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[1981] SLR (SC) 1Supreme Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

BILSON vs. APALOO [1981] GLR 15

6 April 1981 · ANIN JSC · ≈ 14 min read

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OSCOLABILSON v APALOO [1981] GLR 15 [1981] SLR (SC) 1
APABILSON v APALOO [1981] GLR 15, [1981] SLR (SC) 1 (Ghana).
BluebookBILSON v APALOO [1981] GLR 15, [1981] SLR (SC) 1 (Ghana Sup. Ct. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Akufo-Addo v. Quashie-Idun [1968] G.L.R. 667, C.A. (full bench).

(2) R. v. Lovegrove [1951] 1 All E.R. 804; 35 Cr.App.R. 30, C.C.A.

(3) Judges v. Attorney-General of Saskatchewan (1937) 53 T.L.R. 464; 81 S.J. 196, P.C.

(4) Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors (1852) 3 H.L. Cas. 759; 8 State Tr. (N.S.) 85; 19 L.T.

(O.S.) 317; 17 Jur. 73; 10 E.R. 301, H.L.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION before the Supreme Court for a declaration to quash the judgment of the Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court in the case of Tuffour v. Attorney-General delivered on 23 October 1980 wherein a preliminary issue of bias was raised by the plaintiff against two of the judges sitting as members of the panel constituting the Supreme Court. The facts are fully stated in the unanimous ruling of the court.

COUNSEL

Obeng-Manu for the plaintiff.

Nana Akufo-Addo (with him Dr. Prempeh, J. Glover and Fui Tsikata) for the defendant.

C. Tetteh, Solicitor-General, for the Attorney-General.

JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.S.C.

In this suit, the plaintiff claims a declaration to quash the judgment of the Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court in the case of Tuffour v. Attorney-General [1980] G.L.R. 637, S.C. delivered on 23 October 1980, on the ground, inter alia, that the five learned judges, i.e. Sowah and Charles Crabbe JJ.S.C., Lassey and Francois JJ.A. and Agyepong J. who constituted the court “did not constitutionally hold valid nominations to sit in the said suit;” since, it is alleged, the Hon. Mr. Justice Fred Kwasi Apaloo (the defendant herein), who empanelled the court, acted in contravention of articles 114 (5), 121 (2) and section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, of Ghana. The plaintiff further contends in his statement of case, inter alia, that “it was judicially improper for the five judges to accept invalid nominations from the defendant herein to sit on the said case.”

The defendant, in his statement of case denies emphatically the allegations of impropriety and violations of any constitutional provisions and explains further that in empanelling the composition of the court in the said case, he merely acted in fulfilment of the mandatory requirements of article 121 (1) (c) and (4) by virtue of the powers

[p.18] of [1981] GLR 15 conferred on him by those constitutional provisions and in accordance with precedent and authority. He further contends that, “the constitution of the Superior Courts of Judicature is an express constitutional responsibility of the Chief Justice, which he cannot delegate or waive whilst at post.” He cites in support, the case of Akufo-Addo v. Quashie-Idun [1968] G.L.R. 667, C.A. (full bench).

Turning to the plaintiff’s criticisms of the empanelling of the Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court, the defendant retorts, inter alia, that they are “irresponsible and libellous” of the panel members and that “furthermore the said averments scandalise that court.” Elsewhere in his statement of case, the defendant contends that the plaintiff’s said averments against the composition of the Court of Appeal should be struck out of the pleadings and excluded from evidence because article 114 (9) of the Constitution, 1979, confers immunity from suit on judges of the Superior Courts of Judicature in the performance of their judicial functions.

In an earlier reserved ruling delivered on 26 March 1981, this court unanimously held that the Court of Appeal is not a “person” within the contemplation of article 2 of the Constitution, 1979, and cannot be sued in any court and accordingly struck it out as the second defendant in this suit.

Immediately after the delivery of our said ruling, Mr. Obeng-Manu, learned counsel for the plaintiff implored, and then submitted, that both the president of this court (Hon. Mr. Justice Sowah) and Hon. Mr. Justice Charles Crabbe should not sit as members of this Supreme Court hearing his present action because they also sat as members of the Court of Appeal in the case of Tuffour v. Attorney-General and that it is their judgment in that case which is now being sought to be quashed as a nullity.

Learned counsel further submitted that the natural justice rule against bias would be infringed if the said justices sat as judges in their own cause. For full measure, we were reminded of the constitutional adage, “Justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.” In Mr. Obeng-Manu’s contention, there is a real likelihood that the two named justices would have a bias in favour of the defendant herein.

Nana Akufo-Addo, counsel for the defendant, replied that the objection raised as to the competency of the two said justices is wholly unmeritorious. He argued that in the first place, Mr. Obeng-Manu’s grounds for the impeachment of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Tuffuor v. Attorney-General are exclusively legal, to wit, that certain constitutional provisions had been allegedly breached thereby rendering the proceedings a nullity. Both precedents and the rules of court however, permit the parties to appear

[p.19] of [1981] GLR 15 before the very court whose decision is being impugned to seek either a variation or review or vacation of the decision for good cause shown. In the case of review, jurisdiction is usually expressly conferred on the very judge or court that pronounced the earlier decision: see, e.g. rule 33 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962, (LI 218), and Order 39 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). And article 116 (3) of the Constitution, 1979, expressly provides that, “The Supreme Court may, while treating its own previous decisions as normally binding, depart from a previous decision when it appears right so to do…”

In the second place, whether or not a real likelihood of bias arises in this case against the two named justices is essentially a question of fact, dependent on the facts of the case and not on the several legal matters canvassed by the plaintiff’s counsel.

Thirdly, the underlying principle of the rule against bias is the familiar one that no man should be a judge in his own cause. But, Nana Akufo-Addo contended, it cannot be said that when the Chief Justice empanels a court, he thereby becomes a judge in his own cause. On the contrary, he merely exercises his administrative powers under the Constitution, 1979. And in accepting his invitation to sit on the case, the two named justices did not thereby become judges in their own cause.

Fourthly, the fact that a trial judge is invited to sit with other judicial colleagues on appeal from his own decision has never been accepted at common law as a ground of legal bias on his part. Indeed, counsel referred to the decision of an English court per Lord Goddard C.J. in R. v. Lovegrove [1951] 1 All E.R. 804, C.C.A. that there can be no proper legal objection as a general rule to this occasional practice.

Finally, Nana Akufo-Addo drew attention to cases of necessity which provide at common law, a well-known exception to the natural justice rule against judges sitting in their own causes. In such exceptional cases where no replacement can be found for the disqualified judges, they are allowed ex necessitate (as a matter of necessity) to adjudicate.

On this doctrine of necessity, Mr. Obeng-Manu’s answer was that it is inapplicable in this case since “the avenues of appointing judges to the Supreme Court are not closed.” He was of the view that to obviate the necessity of empanelling two allegedly disqualified justices, the Executive could be approached with a request for the appointment of fresh justices to replace the two named justices for the hearing of the plaintiff’s case.

This in a nutshell, sums up the rival cases and arguments of counsel for the parties on the preliminary objection taken to the

[p.20] of [1981] GLR 15 competency of the two named justices to adjudicate in this suit. The rules of natural justice provide minimum standards of fair decision-making imposed by the common law on adjudicating bodies. The two principal rules are nemo judex in causa sua (nobody is to be a judge in his own cause) and audi alteram partem (hear the other side). The first rule aims at fair judicial decisions by impartial and disinterested judges and adjudicators; while the second rule ensures that no man is to be condemned without a fair hearing. Both rules are necessary if the public are to have confidence in the administration of justice.

The first rule is also known as the rule against judicial bias and arises in two ways: (a) where the adjudicator is disqualified because he has any direct financial or proprietary interest in the subject-matter of the suit; and (b) where there is a real likelihood that the adjudicator would have a bias in favour of one of the parties. This likelihood of bias may spring from such causes as membership of an organisation that is a party to the suit; or from partisanship expressed in extra-judicial pronouncements; or from active championing of the cause of a party; or from family relationship with a party or from other close relationship with a party, etc.

It is important to note however, three situations where the presence of any of the said disqualifying elements under this first rule against judicial bias does not render the adjudicator incompetent to sit. In the first place, it is always open to parties, on their being apprised of the disqualifying elements, to waive their right to object to the adjudicator sitting in the particular case. In the second place, an enactment may permit an adjudicator to sit (or may save his adjudication from invalidity).

And in the third exception to the general rule, which is here germane, an adjudicator, who may be otherwise disqualified, is nevertheless eligible and indeed obliged to sit if there is no other competent tribunal or if a quorum cannot be formed without him. The policy reason underlying this third exception is necessity: in other words, the common law considers it expedient that justice shall be dispensed even by a “disqualified” judge than that there should be a failure of justice or that the machinery of justice should grind to a halt in a particular case.

By way of illustration, two instances of the practical operation of this doctrine of necessity in other common law jurisdictions may be cited. We do, of course, regard them as of persuasive force only. Thus in a Canadian case, the Government of Saskatchewan called upon the court to determine whether the salaries of judges were liable to income tax. The judges, though obviously biased by pecuniary interest, did not decline jurisdiction but heard the case and incidentally reached a decision adverse to themselves. On appeal, the

[p.21] of [1981] GLR 15

Privy Council confirmed that the court was right to decide the case, as a matter of necessity: see Judges v. Attorney-General for Saskatchewan (1937) 35 T.L.R. 464.

Again, in Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors (1852) 3 H.L.Cas. 759, the House of Lords reversed the decrees of Cottenham L.C. who in a Chancery suit had affirmed some decrees made by the Vice-Chancellor in favour of a canal company in which the Lord Chancellor was a shareholder. His pecuniary interest in the canal company was held to be a disqualifying factor. However, before the appeal could proceed from the Vice-Chancellor to the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor had signed an order for enrolment. In their judgment, their lordships further held that the enrolment made by him remained valid since no one was competent in law to effect it.

For this is a case of necessity; and where that occurs, the objection of interest cannot prevail. Of this, the case in the Year Book (Year Book 8 Hen. 6, 19;2 Roll. Abr. 93) is an instance, where it was held that it was no objection to the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas that an action was brought against all the judges of the Common Pleas, in a case in doubt which could only be brought in that court. See also per Parke B. in Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors (supra) at p.787.

Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors was relied upon by the full bench of the Court of Appeal in the celebrated case of Akufo-Addo v. Quashie-Idun [1968] G.L.R. 667, to uphold the then Chief Justice’s empanelling of the court to hear an appeal in which he was himself a party. As the court held, per Amissah J.A. at pp. 673-674:

“this present case presents a situation of necessity where the person to exercise the power to constitute the bench hearing the appeal is also a party to the appeal. As no other may perform his duties for him, the objection on the ground of natural justice cannot be sustained.

In the present case, the plaintiff has alleged, inter alia, judicial impropriety and bias against the two said members of this present panel of the Supreme Court in connection with the discharge of their judicial duties in the Court of Appeal exercising the functions of the Supreme Court in the case of Tuffour v.

Attorney-General. Whether or not the plaintiff’s serious allegations of bias and judicial impropriety are well-founded is a matter going to the merits of the substantive action which should properly be decided after evidence and legal arguments have been heard and not in limine.

The second natural justice rule of audi alteram partem enjoins us to allow the parties to present their cases fully. In the circumstances, it would be prudent to reserve the determination of the substantive

[p.22] of [1981] GLR 15 issues, including the plaintiff’s allegations of judicial impropriety and bias, until the relevant evidence and arguments have been heard.

Meantime, assuming for the purpose of argument only, the correctness of the plaintiff’s allegation of bias against the two named justices of this court, we would nevertheless hold that this is eminently a case where natural justice has to yield to necessity; since otherwise it would be impossible to constitute a minimum quorum of five Justices of the Supreme Court for the hearing of the case under article 115 (2) of the Constitution, 1979. As is well known, the present composition of the Supreme Court is the Chief Justice (who has been sued herein as the defendant) and six other Justices of the Supreme Court.

The present complement of Justices of the Supreme Court represents the minimum number prescribed by article 115 (1) (b) of the Constitution. Should the two named justices excuse themselves from sitting in this case, there would be a total of only four Justices of the Supreme Court left, that is, one short of the stipulated mandatory minimum quorum of five under article 115 (2). It is therefore manifestly clear that the two named justices cannot be dispensed with or replaced by other duly appointed Justices of the Supreme Court.

Unlike the situation in the Court of Appeal and the High Court of Justice in which any Justice of the Superior Court of Judicature (a term embracing Justices of the Supreme Court) may upon the written request of the Chief Justice be invited to sit on an ad hoc basis by virtue of articles 121 (1) (c) and 124 (1) (c) respectively, the Supreme Court can only be constituted by the Chief Justice himself and the duly appointed Justices of the Supreme Court: see article 127 (1).

The other Justices of the Superior Court of Judicature are incompetent to sit in the Supreme Court. That being so, the grant of the plaintiff’s counsel’s request and the withdrawal of the two named justices would automatically result in a failure of justice and in the inability of the Supreme Court as duly constituted to hear and determine the plaintiff’s suit. It is our firm conviction that this is a proper occasion calling for the invocation of the doctrine of necessity to prevent a failure of justice, the allegation of bias against the two justices notwithstanding; and we do so hold accordingly.

We presume the plaintiff has an interest in the speedy trial of his action and that he would be the last person to desire the sudden grinding to a halt of the machinery of justice which he himself has set in motion with his writ. By the same token, it would not be fair either to the defendant to have this litigation hanging over him like the sword of Damocles. In the event, the ends of justice would be

[p.23] of [1981] GLR 15 best served by the court as at present constituted, which incidentally to our knowledge is the only panel available, continuing with the hearing of the suit notwithstanding the plaintiff’s objection based on natural justice.

As to Mr. Obeng-Manu’s plea for the appointment of more Justices of the Supreme Court to dispose of his case, we regret it is not within our competence to make any order. Having ourselves been duly appointed, we must discharge our judicial duties faithfully and diligently within the law and the Constitution, while leaving the question of possible addition to our number to interested persons and the appointing bodies.

Apart from considerations of necessity which come to the fore in the special circumstances of this case, it is incontrovertible that the issues raised by the parties are predominantly issues of law. As already summarised above, the plaintiff is by his action seeking to set aside the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Tuffour v.

Attorney-General on such legal grounds as the defendant’s alleged violation of stated constitutional provisions in empanelling that court; the alleged illegality of the court’s quorum; the alleged impropriety of the panel of judges in accepting the defendant’s invitation to sit; and the alleged nullity of the court’s judgment.

Without going into the merits, we would have thought that the adjudication of these legal issues need not pose any special problems for learned judges of this court performing, in the words of their judicial oath, the functions of their office “without fear or favour, affection or ill-will and upholding the Constitution and the laws of Ghana.”

For the above reasons, we would disallow the plaintiff’s counsel’s objection to the membership of Mr. Justice Sowah and Mr. Justice Charles Crabbe of the panel hearing the suit herein; and accordingly order that the hearing of the suit should proceed forthwith. Costs in the cause.

DECISION

Objection disallowed.

J. K. E. E.

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