SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1984] SLR (CA) 25Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

NTOAH vs. APPEADU [1984-86] 1 GLR 45

9 May 1984 · ADADE JSC · ≈ 11 min read

Cite as[1984] SLR (CA) 25
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLANTOAH v APPEADU [1984-86] 1 GLR 45 [1984] SLR (CA) 25
APANTOAH v APPEADU [1984-86] 1 GLR 45, [1984] SLR (CA) 25 (Ghana).
BluebookNTOAH v APPEADU [1984-86] 1 GLR 45, [1984] SLR (CA) 25 (Ghana Ct. App. 1984).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Tutu v. Dapaa (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 15.

(2) Anaman v. Eyeduwa [1978] G.L.R. 114, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decision of the High Court, Kumasi affirming the decision of the trial district court in an action for declaration of title to land. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

C. F. Hayfron-Benjamin for the appellant.

No appearance by or on behalf of the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ADADE J.S.C.

This case comes to us on appeal from the High Court, Kumasi (coram Roger Korsah J.). The suit had originally been heard and determined by the District Court Grade II, Effiduasi.

The plaintiff sued for a declaration that she is the owner of a piece of land at Odaho. She says the land belonged to her grandmother, Ama Nyarko. On her death it passed to her mother, Akosua Konadu. She has succeeded Akosua Konadu, and has by virtue of the succession become entitled to the land. She had been in possession of the land for about ten years. In 1976 the defendant trespassed onto the said land, and she sued. In an affidavit filed on 8 June 1976 the defendant claims the said land as his property, “being given to [him] by Nana Odahohene.”

After hearing evidence and inspecting the area the district court magistrate, his Worship Tekyi Mensah, dismissed the plaintiff ‘s claim

[p.47] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 45 and entered judgment for the defendant. Her appeal to the High Court, Kumasi was also dismissed. In this court the plaintiff ‘s case has been argued substantially on the ground that the decision of the High Court, like that of the district court, is against the weight of the evidence.

The judgment of the district magistrate is significant for its brevity. After a short resume of the evidence of the various witnesses, the honourable magistrate tersely concluded:

“After considering the evidence led by both parties and their witnesses as well as the result of the inspection of the area in dispute, I do not accept the plaintiff’s claim of ownership in respect of the land which is the subject matter of this action and accordingly dismiss her claim with costs…”

There is nothing in the judgment to show that the magistrate considered the evidence of the parties and their witnesses; which statements he believed and which he did not believe. He made no findings of fact at all. This court therefore has to come to its own conclusions on the facts if there is material on record from which this can be done. Otherwise the case has to go back to be tried de novo. Nor is much help provided by the inspection report which the magistrate prepared. The report merely recites the boundary features allegedly shown by the parties, but in the absence of a plan one can hardly make anything out of the report.

The plaintiff led evidence to show that the land had been her ancestral property which had descended to her through her grandmother, Ama Nyarko, and mother, Akosua Konadu. To prove possession she called Emmanuel Kwasi Abreshie alias Kwasi Emma, a palmwine tapper. He had felled palm trees on the land in 1970, 1972 and 1976, and on each occasion had paid the fees involved to the plaintiff. At the inspection the said Kwasi Emmanuel showed the remains of the palm tree he had felled; these were all “within the area which the plaintiff claims”, according to the inspection report.

The plaintiff also called Nana Ware Djiabuor, the odikro of Krapa No 1 to establish that the plaintiff has land on one side of the Krapa to Odaho footpath. According to this witness the plaintiff lies on the right, with the Odahohene on the left. This finds corroboration in the evidence of the second plaintiff witness, Emmanuel Kwasi, who said, “Pointing to Krapa from Odaho the land on which I felled the palm trees is on the left.” He had taken his bearings in the reverse order (Odaho-Krapa instead of Krapa-Odaho), so the plaintiffs land appears on the left.

The defendant himself seems to agree that the plaintiff has land in the area, for he says that on a complaint by the plaintiff that the defendant’s mother had trespassed onto the plaintiffs land, he, the defendant, “inspected the land and found that [my] mother Akosua Buo

[p.48] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 45 had not encroached on the plaintiff’s land but had cultivated my own portion .. .” At the inspection the defendant showed an “. . . Osine tree as head boundary between the plaintiff and himself, and in the rear is a mangrove and thence to a stream called Asesesu where the boundary ends.” In spite of this the defendant tried to persuade the court that the plaintiff has no land in the area. He says the plaintiff does not “form boundary with [her].”

Kwasi Kwarteng, the first defendant witness, seems to have told a tissue of lies. His evidence was riddled with myriads of inconsistencies, and it is not surprising that he was charged by the plaintiff with not knowing the land in dispute at all. The evidence of the second defendant witness, Kwaku Bawua, suggests that the plaintiff has land in the area. He says the plaintiff is his real sister. If so then the plaintiff’s grandmother Ama Nyarko must be his grandmother and therefore sister to Yeboah Kodie, Bawua’s grandfather. Bawua says Yeboah Kodie acquired the land from Nana Kwarteng, which he subsequently “divided among his sisters.” Ama Nyarko as Yeboah Kodie’s sister must have got a portion, which was later farmed by Akosua Konadu, the plaintiff’s mother, whilst the other portions were farmed by Ekyaama, Ama Buor and Abena Suo. Even so, this witness also seems to have his own axe to grind with the plaintiff and all the women on the Odaho lands. As far as he, as krontihene, is concerned “…all the Odaho lands lying to the left [of the Odaho-Akyena foot path] belong to him and no woman has any rightful claim to the ownership of any land in that area.” He claims to have succeeded to these lands as stool property “when [he] came to occupy the stool.” He inherited them from Yeboah Kodie. These lands are to the left of the Odaho-Akyena road, with the defendant on the right. In other words, with the back to Oda, Yeboah Kodie’s lands, part of which must have gone to the plaintiff’s ancestors, lies to the left, confirming the evidence of the second plaintiff witness, the palmwine tapper, and the plaintiff’s story. The learned magistrate does not appear to have given sufficient consideration to the case put forward by the plaintiff.

The learned High Court judge was much exercised by the fact that the case was fought without pleadings. Whilst we agree that pleadings could have better clarified the initial positions of the contesting parties, the writ filed by the plaintiff contains all the essential strands of her claim. She identified the land by boundaries, and then showed how she came by the land, it having descended to her through her mother and grandmother. Pleadings could not have added much to these essential details. The defendant might have benefited by pleadings, but as a defendant it was enough for him to deny the plaintiff’s claim, and to state, as he did, that, on the contrary, the land belongs to him. Whilst formal pleadings may be desirable in the higher tribunals, they need not

[p.49] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 45 always be insisted on, particularly in the inferior courts. After all it should not be forgotten that day in day out across the length and breadth of the country hundreds of cases are being heard and disposed of in chiefs’ palaces, and before panels of village and town elders, without pleadings. Whether we choose to call these proceedings arbitrations or not it is safe to say that in the majority of cases the parties concerned do not complain about the results. They are satisfied that justice is being done.

In any case, as stated at the beginning of this opinion, this case commenced in the District Court Grade II, Effiduasi and the “general procedure rules” governing civil proceedings in that court requires that: “1. Suits shall ordinarily be heard and determined in a summary manner without pleadings…” (The emphasis is mine): see the Courts Ordinance, Cap 4 (1951 Rev.), Sched 2, Order 25, r. 1. Pleadings may be ordered in exceptional circumstances, and for reasons which must be expressly stated: see Tutu v. Dapaa (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 15. We feel satisfied that in this case no injustice has been occasioned by the absence of pleadings, and we are happy to note that by sheer accident, the learned High Court judge refused to remit the case to the trial court to be tried de novo, thus saving the parties further expense in time, money and energy.

Perhaps a plan would have been eminently helpful. But it would seem from the evidence that the parties themselves have no difficulty with the identity of the land. Sufficient particulars were given in the writ, and detailed boundary features were shown by the plaintiff at the inspection. No useful purpose will be served by ordering a plan at this stage.

The other major complaint by the plaintiff against the decision of the High Court is that the learned judge “misdirected himself in law in applying irrelevant criteria in assessing the plaintiffs case . . .” The alleged misdirection stems from the judge’s appreciation of the evidence of the first plaintiff witness, Nana Ware Djiabour alias Kofi Fofie, Odikro of Krapa No 1. The said odikro gave evidence in the first person and said that he gave the land to the plaintiff. The learned judge took the statement literally and commented:

“Thus while the plaintiff asserted that the land in dispute was her ancestral property which had descended to her the female line, her witness, the first plaintiff witness, in an attempted corroboration of this assertion, stated that the origin of the plaintiff’s title was the gift by him to her. Either one of them was, or both of them were, deliberate in her or their fabrication of falsehoods in an attempt to foul the fountain of justice.”

[p.50] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 45

As a result the judge found the plaintiff’s evidence of her root of title “conflicting.”

It is clear to us that the learned judge completely misunderstood the nature of the evidence of the first plaintiff witness who is a chief, and it is customary for chiefs, speaking in their representative capacity as chiefs, to speak in the first person. If in 1984 a chief says: “I fought in the Sagrenti War and as a result of the bravery I showed, I was given this piece of land”, he does not imply that he personally took part in the Sagrenti War; it may well be that at the time of that war his grandfather had not even been born, let alone his father. What he means is that his stool, i.e. that a predecessor occupant of the stool, took part in that war; and “I was given the land” means the land was given and became attached to his stool. The chief himself may, at the time he gives such evidence, be in his early twenties. In all these matters it is dangerous to take the statements literally, at face value; the context must be carefully watched and considered.

Here it is clear that the odikro was not speaking of himself, but of his stool. He identified himself with the stool (or is it the stool with himself?) and the plaintiff with her ancestors. For instance he talks of the land occupied by Nana Kwarteng, Odahohene as “Ejisu stool land which was a gift from me. It is correct that I form a boundary with Nana Eijisuhene. I gave the Odahohene’s portion to him before I gave the plaintiff her portion.”

This was read in the context of the plaintiff’s earlier evidence that: “It was my grandparent who gave Nana Kwarteng [Odahohene] the land to settle on. My grandfather was chief of Krapa and so it was not necessary for him to be made chief of Odaho.” This clearly shows that the present Krapa chief, the first plaintiff witness, could not have been the “grandfather” chief who made the presentation and that the presentation could not have been made to the plaintiff personally, but to her ancestors.

The courts ought to, in dealing with our own people, take cognisance of our own ways of behaviour and customary and traditional practices. If we try to see everything through the eyes of an Englishman there is every risk that grave injustice may be done. This case offers a typical example. Because the learned judge understood the evidence of the first plaintiff witness as a non-Ghanaian, he concentrates a lot of his fire on the law of gifts at customary law and finds that the ingredients are missing (a finding that is debatable: see Anaman v. Eyeduwa [1978] G.L.R. 114, C.A. for the proposition that in certain cases formal aseda and formal acceptance may be unnecessary) and uses this fact to fault the plaintiff’s case. There can be no greater

[p.51] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 45 misdirection than that. In this we agree with learned counsel for the plaintiff.

On a careful reading of the record, we think the plaintiff did what was necessary to shift the balance of probabilities in her favour. She identified the land; she showed how that land came to her through her mother and grandmother, which finds some corroboration in the defendant’s own evidence; she shows she had been in possession since succeeding to her mother; she also proves the trespass. On the contrary, the defendant’s case is conflicting and confusing; his witnesses are demonstrably unreliable. Indeed, at the hearing of the appeal at the High Court the learned judge himself observed with justification that “…the defendant’s witnesses are not witnesses of truth.” In the circumstances I think the plaintiff deserves judgment.

The appeal is allowed. Accordingly, I would set aside the judgments of the High Court, Kumasi, and the District Court, Effiduase. In their place, I would substitute a judgment for the plaintiff for ownership of the land described in the writ.

The plaintiff will have her costs in this court fixed at ¢2,500 and ¢2,000 in both the High Court and the district court. Any costs paid by the appellant in the two courts below should be refunded to her.

Courts below to carry out.

JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A. I also agree.

DECISION Appeal allowed.

M. C. N. N.

Scroll to Top