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[1980] SLR (CA) 4Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

BOATENG vs. OPPONG AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 946

28 February 1980 · ANIN JA · ≈ 17 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (CA) 4
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OSCOLABOATENG v OPPONG AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 946 [1980] SLR (CA) 4
APABOATENG v OPPONG AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 946, [1980] SLR (CA) 4 (Ghana).
BluebookBOATENG v OPPONG AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 946, [1980] SLR (CA) 4 (Ghana Ct. App. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Decker v. Attah, Court of Appeal, Accra, 22 December 1969, unreported digested in (1970) C.C.

109.

[p.947] of [1980] GLR 946 (2) Henderson v. Jenkins (Henry E.) & Sons [1970] A.C. 282; [1969] 3 W.L.R. 732; [1969] 3 All E.R.

756; [1969] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 603; 113 S.J. 856; [1970] R.T.R. 707, H.L.; reversing [1969] 2 Q.B.

188; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 147; [1969] 1 All E.R. 401; 112 S.J. 909, C.A.

(3) Kesiwah v. Jaja [1976] 2 G.L.R. 280, C.A.

(4) Colvilles Ltd. v. Devine [1969] 1 W.L.R. 475; 113 S.J. 287; [1969] 2 All E.R. 53; 6 K.I.R. 333, H.L.

(5) Barkway v. South Wales Transport Co., Ltd. [1950] A.C. 185; [1950] 1 All E.R. 392; 114 J.P. 172;

66 T.L.R. (Pt. 1) 597; 94 S.J. 128, H.L.; reversing [1949] 1 K.B. 54; [1948] 2 All E.R. 460; [1948] L.J.R. 1921; 64 T.L.R. 462; 92 S.J. 528, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from a judgment of the High Court, Kumasi, which was decided in favour of the defendants in an action for damages for negligent driving of a vehicle, although a prima facie inference of negligence was not rebutted. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Anin J.A.

COUNSEL

J. K. Kodua for the appellant.

No appearance by or on behalf of the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.

At about 6 p.m. on 23 December 1968, a Kumasi tailor by name Kwaku Gyimah alias Dwomoh hired the second defendant’s tro-tro lorry No. AT 9491 to convey him and his mourning party to the funeral of his daughter at Kumawu Bodomase. Among the passengers who undertook the trip was the plaintiff, a fellow tailor resident at Kumasi; and the lorry was driven by the first defendant, a servant and employee of the second defendant. The outward journey was uneventful. However, on the return journey to Kumasi the same night, an accident occurred just after a curve on the outskirts of Dadiase village. According to the plaintiff, the driver drove the lorry so fast and negligently that “it ran into a ditch” and he fell off the vehicle and sustained injuries for which he received medical treatment for some period. This action was accordingly instituted in the High Court, Kumasi, against the defendants jointly and severally for special and general damages for the first defendant’s negligence.

On the issue of the accident, the second defendant (the owner of the lorry) in his pleading stated that “the vehicle did not at any time run into the ditch as averred by the plaintiff.” However, he refrained from giving his version of what actually transpired on the day in question. Neither did he testify in court. In contrast, his driver

[p.948] of [1980] GLR 946 pleaded in paragraph (5) of his statement of defence that in the course of the journey “one of his tyre rod ends came off and he managed to stop his vehicle against a culvert thereby preventing an accident.”

In evidence, the plaintiff attributed the accident to the excessive speed at which the driver was driving on a dusty road coupled with his negligence in not negotiating the curve safely, as a result of which the vehicle careered off the road and collided against the concrete culvert and fell on its near-side. His principal witness, Kwaku Gyimah, the bereaved tailor, gave an account of the accident which amply corroborated the plaintiff’s in all essential particulars.

If I may quote the relevant portion:

“On our return journey at the outskirts of Dadiase village the driver had to pass through dusty road and the lorry got out of the driver’s hand and hit a culvert. When it struck a culvert thus the plaintiff fell off the vehicle.”

To a suggestion under cross-examination that it was the tyre rod ends which got off, Kwaku Gyimah replied that it was not correct. “It was when the lorry hit the culvert that an iron bar beneath got broken and the steering wheel could not be turned. The two front tyres did not come off.”

In his testimony, the driver, the first defendant, confirmed that the lorry swerved off the road in a curve and hit a culvert which stopped the lorry. He narrated:

“On the journey back, at Dadiase, I was negotiating a curve when my steering tyre rod lost its bolt. When the bolt came off I could not control the steering. I found I was going into the bush so I tried to steer back into the road. I could not [do] so. I applied my brakes and the lorry hit a culvert which chocked the lorry.”

In his judgment, the learned trial judge reviewed the evidence and held that despite the different causes of the accident recounted by the parties, it was agreed that the vehicle swerved off the road and ran against the concrete culvert and in the process fell on its near-side. The learned judge accordingly held that the circumstances of the accident, especially the swerving of the lorry, raised a presumption of negligence against the driver; since in the normal course of events one expects a vehicle being driven to stay on the road. Having thus found, correctly in my respectful view, negligence established against the defendants, the learned judge surprisingly held that the skidding happened without the fault of the defendants and concluded that the first defendant was not negligent in driving against the culvert and dismissed the plaintiff’s action.

[p.949] of [1980] GLR 946

The main thrust of the argument of learned counsel for the plaintiff in this appeal was that the learned judge erred in exonerating the defendants from blame for the accident. Having accepted the probable cause of the accident as the loss of the tyre rod ends, the learned judge erred in absolving the defendants from negligence; since they did not discharge the evidential burden of establishing that the dislocation of the tyre rod ends and the resultant accident was not due to their negligence. For one thing, they did not rebut the inference of negligence against them arising from the fact of the accident itself, and for another, no proof was forthcoming from them that the vehicle was regularly maintained prior to the accident. Learned counsel finally relied on this court’s decision in Decker v. Attah, Court of Appeal, Accra, 22 December 1969 unreported; digested in (1970) C.C. 109.

The facts of that case bear close resemblance to those of the present. In that case, the plaintiff-respondent travelled as a passenger in the second appellant’s lorry from Saltpond to Fanti Nyankumasi, the lorry being driven by the first appellant, servant of the second appellant. The vehicle reached its destination without incident but on the return journey to Saltpond, an accident occurred. It was said the “vehicle fell on its near-side in the middle of the road.” The respondent was at the time sitting by the driver on the near-side and was thrown onto the ground. She sustained fairly serious injuries and was hospitalised for about three weeks.

In the court below, the plaintiff-respondent recovered judgment, the trial circuit judge applying the maxim res ipsa loquitur to the facts of the accident and holding that the twin defences of the sudden breaking of the long shaft and the corrugated nature of the road failed to displace the prima facie evidence of negligence against the defendants. On appeal, the appellants conceded that a presumption of negligence arose from the facts, but they submitted that this was rebutted by the said twin defences and therefore the onus should have shifted back to the plaintiff-respondent to establish negligence affirmatively. This court—per Apaloo J.A. (as he then was) and Sowah J.A., Lassey J.A. dissenting—dismissed the defendants’ appeal and held that the facts raised a prima facie case of negligence. In rebutting it, there was a burden upon the appellants to show that the vehicle was in a good and roadworthy condition at the time of the accident and that they exercised reasonable skill and care in detecting and remedying any hidden or latent defects. In his leading judgment, Apaloo J.A. referred to the two-fold common law duty incumbent on common carriers like the defendants-appellants of (i) carrying the passenger safely and (ii) providing a safe vehicle for this purpose. He cited with approval the formulation of these two duties of care

[p.950] of [1980] GLR 946 in Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 4 at pp. 174-175, paras. 445 and 447, viz:

“Their undertaking (i.e., of carriers) is to take all due care, and to carry safely as far as reasonable care and forethought can attain that end . . . The obligation upon carriers of persons is to use all due, proper, and reasonable care, and the care required is of a very high degree . . .

Carriers of passengers are answerable for the soundness and sufficiency of their vehicles, and are liable for any defect which careful and reasonable examination would reveal . . . Periodical testing and examination is a duty, and the fact that a vehicle breaks down is prima facie evidence of negligence . . .”

Reference was also made to the relevant proposition of the duty of care in Charlesworth on Negligence (4th ed.) at pp. 264-265:

“The duty to exercise reasonable care involves the making of a reasonable examination of the vehicle from time to time in accordance with the practice of reasonably careful carriers. The breakdown of the vehicle is evidence of negligence on the part of the carrier, throwing upon him the burden of showing that he exercised reasonable care and skill in detecting and remedying defects.”

Applying these dicta to the facts, Apaloo J.A. observed in the case of Decker v. Attah (supra) that:

“The only explanation offered by the first appellant, the driver of the vehicle, was: ‘the shaft in it got broken.’ He did not venture any opinion as to the cause of the breaking of the shaft. He did not say how often the vehicle was examined for defects and what was done to make the vehicle safe for carrying persons.

It is no more sufficient to say that an accident was caused by the breaking of a shaft than it is to say it was due to sudden tyre burst . . . In so far as a duty is cast on the first appellant to show that he exercised reasonable care and skill in detecting and remedying defects on the vehicle, he did not even begin to discharge it.”

Turning to the claim of the owner, the second appellant, that at the date of the accident he had a certificate of roadworthiness on the vehicle, Apaloo J.A. held that even if this certificate had been tendered in evidence (incidentally, it was not tendered) and that it was difficult to see what probative value it would have on the case of a party who had a duty of showing that he had exercised reasonable care and skill in detecting and remedying defects.

[p.951] of [1980] GLR 946

I have quoted at length from the leading judgment in the case of Decker v. Attah (supra) because I find the facts of that case to be on all fours with the facts of the present case and the statement of the law in that case to be extremely apposite and pertinent to the present case. As in the Attah case, the facts of the accident sufficed to raise a prima facie case of negligence against the owner and driver of the tro-tro vehicle No. AT 9491 and the learned trial judge was right in so holding. Unfortunately, he overlooked the important legal principle or rule of evidence that once a prima facie case of negligence is established against the defendants from the nature and the facts of the accident, an evidential burden is thereupon cast on them to rebut it, by providing some explanation which is adequate to displace the prima facie inference: see, for example, Lord Pearson’s statement of the rule in Henderson v. Henry E. Jenkins & Sons [1969] 3 All E.R. 756 at p. 766, H.L.

In cases where the defendants attribute the accident to the sudden dislocation of vital engine parts, like the long shaft in the Attah case or tyre rod bolts in the instant case or where reliance is placed on a plea of latent defect in the mechanical parts, as in Kesiwah v. Jaja [1976] 2 G.L.R. 280, C.A. it is incumbent on them to show that the vehicle in question was in a good and roadworthy condition at the time of the accident and that they exercised reasonable skill and care in detecting and remedying any hidden or latent defects.

In the recent case of Kesiwah v. Jaja (supra), the plaintiff in a running down action alleged that the vehicle had defective steering and had not been properly maintained. The defendant in his pleading admitted that the accident was caused by a sudden break in the steering arm but gave no evidence in support of his plea of latent defect. The trial judge, as in the instant case, dismissed the plaintiff’s action on the ground that she had failed to prove the cause of the accident which she alleged was due to the defendant’s negligence. In allowing the appeal, this court unanimously held that where a plea of latent mechanical defect was urged as exculpatory of negligence, a burden was cast on the defendant to show that the defect was not discoverable by the exercise of reasonable care and consequently the accident occurred without any contributory fault. The court further held that it was incumbent on the defendant to negative any premonitory signs of steering failure and the safety of the vehicle; but he had made no attempt to discharge that onus and, in fact, led no evidence. He failed to make good a plea which exonerated him of negligence. The trial judge erred in shifting the burden on the plaintiff since the defendant failed to displace the prima facie inference of negligence against him. In reaching their conclusion, the court cited with approval two recent House of

[p.952] of [1980] GLR 946

Lords decisions in Henderson v. Henry E. Jenkins & Sons (supra) and Colvilles Ltd. v. Devine [1969] 2 All E.R. 53, H.L.

In the present case, the learned trial judge failed to apply the relevant law as summarised above to the facts as found by him. In particular, having found a prima facie case of negligence established against the defendants, he omitted to examine the crucial question whether the defendants had displaced the inference of negligence by showing that the vehicle was in a good and roadworthy condition at the material time and that they had exercised reasonable skill and care in detecting and remedying any latent defects. In other words, once the facts of the accident raised an inference of negligence against the defendants they had to displace it by showing that the alleged dislocation of the tyre rod ends and the resultant crash of the vehicle against the culvert, was not due to any negligence on their part and that at all material times they exercised reasonable care and skill in detecting and remedying the alleged faulty and loose bolts and parts. Had the learned trial judge adverted his mind to these material questions he would undisputably have held that the defendants failed to adduce any relevant evidence to show that the accident was not due to any negligence on their part. On the one hand, the owner himself gave no evidence, and on the other, the driver merely proffered an unsubstantiated explanation that the sudden dislocation of the tyre rod ends might have been the cause. It was not their case that there was a latent defect which could not be discovered by the exercise of reasonable care and skill. Neither was any evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants establishing either regular maintenance and servicing of the vehicle or any steps taken by them to render the vehicle safe for carrying persons or that the tyre rod ends came off without any negligence on their part. The driver’s explanation of the cause of the accident, which was uncritically accepted by the learned judge, was unsupported by the facts and did not amount in law to an exoneration. As was held by the House of Lords in Barkway v. South Wales Transport Co. Ltd. [1950] 1 All E.R. 392, the unexplained overturning of an omnibus into a ditch raises a presumption of negligence. If the explanation put forward is that the accident was due to a burst tyre this explanation per se will not do. It must be supported by evidence not only proving the fact of the burst tyre but also that the burst tyre was not due to any negligence on the part of the defendants.

As the tyre burst without more was held to be an insufficient explanation in the Barkway case, so in this case the learned judge erred in accepting without more the dislocation of the tyre rod ends as an explanation of the accident; for it was necessary for the defendants

[p.953] of [1980] GLR 946 to prove either that the dislocation of the tyre rod ends was due to a specific cause which did not connote negligence, or if they could point to no such specific cause, that they had used all reasonable care in the management, servicing and maintenance of the vehicle and in particular the tyre rod ends. This they failed to do.

Another reason given by the learned judge in support of his finding of no negligence was that “the evidence does suggest the defendant’s lorry was in serviceable condition that day when it was, hired to the second plaintiff witness.” Suffice it to say that there was, in fact, no such evidence of due maintenance and roadworthiness of the vehicle at the material time. The defendants made no attempt to prove the serviceable condition of the lorry and they did not consider it necessary to prove this. With respect, it is a non sequitur for the learned judge to conclude from the mere fact of hiring of a tro-tro vehicle, that it must have been in a roadworthy condition. Without having to take judicial notice of the usually deplorable condition of most tro-tro vehicles, it is enough to point out that there was not a scintilla of evidence in support of the judge’s tentative suggestion. I would reject it as being unwarranted and unsubstantiated.

Finally, on the issue of negligence the learned judge adverted to the dusty condition of the road in the curve and held, “that on a laterite road amounts to a treacherous surface. The cumulative effect of all this is that I find the skidding happened without fault of the defendants.” With respect the reasoning is faulty. I would have thought that if the road was dusty, corrugated and treacherous, then a reasonably prudent driver ought to exercise a greater degree of care and attention when driving on it. The treacherous surface of a road does not absolve a driver from his primary obligation as a common carrier to take all due care and to carry passengers safely as far as reasonable care and forethought can attain that end. Neither does it exempt him from his normal duty to drive with due care and attention. In any event, I do not regard the alleged treacherous surface of the road either as an explanation or exoneration of the prima facie negligence found against the defendants by the mere happening of the accident. On the evidence as a whole, I hold that the defendants failed to discharge the evidential burden of displacing the inference of negligence against them. In the result, I find that the plaintiff’s claim of negligence was established.

The next factual issue to be considered is whether the plaintiff was thrown out of the vehicle and was injured as alleged by him. I would not have thought there was any doubt about this issue. Unfortunately the learned judge misquoted the relevant evidence and rejected the plaintiff’s claim of having fallen out of the lorry after the accident. The learned judge stated—quite erroneously —

[p.954] of [1980] GLR 946 that “the evidence of the second plaintiff witness denies that the plaintiff or any one fell out of the vehicle.” On the contrary, the evidence of the second plaintiff witness, Kwaku Gyimah, on the point, already quoted in full, is that:

“On our return journey at the outskirts of Dadiase village the driver had to pass through dusty road and the lorry got out of the driver’s hand and hit a culvert. When it struck a culvert thus the plaintiff fell off the vehicle. The plaintiff then complained of pains in the waist. There was one other person who had abrasions on the neck.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

In view of the above evidence, it is clear that the learned judge erred in holding that the plaintiff did not fall out of the vehicle. And I find that the plaintiff’s own evidence on the issue was amply corroborated by his star witness, the second plaintiff witness. It may be mentioned in passing that the learned judge did not reject his medical witness, the first plaintiff witness, as unreliable; neither did he disbelieve his evidence that the plaintiff spent four days in his hospital as an in-patient complaining of chest and waist pains from injuries sustained in a road accident. On the evidence as a whole, I find that there was sufficient proof that plaintiff fell off the vehicle after the accident and sustained injuries for which he subsequently received medical treatment.

[His Lordship here dealt with the issue of quantum of damages and having assessed special and general damages at ¢270 and ¢4,000 respectively, continued:] I would therefore allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the court below together with the order for costs. I would order that the costs if paid should be refunded to the plaintiff. In lieu of that judgment, I would enter judgment for plaintiff against the defendants jointly and severally for the sum of ¢4,270. The plaintiff will have costs in the court below assessed at ¢180. He will also have costs in this court.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF ARCHER J.A.

I also agree.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

Special and general damages awarded for negligence.

K. A. A. M.

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