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[1980] SLR (HC) 67High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

SONO vs. KWADWO [1982-83] GLR 398

5 March 1980 · AMPIAH J · ≈ 13 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 67
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OSCOLASONO v KWADWO [1982-83] GLR 398 [1980] SLR (HC) 67
APASONO v KWADWO [1982-83] GLR 398, [1980] SLR (HC) 67 (Ghana).
BluebookSONO v KWADWO [1982-83] GLR 398, [1980] SLR (HC) 67 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASE REFERRED TO

Gliksten (West Africa) Ltd. v. Appiah [1967] G.L.R. 447, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the plaintiff to, inter alia, recover damages from a concessionaire for economic trees destroyed as a result of the operation of the concession. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

A. A. Munufie for the plaintiff.

Bempah for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH J.

By his writ of summons the plaintiff claimed from the defendant:

“(a) the sum of ¢455,250 being damages for cash crops destroyed by the defendant as a result of the defendant’s timber felling operations in the plaintiff’s cocoa and coffee farm situate at Tetter on Dormaa stool land, whereof the sum of ¢450,000 represents 30,000 matured cocoa trees at ¢15 per tree; ¢2,400 representing 120 oil palm trees at ¢15 per tree; ¢400 representing 40 coffee trees at ¢10 per tree; ¢1,500 representing 150 plantain suckers at ¢10 per tree; ¢800 representing 20 kola trees at ¢40 per tree; and ¢150 representing garden egg plants.

(b) A perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his agents or servants or both, assigns and successors in title from causing damage to the plaintiff’s said cocoa farm.”

In the course of the trial the plaintiff moved the court to have his writ of summons amended to include a claim for:

“(c) General damages for capsid rehabilitation and other incidental damage suffered as a result of the defendant’s timber felling operations in his said cocoa farm.”

The application was granted as prayed and the plaintiff amended his writ accordingly.

On the pleadings, the defendant admitted felling timber trees which caused damage to cocoa and other crops on the plaintiff’s land. It is not disputed that the defendant has a valid timber concession which covered the area where the timber trees were felled. Liability having thus been admitted the only issue left to be determined was how much the plaintiff was entitled to by way of compensation for the damage caused to his cocoa trees and other crops. Both parties agreed to have a valuation officer appointed to assess the damage caused.

[p.401] of [1982-83] GLR 398

A team of valuation officers from the Lands Department was appointed to go with the parties to the area to find out the actual damage caused. An inspection was accordingly carried out on 3 July 1979; the findings are contained in a report which was subsequently tendered in evidence as exhibit X. The damage was assessed at ¢7,351.70.

Counsel for the plaintiff did not agree to this figure and contended that wrong rates had been used in the assessment of the damage. On the capsid damage, the report stated: “Expert comment on capsid damage and rehabilitation of damaged crops could best be done by the agriculturists. You are accordingly advised to refer this part of the case to them.”

It became necessary therefore to call further evidence. The plaintiff gave evidence and called two other witnesses. The first witness for the plaintiff, a senior technical officer from the Cocoa Production Division, Sunyani, gave evidence generally on capsid damage and rehabilitation of cocoa. I will come back to this evidence later. The second witness for the plaintiff was a private chartered surveyor, who before he turned into private practice was the Principal Lands Officer in charge of the Volta River Authority’s land matters. As part of his duties, he dealt with the assessment and valuation of cocoa trees.

The defendant gave evidence himself and called as his first witness, the one who had earlier given evidence as a common witness and tendered exhibit X in evidence. The sum total of the evidence by both the second plaintiff witness and the first defendant witness was an attempt to help the court to find the proper basis for the assessment of the damages.

The concession agreement between the defendant and the government which was tendered in evidence as exhibit 1, envisaged damage being caused to crops in the area of the operations of the concession.

Clause 2 (i) of this agreement states:

“To compensate the owner or owners of any fruits-bearing trees or cocoa tree growing thereon for any damage done by the lessee or his agents and contractors PROVIDED ALWAYS THAT the amount of compensation payable shall be that determined by the Administrator of Stool Lands.”

Clause 2 (p) also reserved in the local population their customary rights and privileges on the land including farming, provided these activities did not interfere with the operation of the concession.

It states:

“(p) To permit members of the local population to exercise the following customary rights and privileges on or over the demised premises viz: to hunt and snare game, to gather firewood for domestic purposes only, to collect snails and building materials for dwelling houses and to till and

[p.402] of [1982-83] GLR 398 cultivate farms and plantations PROVIDED THAT those rights and privileges are exercised without any damage to or interruption of or interference with any of the operations hereby permitted to be carried on on the demised premises or the rights, liberties and privileges hereby granted.”

It is not disputed that the defendant has a valid concession over the area in dispute. It is obvious that his activities or the operation of the concession would cause damage to the rights or properties of the local population. Consequently, provision has been made for the payment of compensation. But was the concessionaire expected to pay for all damages? In the case of Gliksten (West Africa) Ltd. v. Appiah [1967] G.L.R. 447 at p. 451, C.A., Amissah J.A. delivering the judgment in that case observed:

“If the law allows a person to go on land to carry out certain activities, it cannot be a wrong for the person to act in accordance with that permission. I do not think the appellants committed any wrong for which general damages could be awarded.”

This was a case on appeal from the decision of a High Court judge. The trial judge had correctly found that the plaintiff in that case could not claim prospective damages in the sense of a loss which it may reasonably be anticipated he will suffer thereafter in consequence of the defendant’s permanent devastation, but he had wrongly held that the plaintiff was entitled to general damages for a certain period. The Court of Appeal held that not only was prospective damages not claimable but that the plaintiff could not also claim for general damages at all. In the instant case, the evidence of the second plaintiff witness was on the capsid damage, which is the loss which may reasonably be anticipated the plaintiff could suffer thereafter in consequence of the defendant’s damage to the crops on the land. On the authorities, it is clear that such damages are not recoverable from a concessionaire who by law is permitted to carry on with his activities on the land; which activities are carried out in accordance with the permission granted. There is no evidence that apart from carrying on his timber operations which include the felling of timber and making of roads, the defendant did anything outside his permission to cause damage to the plaintiff’s properties. I hold therefore that the plaintiff cannot claim general damages as contained in claim (c) of his amended writ of summons. His claim to that extent is accordingly dismissed.

Different considerations apply to the award of the special damages for the actual destruction of the cocoa trees and other crops. Although the concession agreement, exhibit 1, stipulates that the compensation to be payable for any such damage shall be that determined by the Administrator of Stool Lands, I have no doubt in my mind that such

[p.403] of [1982-83] GLR 398 compensation can be determined by agreement between the parties. It is only where the parties disagree that they have to resort to the assessment by the Administrator of Stool Lands. In the instant case, there was no agreement between the parties. According to the common witness who was also the first defendant witness, the Chief Lands Officer is the Administrator of Stool Lands and therefore the assessment as contained in the valuation report, exhibit 1, must be deemed to be the assessment determined by the Administrator of Stool Lands.

It was clear from the evidence of Mr. Anthony Enchill, both as a common witness and as a witness for the defendant that the provisions of the State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125) were not applicable to this case; the provisions affected lands compulsorily acquired. Although the second plaintiff witness was not quite definite as to the application of those provisions to the present case, he stated in his examination-in-chief thus.

“. . . the government rate is the open market rate; there is therefore no difference between what a private person would charge and what the government would pay; they are all the same. The rate increases and decreases depending upon the economic conditions of the time.”

He gave some of the conditions as, the price of one property at the time, the age and the life span. According to the first defendant witness, the rate used for the assessment of the damaged properties contained in the report, exhibit 1, was based on the government directives. The directives which can properly be described as a circular was tendered in evidence as exhibit X. It gave the revised crop compensation rates for 1974. The first defendant witness who admitted not being an expert in valuation could not tell the court on what basis the government directives were arrived at, although he agreed under cross-examination that the compensation should not be more than what the damaged property should cost; this he said should be the market value.

Paragraph 2 of exhibit X reads:

“In the past, compensation rates in use in the department were restricted to land acquisition cases where government acquired both land and crops. From the basis of calculation in arriving at the present (1974) rates, it is clear that pre-eminence has been given to the estimated useful life of every crop in question and this will necessarily imply a major change in the valuation assessments in land acquisition cases where crops are also encountered and compensation paid separately thereof.”

[p.404] of [1982-83] GLR 398

It is clear from the contents that the rates are meant for lands acquired by the government. Also, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the same exhibit state:

“4. I shall be grateful if you will give the matter your serious consideration and let me have your comments without prejudice to the operation of the new rates with effect from 1 May 1974.

5. A review of the crop compensation rates in respect of the under-noted crops is still being undertaken and the finally agreed rates will be communicated to you in due course . . .”

It is obvious also that the rates are not meant to be final and that finally agreed rates were expected to be communicated to the various officers in due course.

The damage was caused in July 1977. One would have expected therefore that the rate would take into consideration the prevailing economic conditions at the time. According to the second plaintiff witness even the government directives are subject to review from time to time. If a fair value is to be given to the injured person then it is only reasonable that a realistic assessment is made of the properties damaged.

A compensation based on rates which had outlived their usefulness and have no semblance to realities, would, in my mind, be unfair and unreasonable. By article 18 of the Constitution, 1969, which was the operating provision at the time of the incident, the government was expected by law to pay reasonable compensation for land acquired compulsorily. This provision is repeated in article 24 of the Constitution, 1979; the compensation is to be based on the current price of any such property. As already stated, the rates applicable to lands compulsorily acquired would not apply to cases of this nature. Any compensation paid by the government would be ex-gratia and it would be wrong to use such a figure to calculate the damage to a farmer whose trees, of which none have been suggested to be diseased, have been destroyed by a private person: see Gliksten (W.A.) Ltd. v. Appiah (supra).

If anything at all, the government rate could only be used to assist in the valuation since in fixing the rate the government also takes into consideration the prevailing prices of the properties damaged at the time. In the instant case, however, we had the rate for 1974; the prevailing price of cocoa then was about ¢30 a load and the rate was fixed at ¢1.50 per tree. The price of cocoa at the time of the damage was about ¢80. In the Gliksten (W.A.) Ltd. case (supra), the Court of Appeal approved and recommended the acreage system of assessing the compensation. Unfortunately, in this case, no assistance has been had as to the possible compensation to be paid per an acre of damaged cocoa trees, although the acreage of the cocoa farm damaged was

[p.405] of [1982-83] GLR 398 taken to be 11.68 which seems to have been accepted by the parties. There was also some difficulty in getting the actual number of cocoa trees damaged. In the absence of any better form of calculation, I think I would accept the figures as given in the valuation report, exhibit X. The parties seem to agree on the figures.

Apart from the cocoa trees, the inspection team could estimate the number of oil palm trees damaged as 56. According to them they could not estimate the number of other crops damaged because the area had been destroyed by caterpillar tracts. In his statement of claim the plaintiff alleged 40 coffee trees, 150 suckers, 20 kola trees and about ¢150 worth of garden egg plants were damaged. The defendant did not specifically deny causing damage to any other crops apart from the cocoa trees, but said he would only admit any damage when the cocoa farm was inspected and the exact number of oil palm trees, cola trees and the few plantain suckers destroyed were counted. The inspection team could not tell us this and the plaintiff gave evidence only on the 56 oil palm trees counted at the scene. In the absence of any further evidence it would be difficult to estimate the number of other crops destroyed. I would therefore award the plaintiff damages for the 5,067 cocoa trees and the 56 oil palm trees. The plaintiff gave the price of an oil palm tree as ¢15. At the time that the government rate was ¢1.50 for a cocoa tree, an oil palm tree was valued at ¢4.30 (vide exhibit X). Taking everything into consideration, I award the plaintiff ¢8 for each oil palm tree damaged; that will be ¢448 (the price of oil palm tree has not gone up as fast as that of cocoa tree).

The price of cocoa has rocketed so high from ¢30 to almost ¢80 per load at the time of the incident. Looking at the age, and the annual yield of the destroyed cocoa, coupled with the economic conditions existing at the time, I think a price of ¢12 per cocoa tree would not be unreasonable. I would therefore award the plaintiff ¢60,804 damages for the cocoa trees damaged.

The plaintiff claims for an order of perpetual injunction against the defendant. Since the defendant is permitted by law to operate in the concession, I do not think, I would be justified in putting a stop to his lawful activities. Counsel for the plaintiff has referred me to section 4 of the Economic Plants Protection Decree, 1979 (AFRCD 47), which makes the felling operations on the land by the defendant void.

The said section states:

“4. (1) No felling rights in respect of timber trees shall be granted where such timber trees stand in farms where specified plants are cultivated.

(2) Where immediately before the publication of this Decree in the Gazette there existed any felling rights in respect of

[p.406] of [1982-83] GLR 398 timber trees standing in farms where specified plants are cultivated, such rights shall be deemed to be void and shall forthwith cease to have any effect.

(3) Any person who grants or purports to grant or acts or purports to act in pursuance of any felling rights in contravention of the provision of this section shall be guilty of an offence.”

Section 5 of the Decree provides:

“5. Any person who commits an offence under this Decree shall on summary conviction be liable for every offence to a fine not exceeding ¢500.00 or to imprisonment not exceeding three months, or to both.”

This section thus creates a punishment for all those who infringe against the provisions of the Decree. It is also provided by clause 4 (e) of the concession agreement between the defendant and the government that, the defendant shall obtain the necessary permit for operating in the concession. I would therefore leave the issue as to whether or not the defendant would be permitted to operate the concession in view of the provisions of AFRCD 47. I would accordingly dismiss the claim for an order of perpetual injunction. In conclusion the plaintiff succeeds in his claim and is awarded damages of ¢61,252; he is also awarded costs of ¢2,500 against the defendant.

DECISION Judgment for the plaintiff.

D. R. K. S.

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