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[1980] SLR (CA) 17Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

B.I.O. LIMITED vs. DEGRAFT-AIDOO [1982-83] GLR 239

10 March 1980 · ABBAN J · ≈ 12 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (CA) 17
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OSCOLAB.I.O. LIMITED v DEGRAFT-AIDOO [1982-83] GLR 239 [1980] SLR (CA) 17
APAB.I.O. LIMITED v DEGRAFT-AIDOO [1982-83] GLR 239, [1980] SLR (CA) 17 (Ghana).
BluebookB.I.O. LIMITED v DEGRAFT-AIDOO [1982-83] GLR 239, [1980] SLR (CA) 17 (Ghana Ct. App. 1980).

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CASE REFERRED TO

Singh v. Ali [1960] A.C. 167; [1960] 2 W.L.R. 180; [1960] 1 All E.R. 269; 104 S.J. 84, P.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decision of the High Court awarding ¢20,000 general damages against a legal practitioner in an action brought against him by a client for the return of title deeds and damages for their return. the facts are fully set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Ebow Dawson for the appellant.

Atta Erskine for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.

Abban J. delivered the judgment of the court. The appeal is from the judgment of the High Court, Sekondi, dated 27 July 1977. In 1974 the respondents through their managing director, one Mr. Carlo, consulted the appellant who is a legal practitioner in connection with the sale of caterpillar and its accessories to two gentlemen – Kwame Appiagyei and Kwame Asante. The respondents who were timber inspectors and agents were operating in the Takoradi area. The two gentlemen were also carrying on business as timber contractors.

The respondents intended to sell the caterpillar for ¢30,000 and the two gentlemen wanted to buy it on credit. They deposited title deeds to the building of one of them – Appiagyei – in Kumasi as a security for the payment of the agreed purchase price. The respondents gave the said title deeds to the appellant with instructions to prepare the necessary legal document to cover the transaction between the respondents on one hand and Appiagyei and Asante on the other.

It was obvious that the transaction was one of credit sale and the appellant for some reasons felt it was not in the best interest of the respondents. He therefore advised the respondents to insist on outright sale. The respondents were bent on selling the caterpillar to Appiagyei and Asante on credit. So the appellant’s advice did not seem to go down well with them. In the circumstances the appellant again

[p.242] of [1982-83] GLR 239 advised that the building in Kumasi, as described in the title deeds, should be valued to make sure that it was an adequate security for a debt of ¢30,000.

The respondents having agreed to the latter advice, the appellant sought the service of a valuer in Cape Coast. The valuer set to work and employed other persons in Kumasi to assist him in the valuation exercise. The appellant in the meantime made a draft of the proposed agreement, the final document to be prepared on the receipt of the valuer’s report. But before the valuer completed his work, the respondents informed the appellant that the two gentlemen had indicated that they were no longer interested in the caterpillar and so they had withdrawn from the transaction, and that the appellant should put an end to the preparation of the agreement. The transaction having been called off, the respondents requested the appellant to return to the respondents the title deeds (which the respondents had earlier on given to the appellant) for onward transmission to the said two gentlemen.

The appellant did not take kindly to the request. He insisted that he should be paid fees for the work he had so far done. He further demanded that the respondents must pay the fees and the expenses of the valuer, and until the respondents met those demands he would not release the title deeds to the respondents. The respondents refused to pay any fees to the appellant and sued the appellant for the return of the title deeds and for damages for their detention. The learned trial judge entered judgment for the respondents and awarded them ¢20,000 as general damages.

It is against this judgment that the appellant has appealed. Several grounds of appeal were filed. But counsel for the appellant argued ground 2 of the additional grounds filed on 20 January 1982 as well as the supplementary grounds filed on 3 February 1978. In ground 2 of the additional grounds it was complained that the learned trial judge contradicted himself in law in holding that the title deeds, the subject-matter of the action, did not belong to the respondents and yet held that the respondents were entitled to maintain the action and proceeded to award damages to the respondents.

Learned counsel for the appellant contended that it was the owners of the title deeds who alone could sue in detinue and since the learned judge found that the respondents were not the owners of the title deeds the respondents could not in law bring any action in detinue. Counsel therefore submitted that it was wrong for the trial judge to entertain the suit.

The submission, with due respect to learned counsel, did not take account of the circumstances under which the title deeds went into the possession of the appellant. The respondents were given custody of the title deeds by their owners and the respondents had the consent of

[p.243] of [1982-83] GLR 239 the owners to keep them for an agreed purpose, namely as a security and for the preparation of an agreement between the owners and the respondents. It was in the process of carrying out the agreed purpose that the respondents parted with possession of those title deeds to the appellant, with instructions to prepare the said agreement. In a situation like this, did the respondents have to be owners of the title deeds before they could institute action in detinue? We do not think so. The fact that the respondents were not the owners did not mean that they could not legally recover possession of the very title deeds which they themselves had given to the appellant for a specific assignment, which assignment the appellant never carried out.

Truly the respondents were not the owners of the title deeds. But they had actual possession of those title deeds and they parted with that actual possession to the appellant; and so at the time the respondents made a demand for their return and which demand the appellant refused to comply with, there existed in the respondents the right to immediate possession of those title deeds. That right to immediate possession entitled the respondents to bring an action founded in detinue. Ownership in the circumstances was not a prerequisite.

In singh v. Ali [1960] A.C. 167, P.C. Lord Denning emphasised that a right to the immediate possession of a chattel at the time an action is commenced is essential. At p. 176 of the report he stated: “In order to succeed in detinue, it was essential for the plaintiff to show that he had the right to immediate possession of the lorry at the time of commencing the action…” (The emphasis is ours) Then further on at p. 177, the learned lord continued:

“In this case, on the facts pleaded and the findings of the trial judge, the plaintiff had a clear cause of action.

He had actual possession of the lorry at the moment when the defendant seized it… When he commenced this action, he had the right to immediate possession. Their Lordships think that in these circumstances he had a claim in detinue.”

(The emphasis is ours.) We are therefore of the opinion that the present action was well founded in law.

Grounds 4 – 7 of the supplementary grounds criticised the manner in which the learned trial judge dealt with the assessment of damages and attacked the award as being arbitrary and excessive. It is not necessary to state here those grounds which were argued together. Counsel for the appellant contended that the learned trial judge erred in law in basing his assessment on an alleged consequential loss of the respondents when the alleged consequential loss was never approved. He further submitted that the learned trial judge having in effect found that the title deeds were returned by the appellant to the respondents

[p.244] of [1982-83] GLR 239 before judgment, erred in law in not awarding nominal damages. Counsel contended that the unlawful detention of the title deeds could only be calculated from 3 June 1975 to 24 November 1975 and there was no evidence that within that period the respondents, without those title deeds, could not have done business. Counsel therefore submitted that the assessment was not only arbitrary but also too remote.

Learned counsel for the respondents was hard put to justify the award. However, he submitted that the damages were not too remote even though in another breath he conceded that the actual damage suffered by the respondents was not proved.

Counsel contended that in any case it was the appellant’s refusal to return the title deeds that led Appiagyei an Asante to decide not to do business with the respondents and any damage which the respondents suffered as a result of that decision of the two gentlemen ought to be recovered by the respondents from the appellant. We find it difficult to appreciate the latter submission of learned counsel for the respondents. The conduct of Appiagyei and Asante in refusing to do business with the respondents in the circumstances of this case was most unreasonable and we do not see the legal justification in holding the appellant responsible for damages which flowed from the unreasonable conduct of the two gentlemen.

However, the main issue is whether the respondents were able to prove loss of business which was the basis on which the learned trial judge awarded the respondents damages of ¢20,000. The cause of action arose from the date the respondents demanded the return of the title deeds and the appellant refused to return them. There was evidence that the formal demand was made by a letter dated 30 June 1975. The respondents sought to show that the demand was made earlier than this date. This was challenged by the appellant, but the learned judge did not make any positive finding as to the exact date of demand.

In his evidence – in-chief, Mr. Carlo said he demanded the return of the document one year after he had given it to the appellant. In his address in the court below learned counsel for the respondents stated:

“There is also the question as to when the document got to his hand, the plaintiff says he gave it to him in June 1974 but the defendant says he got it in either December 1974 or early January 1975.”

The learned trial judge in his judgment made the following findings:

“Having waited for about one year Mr. Carlo demanded the document from the defendant for by then the two gentlemen had indicated they were no longer interested in the caterpillar.”

[p.245] of [1982-83] GLR 239

So that going by June 1974, stated by learned counsel for the respondents in his address as the date on which the title deeds were given to the appellant, and the learned judge having found that Mr. Carlo made the demand after he had waited for one year from the date on which the title deeds were given to the appellant, it can safely be concluded that it was a year after June 1974 when the demand was made; and that could only be June 1975 and not any other date earlier than June 1975.

The title deeds were returned by the appellant on 24 November 1975. We may observe that hearing of the case commenced as 5 April 1976 and judgment was delivered on 27 July 1977. It is therefore clear that the appellant returned the title deeds, the subject matter of the dispute, to the respondents long before hearing commenced.

The unlawful detention, on the facts, lasted for only five months. That is, from 30 June 1975 to 24 November 1975 and within this period what damage did the respondents suffer? Appiagyei in his evidence alleged that he stopped supplying timber logs to the respondents in August 1974 and he put forward certain figures to indicate the volume of business he had been doing with the respondents. But when he was challenged under cross-examination he asserted that he had “documents and inventory on the logs” he supplied to the respondents to support his allegation. But unfortunately he failed to tender or produce any such documents and do reason was given for the failure. There were therefore many question marks about the figures given by Appiagyei.

In our view, the respondents failed to prove the volume of business they lost when Appiagyei refused to do business with them. In other words, the actual damage suffered by the respondents was not proved. Indeed, learned counsel for the respondents candidly conceded to this fact. Again the respondents failed to show that when Appiagyei stopped doing business with them, they were unable too do business with any other timber contractor, for there was the possibility that during that period the respondents could have done more lucrative business with other timber contractors. Since the respondents could not prove any loss of business or any financial loss, for that matter, the learned trial judge should have awarded the respondents nominal damages only.

We must remark that the learned trial judge seemed to have been influenced unduly by certain irrelevant matters when he was considering the question of damages. For example, in his judgment he stated:

“Besides by his conduct he involved his clients (the plaintiffs) in a breach of their obligations. Prior to this Appiagyei had been supplying the plaintiffs logs and indeed it was because the plaintiffs were satisfied with the work of Appiagyei that they

[p.246] of [1982-83] GLR 239 offered the caterpillar to him for the purpose of improving his timber business. But as a result of the defendant’s conduct the plaintiffs lost his business with Appiagyei. They are therefore entitled in my view to a fair and reasonable compensation.”

(The emphasis is ours.) With respect to the learned trial judge, the finding that the appellant’s conduct of unlawfully detaining the title deeds did involve the respondents in “a breach of their obligations” is not borne out by the evidence. There was no evidence either from the respondents themselves or from any of the witnesses that the respondents were under obligation, legal or otherwise, to receive timber logs from Appiagyei or from any other person. There was no legal obligation or contract whatsoever which bound the respondents to do business with Appiagyei. The wrong holding that the conduct of the appellant had involved the respondents in a breach of obligation towards Appiagyei clearly influenced the assessment of the damages. This was an error of law on the part of the learned trial judge in as much as he took into account something of which there was no evidence.

Still commenting on the portion of the judgment quoted above, the learned judge further stated that the respondents were satisfied with the work of Appiagyei and that was the reason why the respondents were desirous of assisting Appiagyei to improve his business by selling the caterpillar to him. That was fair enough. But if the sale did not materialise the person to complain of loss of business was Appiagyei, who was looking forward to an improvement in his business after the sale.

The respondents could not be said to have lost any business because whether Appiagyei improved his business or not, Appiagyei was under no obligation, as already stated, to do business with the respondents. It was therefore wrong for the learned trial judge to consider the inability of Appiagyei to improve his business due to the conduct of the appellant as an essential element to support an award of damages against the appellant.

In our opinion, there was no legal justification for the award of the damages made by the learned trial judge, and in the circumstances this is a proper case where this court ought to interfere with the said award. The award of ¢20,000 was not only speculative and excessive, but also out of all proportion to the facts and the circumstances of the case. It was indeed a wholly erroneous estimate of the damages to which the respondents were entitled and it must be reduced drastically. Since the respondents did not suffer any financial loss by the unlawful detention of the title deeds, nominal damages of ¢500 should have been sufficient to mark the vindication of the respondent’s right which was infringed by the appellant.

[p.247] of [1982-83] GLR 239 Consequently, the appeal will be allowed insofar as the damages are concerned. The award of ¢20,000 made in favour of the respondents is hereby set aside and in its place we substitute ¢500 as nominal damages.

DECISION Appeal allowed in part.

D.R.K.S.

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