

On the close examination of the evidence, I find that the conduct of the defendants in the matter was quite inconsistent with that of a person who had actually been defrauded. The managing director of the defendants said the building was valued at ¢75,000 and the “chattels and things” were valued at ¢10,778.85 making a total of ¢85,779.85. This valuation exercise was carried out by valuers employed by the National Investment Bank. The defendants relied on this to contend that the plaintiffs fraudulently inflated the purchase price of the property.

The plaintiffs, on the other hand, insisted that the market value of the building at the time was assessed by their own valuers as ¢100,000. The senior project officer of the National Investment Bank, who gave evidence for the defendants, conceded in the course of his evidence that in matters of valuation, such as this, opinion might differ.

In other words, valuations made by different valuers are opinions which may differ. So that the fact that the value which was put on the building by the valuers of the National Investment Bank differed from that of the valuers of the plaintiffs cannot, without more, be evidence of fraud on the part of the plaintiffs; and I do not see the justification on the part of the defendants in insisting that the value put on the building by the valuers of the bank should be accepted as the true value of the building.

Indeed, the valuation made by the bank was not even brought to the notice of the plaintiffs, either verbally or in writing, so as to give the plaintiffs the opportunity to challenge it. It was kept from the

[p.542] of [1982-83] GLR 536 plaintiffs by the defendants. The bank too never communicated it to the plaintiffs. The bank treated it as a matter between the defendants and the bank. I will here quote a portion of the evidence of Mr. Akko, the Senior Project Officer of the bank, who gave evidence as the first defendant witness.

Under cross-examination he stated as follows:

“Q. Was your valuation brought to the notice of the defendants?

A. It was. The plaintiffs did not know of our valuation. It was a matter between the bank and the defendants. It was the defendants whom the bank was dealing with and should therefore know.”

It is therefore plain that the valuation made by the bank was not made with the consent of the plaintiffs as the defendants tried to show. The plaintiffs had nothing to do with it and in fact the defendants, as I have found, never brought it to the knowledge of the plaintiffs.

According to Mr. Randolph, the defendants became aware of the true value of the property after the assessment had been made by the valuers of the bank and three days after the defendants had made payment. It was at that stage that the defendants realised, for the first time, that they had been deceived and cheated by the plaintiffs. Payment was made by the defendants on the execution of the deed of conveyance which was dated 15 March 1971. In effect, the defendants must have become aware of the inflated value and of the fraud in March 1971. Yet they chose to do nothing. Instead, the defendants did everything to indicate to the plaintiffs that there was nothing wrong with the transaction. The defendants kept silent over this serious matter for all these years. It was only when they were sued in the present action that they raised the question of fraudulent inflation of the purchase price on the part of the plaintiffs.

There is no doubt in my mind that if the plaintiffs had not sued to recover the balance of the purchase price, the defendants would have been quite happy with the purchase price. In my opinion, the contention of the defendants as to the fraudulent misrepresentation was an after-thought. I hold that the plaintiffs never inflated the purchase price; neither were the defendants induced or influenced in any way by any false or fraudulent misrepresentation to enter into the said contract.

In any case, even if I had found that there was fraudulent misrepresentation as alleged by the defendants, I would still have held that the defendants, on the evidence, could not succeed in rescinding the contract. Because the defendants having become aware of the alleged fraud a few days after the payment of the ¢96,960 (and this was in or about March 1971) never complained either immediately or thereafter.

But they proceeded to abide by the terms of the agreement and even

[p.543] of [1982-83] GLR 536 called upon the plaintiffs to give up possession of the premises when the plaintiffs failed to leave the place three months after the execution of the contract as agreed upon.

Furthermore, the defendants caused a letter, exhibit B, to be written by their solicitors demanding the removal of the plaintiffs from the premises. This letter was replied to by the solicitors of the plaintiffs indicating the willingness of the plaintiffs to pay the defendants rent for the extra one month the plaintiffs over-stayed. The reply is exhibit C. The defendants eventually got possession and moved into occupation; and they have been occupying the premises for their business all these years.

Not only that, the defendants with full knowledge of the so-called fraudulent misrepresentation agreed to accept from the plaintiffs sums of money to enable them to purchase from other sources those “chattels and things” which the plaintiffs were unable to supply in terms of the agreement. Again, the defendants, despite the alleged fraud, entered into negotiations with the plaintiffs for the plaintiffs to reimburse them for the expenses the defendants incurred during the one month the plaintiffs over-stayed on the premises.

Surely, these unequivocal acts on the part of the defendants are consistent with their having opted to go by the agreement irrespective of the fraudulent misrepresentation. I am therefore of the view that the defendants, with full knowledge of the alleged fraud, chose to abide by the contract and indeed obtained benefits thereunder. Where a purchaser has been induced to buy property by the vendor’s fraudulent misrepresentation, the purchaser has two courses or options open to him. He may abide by the contract and then bring action to recover damages he has sustained due to the fraud; or he may rescind the contract, return the property if already accepted, and recover the purchase price, if already paid, by action after demand and refusal.

For the principle is that a contract induced by fraud is not void but only voidable at the election of the party defrauded, and when once the party defrauded has elected to abide by the contract, being aware of the fraud, he cannot afterwards rescind it: see Scarf v. Jardine (supra). At pp. 360-361 of the report, Lord Blackburn stated the law in the following terms:

“The principle, I take it, running through all the cases as to what is an election is this, that where a party in his own mind has thought that he would choose one of two remedies, even though he has written it down on a memorandum or has indicated it in some other way, that alone will not bind him; but so soon as he has not only determined to follow one of his remedies but has communicated it to the other side in such a way as to lead the opposite party to believe that he has made that choice, he has

[p.544] of [1982-83] GLR 536 completed his election and can go no further; and whether he intended it or not, if he has done an unequivocal act —- I mean an act which would be justifiable if he had elected one way and would not be justifiable if he had elected the other way —- the fact of his having done that unequivocal act to the knowledge of the persons concerned is an election.”

(The emphasis is mine.) See also Urquhart v. Macpherson (1878) 3 App. Cas. 831, P.C.

If the defendants had intended to rescind the contract on grounds of fraud they ought to have made this decision known to the plaintiffs at the earliest opportunity and should not have kept that intention to themselves for all those years. It should be realised that in cases where there is a choice between two remedies the choice must be made within reasonable time and without undue delay: see Allen v. Robles [1969] 3 All E.R. 15th at p. 157.

The undue delay on the part of the defendants, coupled with those unequivocal acts already referred to, undoubtedly showed that the defendants elected to abide by the agreement despite the so-called fraudulent misrepresentation and they are bound by their election.

They cannot when it suited their convenience retract it, reprobate it, and go back on their liability. Thus, as I have stated, even if I had held that the fraudulent misrepresentation had been proved, I would still have refused to order the rescission of the contract. Of course, the defendants would then, in those circumstances, have been left with their remedy of recovering damages for the loss which they might have sustained as a result of the fraud. However, I find that the true market value of the building at the material time was ¢100,000 and this price was freely accepted by the defendants. No deceit of any kind was practised on the defendants by the plaintiffs.

I will now resolve the issue as to whether the plaintiffs supplied all or any of the “chattels and things” itemised in the schedule to the deed of conveyance.

The plaintiffs agreed to supply those items to the value of ¢22,000 but on the evidence, I find that apart from the service lift, the plaintiffs were unable to honour that obligation. The contention of the plaintiffs that they supplied all those items was untenable. As a matter of fact, in the course of his evidence, the managing director of the plaintiffs was at pains to admit that the plaintiffs gave the defendants the sum of ¢5,788.85 to enable them to purchase some of the “chattels and things” which the plaintiffs could not supply. But worse still, the plaintiffs failed to prove to the court as to which of the items stipulated in the schedule were supplied by them and those they could not supply; neither could they give any indication as to the total value of those items they supplied. The plaintiffs’ managing director promised, during the trial, to produce and tender a

[p.545] of [1982-83] GLR 536 list showing particulars but failed to do so.

The result is that in case I had found that the plaintiffs supplied some of the “chattels and things,” it would have been very difficult for me to find out whether the sum of ¢5,788.85 which the plaintiffs gave to the defendants, in place of the items not supplied, was reasonable.

A suggestion was made by counsel for the plaintiffs during the cross-examination of the managing director of the defendants to the effect that the plaintiffs supplied the defendants with “chattels and things” to the value of 9,211.25. The suggestion was denied and no attempt was made to establish the truth of that allegation. I find that the plaintiffs did not supply the “chattels and things” apart from the service lift.

There was dispute as to whether the said service lift which was supplied was a new one. The defendants and their witnesses stated that it was an old one. But, there was ample evidence showing that the said lift was brand new and I believe the evidence of the plaintiffs and their witnesses on this issue. I am satisfied that the old lift which was in the building was dismantled by the plaintiffs and a brand new one was installed in its place for the defendants. The price of the new lift was not spelt out in the schedule but it formed part of the ¢22,000 being the total value of “chattels and things” to be supplied. Nevertheless, I am inclined to accept the evidence of Mr. Boyefio Quartey, who was a disinterested party, that a brand new lift of that type at that time cost ¢2,500. In the course of his normal work, Mr. Boyefio Quartey used to collect proforma invoices in respect of equipment of this nature and through this he had become conversant with prices of lifts at that relevant period.

I therefore hold that the plaintiffs supplied the defendants a brand new lift which was worth ¢2,500 and in addition gave the defendants ¢5,788.75. So that in respect of the “chattels and things” the defendants benefited to the tune of ¢8,288.75 instead of ¢22,000. In other words, the value of “chattels and things” which the plaintiffs never supplied to the defendants amounted to ¢13,711.25. The claim of the plaintiffs for the full value of ¢22,000 plus interest is therefore unjustified.

The total amount paid by the defendants themselves and the National Investment Bank on behalf of the defendants was ¢100,920. Apart from this amount, I find that the plaintiffs credited the defendants with ¢4,080. This amount represented the rent for the four months (at ¢1,020 a month) which the plaintiffs occupied the premises after the execution of the deed of conveyance. The defendants having been given credit by the plaintiffs for the ¢4,080, the total amount which the defendants paid for the whole transaction was ¢105,000. The value of the building alone was ¢100,000.

[p.546] of [1982-83] GLR 536

Consequently, the amount which the defendants in actual fact paid toward the “chattels and things” was only ¢5,000 and no more. But as I have already found the defendants benefited to the tune of ¢8,288.75 so far as those “chattels and things” were concerned. It is therefore only fair that the defendants should pay to the plaintiffs the difference between the ¢8,288.75 and the ¢5,000, which is ¢3,288.75; and in my view this is the only amount the plaintiffs are entitled to in this action.

Adverting to the counterclaim, I must observe that the defendants could not prove any damages they suffered for the failure of the plaintiffs to supply them all the “chattels and things.” They were rather concerned with proving, somehow, damages for fraudulent misrepresentation as an alternative to rescission and the expenses they were put to when the plaintiffs over-stayed in the premises for the extra one month.

However, I accept the evidence of the managing director of the defendants and that of Mr. Kwetey Kwei, the administrative officer of the defendants, that the defendants had to pay the salaries and wages of workers and staff for June 1971. Those persons had been engaged to work at the premises but due to the failure of the plaintiffs to vacate the premises on time, the defendants were deprived of their services. But the defendants had to pay them all the same. Exhibit G shows the wages and salaries paid by the defendants. Other expenses incurred by the defendants in connection with the delay in vacating the premises were paid by the plaintiffs either by cheque (as in the case of ¢571.08 being the interest on the loan), or the defendants were given credit for them as in the case of rents. What the plaintiffs did not pay or credit the defendants with was the amount the defendants paid out in wages and salaries which I find to be ¢2,675.30.

In my opinion, this is the only legitimate amount which the defendants are entitled to; and I consider all the other claims of the defendants in the counterclaim as baseless.

In the circumstances, judgment would be entered for the plaintiffs for the sum of ¢3,288.75. Similarly, judgment is hereby entered for the defendants on their counterclaim for ¢2,675.30 The plaintiffs are awarded costs of ¢1,000 and the defendants costs of ¢800, all inclusive of fees to counsel.

DECISION

Both claim and counter claim allowed in part.

K. B.

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