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[1986] SLR (CA) 5Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

BALLMOOS vs. MENSAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 724

26 June 1986 · OSEI-HWERE JA · ≈ 12 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (CA) 5
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OSCOLABALLMOOS v MENSAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 724 [1986] SLR (CA) 5
APABALLMOOS v MENSAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 724, [1986] SLR (CA) 5 (Ghana).
BluebookBALLMOOS v MENSAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 724, [1986] SLR (CA) 5 (Ghana Ct. App. 1986).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Crabbe III v Quaye, Court of Appeal, 31 July 1970, unreported.

(2) Crentsil v Crentsil [1962] 2 GLR 171,SC

(3) Blunt v Blunt [1943] AC 517; [1943] 2 All ER 76, HL.

(4) Leeds Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd v Slack [1924] AC 851; 131 LT 710, HL.

(5) Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287; 72 LT 34, CA.

(6) Hoffman-La Roche and Co v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295; [1974] 3 WLR 104; [1974] 2 All ER1128, HL.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decision of the High Court, Accra granting an application for an order of interim injunction subject to the plaintiff applicant giving an undertaking as to damages in an action for declaration of title to land. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Osei-Hwere JA.

COUNSEL

Mike Ocquaye for the defendant-appellant.

Ayikoi Otoo for the plaintiff-respondent.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE JA

The plaintiff sued out a writ in the High Court, Accra for the following reliefs against the defendant:

(a) declaration of title to a piece of land at Odawkwa measuring 200 feet by 600 feet;

(b) recovery of possession;

(c) ¢5 million damages for trespass; and

(d) perpetual injunction.

The writ was accompanied by a statement of claim. That same day the writ was sealed. He subsequently filed his motion on notice for an interim injunction to restrain the defendant from carrying out building operations on the land.

The motion came before Ammah J who after he had taken some pains to inquire into the allegation and denials evoked by the affidavits of the parties by inspecting the disputed land, ruled in favour of the plaintiff’s motion subject to the plaintiff giving an undertaking as to damages. Aggrieved by the interlocutory order of injunction obtained against him the defendant has appealed to this court.

The plaintiff’s affidavit supporting his motion disclosed that he bought his land in 1976 from one Samuel A Acquaye. The sale is evidenced by a deed stamped and registered as No 2695/1976. The plaintiff’s vendor, in turn, derived his title from the Sempe stool. The

[p.728] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 724

plaintiff entered into possession and fenced his land by using pillars and steel wires. He laid a pipe to connect water to the site and he deposited cement blocks on the land. In July 1985 his attention was drawn to the defendant’s trespass to the land. He found that the defendant had dug a foundation for a proposed building. He contacted the defendant who delegated his brother to make a search with him at the Lands Department. The search disclosed that the land has been registered in the plaintiff’s name, whereupon he warned the defendant to desist from committing further acts of trespass. The plaintiff visited the land in July 1985 only to discover that the defendant was carrying out frantic building operations on the land and that part of his fence and some of his pillars had been broken down to gain access to the land.

In his affidavit in answer, the defendant deposed that he owns a plot of land at McCarthy Hill by virtue of a deed of conveyance dated 13 June 1985 between John Richard Nii Awuley and family (as the vendors) and himself (as the purchaser). His deed was stamped and registered in 1985-and the land bought measures 100 by 150 feet. His vendors, on their part, derived their title to the plot from the James Town stool as per their deed of conveyance from the said stool dated 23 February 1984, stamped in 1984 and registered in 1985. He further deposed that by a judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of Crabbe III v Quaye, Court of Appeal, 31 July 1970, unreported, a suit between James Town stool and Sempe stool, boundaries of Sempe stool lands were determined.

The defendant attached to his affidavit a copy of the notice together with the judgment plan which the Sempe stool subsequently circulated. According to him his plot falls about one mile outside the Sempe stool property. Paragraphs 10 and II of the defendant’s affidavit ran as follows:

“10 (a) That to the best of my knowledge and belief at no material time have there been any pillars, fence, nor water pipe connection belonging to the plaintiff-as alleged by him in his paragraph 4-or to any other person on my plot or on any part thereof.

(b) That with further reference to the plaintiff’s paragraph 4, on the advice of my vendor, I caused some cement blocks unlawfully placed on my plot to be packed outside the same in abatement of the nuisance caused thereby.

11. That to the best of my knowledge and belief, the plaintiff has not been in possession of my plot or any part thereof as alleged in paragraph 5 of his affidavit but if he had purported to do so, that would amount to trespass.”

[p.729] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 724

The defendant’s version of what took place at the Lands Department is that the officials advised the plaintiff that since his plot fell outside the boundaries of Sempe stool land as defined in the said judgment plan his title was bad. They, however, pronounced favourably on his title deed. In the honest belief of the superiority of his title deed, which the plaintiff seemed to have accepted in good faith, he continued with the building operations. According to him he was developing the plot from the proceeds of the sale of his house which he was obliged to vacate to the purchaser thereof by 20 September 1985. He confessed that he had to complete the house expeditiously to minimise, as he put it, “the harsh effects of the current floating exchange rate (2 rate) regime.”

The learned trial judge was expressly cautious in avoiding the temptation of saying anything in his ruling that might pre-empt the final determination of the action. Consequently, he was content to say:

“From my visit to the locus and after hearing counsel and reading the competing affidavits it would appear that the plaintiff-applicant had been in possession of the land where the defendant has started to build. I do not regard the plaintiff’s case as frivolous or vexatious and I think there is need to preserve the status quo to avoid irreparable damage to the applicant.”

It would seem that in coming to the above conclusion the judge was not uninfluenced in a large measure by what he saw physically and indisputably at the inspection site which he faithfully recorded in his ruling as follows:

“At the site the plaintiff pointed the boundaries of his land to us. He has fixed block pillars with steel wires around; the pillars in front of the land facing the Accra-Winneba road had been broken down. We saw some blocks on the land and other blocks a bit outside the land which the plaintiff claimed or still claims. The defendant pointed the boundaries of his land. The defendant’s land was or is squarely inside that of the plaintiff. At the time, the defendant’s workmen were working on the defendant’s building which had then reached a bit above lintel level. The site is down MacCarthy Hill on the left side of the road facing Winneba direction from Accra. The position where the defendant’s building was being put up blocks a large portion of what the plaintiff is claiming form access to the main road. My visit to the locus convinces me clearly that what the defendant has deposed to in paragraphs 10 (a)-(b) and 11 are false.”

[p.730] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 724

Essentially, the judge made no “speaking order” but exercised his discretion after giving due consideration to the competing affidavits and what he found at the locus. It was observed by the predecessor of this court in Crentsil v Crentsil [1962] 2 GLR 171 at 175, SC that:

“As to appeals from the exercise of the courts discretion, it is a rule of law deep rooted and well established that the Court of Appeal will not interfere with the exercise of the court’s discretion save in exceptional circumstances.”

And, as was pointed out in the headnote by the House of Lords in Blunt v Blunt [1943] AC 517 at 518 HL:

“An appeal against the exercise of the court’s discretion may succeed on the ground that the discretion was exercised on wrong or inadequate materials if it can be shown that the court acted under a misapprehension of fact in that it either gave weight to irrelevant or unproved matters or omitted to take relevant matters into account, but the appeal is not from the discretion of the court to the discretion of the appellate tribunal.”

The defendant’s notice of appeal urges three grounds of appeal. The first is to the effect that the trial judge erred in making the order since there was no evidence of any potential damage to the plaintiff which could not have been compensated for or undone by the ¢5 million general damages claimed by the plaintiff. The second is that he erred in not considering the balance of convenience of the parties. The last ground is that the financial circumstances of the plaintiff was unknown and unestablished and the judge, therefore, misdirected himself in allowing the plaintiff to give a written undertaking which was neither guaranteed nor secured in any other way and is worthless for that matter.

As to the first ground, it is enough to say that the plaintiff also sued for trespass which in this case consists in the personal entry by the defendant or his workmen onto the land the plaintiff allegedly occupies and he is building on it. Trespass is, of course, actionable per se without any proof of damages. The trespass complained of is a continuing injury which the plaintiff is entitled to abate by an order of interim injunction, especially as damages for continuing trespass (unless awarded in lieu of an injunction) are assessed only up to the date of the action. The High Court has always a discretionary jurisdiction to award damages either in addition to or in substitution for an injunction. As explained in Leeds Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd v Slack- [1924] AC 851 at 860-861 and 871-872, HL damages so

[p.731] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 724

given in substitution for an injunction have reference to the future, and not merely to the past, and they therefore amount to the legalization of the further continuance of the act complained of-a purchase by the defendant of the right to go on doing it. A claim for damages is a claim of right, but a claim for an injunction may be granted or refused by the court in exercise of its judicial discretion. It is, therefore, a fallacy to argue that a claim for damages in trespass will necessarily exclude the grant of an injunction.

Indeed, the commonest and most important situation in granting injunctions is against the continuance of an injury. And, as it was observed by Lindley LJ in Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287 at 315, CA.

“the Court has always protested against the notion that it ought to allow a wrong to continue simply because the wrongdoer is able and willing to pay for the injury he may inflict such jurisdiction ought not to be exercised except under very exceptional circumstances.”

Despite the fact that another court might have considered the compensatory claim for damages in refusing an injunction, this court cannot restrict or limit the exercise of the trial judge’s discretion in granting the interlocutory injunction by placing a fetter on his discretion that it ought to have been exercised in a particular way. The first ground of the appeal accordingly fails.

In regard to ground (2) it appears that the inconvenience complained of by the defendant was that he needed to complete the building for his occupation as he had to give up possession of his house to his purchaser. That inconvenience, in my opinion, was too remote for the court’s consideration. The only legitimate inconvenience engendered by the cessation of his building operations was the impact of the inflationary spiral. The trial judge in his wisdom made an adequate order to compensate the defendant for any such loss arising thereby. This can hardly give cause for any grievance.

By his ground (3) the defendant exposed his misconception of the undertaking as to damages demanded of the plaintiff. It is a matter of sad reflection that even though motions for interim injunctions, especially in land suits, are everyday fare in the courts, our trial courts hardly resort to that flexible and most useful tool in aid of justice, namely the practice of exacting an undertaking as to damages from a plaintiff to whom such an interim injunction is granted. This practice is almost universal and applied as a matter of course in other common law jurisdictions. In Hoffman-La Roche & Co v Secretary of State for [p.732] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 724

Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295, HL the House of Lords took time off to extol and explain this practice which our trial courts will do well to follow. The practice is said to have originated during the Vice-Chancellorship of Sir James Knight Bruce who held that office from 1841-1851. As explained by Lord Wilberforce at 355-356:

“The object [of an interim injunction] is to prevent a litigant, who must necessarily suffer the law’s delay, from losing by that delay the fruit of his litigation . . . Since the injunction by its nature freezes the situation, it is necessary also to think of the other party’s position and rights; he, too, by being stopped in what may be some lawful action, may suffer serious damage, so the procedure has been evolved … of matching the injunction with an undertaking to pay any damage which it is just should be paid if it should turn out that the injunction was unjustified.”

On the effect of the undertaking Lord Diplock explained at 361 as follows:

“The court has no power to compel an applicant for an interim injunction to furnish an undertaking as to damages. All it can do is to refuse the application if he declines to do so. The undertaking is not given to the defendant but to the court itself. Non-performance of it is contempt of court, not breach of contract, and attracts the remedies available for contempt, but the court exacts the undertaking for the defendant’s benefit.

It retains a discretion not to enforce the undertaking if it considers that the conduct of the defendant in relation to the obtaining or continuing of the injunction or the enforcement of the undertaking makes it equitable to do so, but if the undertaking is enforced the measure of the damages payable under it is not discretionary. It is assessed on an inquiry into damages at which principles to be applied are fixed and clear.

The assessment is made upon the same basis as that upon which damages for breach of contract would be assessed if the undertaking had been a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant that the plaintiff would not prevent the defendant from doing that which he was restrained from doing by the terms of the injunction: see Smith v. Day (1882) 21 Ch. D. 421, per Brett L.J. at p. 427.”

The sanctions for breach of the undertaking, as it would be seen, are severe enough and the complaint against the exaction of the undertaking cannot, therefore, be sustained.

The rest of the arguments urged before us concerned an attack on each other’s title. Like the trial judge, this court must not be inveigled

[p.733] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 724

to prejudice the substantive trial by any premature pronouncement on title. The appeal, in my view, is without merit and ought to fail.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI JA.

I also agree.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed

M. C. N. -N

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