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[1981] SLR (HC) 23High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL II)

IN RE AMARTEIFIO (DECD.); AMARTEIFIO vs. AMARTEIFIO [1982-83] GLR 1137

10 February 1981 · STRIGGNER-SCOTT J · ≈ 6 min read

Cite as[1981] SLR (HC) 23
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAIN RE AMARTEIFIO (DECD.); AMARTEIFIO v AMARTEIFIO [1982-83] GLR 1137 [1981] SLR (HC) 23
APAIN RE AMARTEIFIO (DECD.); AMARTEIFIO v AMARTEIFIO [1982-83] GLR 1137, [1981] SLR (HC) 23 (Ghana).
BluebookIN RE AMARTEIFIO (DECD.); AMARTEIFIO v AMARTEIFIO [1982-83] GLR 1137, [1981] SLR (HC) 23 (Ghana High Ct. 1981).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASE REFERRED TO

Gray v. Pearson (1857) 6 H.L.C. 61; 10 E.R. 1231.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

RULING on an application seeking an interpretation of a clause in a will. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.

[p.1138] of [1982-83] GLR 1137

COUNSEL

Aduani for the plaintiffs.

Marfo for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF STRIGGNER-SCOTT J.

In his lifetime Bob Amarteifio (deceased) had seven children, it would appear by two different wives, the plaintiff being the son of the one wife, and the defendants the children of another wife called Rosina Amarteifio (also deceased). In his will dated July 1947, and admitted to probate in 1954, the year of his death, Bob Amarteifio appointed the plaintiff, his eldest son, an executor under the will, and all his children beneficiaries under the said will. One of the assets forming part of his estate was a building designated as 602/RL 3.

At the time of his death, the testator, Bob Amarteifio, had leased the said building to U.A.C. By clause 6 of his will, he directed that the balance of rents accruing from his property annually should be distributed equally between the devisees under his will—that is his children — but not until his wife Rosina Amarteifio, the defendants’ mother had been paid 20 pounds of such rents annually. It is the plaintiff’s case that clause 6 has been misinterpreted by the defendants to mean that since the rent at the date of the will was 100 pounds per annum, Rosina Amarteifio whose share of the rents now passes to the defendants since her demise, must be entitled to twenty per cent of rents accruing at all times from the property. The plaintiff therefore comes by an originating summons seeking that the court gives clause 6 its true and meaningful interpretation.

At the time and point in the proceedings when the court heard legal arguments put forward by counsel, it would appear the other issues filed for the court’s determination had been discontinued or dealt with by the court at previous sittings and before another judge, leaving clause 6 as the only issue for the court’s determination.

In the words of the testator, Bob Amarteifio, clause 6 of his will reads:

“. . . I direct that my devisees shall distribute or divide the rents accruing therefrom annually, and that in such distribution my wife Rosina Mansah Amarteifio shall be paid twenty pounds (20 pounds) of such annual rent and the balance to be distributed equally between the other devisees.”

The strict interpretation the plaintiff chooses to put on the wording of the clause is that his father must have intended Mrs. Amarteifio to receive 20 pounds only of the accruing rents at all times. His counsel argues that the will was prepared by no other than the eminent lawyer Adumua-Bossman who later became an equally eminent judge, that if the testator had any intention other than the dictionary and grammatical meaning of the words selected in the construction of the clause as

[p.1139] of [1982-83] GLR 1137

contended by the defendants, the eminent lawyer would have brought out that intention when drafting the will.

Lawyers are not infallible. They try in the best way they possibly can to express the intentions of their clients in their own chosen words. In some cases their choice of construction may coincide with the exact intentions of a testator whose will they draw up, and in other cases they may fall short of the intentions sought to be generated. All the authorities the court was referred to in counsel’s submission lead to one thing and, that is the court must do what is right by giving the will its real meaning and consequently the testator his true intentions. On this note, Lord St. Leonard in Gray v. Pearson (1857) 10 E.R. at p. 1231 said that:

“. . . if I give to the words their simple meaning according to grammar and according to their plain prima facie import, I defeat the intention, I hold that I am bound by every rule, both of law and equity, to see whether I cannot give to them, by natural construction, an import which will effectuate and not defeat the intention.”

At page 5 of Hawkins and Ryder on the Construction of Wills (1965 ed.), a similar observation is made: “The intention,” it says, “when legitimately proved, is competent not only to fix the sense of ambiguous words, but to control the sense even of clear words.” Accordingly, where the literal sense of words creates an absurd situation they may be properly discarded or modified.

At the time of his death, the plaintiff’s pleadings show that the rent accruing from the property was £100, though his counsel in his submission warns the court that to admit that would be admitting inadmissible extrinsic evidence. With respect, the plaintiff is bound by his pleadings. It is he who asserts that the rent at the time of death was £100 and has only himself to blame if the other side uses his pleadings to their advantage. Rent appreciation is a thing of recent practice. It is possible that from the date of the execution of the testator’s will in 1947, up to, and until his death in 1954, the rent remained stagnant without appreciating, though the court’s information is that the rent as it now stands, 26 years after the testator’s death, is 1,440 pounds per annum, a fairly substantial appreciation since 1954. It would be an absurd situation then to construe clause 6 as intending that if Mrs. Rosina Amarteifio were she still alive, she should at all times receive £20, or its equivalent in present day currency. And if that was not consistent with his intentions then since the rent at the time is stated by the plaintiff to have been £100, in bequeathing £20 of it to his wife, his intention must have been that twenty per cent of the total rent should go to his wife. A good point, in my view, raised by counsel for the

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defendants, is that since £20 in terms of today’s currency is equivalent to ¢40, and clause 6 talks of “the balance” of the rent after £20 is paid out to Mrs. Rosina Amarteifio to be divided in equal shares amongst the testator’s children, it stands to reason to assume—going by the argument put forward by plaintiff’s counsel—that the testator only intended £20 to go to his wife—that he must in like manner, have intended that only £80 or its equivalent of ¢160, should at all times go to the children. What then becomes of the rest of the current rent of ¢1,440 after deductions of the ¢40 and ¢160 to Mrs. Amarteifio and the children respectively, since there is no residuary clause in the will.

A will should be read together as a whole to realise the true intention of the testator. It would be ludicrous to accept that the testator who at clause 8 of his will directs that all documents pertaining to his house at Kokompe should be handed over to his wife, Rosina, and who at clause 12 (f) gives the said wife, Rosina, a bigger share of the said house, could have intended that only £20 annually should be paid to Rosina irrespective of any rent appreciation. I would conclude that the court would be doing an injustice if it did not give the words of clause 6, an import which would give effect and not defeat the intention of the testator.

I therefore rule that the successors of Mrs. Rosina Amarteifio — that is the defendants — receive twenty per cent of the annual rents now and at all times.

Costs for the defendants ¢350.

DECISION Application granted. M. C. N. – N.

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