DZAMBOE vs. MARK [1981] GLR 350
4 March 1980 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 19 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) West African Bakery v. Miezah [1972] G.L.R. 78, C.A.,
(2) Chaplin v. Howes (1928) 3 C. & P. 554.
[p.351] of [1981] GLR 350 (3) Pratt v. Bloom, The Times, 21 October 1958; digested Bingham’s Motor Claim ases (7th ed.), p.
92.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION for damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff in a motor accident. The facts are stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Cletus Amoah for the plaintiff
C. A. Lokko for the defendant
JUDGMENT OF CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J.
This is a claim for general damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in a collision between his Honda motor-cycle and the defendant’s car. The collision occurred on 26 April 1974 at 6 p.m. The plaintiff’s case is that he was riding from Legon along the road linking Legon with Achimota School towards Achimota. At the main junction to Christian Village, he rode past it, but attempted to turn right at the second junction which is about 150 metres from the other junction. In the act of turning, the defendant came from behind and collided into him. The defendant was attempting to overtake the motor-cycle. The plaintiff suffered a compound fracture of the right tibia and fibula which took ten months to heal.
The defendant’s case is that on the same day and time he was driving from Legon along the same road and in the same direction. He saw the plaintiff as soon as he came out of a bend to a straight stretch of the road which stretches for a distance of about 300 metres to the Christian Village junction. The defendant followed the motor cycle along this straight stretch of the road to the Christian Village junction. The plaintiff rode past the junction without evincing any intention to turn right. The defendant then decided to overtake. He sped up and caught up with the plaintiff, while gradually shifting to the right lane. At the time, Ghana drove left. When he was about a metre to the plaintiff the latter swerved right, suddenly and by reflex action, he also swerved right to avoid him but he could not do so completely. As the defendant was already in the right lane the motor-cycle came along and collided into the front left mudguard of the car. The handle of the Honda was trapped between the mudguard of the car and the tyre, so by the time the car came to a complete stop the Honda had been dragged for a short distance. The plaintiff was thrown off the Honda by the impact, but the Honda dropped on the road. Later it was carrie off the road and placed at the roadside. The plaintiff himself was lying prostrate on the road. The defendant sought and obtained assistance from two people who came to the scene and they put the plaintiff in his car, and took him to the
[p.352] of [1981] GLR 350
Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital where he was admitted for treatment. Then he reported the accident at the Tesano Police Station and an officer was detailed to go to the scene of the accident with him. The police officer made a plan which was tendered in this case as exhibit B.
There was so much controversy about the nature of the road into which the plaintiff intended to turn. Therefore it became necessary for the court to visit the scene of the accident. There are two turnings from the main Legon-Achimota link, into Christian Village. These turnings are linked together by a semi-circular loop which joins the two ends of the roads. The side of the circular-loop near the turning at the Legon end of the road, opens into the road leading to Christian Village. The nature of these turnings are such that the one at the Legon end of the road leads directly into the village, so that coming from Legon, the most reasonable course a person intending to go to the village would take, would be to turn at the first entrance. If one misses the first turning, and turns at the second, he would have to drive backwards along the loop which runs almost parallel to the main road to join the road from the first junction before actually entering the Christian Village road. The road at the second turning was narrow and bushy, on both sides. It turns acutely from the Legon end of the road.
The plaintiff’s witnesses maintained that by usage and custom of the people, the first junction is regarded as an exit from the village, and the second junction as the entrance to it. There are no traffic sign posts to give such directions and the road from both turnings are untarred. Both parties conceded that the second turning was a bushy path of about six feet wide at the time of the accident. The road, as the court saw it, had been widened and resurfaced. But the first junction has always been regarded as the main entrance to the village. Even with the facelift given to the road from the second junction, the first junction still stands out as the main entrance to the village. The second junction is not quite visible from the Legon end of the road, one gets to it before one is aware there is a turning. The impression I formed was that it would be easier and more reasonable for intending travellers to Christian Village from the Legon end to turn at the first junction. The inference I make of the plaintiff’s conduct is that he missed the first turning and tried to make it at the second. I do not believe that he deliberately went past the first turning because it was by custom plied on as a one-way traffic road for vehicles making their exit from the village.
[p.353] of [1981] GLR 350
The parties in this case have shifted blame for the accident on each other. The plaintiff maintains he indicated by his trafficator sign that he was turning right, and that the defendant ignored the sign and drove into him. The defendant contends that the plaintiff had not shown by any sign whatsoever his intention to turn right. On the contrary he said the plaintiff was riding close to his nearside, and it was after he had moved to the right ready to overtake when the plaintiff swerved suddenly to the right. The only issue in this matter therefore is who is to blame for this accident.
There is no hard and fast rule as to how and where a vehicle should overtake another, but the Highway Code prohibits overtaking at road junctions. However, such a prohibition if it were stretched to cover every side-road, would make driving in towns and cities, which have so many side-roads, intolerable. The mere fact of an accident occurring at a junction while a leading vehicle is being overtaken should not, ipso facto, make the person in charge of the overtaking vehicle liable. Each case must be taken on its own peculiar facts. Where the condition of the road permits, a following vehicle should feel free to overtake if the leading motorist behaves in a way which indicates that he is going straight. The driver of a leading vehicle owes an equal duty of care to the driver of the vehicle coming from behind as the latter owes to the former. If the driver of a leading vehicle intends to change his course, he must indicate this intention to other users of the road. This includes vehicles approaching from behind and on-coming vehicles. From decisions on cases involving overtaking vehicles, that duty is not discharged by merely giving the indication; the driver of the turning vehicle must see that his signal has been observed and appreciated by the driver of the vehicle behind him: see West African Bakery v. Miezah [1972] 1 G.L.R. 78, C.A. and the cases cited thereunder. The rules which ought to be observed at the date of this accident are to be found in the Road Traffic Regulations, 1957(L.N. 135). Regulation 46 deals with overtaking or turning vehicles. These were the regulations which were in force when Ghana drove left. Every motor vehicle was required to be driven on the left or nearside of the road and a vehicle overtaking traffic moving in the same direction was to pass on the right, but if the leading vehicle was turning right and had signalled accordingly, the overtaking vehicle would pass on the left. As was held in Chaplin v. Howes (1928) 3 C. & P. 554 and applied in West African Bakery v. Miezah (supra) failure to observe these rules is prima facie evidence of negligence, and the question whether a driver has driven prudently and reasonably in accordance with the regulations is one of fact.
The plaintiff has made a big issue of the fact that the defendant overtook at a road junction, and his counsel submitted this was an
[p.354] of [1981] GLR 350 act of negligence. The plaintiff has also made capital out of the fact that the defendant came from behind him and that hitting him in those circumstances amounts to prima facie evidence of negligence. At paragraph 3 of the statement of claim the following particulars of negligence were charged against him:
“(1) excessive speed;
(2) failure to exercise proper control over the vehicle;
(3) failure to have regard for a vehicle in front;
(4) ignoring signal of a vehicle in front; and (5) failure to make a proper use of brakes.”
The case for the defendant has been that the plaintiff misled him into thinking he was going on a straight course and as the road was clear of other traffic, he found it safe to overtake. He had followed the plaintiff for a distance of about a quarter of mile before he attempted to overtake him. A greater portion of this quarter of a mile stretch of the road is a straight course. The defendant said he was familiar with the road. He knew there was the junction to Christian Village so he lagged behind the plaintiff to watch his intentions. The plaintiff was not riding fast so the defendant who followed for some time could not have driven faster than the plaintiff. The charge of excessive speed made against the defendant could have no basis. The damage caused to the respective vehicles are not very serious. According to exhibit C, the vehicles examiner’s report, the defendant’s vehicle had dents at the fore-end of the nearside mudguard, a dent at the radiator, and a graze at the front bumper. The plaintiff did not even find it worthwhile to make any claim for damages for his motor-cycle. He did not mention any damage on it. It could not have been substantially damaged. If the defendant had driven at excessive speed the impact would have been more traumatic than it was recorded in both injury to plaintiff and damage to the vehicles.
With regards to the failure to exercise proper control the evidence does not support such an allegation and nothing needs be said about that. On failure to have regard for a vehicle in front, I accept the defendant’s case that the plaintiff misled him into thinking that he was going straight and not turning right. The plaintiff himself said he did not see the defendant at all before he turned, he just noticed that he had been hit by something. Yet he said he looked both ways⎯ back and front ⎯ before he turned. That evidence could not be true. The accident happened towards the Achimota side of a straight portion of the road which stretches for a distance of about 440 metres. If the plaintiff did not see the defendant in the bend, he was bound to notice him while they were on the straight stretch. As he did not,
[p.355] of [1981] GLR 350 the only inference I can make of this omission was that he, the plaintiff, was not keeping a proper look-out on the road. It also shows that he made no effort to ensure that it was safe to turn; he took no steps to see that his change of direction would not incommode another user of the road. Even if he gave indication of his intention to turn (this will be discussed later) he still had a duty to ensure that his intention to change course had been communicated to other users of the road: see Pratt v. Bloom, The Times, 21 October 1958; digested in Bingham’s Motor Claim Cases (7th ed.), p. 92.
The way to determine whether one’s signals have been observed is to watch the other’s reactions. The way he reacts will be indication that he appreciates the course of action one wants to take. For instance if a leading driver signalled that he was turning to the right and slowed down as he approached the junction, and the motorist approaching from behind came with such speed, that he could not stop before the leading vehicle turned, it would be an indication that he had not observed or appreciated that the leading vehicle was turning across to the right. If in spite of this the leading driver went ahead and turned and a collision thereby occurred the leading vehicle driver could not completely escape blame. The approaching vehicle driver had been inattentive but the leading vehicle driver in such a case could be said to have contributed to the accident because he did not wait until his intention to change course had been seen by the other vehicle. In fact, in circumstances like this it would behove the leading vehicle to halt and allow the approaching vehicle to pass if judging from his speed he realised that the latter could not pull up behind him. It is important that before one turns across the road, one looks into the driving mirror to see that one has been observed by vehicles from behind. That should be the behaviour of a reasonable and prudent man. That is the yardstick to measure the conduct of a careful driver.
The conduct of the plaintiff in this case fell short of this. He completely disregarded the presence on the road of approaching vehicles. But whether this conduct wholly caused or merely contributed to the accident would depend on whether the plaintiff gave any signal at all of his intention to turn. If he did not, and misled the defendant to think that it was safe to overtake, then the conduct of the defendant in overtaking in those circumstances could not be faulted.
The plaintiff’s evidence is that he showed by his trafficator sign that he intended to turn to the right. In his evidence he said, “After I showed the trafficator I went ahead for 20 feet before 1 was knocked down.” Yet when we went to the locus in quo, he pointed to a point from which he showed his trafficator. This was about 200 metres from the point of impact. The main junction is about 150 metres to
[p.356] of [1981] GLR 350 the second junction. It would mean that he started showing the sign about 50 metres to the main junction. This would obviously mislead any following driver into thinking the plaintiff intended to turn at the main entrance. This evidence was repeated by Nyamekye, a witness produced by the plaintiff, and who was alleged to have been at the scene when this accident occurred. This witness was not known to the plaintiff before the accident, and even though the plaintiff said under cross-examination that this witness was one of the people he observed at the scene of accident from his gait and complexion, it is my judgment that from the evidence he could not have seen this witness at the time of the accident.
The witness’ evidence was that he had alighted from a taxi which had stopped at the main junction to Christian Village. He said it was because the taxi had obstructed the way at that junction that the plaintiff did not turn at that first junction. He said he saw the plaintiff’s trafficator sign on, indicating a turn to the right even before he got to the main junction but he drove past that junction and soon afterwards the defendant crashed into him. He said the defendant was five metres behind the plaintiff. He did not go to the scene after the accident he stood 200 metres away at the main junction; he made no report to the police, he did not know the plaintiff before this accident. Yet the plaintiff managed to get him to give evidence.
When the plaintiff was asked to explain how he got on to the witness, he said he recognised him at the time of the accident by his form. He did not explain this form which made him stand out from a distance of 200 metres, and which made the witness so distinct from the others whom the plaintiff alleged were at the scene. Judging from the plaintiff’s evidence of the events after the accident, he could not have seen the witness. He said that he passed out, but regained consciousness soon afterwards and he asked the defendant to take him to a hospital. He did not say at what point he saw the people at the scene but he said he did not see them again until ten months after the accident. According to the defendant, the plaintiff lay prostrate on the road. He thought he was unconscious but when he was assisted by the people who had gathered there to pick up the plaintiff, he realised he was not unconscious; he was rather dazed and drunk. Two people from the scene accompanied the defendant in the car to convey the plaintiff to hospital. It is clear that the plaintiff could not have recognised anybody at the scene.
The witness in examination-in-chief explained bow he came to give evidence. He said:
“I know the plaintiff’s friend, so after the accident I reported to the friend and when the plaintiff saw the friend he told the plaintiff and the plaintiff and the friend came to me.”
[p.357] of [1981] GLR 350
When he was cross-examined he made the following statements:
“Q. When was the first time you saw the plaintiff?
A. The day of the incident.
Q. You had not seen him before or known him before.
A. I did not know him before.
Q. I put it to you seriously that you did not know any such friend.
A. The plaintiff had been coming to Christian Village so on the day of the accident I recognised him as the person who had been coming to Christian Village to that friend.”
This evidence is conflicting and it diverges from the evidence of the plaintiff. Due to the nature of their evidence, I insisted and took the evidence of the witness immediately after the plaintiff’s evidence. The revelation in their evidence justified that course. The witness was most unimpressive in his evidence. I formed the impression that he was a procured witness. At the locus in quo, he pointed to a scratch mark on the road which he alleged was left by this accident, which had defied the wear and tear and repairs of the road from 1974 to 1979. This mark was in the right lane from the Legon direction. The plaintiff’s second witness, the police officer, disagreed that the mark pointed out by the plaintiff’s first witness could have been left by this accident in 1974. I think this was another futile and puerile attempt by the witness to buttress his evidence that he was a witness to the accident. I did not believe him and I do not accept his evidence. The plaintiff himself lied when it suited him. His evidence that his trafficator was on for a distance of 200 metres before he attempted to turn could not be correct; it could also not be correct that before he turned, he looked behind him and in front of him and he did not see the defendant’s car. The defendant had followed him closely for a distance of over 400 metres just waiting to overtake. He did not come upon the plaintiff suddenly at the place of accident, he had had ample time to observe him. If he had signalled, the defendant would have seen it. It was suggested to the defendant by counsel for the plaintiff that the plaintiff gave a signal but because he did not take the first turning, the defendant thought that the trafficator was on idly. Contrary to what the plaintiff’s first witness said, the police officer who investigated the case and called to testify by the plaintiff, said that the plaintiff was turning at the proper junction because the other was an exit only. There is no basis for this evidence. There is no sign post there and the policeman does not live in that vicinity. He came from the Tesano Police Station, he did not say how he became so familiar with the habits of the people with regard to the
[p.358] of [1981] GLR 350 use of the road, I did not find his evidence useful in resolving the issues in this case.
For all the excuses that were made for him by his witnesses, the plaintiff himself did not explain why he did not turn at the main entrance. When he was cross-examined on this, he gave non-committal answers, viz:
“Q. I suggest to you that coming from Legon you did not turn into the first minor road, you tried to turn into the second one.
A. It is true I did not turn into the first one. I turned into the second one.
Q. I suggest to you you did so because you were undecided and you did the turning suddenly.
A. It is not true.
Q. To turn on the second turning you had to make an acute and sharp turning A. Yes.
Q. You were undecided.
A. I was not.”
I agree with counsel that the plaintiff was undecided and this indecision misled the defendant.
The plaintiff’s counsel made great fuss about the point of impact in this case. The plaintiff has maintained all along that because it was in the right lane the defendant is to blame. This establishes only a prima facie case which calls for explanation from the defendant The defendant has given a very cogent and lucid explanation of his conduct. He said:
“As I accelerated to overtake I noticed a sudden swerve to the right by the motor-cyclist. At this stage I was about a yard or so behind him. I automatically swerved with him in order or avoid him. I also quickly turned right in order to avoid him. I was applying my brakes at the same time gradually. I could not avoid him completely.”
The nature of the damages on the car suggests to me that the car was already in the right lane when the motor-cyclist came from the left and grazed the front tip of the front nearside of the car. The damage was, “Front nearside mudguard dented at the fore-end; radiator grille dented; front bumper grazed at the nearside end.”
The petrol tank of the motor-cycle came off; there is no evidence of other damage. But whatever the damage, the nature of the evidence points to the fact that it was the plaintiff who was negligent. As plaintiff turned suddenly when the defendant was almost abreast of
[p.359] of [1981] GLR 350 him, there was nothing the latter could have done to avert the situation created by the plaintiff. The regulation that motorists must not overtake at road junctions cannot apply to an almost concealed six-foot wide bush-path which turns off a main road. Therefore I do not find that the defendant caused the accident or contributed to it by overtaking at the junction. I think the defendant did what should be expected of a prudent and reasonable driver in the circumstances of this case. The plaintiff caused this accident by riding close to the verge and then swerving suddenly when the defendant was just a yard behind him and in the middle of the road ready to overtake. That the plaintiff did not see the defendant at all until after the accident emphasises the plaintiff’s inattentiveness at the time of the accident. He was the negligent party in this case. The claim must be dismissed, and I so order.
I shall nevertheless go ahead and assess his damages, should the case go elsewhere, and the liability be determined differently from my judgment. Dr. Adomako Mensah who examined the plaintiff and issued the medical report assessed his permanent incapacity at seven per cent for persistent pain at the knee and ankle. The fracture was slow to heal; the accident occurred on 26 April 1974 but it was on 13 December 1974 when an X-ray photograph confirmed that there was a union of the fracture. All this time he was in a plaster cast but he was detained in the hospital for only about five weeks. He is a youngman of 42 years old and employed as a despatch rider at the Attorney-General’s Office. He lost no income, and he has retained his job. His only complaint is that he cannot engage in sports like football because he has pain in the knee and ankle. The doctor said with regular and diligent physical exercises the muscles will build up, and this will stop the pain. Considering the nature of the injury, the healing processes and the complaint, the only important factor to consider in assessing his damages is pain and suffering. The fracture was a comminuted one and healing took a considerable time for a man of 42 years. His pain therefore was prolonged. For the duration of the pain, he could not engage in his pastime which is football. Apart from the pain there is nothing much to complain about. Considering the purchasing power of the cedi, I would assess the damages at ¢2,000. The claim is dismissed, there is judgment for the defendant I assess the defendant’s costs at ¢300.
DECISION
Claim dismissed; judgement for defendant.
K. A. A. M.
