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[1986] SLR (CA) 6Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

BOATENG vs. VOLTA ALUMINIUM CO LTD [1984-86] 1 GLR 733

26 June 1986 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 11 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (CA) 6
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLABOATENG v VOLTA ALUMINIUM CO LTD [1984-86] 1 GLR 733 [1986] SLR (CA) 6
APABOATENG v VOLTA ALUMINIUM CO LTD [1984-86] 1 GLR 733, [1986] SLR (CA) 6 (Ghana).
BluebookBOATENG v VOLTA ALUMINIUM CO LTD [1984-86] 1 GLR 733, [1986] SLR (CA) 6 (Ghana Ct. App. 1986).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Danquah v Timber and Transport Co Ltd [1971] 2 GLR 383, CA.

(2) Jodrell In re; Jodrell v Seale (1890) 44 Ch 590.

(3) Wigsell v The Corporation of the School for The Indigent Blind (1880) 43 LT 218. (4) Hilbers v Parkinson (1884) 25 ChD 200; 49 LT 502.

(5) Colquhoun v Brooks (1888) 21 QBD 52; 59 LT 661.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decision of the High-Court, Accra dismissing the plaintiff’s action on an originating summons for the proper interpretation of a contract of employment. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Abban JA.

COUNSEL

Kwaku Baah for the appellant.

Boafo for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN JA

On February 1985 the High Court, Accra delivered a ruling dismissing an originating summons brought by the appellant, the production supervisor of the respondent-company (hereinafter called the company). On 18 November 1983, the company served on the appellant a letter terminating his employment with the company.

The appellant was not given a month’s notice of termination of his services. He was rather given a month’s salary in lieu of such notice. The appellant contended that his employment could lawfully be terminated in that manner only where there had been a serious misconduct, fraud, dishonesty, or stealing on his part. Other than that his employment could also be terminated involuntarily for cause after a month’s notice and there was no option of payment of a month’s salary in lieu of notice, and since his termination was not in accordance with the conditions of service agreed between the employees on the one hand and the company on the other, it was unlawful.

[p.736] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 733

The company held a contrary view. Since this was mainly a question of the correct interpretation of the terms of the conditions of service, ie the service agreement, dealing with the termination of employment, the appellant filed an originating summons for the determination of the following two questions: 1. whether the appellant’s appointment as a supervisor of the company could be terminated under the conditions of service without a month’s prior notice; and 2. whether the company was entitled under the conditions of service to pay to the appellant a month’s salary in lieu of notice for termination of the appellant’s employment for cause.

The relevant clauses of the conditions of service which dealt with termination of employment can be found in exhibit A tendered at the trial. They read as follows:

“TERMINATION”

“1. Voluntary termination of employment (resignation) shall require a notice of one calendar month (or four calendar weeks if the notice is not given at month’s end) by the resigning supervisor with pay up to the date of termination plus all accrued benefits less any outstanding debts owed by the supervisor to Valco. Supervisors voluntarily terminating employment without giving Valco one month’s notice shall in lieu of notice pay the equivalent sum of money.

2. Involuntary termination of employment for redundancy shall require a notice of one month to redundant supervisor with pay up to the date of termination plus all accrued benefits less any outstanding debts owed by the supervisor to Valco.

3. Involuntary termination of employment for cause shall require a notice of one month to the terminated supervisor.

4. In cases of serious misconduct, fraud, dishonesty, stealing and allied offences, the supervisor may be summarily dismissed without notice.”

The learned High Court judge in his ruling concluded as follows:

“The only complaint by the plaintiff is that he was not given a month’s notice. I hold that under clauses 2 or 3 of the conditions of service (exhibit A) there could be implied an intention to pay a month’s salary in lieu of notice. I find therefore that the termination of the plaintiff’s appointment without a month’s notice but with a month’s salary in lieu of the notice was lawful.”

The basis of this holding was questioned by learned counsel for the appellant. Counsel argued only one ground of appeal, namely that the

[p.737] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 733

learned trial judge was wrong in law when he held that the company was entitled to pay the appellant a month’s salary in lieu of notice. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant being a supervisor, his appointment could be terminated lawfully only under exhibit A. In exhibit A there are four clauses and the company could only terminate the appellant’s appointment by coming under one of those clauses and that the learned judge was right when he said clause 3 was the applicable clause under which the appellant’s employment could be terminated. But, counsel contended that under clause 3 a month’s notice was required to be given to the appellant, but this was not done and furthermore, no cause for the termination was stated in the letter of termination, exhibit B, and it was therefore wrong for the learned judge to hold that the termination was lawful.

Learned counsel further contended that the learned judge came to that wrong conclusion because of his improper reliance on Danquah v Timber and Transport Co Ltd [1971] 2 GLR 383, CA. Counsel submitted that the authority could be applied only where the document to be interpreted was vague and ambiguous, but where the words used in the conditions of service, as found by the trial judge, were clear there was no room for speculations and inferences; and in that respect the decision of the learned judge offended against the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius – the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another – and it should not therefore be allowed to stand.

Learned counsel for the company in substance contended that the company could pay the appellant one month’s salary in lieu of notice if all the clauses are looked at; and he urged the court to adopt a construction which would not only harmonise all the four clauses but also effectuate the intentions of the parties.

I think it is pertinent to recall the circumstances which led the company to terminate the appellant’s employment. The affidavit of the company sworn to by its personnel manager gave the background and the reasons for the steps taken by the company. The affidavit, paragraphs 4-8, narrated how the appellant on 16 August 1983 took five electric cables and two electric motors. He managed to outwit the guards at the gates and conveyed those goods out of the yard of the company. In paragraph 9 the affidavit continued:

“9. The company became satisfied from its investigatory reports that the applicant did not secure gate permit before he transported the motors and cables through gates two and three to Fishing Harbour Area and managed to deceive the guard thereof that he had such a permit.

[p.738] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 733

10. The company considered the conduct of the applicant as unbecoming of a supervisor who cannot be trusted any longer having regard to the sensitive position he was occupying at the plant. In brief the applicant was a risk.

11. The company in the light of the foregoing considerably felt that it would not be in the interest of the company to retain the applicant at his post for fear of repetition and having regard to the fact that the applicant’s conduct was not grave to pay the applicant one month’s salary in lieu of notice and terminated the applicant’s appointment with themselves.”

Incidentally, those facts were not controverted by the appellant. In any case, there was no doubt that the appellant was aware of them and in the absence of any denial of those facts by the appellant it was clear that the company had cause for terminating the employment of the appellant. The appellant was definitely guilty of some misconduct, which could have led to his instant dismissal under clause 4 if it had been a serious one. There is no fixed rule of law defining the degree of misconduct which will justify dismissal from service.

It is a question of fact whether the degree of misconduct is inconsistent with the fulfilment of the express or implied conditions of service, so as to justify dismissal. In the present case, the company felt the misconduct of the appellant was not serious so as to necessitate his summary dismissal under clause (4). But all the same it was a misconduct all right and it was of such a nature that he could no longer be trusted by any reasonable employer; and in that respect, the company had cause for terminating the employment of the appellant. The fact that the cause was not spelt out in the letter, exhibit B, which was addressed to the appellant, did not mean that the cause did not exist.

Since there was cause, the next question is whether the company could terminate the appellant’s appointment only under clause (3) and only after giving him one month’s notice, or the services could also be terminated under the other clauses as well, because the company did not indicate or specify in exhibit B the clause under which the appellant’s appointment was being terminated. The answer should depend on the construction which should be put on the termination clauses of the conditions of service.

In attempting to construe the termination provisions, regard should be had to all the four termination clauses. That is the language used and all the provisions in the termination clauses should be looked at as a whole and every clause must be compared with the other and one entire sense made out of them. It is only by doing this that the true meaning and the intention of the parties could be discovered. This

[p.739] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 733

method of construction was adopted by Lord Halsbury LC in In re Jodrell; Jodrell v Seale (1890) 44 ChD 590 where the learned Lord said at 605:

“I am called upon to express an opinion on what is the meaning of this written instrument … For myself, I am prepared to look at the instrument such as it is; to see the language that is used in it; to look at the whole of the document, and not to part of it; and, having looked at the whole of the document, to see (if I can) through the instrument what was the mind of the testator.”

The same view seemed to have been expressed by Huddleston B in Wigsell v The Corporation of the School for the Indigent Blind (1880) 43 LT 218 where he said at 219:

“In construing covenants, the fulfilment of the evident intention and meaning of the parties to them must be looked at, not confining oneself within the narrow limits of a literal interpretation, but taking a more liberal and extended view, and contemplating at once the whole scope and object of the deed in which they are contained.”

Having therefore considered the clauses as a whole and taking a liberal and extended view of the language used, I can safely say that those clauses were designed to accomplish or achieve one particular object, namely to protect both the employer and the employee in the sense that the clause did ensure that an employee would not suddenly leave the services of the employer and thereby create an unexpected vacuum; and in the same token they safeguarded the employee against the sudden termination of his services by the employer except where clause (4) was to be invoked.

In clause (1) the employee could terminate his services by giving one month’s notice or by paying one month’s salary in lieu of notice to the employer. But the payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice was absent in clauses (2) and (3). But reading all the clauses together I do not think clauses (2) and (3) were intended to exclude the possibility of paying a month’s salary as an alternative to giving a month’s notice. If clause (1) gave such an alternative to an employee it was only fair and just that it should be inferred or implied that the employer also had the said alternative in the other two clauses, i.e. clauses (2) and (3). Such an inference would not only do that which was the highest equity, namely make an equality between parties who stood in the same relation, but would also effectuate the real object and intention of the parties. Thus in Hilbers v Parkinson (1884) 25 ChD 200 at 203-204 Pearson J said:

[p.740] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 733

“I conceive that all deeds are to be construed, not only strictly according to their words, but, so far as is possible without infringing any rule of law, in such a way as to effectuate the intention of the parties.”

The contention of learned counsel for the appellant that any inference that the company could also pay a month’s salary in lieu of notice would offend against the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius was not tenable in view of the fact that such an inference would rather bring all the clauses into harmony with one another. I must observe that great caution is necessary in dealing with this maxim for it is not of universal application. Its application depends upon the intention of the parties as discoverable upon the face of the document or of the transaction; and the nature of the agreement in this case was such that the maxim cannot properly be applied. The maxim has been described as “a valuable servant but a dangerous master” by Lopes LJ in Colquhoun v Brooks (1888) 21 QBD 52 and as I have already stated, care ought to be exercised in resorting to it.

In any case, the construction which has been put on clauses (2) and (3) does not in anyway violate the said maxim. I am therefore of the view that the company could under clauses (2) and (3) pay the appellant one month’s salary in lieu of a month’s notice and so the company was entitled to terminate the appointment of the appellant in the way it did.

The learned judge, was in the circumstances, right in his ruling. Consequently, I am of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE JA.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI JA.

I also agree.

DECISION Appeal dismissed. M. C. N. -N

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