ANOKYI AND OTHERS vs. TUFFOUR [1984-86] 1 GLR 42
9 May 1984 · ADADE JSC · ≈ 4 min read
[1984] SLR (CA) 5Other citation styles and permanent link
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the decision of the High Court, Cape Coast setting aside the sale by public auction of the plaintiff-judgment debtor’s house. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
K. Ewusie-Wilson for the appellants.
No appearance for or by the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF ADADE J.S.C.
By his decision dated 6 November 1979 (the reasons for which were given on 12 November 1979) Osei-Hwere J. (as he then was) sitting at Cape Coast set aside the sale by public auction of the plaintiff’s house on the ground that it was unlawful, and contravened Order 44, r. 14 of the Court’s Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.), Sched. II. The defendants challenge this decision.
On 23 September 1970 the first defendant recovered judgment against the plaintiff for ¢270. In execution of this judgment he applied for a writ of fifa to attach and sell: “1. One compound house at Ntronang and at a place commonly known and called Rest House. 2 All personal effects of the defendant-judgment debtor [now the plaintiff].” The writ of fifa was issued in October 1970. The sale of the house was duly advertised, but did not take place till 26 April 1972. The second defendant was the purchaser; the third defendant was the auctioneer. Later the second defendant resold the house to the co-defendant, Seth Alimo. The plaintiff brought this action to set aside the sale of the house because he contends it contravened Order 44, r. 14 of Cap. 4, and was therefore null and void.
The said Order 44, r. 14 reads:
“If the judgment debtor has sufficient moveable property within the Judicial Division in which the decree was issued to satisfy the debt, damages, and costs recovered, his lands shall not be levied upon; but if he has not sufficient moveable property within the Judicial Division, it shall be optional to the execution creditor to levy upon his immovable property within the same Judicial Division before levying on his moveable property elsewhere, or to levy upon the moveable property of such judgment debtor wherever it may be found within [Ghana], before having recourse to his immovable property.”
In other words, by the said provisions of Order 44, r. 14 a judgment creditor could proceed against the immovable property of a judgment debtor only after he has exhausted his personalty within the judicial
[p.44] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 42
division, or if there is proof that the judgment debtor has no personal effects. The marginal note to Order 44, r. 14 reads: “Lands not to be levied on till goods exhausted.” Indeed, at common law only the goods and chattels of the judgment debtor could be taken in execution. Money and various securities for money became seizable by virtue of section 12 of the Judgments Act, 1838 (1 & 2 Vict, c. 110). Real property cannot be seized at common law. In taking personalty the sheriff is under a duty to take only so much, and not more than that, as is reasonably sufficient to satisfy the judgment debt and the sheriff’s own expenses. An “over-attachment” is actionable.
The fifa, Form 23, Appendix A of Cap. 4 commands the sheriff in the name of the Republic:
“. . . that of the moveable property of [the judgment debtor] within the . . . Judicial Division or within the jurisdiction of the Court if the same be sufficient, and if not, then of the moveable and immovable property of the said [judgment debtor] you cause to be made the sum of ¢. . . and also interest thereon at the rate of . .
.”
Our Order 44, r. 14 of Cap. 4 therefore seeks first to apply and enforce the common law and then making allowance in cases where the common law is proved inadequate.
In this case, the plaintiff contends that although he had personal effects sufficient to satisfy the judgment debt of ¢270 the first defendant ignored these and proceeded to sell his house. In June 1972 when bailiffs attempted to forcibly eject the plaintiff in order to put the purchaser in possession they took an inventory of the plaintiff’s effects in the house. This inventory was tendered at the trial as exhibit F. The plaintiff argues that those effects were in the house in the preceding April when it was being sold. The first defendant on the other hand contends that there was nothing in the house at the time, but that the plaintiff sneaked these items into the house after the sale. The judge disbelieved this latter story. In any case, the bailiffs who sold the house in April did not prior to the sale make a return of “no goods” to satisfy the requirements of Order 44. It would seem therefore that on the evidence the probabilities favour the plaintiff that he had goods in the house in April, in which case the sale of the house without a first recourse to the personal effects would conflict with Order 44 and be illegal for if he had goods then “his lands shall not be levied upon.”
The learned judge was right in the conclusion he came to, after a careful consideration of the relevant law. We affirm his decision, and dismiss this appeal.
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As the respondent did not appear at the hearing of the appeal, there will be no order as to costs in this court.
JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.
I agree.
JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.
I also agree.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
