SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1984] SLR (CA) 10Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

BARNIEH II vs. MENSAH AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 20

17 April 1984 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 6 min read

Cite as[1984] SLR (CA) 10
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLABARNIEH II v MENSAH AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 20 [1984] SLR (CA) 10
APABARNIEH II v MENSAH AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 20, [1984] SLR (CA) 10 (Ghana).
BluebookBARNIEH II v MENSAH AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 20, [1984] SLR (CA) 10 (Ghana Ct. App. 1984).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASE REFERRED TO

Joseph v. Jebeile [1963] 1 G.L.R. 387, S.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for stay of execution pending appeal in an estate matter. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Apaloo C.J.

COUNSEL

Nana Akufo-Addo for the applicant.

Hayfron-Benjamin for the respondents.

[p.22] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 20

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

Apaloo C.J. delivered the ruling of the court. In this matter, the applicant invites us to stay the execution of a ruling delivered by the High Court, Kumasi in an estate matter. Counsel says that that ruling is wholly wrong and he seems confident that it would be reversed on appeal. We have looked carefully at the ruling. It merely held that the applicant was not clothed with power to institute the proceedings he did. It held he was neither head of family nor customary successor of the late Opanin Kojo Mensah alias Kojo Teng and was bereft of capacity to sue.

It seems therefore that the ruling made no order or direction which the successful respondents could enforce by the known process of execution. That is why Mr. Hayfron-Benjamin argued that this application was ill-conceived. Mr. Akufo-Addo replied that that was only looking at the form of the matter. The substance really is that this ruling would enable the respondents to proceed to carry out the wishes of the testator in his will. He says that will purports to dispose of properties which did not belong to the testator but to the family which he heads. He says if this ruling is not stayed, he would suffer irreparable damage in the event of his success on appeal.

Mr. Hayfron-Benjamin’s contention is superficially attractive, but in matters of this sorts where this court’s equitable discretion is appealed to, we think it conforms to equitable principle to look at the substance and not at the form of the relief sought. Looked at that way, it is in reality an application to us to grant an injunction restraining the respondents as executors of the will from carrying out its provisions until the determination of this appeal.

That being so, we must consider whether taking all the circumstances of this case into consideration, it is just and convenient to do so. According to the available evidence, the testator died nearly ten years ago. Presumably to avoid litigation after his death, he took the trouble to set out his wishes in a valid testamentary document. He was, himself, said to be a man of substantial means in his own right. Those wishes have not yet been carried out because of the applicant’s objections. First, it was the validity of the will that he contested. In the result, he was unsuccessful. He now claims that the testator did not own any one of the properties he sought to bequeath. They all allegedly belonged to the family. With regard to one farm, the applicant said it was his own self-acquired property.

Because of the pendency of the suits, the farms were entrusted to a receiver and manager. He is the registrar of the High Court. The respondents say he has mismanaged the estate and the court below ordered his discharge pending the filing of accounts. It is said, he is

[p.23] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 20

having trouble doing so. If, in fact, the properties devised belonged to the deceased, the beneficiaries have been put to great loss since for nearly ten years, they have been disabled by reason of the applicant’s suits from entering upon their inheritance. The applicant was not prepared to concede that any of the properties devised belonged to the deceased. That appeared odd to the judge below as it appeared to us. Indeed, the judge said, “I cannot but take note of the hardship caused to them” (i.e. the beneficiaries) “by the all embarrassing nature of the plaintiff’s claim.” The balance of hardship is one of the factors we should take into consideration when dealing with an application of this sort. It seems to us, prima facie at any rate, that the balance of hardship lies heavily on the beneficiaries, and we should, on that account, think it right to refuse this application.

But Mr. Akufo-Addo reminded us of the well-known decision of the Supreme Court in Joseph v. Jebeile [1963] 1 G.L.R. 387, S.C. At 390 the court, inter alia, observed:

“Generally speaking it is not our view that the policy of the law in this country should be against staying execution pending appeal especially where large sums of money are involved …

Any situation created by a judicial act, done either inadvertently or callously, which makes it impossible for a successful appellant to recover money paid, or any interest in property or other legal rights surrendered, under a judgment vacated on appeal does a disservice to the course of justice . . .”

There is no doubt that this ruling lays down principles of abiding value. But the Supreme Court at the same time, was at pains to point out that it did not wish to say anything that would be interpreted as a fetter on the exercise of the discretion of a judge when called upon to grant a stay of execution pending appeal. So in this, as in the exercise of all judicial discretions, each case must be considered on its own merits.

Here, the question is not the payment of money as the transfer of property. It seems to us that if the ownership of these properties is truly vested in the family and if the applicant is adjudged the head of family, any temporary transfer that the executors may make of the property will not affect the title. It can still be recovered for the family. So the real question is, who should be in enjoyment in the meantime? It seems to us that on this, the beneficiaries have a stronger claim. For nearly ten years they have been kept out of enjoyment of these properties. The applicant does not seek to enjoy it. He says it should be kept with a neutral third party who for all we know, may not have any sense of commitment to these farms as the real owners. There is also evidence

[p.24] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 20

that the deceased’s family acknowledge the ownership of the testator and concede his right to alienate them by will.

As it seems to us, if the applicant succeeds on appeal, that would not end the matter. That would only entitle him to proceed to prove, as against the beneficiaries, the family’s ownership of these properties. If the beneficiaries lose the suit eventually, it would not be out of place to order them to account for any benefits they may have enjoyed in the interim. We concede all these are pure speculations but that cannot be avoided in matters of this sort.

We note that the Mankranso Agya farm will remain in the care of the receiver and manager. If the applicant loses this appeal, or loses his eventual claim that these properties belong to the family, the beneficiaries would have suffered great loss and inconvenience. It is uncertain when this long litigation will end. A consideration of all these matters lead us to think that greater hardship would be caused in granting this application than in refusing it. We accordingly decline to exercise our discretion in the applicant’s favour and dismiss this motion with ¢1,000 costs to the respondents.

DECISION

Application for stay of execution

dismissed.

J. A. A.

Scroll to Top