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[1981] SLR (HC) 20High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

AYIAH vs. COLEMAN [1982-83] GLR 322

10 February 1981 · WUAKU J · ≈ 19 min read

Cite as[1981] SLR (HC) 20
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OSCOLAAYIAH v COLEMAN [1982-83] GLR 322 [1981] SLR (HC) 20
APAAYIAH v COLEMAN [1982-83] GLR 322, [1981] SLR (HC) 20 (Ghana).
BluebookAYIAH v COLEMAN [1982-83] GLR 322, [1981] SLR (HC) 20 (Ghana High Ct. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Motor Parts Trading Co. v. Nunoo [1962] 2 G.L.R. 195, S.C.

[p.324] of [1982-83] GLR 322

(2) Dua v. Afriyie [1971] 1 G.L.R. 260, C.A.

(3) Cofie v. Otoo [1959] G.L.R. 300.

(4) Painstil v. Aba [1964] G.L.R. 34, S.C.

(5) Cook v. Kutsoatsi [1960] G.L.R. 96.

(6) Dzanku v. Kwadwo [1960] G.L.R. 31, C.A.

(7) Kwansa v. Brahima [1966] G.L.R. 784.

(8) Dapaah v. Poku (1950) Oll. C.L.L. 173, W.A.C.A.

(9) Asare v. Brobbey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 331, C.A.

(10) Ussher v. Darko [1977] 1 G.L.R. 476, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by pledgee to recover loans granted the pledgor and for general damages for breach of a pledge agreement. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Amponsah-Dadzie (with him Arthur) for the plaintiff.

Short for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF WUAKU J.

By his writ of summons filed at the registry of this court on 12 June, 1979, the plaintiff claims from the defendant:

“(a) The total sum of ¢80,174.26 made up as follows:

1. ¢50,000 general damages for breach of a pledge agreement entered into between the parties on or about 29 April, 1977.

2. Recovery of the sum of ¢30,174.26 (including moneys totalling ¢6,000 subsequently taken by the defendant from the plaintiff on same security) being financial assistance the plaintiff rendered to the defendant without interest at the defendant’s own request for which the defendant pledged his house number L.88, Kokoso-Sankoa quarters, Agona Swedru, as security.

(b) An account of payment to the plaintiff of all rents, collected from tenants put in the said house by the defendant from 29 April 1977 to the date of judgment.”

The facts of the case are not very much involved. Some time ago, the defendant’s house No. L.88 situated at Kokoso-Sankoa quarters, Agona Swedru, was sold at a public auction. The defendant who was anxious to retrieve his said house from the purchaser therefore approached one Nana Osei Bonsu to implore the plaintiff on his behalf for financial assistance to pay off the amount involved.

The plaintiff was approached by Nana Osei Bonsu accompanied by the defendant himself. Initially, the plaintiff was unwilling to assist the defendant. However, he was prevailed upon by Nana Osei Bonsu and so he yielded to the demand and advanced an amount of ¢24,174.26 to the defendant charging no interest thereon. Exhibit A

[p.325] of [1982-83] GLR 322 which is the fulcrum of this controversy was then drawn up to evidence the transaction. Upon further request by the defendant, the plaintiff advanced an additional sum of ¢6,000 to the defendant. No new document was prepared to cover this additional sum of ¢6,000. But it was agreed between the parties that this amount was also to be covered by exhibit A. Thus the defendant’s total indebtedness to the plaintiff came to ¢30,174.26. Exhibit A is as follows:

“DEED OF AGREEMENT THIS AGREEMENT is made the 29 day of April, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Seven (1977)

BETWEEN the pledgor TIMOTHY AUGUSTUS COLEMAN of Agona Swedru in the Central Region of Ghana of the one part and the pledgee KWAME AYIAH of Agona Swedru in the Central Region of Ghana of the other part.

1. That the pledgor is the owner of all that piece or parcel of land situate at Kokoso-Sankoa quarters, Agona Swedru, aforesaid with building on it known as and called House Number L.88, Kokoso-Sankoa quarters, Agona Swedru (hereinafter called the property).

2. That the pledgor has obtained from the pledgee the total sum of twenty-four thousand one hundred and seventy-four cedis twenty-six pesewas (¢24,174.26) being financial assistance without interest to be repaid on or before 1 May, 1982 (five years’ time).

3. That as security for the said sum of ¢24,174.26 the pledgor hereby pledges the property to the pledgee for a period of five (5) years from the date of execution; after which period the pledgee shall have the right to dispose of the property.

4. That the pledgor hereby acknowledges the receipt of the sum of twenty-four thousand one hundred and seventy-four cedis twenty-six pesewas (¢24,174.26) from the pledgee as financial assistance.

THE PROPERTY is bounded on the North by the property of MADAM ESTHER MANN on the South by the KWANSAKROM-SWEDRU ROAD, on the East by YAW BOO’S property and on the West by MADAM ESTHER MANN’s property.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Parties have hereunto set their respective hands and seals the day and year first above written.

SIGNED, SEALED AND DELIVERED by the pledgor TIMOTHY AUGUSTUS COLEMAN of Agona Swedru in the presence of (Sgd). TIMOTHY AUGUSTUS COLEMAN

[p.326] of [1982-83] GLR 322

SIGNED, SEALED AND DELIVERED by the pledgee KWAME AYIAH of Agona Swedru in the presence of (Sgd.) KWAME AYIAH.”

It is the plaintiff’s case that after execution of exhibit A he took physical possession of the house as a customary pledgee. The house was then in occupation of tenants put there by the defendant. He called the tenants and introduced himself to them as their new landlord and collected the rents from them at ¢100 per month.

Some three months later, the plaintiff gave notice to the tenants to quit, because he intended renovating the premises. The tenants asked for extension of time to which he agreed, eventually the tenants left the premises without his knowledge. When the plaintiff got to know that the tenants had left, he sent his workmen to the house only to discover that the tenants had come back to the house at the instance of the defendant. He therefore wrote exhibit B to the defendant but had no reply from him.

The plaintiff contends that he is a customary pledgee of the house and is entitled not only to have possession of the house, but also to collect the rents without accounting to the defendant. He admits that he collected rents from the tenants up to the time that they left the house at his request. He also admits that he had attempted to increase the rent to ¢300, but the tenants said they could not afford to pay that amount.

The defendant’s case put briefly is that in 1977 with the help of Nana Osei Bonsu, he obtained financial assistance from the plaintiff to enable him retrieve his house which had been sold at a public auction. Nothing was said about his house, but later on an agreement, exhibit A, was prepared by Mr. Amponsah-Dadzie; the plaintiff’s solicitor whereby his house was pledged to the plaintiff for five years. He also gave his title deed to the plaintiff. He, however, denied that there was an agreement that the plaintiff should collect the rents accruing from the house although he allowed the plaintiff to collect rents because it was convenient for the plaintiff to do so, adding that the plaintiff was to use the rents to pay off the debt. He says that after the plaintiff had asked the tenants to quit, the house was unoccupied for seventeen months. The house became dilapidated, and to arrest the situation he put back the tenants into the house. He, the defendant has since then been collecting the rents and making use of them. He approached the plaintiff on 6 January 1979 and offered to pay him ¢8,000 and issued two post-dated cheques to mature in April and October respectively to cover the balance outstanding, but the plaintiff refused insisting that he should pay him in full.

[p.327] of [1982-83] GLR 322

The main controversy between the parties is the interpretation to be put on exhibit A or the effect of it, and whether extrinsic evidence should be adduced to add to, or explain exhibit A. The plaintiff pleaded that the house was pledged to him. The defendant admits this in paragraph 3 of his defence on 25 August, 1979.

The defendant sought and obtained leave to amend paragraph 19 of his defence by adding thereto the following:

“(19) (a) Having regard to the provisions of the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122) the instrument of pledge relied on is null and void and of no effect.” When the defendant filed his amended defence he pleaded in paragraph 3 thus: “The defendant admits that he collected the sum of ¢30,000 from the plaintiff and secured it with his said house.” This is slightly different from the original paragraph 3 of the defence which was that: “The defendant admits that he collected the sum of ¢30,000 from the plaintiff and secured it with his house by way of a pledge.”

Because the defendant never sought to amend the said paragraph 3, counsel for the plaintiff, Mr. Amponsah-Dadzie, tendered the original defence which is marked exhibit C. The leave which was granted to the defendant to amend was limited to paragraph 19, and it was not to affect paragraph 3. I therefore hold that the purported amendment of paragraph 3 was without authority and is therefore void. I cannot therefore agree with Mr. Short that the amended defence filed entirely supersedes the original defence.

The plaintiff said that when the defendant and Nana Osei Bonsu came to see him it was Nana Osei Bonsu who spoke for the defendant; the defendant himself said that because he had already told his story to Nana Osei Bonsu, it was Nana Osei Bonsu who narrated everything to the plaintiff. From the evidence on record, it is quite clear that Nana Osei Bonsu played a leading role in the matter. His evidence must, therefore, deserve serious consideration. Part of Nana Osei Bonsu’s evidence-in-chief is as follows:

“I know the defendant, he is my friend. In April 1977 the defendant came to see me with one Mr. Edufu that he had a case and as a result his house was sold at an auction and was bought by somebody in Accra, and he does not want a person staying in Accra to purchase his property and I should therefore intercede on his behalf to see the plaintiff on his behalf and to discuss the matter with him and that he should pay the debt for him and he would pledge his house to him according to our African custom. At the time when the defendant came to see me the plaintiff was at Cape Coast. I telephoned the plaintiff who came from Cape Coast. The plaintiff came to meet me and the defendant at the plaintiff’s house. I informed the plaintiff on his arrival that the

[p.328] of [1982-83] GLR 322 defendant’s house was auctioned after a court action and that the defendant needed financial help to retrieve the house. The defendant was offering his house as security to be managed by the plaintiff under our African custom.”

Mr. Short for the defendant has submitted that on the face of exhibit A the plaintiff was neither granted nor was he entitled to possession and, therefore, if one is to go strictly by the terms of exhibit A, there was no breach of that agreement and that there was nothing which entitles the plaintiff to treat the agreement as having been terminated. Counsel submitted further that when a transaction is reduced into writing by parties, the parties are bound by the agreement and extrinsic evidence is not admissible to vary, contradict, extract, add to, or subtract from the terms of the agreement. Counsel cited in support of his argument the case of Motor Parts Trading Co. v. Nunoo [1962] 2 G.L.R. 195, S.C.

Mr. Short has invited the court to hold that exhibit A creates an equitable mortgage because the defendant has deposited his title deed with the plaintiff and that the right of the plaintiff would mature after a period of five years. That no evidence was led to show that exhibit A does not contain all that was agreed upon and that there was no breach when the defendant retook possession of the house which still exists as a security for the plaintiff.

Counsel for the plaintiff, Mr. Amponsah-Dadzie, on the other hand argued that to understand the true nature of exhibit A, it was necessary to lead extrinsic evidence and relied on the case of Dua v. Afriyie [1971] 1 G.L.R. 260, C.A. and Cofie v. Otoo [1959] G.L.R. 300. He submitted that the pleadings and the evidence show that the plaintiff was given and had physical possession of the house, because the plaintiff collected rents and was able to eject the tenants at will.

On the question of deposit of the defendant’s title deed, counsel submitted that it only goes to support the plaintiff’s possession and referred to the case of Painstil v. Aba [1964] G.L.R. 34, S.C. Counsel further referred to the cases of Cook v. Kutsoatsi [1960] G.L.R. 96; Dzanku v. Kwadwo [1960] G.L.R. 31, C.A. and Kwansa v. Brahima [1966] G.L.R. 784 and submitted that the transaction was a customary pledge because all the incidents of customary pledge had been proved, such as the plaintiff going into possession, collecting the rents and not accounting to the defendant.

The evidence of Nana Osei Bonsu shows that the defendant was to pledge his house to the plaintiff according to custom. Nana Osei Bonsu’s evidence that the defendant came to see him with one Edufu that he would customarily pledge his house was not challenged. Edufu is undoubtedly the defendant’s member of family, he was not called by the defendant to come to dispute Nana Osei Bonsu’s allegation. In

[p.329] of [1982-83] GLR 322 exhibit A, the parties were described as “the pledgor” and “the pledgee.”

Painstil v. Aba (supra) shows that the surrendering of a title deed per se is not an unequivocal act of sale or equitable mortgage. One has to look at the evidence as a whole to determine whether the surrendering of the title deed was to create an equitable mortgage. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of exhibit A show quite clearly that the defendant acknowledged the receipt of the loan and the house was given as a security. Exhibit A must in my view be described as a memorandum covering the loan transaction: see the case of Cook v. Kutsoatsi (supra). I accept the evidence of Nana Osei Bonsu that the defendant gave out his house for a customary pledge to the plaintiff for the loan he obtained, and that he deposited his title deed merely as a symbol of his good faith or credit.

The defendant’s version as to how the plaintiff came to collect the rents from the tenants is so inconsistent as not to be true. He stated: “It was convenient for the plaintiff to collect the rents to pay the debt so I allowed it. We never had any discussions as regards the collection of rents.” The cross-examination of him on this piece of evidence went like this:

Q. Is it also true that after the execution of the agreement the plaintiff had possession of the house?

A. Yes, he had it as a matter of convenience.

Q. What do you mean by a matter of convenience?

A. Ostensibly to collect rents to pay the loan advanced to me.

Counsel for the defendant gave the impression that the rents were to be used as part-payment towards the liquidation of the loan the plaintiff advanced to the defendant.

If according to the defendant there was no discussion that the plaintiff was to collect the rents, then I do not see how the defendant expects the plaintiff to know that rents collected were to be used either to pay off the loan or to be regarded as part-payment. In five years, the rent at ¢100 per month will amount to only ¢6,000. Obviously that cannot pay off the debt. The defendant is admittedly educated, he is a former bursar of a school, he must have a reason for saying that he allowed the plaintiff “ostensibly to collect [the] rents to pay the loan advanced to him.” Might it not be true that the true reason for allowing the plaintiff to collect the rents is because the plaintiff is a customary pledgee? And that he was entitled to collect the rents for five years without accounting to the defendant. In my opinion, the agreement entered into between the parties was a customary pledge and the plaintiff was to take possession of the house and to collect the rents without accounting to the defendant.

[p.330] of [1982-83] GLR 322

I derive a great deal of support for the conclusion I have reached from Ollennu’s Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana at pp. 94-107 and the case of Dapaah v. Poku (1950) Oll. C.L.L. 173, W.A.C.A. At page 99 the learned author said “It is an incident of pledge that the pledgee is absolutely entitled to enjoy all profits accruing from the pledged land, and is not accountable to the pledgor.” This observation applies to the present case.

A good deal of argument was devoted to the question whether extrinsic evidence should be allowed having regard to the fact that the transaction was reduced into writing, i.e. exhibit A. There is enough authority to place it beyond dispute that extrinsic evidence is never inadmissible where a transaction has been reduced into writing. An authority in point is the case of Dua v. Afriyie (supra). In this case Apaloo J.A. (as he then was) said at p. 264:

“This contention is founded on no more than the trite rule of the law of evidence that, when a transaction has been reduced to or recorded in writing, either by requirement of law, or agreement of the parties, extrinsic evidence is, in general, inadmissible to contradict, vary, add to or substract from the terms of the document.

But this well-known rule is subject to a number of exceptions. One such exception noted at p. 731, para, 1798 of Phipson on Evidence (10th ed.) is:

“Extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove any matter which by substantive law affects the validity of a document or entitles a party to any relief in respect thereof, notwithstanding that such evidence tends to vary, add to or, in some cases, contradict the writing…”

The evidence clearly shows that not everything that the parties agreed upon was embodied in exhibit A, such as the plaintiff taking possession, that there were tenants in the house and the fact that the plaintiff was to collect the rents, and above all that the plaintiff was in the future to make further advances to the defendant upon the same security.

Another argument by Mr. Short was the non-registration of exhibit A in compliance with section 24 of the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122). Mr. Amponsah-Dadzie conceded that exhibit A was not registered immediately after its execution, but rather on 5 February, 1980, after the writ of summons in the action had been issued. He submitted, however, that the trial had not then started and no evidence had been taken, and that any defect on the face of the document was cured by the subsequent registration because registration could be effected at any time, and that both parties are entitled to take benefit under it. Counsel argued that in view of the decision of the Court

[p.331] of [1982-83] GLR 322 of Appeal in Ussher v. Darko [1977] 1 G.L.R. 476, C.A. the decision in Asare v. Brobbey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 331, C.A. does not apply to the present case. That the exhibit apart, there is evidence which established an oral pledge agreement binding on the parties.

One has in each case to consider the agreement as a whole with any relevant surrounding circumstances. Is the plaintiff a pledgee with exclusive use of the house during the time the agreement subsists or is the plaintiff a pledgee, giving words their ordinary meaning, with only a right to dispose of the premises if the defendant-pledgor failed to repay the loan at the end of the five years? Having regard to all the facts, including the fact that the defendant is neither claiming a set-off nor counterclaiming for the rents collected by the plaintiff, I do not think that the agreement is a mortgage deed, but a memorandum or a receipt for the loan granted to the defendant and therefore need not to be registered.

The two cases in point are Asare v. Brobbey (supra) and Ussher v. Darko (supra). In the former case, the plaintiff obtained a loan from the defendant, a money-lender. The plaintiff purported to mortgage his house to the defendant as a security for due payment of the loan with a right of sale in default of payment. The plaintiff failed to repay the loan within the stipulated time and the defendant exercised his right of sale and sold the house at a public auction. The plaintiff successfully brought an action against the defendant, the auctioneer and the purchaser. The headnote to the report, reads:

“(2) Since the mortgage deed was not registered at the time the power of sale was exercised, the document itself was ineffective and invalid to confer the rights and to impose the obligations stipulated in the mortgage deed. Consequently the first respondent did not have any power of sale at the time the house was sold by auction; and therefore had no title to transfer the property to the third respondent.”

In the latter case the Court of Appeal held per curiam at p. 493 that:

“The decision in Asare v. Brobbey (supra) implies that where there is nothing intrinsically invalid about an instrument, section 24 (1) of the Land Registry Act, 1962, (Act 122), does no more than deny it legal efficacy until it has been registered. The Land Registry Act, 1962, did not prescribe a time limit by which an instrument must be registered. This means that the plaintiff can perfect his title by the formality of registration at any time.”

It is to be noted that in the present case exhibit A was, in fact, registered before the case came on for trial. I have already said that I cannot construe exhibit A as creating a mortgage deed and that it need not be registered. Alternatively, one may look at exhibit A from a different angle. The exhibit gives the plaintiff the right of sale if at the

[p.332] of [1982-83] GLR 322 end of the fifth year the defendant failed to repay the loan. The plaintiff is not seeking by this action to exercise his right of sale at the end of the five years, the action is primarily an action for debt, and if the plaintiff succeeds, he may attach the house described in exhibit A; he might do so not necessarily because of exhibit A, but because the plaintiff is the legal owner of the house.

The defendant says that he approached the plaintiff to give the house back to him to put in tenants to arrest the situation. The plaintiff refused and would not agree unless he, the defendant, paid the whole amount owed. Notwithstanding the plaintiff’s refusal, the defendant put in the tenants in January, 1979 and collected the rents and kept them. I hold this to be in breach of the customary pledge. It meant that the defendant had retaken possession of the house.

Exhibit B is a letter dated 22 April, 1979 addressed to the defendant by the plaintiff’s solicitor. The defendant was warned of the consequences of his retaking possession of the house. The defendant never replied to that letter. The defendant had an opportunity to deny the plaintiff’s allegations in that letter if, indeed, they were untrue and without any foundation.

Now a word or two about exhibit 1. This exhibit was a letter dated 2 November, 1976 written by K. Ayiah and Sons and addressed to the General Manager, Swedru International School, Agona Swedru. The exhibit was put in evidence by the defendant through his witness, one of the tenants. The evidence of both the plaintiff and the defendant are at a variance with exhibit 1 as to time, otherwise it largely agrees with the plaintiff’s evidence.

Whereas the plaintiff and the defendant maintain that the transaction which has resulted in the present action started in April, 1977, the exhibit seems to suggest that K. Ayiah and Sons, became involved in the defendant’s house since 1 January 1976. In the letter K. Ayiah and Sons described themselves as the administrators of the property and purported to give notice to the tenants to quit. It also destroys the defendant’s witness’ allegation that the plaintiff described himself as the purchaser of the house.

Mr. Amponsah-Dadzie has suggested that the exhibit should be ignored because it has nothing to do with the present action before the court. A transaction of the type in which the parties are involved takes time before they are reduced into writing in the form of exhibit A. In my opinion, the letter might have formed part of the negotiations which eventually resulted in exhibit A. I am of the view that both the plaintiff and the defendant were mistaken or wrong as to the time when the negotiations actually started.

I do not see the basis for the plaintiff’s claim (a) indorsed on the writ of summons. The plaintiff failed to prove that he is entitled to

[p.333] of [1982-83] GLR 322 general damages. I think that any damage at all that the plaintiff may be entitled to falls under claim (b) in the indorsement.

The plaintiff does not know when the tenants left the premises, but agreed that he collected rents up to the time that they left. The plaintiff cannot claim the rents for the periods when the house was unoccupied through his own default. The plaintiff will, however, be entitled to rents accruing from the house when the defendant put the tenants back into the house up to date of judgment. The defendant agreed that he took possession in January 1979, therefore the period covered will be January 1979 to January 1981 both inclusive; that will be 25 months.

For the reasons given above, I give judgment for the plaintiff. There will be judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of ¢32,674.26 made up as follows: loan recoverable ¢30,174.26; rents collected by the defendant for 25 months ¢2,500. The plaintiff will have his costs fixed at ¢2,000.

DECISION

Judgment for the plaintiff.

K. A. A.

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