BILSON vs. APALOO [1981] GLR 24
8 May 1981 · ANIN JSC · ≈ 137 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Tuffuor v. Attorney-General [1980] G.L.R. 637, C.A. sitting as S.C.
(2) Motayo v. Commissioner of Police (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 114.
(3) Asare v. The Republic [1968] G.L.R. 37, C.A. (full bench).
(4) Annous v. Appoh [1980] G.L.R. 883, C.A.
(5) Scott v. Stansfield (1868) L.R. 3 Exch. 220; 37 L.J.Ex.155; 18 L.T. 572; 32 J.P. 423;16 W.R. 911.
[p.31] of [1981] GLR 24
(6) Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] A.C. 22; 66 L.J.Ch. 35; 75 L.T. 426; 45 W.R. 193; 13 T.L.R. 46; 41 S.J. 63; 4 Mans 89, H.L.
(7) R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis; Ex parte Blackburn (No. 2) [1968] 2 Q.B. 150;
[1968] 2 W.L.R. 1204; [1968] 2 All E.R. 319, C.A.
(8) Yiadom I v. Amaniampong [1981] G.L.R. 3, S.C.
(9) Nicholson v. Fields (1862) 31 L.J.Ex. 233; 7 H. & N. 810; 10 W.R. 304; 158 E.R.695. (10) Republic v. Western Nzima Traditional Council; Ex parte Nana Kpani Ackah III [1973] 2 G.L.R.
107.
(11) Ambard v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago [1936] 1 All E.R. 704; [1936] A.C. 322; 105 L.J.P.C. 72; 154 L.T. 616; 52 T.L.R. 335; 80 S.J. 344, P.C.
(12) United States v. Wong Kim Ark 169 U.S. 649 (1898); 18 S.Ct. 456; 42 L. Ed. 890. (13) Hadley v. Perks (1866) L.R. 1 Q.B. 444; 7 B. & S. 375; 35 L.J.M.C. 177; 14 L.T. 325; 30 J.P. 485;
12 Jur.N.S. 662; 14 W.R. 730.
(14) Hopes v. Hopes [1948] 2 All E.R. 920; [1949] P. 227; [1949] L.J.R. 104; 113 J.P. 10; 64 T.L.R.
623; 92 S.J. 660; 46 L.G.R. 538, C.A.
(15) Lines v. Hersom [1951] 2 K.B. 682; [1951] 2 All E.R. 650; [1951] 2 K.B. 682; 115 J.P. 494; [1951] 2 T.L.R. 481.
(16) Leisy v. Hardin 135 U.S. 100; 10 S.Ct. 681; 34 L.Ed. 128.
(17) Pierce v. New Hampshire 5 How. 504.
(18) Graves v. New York ex rel O’Keefe 306 U.S. 466; 59 S.Ct. 595; 120 ALR. 1466; 83 L. Ed. 927. (19) Collector v. Day 11 Wall 113; 20 L.Ed. 122.
(20) Swift v. Tyson 16 Pet. 1; 10 L.Ed. 865.
(21) Erle R. Co. v. Tompkins 304 U.S. 64; 82 L.Ed. 1188; 58 S.Ct. 817; 114 ALR, 1487. (22) Bowman v. Secular Society, Ltd. [1917] A.C. 406; [1916-17] All E.R. Rep. 1; 86 L.J.Ch. 568; 117 L.T. 161; 33 T.L.R. 376; 61 S.J. 478, H.L.
(23) Briggs v. Hartley (1850) 19 L.J.Ch. 416; 15 L.T.O.S. 273; 14 Jur. 683.
(24) Bourne v. Keane [1919] A.C. 815; 89 L.J.Ch. 17; 121 L.T. 426; 35 T.L.R. 560; 63 S.J. 606, H.L. (25) West v. Shuttleworth (1835) 2 My.& K. 684; 4 L.J.Ch. 115; 39 E.R. 1106.
[p.32] of [1981] GLR 24 (26) Perrin v. Morgan [1943] A.C. 399; [1943] 1 All E.R. 187, H.L.
(27) Shelmer’s Case (1725) Gilb.Ch. 200; 25 E.R. 139.
(28) Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson 303 U.S. 77 (1938); 58 S.Ct. 436; 82 L.Ed.
673.
(29) Wheeling Steel Corporation v. Glander 337 U.S. 562 (1949); 69 S.Ct. 1291; 93 L.Ed. 1544. (30) Churchill v. Crease (1828) 5 Bing 177; 2 Moo & P. 415; 7 L.J.O.S. C.P. 63; 130 E.R. 1028. (31) Tenney v. Brandhove 341 U.S. 367 (1951); 71 S.Ct. 783; 95 L.Ed. 1019.
(32) Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186 (1962); 7 L.Ed. 2d 663; 82 S.Ct. 691.
(33) Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343 U.S. 579 (1952); 96 L. Ed. 1153; 72 S.Ct. 863; 26 ALR 2d 1378.
(34) Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.
(35) R. v. Huggins [1895] 1 Q.B. 563; 64 L.J.M.C. 149; 43 W.R. 329.
(36) Cottle v. Cottle [1939] 2 All E.R. 535; 83 S.J. 501, D.C.
(37) Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon [1969] 1 Q.B. 577; [1968] 3 W.L.R. 694, C.A. (38) Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. 533 (1963); 12 L.Ed. 2d 506; 84 S.Ct. 1362.
(39) Sidebotham, In re (1880) 14 Ch.D. 458; 49 L.J. Bcy. 41; 42 L.T. 783; 28 W.R. 715, C.A. (40) Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers [1978] A.C. 435; [1977] 3 All E.R. 70, H.L. (41) Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organisation 426 U.S. 26 (1976); 48 L.Ed. 2d 450; 96 S.Ct. 1917.
(42) Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S. 83 (1968); 20 L.Ed. 947; 88 S.Ct. 1942.
(43) Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War 418 U.S. 208 (1974); 41 L.Ed. 706; 94 S.Ct.
2925.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION before the Supreme Court for a declaration to quash the judgment of the Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court in the case of Tuffuor v. Attorney-General. The facts of the case and the basis of the plaintiff’s claims are sufficiently set out in the majority judgment delivered by Anin J.S.C.
COUNSEL
Obeng-Manu for the plaintiff.
Nana Akufo-Addo (with him Dr. Prempeh, Glover and Fui Tsikata) for the defendant.
JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.S.C
Anin J.S.C. delivered the judgment of himself and that of Sowah and Charles Crabbe JJ.S.C. The case of Tuffuor v. Attorney-General [p.33] of [1981] GLR 24 [1980] G.L.R. 637, C.A. sitting as S.C., is unique as being the only one heard by the Court of Appeal under section 3 (1) of the First Schedule to the Constitution, 1979, before that section became spent with the appointment of the required number of justices for a duly constituted Supreme Court. The judgment and the reasons thereof, were given on 23 September and 23 October 1980 respectively. The court, composed of Sowah J.S.C. (presiding), Charles Crabbe J.S.C., Lassey and Francois JJ.A and Agyepong J., resolved important issues concerning the office of the Chief Justice in general and the position of the incumbent Chief Justice (The Hon. Mr. Justice Fred Kwasi Apaloo) in particular as at the commencement of the new Constitution on 24 September 1979, and made the following declarations in its judgment:
“(a) that on the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979, the person who was the Chief Justice immediately before such commencement (i.e. Mr. Justice Fred Kwasi Apaloo) became the Chief Justice of Ghana;
(b) that the Chief Justice, under our system, is sui juris and he is appointed as such;
(c) that consequently his nomination for consideration, and that consideration by the Judicial Council, as well as the submission by the incumbent Chief Justice of himself for approval by Parliament, were each unlawful under the Constitution;
(d) that the provisions of article 96 of the Constitution confer a positive protection and a definite defence on Parliament such as the protection afforded a Justice of the Supreme Court of Judicature by the provisions of article 114 (9) of the Constitution, and therefore the writs of our courts cannot, and do not extend into Parliament;
(e) that the submission of the incumbent Chief Justice of Ghana of himself for approval did not, as would have been the case of a non-constitutional right, deprive him of the rights of office conferred on the holder of the office of Chief Justice by the provisions of article 127 (8) and (9) of the Constitution and the protection thereby afforded to him by the provisions of article 128 of the Constitution relating to removal from office.”
There the matter rested until the present suit —No. 13 of 1981—filed on 27 February 1981 was instituted to challenge the decision in the Tuffuor v. Attorney-General, not only on the ground of jurisdictional incompetence of the five-member court but also for the invalidity or unconstitutionality of the judgment itself.
[p.34] of [1981] GLR 24
In the present suit, the plaintiff originally sued the Chief Justice (Mr. Justice Fred Kwasi Apaloo) jointly with the Court of Appeal. In our earlier ruling dated 25 March 1981, we unanimously held that the Court of Appeal does not come within the purview of article 2 of the Constitution and is not a proper party to the action. We accordingly struck it out from the suit and reserved our reasons which we shall soon give in this judgment.
The reliefs sought by the plaintiff in this action as contained in the writ are:
“(i) that Mr. Justice Fred Kwasi Apaloo acted in contravention of article 114 (3), section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions and article 121 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1979, in appointing five judges to sit, hear and determine the suit, i.e. Tuffuor v. Attorney-General, in the Court of Appeal —in or around the month of September 1980;
(ii) that the five judges who sat, heard and determined the said suit did not constitutionally hold valid nominations to sit on the said suit in that the act of Mr. Justice Fred Kwasi Apaloo who nominated or selected them was inconsistent with or in contravention of articles 127 (5) and 214 of the Constitution, 1979, and at any rate the said five judges were guilty of serious judicial impropriety, bias and prejudgment;
(iii) that the said Court of Appeal was not duly constituted having regard to article 121 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, when five judges instead of three judges sat, heard and determined the said suit and consequently the constitution of the said Court of Appeal was irregular, illegal and unconstitutional;
(iv) that by so irregularly, illegally and unconstitutionally sitting with five judges after the Constitution, 1979, had come into force the said Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the said suit having regard to section 3 (1) and 5 of the transitional provisions thereof;
(v) that the purported declaration, judgment or decision of the said Court of Appeal in the suit, namely, Tuffuor v. Attorney-General made or delivered on or about 23 October 1980, was null and void and of no legal effect in that the whole trial and the decision founded upon it were inconsistent with or in contravention of article 44 (9) of the Constitution, 1979.”
[p.35] of [1981] GLR 24
The Plaintiff’s Case
From the pleadings and oral arguments in support of the parties’ respective cases, four main issues stand out—all of them being variations on the common theme of legal competence. In the first place, the plaintiff claimed that the Court of Appeal which heard the Tuffuor case was improperly constituted. Instead of three justices as required by law, five justices were, in fact, empanelled by the defendant in an alleged contravention of articles 114 (5), 121 (2) and section 3 (1) of the First Schedule of the Constitution. Since, it was claimed, the Court of Appeal is “duly constituted by any three justices thereof”—according to article 121 (2)—the quorum of five that sat, lacked competence and its judgments and declarations, having been made without jurisdiction, were illegal, null and void.
The second issue related to the competence of the five judges themselves; the plaintiff accused them of “serious judicial impropriety, bias and prejudgment”; their alleged sin being that they accepted the defendant’s invitation to sit on this case at a time when the defendant’s own position as the Chief Justice was in doubt and the Tuffuor case had been instituted to determine the issue whether he was in law the Chief Justice. They had thereby prejudged that issue; or at any rate opened themselves to attack as being biased in the defendant’s favour. At the very least, it was contended, there was a real likelihood of their being biased in his favour; and this legal bias and prejudgment vitiated their judgment. An allegation of bias peculiar to one of the learned judges was also canvassed.
The third issue concerned the defendant’s position as the Chief Justice and his competence to act in that office and empanel the judges that sat on the Tuffuor case. The complaint was that, since the defendant’s tenure of office was then in doubt, he was in the language of article 127 (5) “unable to perform the functions of his office.” He was therefore enjoined by law to delegate his constitutional duty of empanelling the court to the most senior justice of the Supreme Court for the time being. Furthermore, it was claimed, since he had a personal interest in the outcome of the suit, he ought to have refrained from empanelling the court. By doing so, he had contravened the Constitution, equity, natural justice and good conscience.
The fourth issue dealt with article 44 (9) which confers immunity from suit on the President while in office – save in two stated cases—for the performance of his functions or for any act done in the performance of his functions under the Constitution or any other law. The writ in the Tuffuor case had sought, inter alia, a declaration that the purported nomination by the President of the defendant
[p.36] of [1981] GLR 24 herein for approval by Parliament as Chief Justice was unconstitutional. The court, it was argued, exceeded its jurisdiction in invoking article 118 for it lacked competence to call in question any executive act of the President such as his nomination of the defendant as the Chief Justice and the submission of his name to Parliament for approval pursuant to article 127 (1).
The Defendant’s Case
In his general reply to the writ, the defendant maintained that the plaintiff’s real object was to vacate the judgment in the Tuffuor case. But, it was contended, the Court of Appeal’s decision under section 3 (1) of the First Schedule to the Constitution, 1979, was neither appealable nor open to review since that court performs the functions of the Supreme Court, and its decision, like that of the Supreme Court itself, is final and conclusive.
Turning to the plaintiff’s first ground alleging improper constitution of the Court of Appeal in the Tuffuor case and its lack of jurisdictional competence, the defendant argued that neither article 121 (2) or any other article provides for the maximum composition of the court; article 121 (2) provides for only the minimum membership of the court. In paragraph 13 of the statement of defence, it was stated that when the Court of Appeal exercises jurisdiction under section 3 (1) of the First Schedule, it:
“performs the gravest of the Supreme Court’s functions, i.e. the interpretation and enforcement of the Constitution. Public policy and commonsense, if not constitutional prescription, dictate that the Court of Appeal should in such circumstances sit with its full complement of judges. Indeed operating under the identical provision of section 8 of the First Schedule to the Constitution, 1969, and under the leadership of successive Chief Justices, the predecessor Court of Appeal, sitting with its full complement of five judges performed the functions of the Supreme Court in fifteen different suits. No issue was ever made of the numerical composition of the court.”
In the event, the constitution by the defendant herein of the Court of Appeal that determined the Tuffuor case was, as stated in paragraph 16 of the statement of defence, “regular and in accordance with precedent and authority.”
In reply to the plaintiff’s second and third grounds dealing with the right or competence of the defendant to empanel the Court of Appeal in the Tuffuor case and the alleged bias of the judges who sat on the case, learned counsel for the defendant first pointed out
[p.37] of [1981] GLR 24 that no specific allegation of impropriety was alleged or proved against the defendant other than his discharge of his ministerial duty of empanelling the court, neither was any concrete evidence of bias adduced against the learned judges of the court; instead a bare allegation was made that they had accepted the defendant’s invitation to sit on the case. It was not the plaintiff’s case that the defendant had abused his constitutional powers by inviting the judges in question to form the panel. Bias could not be inferred from the defendant’s mere discharge of his administrative duties without more.
The Chief Justice is under a mandatory duty to empanel the court. It is not a discretionary power and consequently article 214 of the Constitution was inapplicable to these proceedings and there had been no breach thereof. The exercise of a ministerial or administrative function, per se, cannot amount to perversion of justice. The disqualifying factor, if any, must arise from an adjudicating function. Article 114 (9) furthermore confers on the judges who adjudicated the suit immunity from suit for anything done by them in the performance of their judicial duties. By agreeing to sit, they expressed their willingness to discharge their judicial duty and pronounce judgment. There could be no sinister inference drawn from their mere acceptance of the defendant’s invitation to sit. It was further argued that article 127 (5) did not disqualify the defendant from discharging his normal administrative duty of empanelling the court.
It had not been established by the plaintiff that the defendant was “in any way unable to perform the functions of his office” within the true meaning of that article.
Finally, paragraph 8 of the statement of defence summarily dismissed the plaintiff’s argument based on article 44 (9) as being “ex facie irrelevant to the case, as indeed are also articles 114 (5), 127 (5) 214 and sections 3 (1) and 5 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution.”
For his part, the Deputy Attorney-General submitted that article 121 (2) prescribes a quorum of three justices as the only lawful quorum of the Court of Appeal. Hence the panel of five justices that sat in the Tuffuor case was unlawful, irregular and unconstitutional. He had been authorised by the Attorney-General to state that his earlier written request for the empanelling of a court of five to hear that case was in error, it having been realised that the full bench of the Court of Appeal under the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101), had lapsed with the promulgation of the Constitution, 1979. As to the defendant’s competence to empanel a Court of Appeal for the hearing of the Tuffuor case, the learned Deputy Attorney-General submitted that he was competent to do
[p.38] of [1981] GLR 24 so in his capacity as the “Transitional Chief Justice” with power to constitute the Court of Appeal.
Evaluation The central issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeal that adjudicated the Tuffuor v. Attorney-General case was improperly constituted by the defendant or not. It boils down to whether the jurisdiction created by section 3 (1) of the First Schedule to the Constitution, 1979, is exercisable by a Court of Appeal of five or three members only. While the plaintiff and the Attorney-General argued in favour of a panel of three only, the defendant on the other hand contended that it is permissible and not unconstitutional for a panel of five to sit.
Section 3 (1) of the First schedule to the Constitution, 1979, is in the following terms:
“3. (1) The required number of Justices for a duly constituted Supreme Court as established under clause (5) of article 114 of this Constitution shall be appointed within twelve months after the coming into force of this Constitution, and until the appointments are made, the Court of Appeal as established under that clause shall perform the functions of the Supreme Court contained in articles 51, 117 and 118 only of this Constitution.”
Article 114 (5) of the Constitution enacts:
“(5) The Judiciary shall consist of the Supreme Court of Ghana, the Court of Appeal and the High Court of Justice which shall be the superior courts of record and which shall constitute one Superior Court of Judicature, and such other inferior Courts and traditional Courts as Parliament may by law establish.”
The composition of the Supreme Court is defined in article 115:
“115. (1) The Supreme Court shall consist of
(a) the Chief Justice, who shall be the president thereof; and
(b) not less than six other Justices of the Supreme Court.
(2) The Supreme Court shall, except as otherwise provided in article 120 of this Constitution, be duly constituted for the despatch of its business by not less than five Justices thereof.
(3) The Chief Justice shall preside at the sittings of the Supreme Court and in his absence the most senior of the Justices of the Supreme Court as constituted for the time being shall preside.”
[p.39] of [1981] GLR 24
Article 121 spells out the composition of the Court of Appeal as follows:
“121. (1) The Court of Appeal shall consist of— (a) the Chief Justice;
(b) not less than five Justices of the Court of—
Appeal; and (c) such other Justices of the Superior Court of Judicature as the Chief Justice may, for the determination of a particular cause or matter by writing under his hand, request to sit in the Court of Appeal for such period as the Chief Justice may specify or until the request is withdrawn.
(2) The Court of Appeal shall be duly constituted by any three Justices thereof and when so constituted the most senior of the Justices shall preside.
(3) Subject to the provisions of clause (3) of article 116 of this Constitution, the Court of Appeal shall be bound by its own previous decisions and all Courts inferior to the Court of Appeal shall be bound to follow the decisions of the Court of Appeal on questions of law.
(4) The Chief Justice may create such Divisions of the Court of Appeal as he may consider necessary, (a) consisting of such number of Justices respectively as may be assigned thereto by the Chief Justice;
(b) sitting at such places in Ghana as the Chief Justice may, by constitutional instrument, determine; and (c) resided over by the most senior of the Justices of the Court of Appeal constituting the Court.”
From the above provisions of the Constitution, we may note the following important points:
(1) Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal (as well as the High Court of Justice) were established by the Constitution as superior courts of record, and together the three courts make up one Superior Court of Judicature: see article 114 (5).
(2) The total minimum strength or membership of the Supreme Court is seven, comprising the Chief Justice, who is ex-officio president, and a minimum of six other Justices of the Supreme Court.
[p.40] of [1981] GLR 24
(3) Except in cases set out in article 120 when a single justice of the Supreme Court is empowered to act in interlocutory matters, the quorum or number of justices of the said court whose presence is necessary for the acts of the court to be legally valid is f five.
(4) By expressly stating that “the Supreme Court shall … be duly constituted for the despatch of its business “by not less than five Justices thereof” article 115 (2) has prescribed a minimum quorum of five but not the maximum number of members who may lawfully sit. No fewer than five members must be empanelled. The court may sit either five or more up to its full complement of members. In this way, a minimum working quorum for the court is prescribed; and by inference, the clause permits more members to sit. In this extent, we construe the phrase “shall be duly constituted” in its ordinary grammatical or dictionary sense to mean shall be “rightly or properly formed or established.” In other words, the Supreme Court is properly or legally in session when at least five of its members have been empanelled. The Constitution is replete with other instances of the use of the same phrase “shall be duly constituted” or its grammatical variations to define the quorum of courts: see e.g. articles 121 (2), 123, 124 (2) and 26 (2) (h) of the Constitution.
(5) By contrast, the composition of the Court of Appeal is defined by article 121 (1) to comprise the Chief Justice plus a minimum of five Justices of Appeal plus any other justice of the Superior Court of Judicature (i.e. from either the Supreme or High Court invited on ad hoc basis by the Chief Justice for the determination of any case.
(6) Out of its total minimum membership of six and any invited justices, a quorum of three justices is prescribed for the court by article 121 (2).
(7) Comparing the language of article 115 (2) with that of article 121 (2), one detects a change. While the former states that the Supreme Court “shall be duly constituted … by not less than five justices thereof” the latter states that the Court of Appeal “shall be duly constituted by any three justices thereof” How significant is this variation in language? Was it intended to convey a different intention on the part of the law-makers? Incidentally, the antecedent Constitution, 1969, contained identical provisions for the due constitution of both Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal: see article 103 (2) thereof which provides, “the Supreme Court shall… be duly constituted…by not less than five Justices thereof”; and article 109 (2) which also provides,
[p.41] of [1981] GLR 24 “the Court of Appeal shall be duly constituted by any three Justices thereof…” In our view, the language used in both Constitutions to prescribe the due constitution of the Supreme Court defines a minimum quorum without fixing the maximum; whereas the words employed in both Constitutions for the definition of a duly constituted Court of Appeal provides for the court’s quorum simpliciter. The maximum number of members who can sit on the Court of Appeal has not been specified. It has been left deliberately open.
(8) It is noteworthy that section 3 (1) of the First Schedule of the Constitution, 1979, in conferring the three specified functions of the Supreme Court on the Court of Appeal as established under article 114 (5), does not refer to the “due constitution” of the Court of Appeal in connection with its discharge of these additional functions of the Supreme Court. Incidentally, the relevant formula used in section 3 (1) of the First Schedule of the Constitution, 1979 is in pari materia with that employed in section 8 of the First Schedule of the Constitution, 1969, i.e. the Court of Appeal as established pursuant to article 102 (4). Even though section 3 (1) of the First Schedule of the Constitution, 1979, conferred on the Court of Appeal jurisdiction in two extra areas of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, namely, the whole of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under article 117 and challenges to the election of the President under article 51, section 8 of the First Schedule of the Constitution, 1969, restricted the Court of Appeal to the solitary function of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to interpret and enforce constitutional provisions under article 106 of the Constitution, 1969. (See now the identically worded article 118 of the Constitution, 1979).
(9) Having been established under article 114 (5), the Court of Appeal has a composition of at least six permanent members and a number of “temporary” members who can be empanelled at the option of the Chief Justice on an adhoc basis.
(10) If it had been the intention of the law-makers to confine the exercise of the special jurisdiction created and conferred by section 3 (1) of the First Schedule of the Constitution on the Court of Appeal to a duly constituted court of three members only, we are sure no doubt the phrase “Court of Appeal as duly constituted” would have been used in section 3 (1) instead of “Court of Appeal as established.” Reference having, in fact, been made to “the Court of Appeal as established,” we incline to the view that the section had in contemplation the “composition” of the court and not its “ due constitution.” This would enable a court of five members to sit as the Court of Appeal established
[p.42] of [1981] GLR 24 under article 114 (5) to perform, in the words of section 3 (1) of the First Schedule “the functions of the Supreme Court contained in articles 51, 117 and 118 only of this Constitution.”
(11) Where the Supreme Court, as established, is sitting to discharge its functions including those embodied in articles 51, 117 and 118, it is mandated to sit with at least five members under article 115 (2). It is, however, now being contended by the plaintiff that the Court of Appeal, when it performs exactly the same functions of the Supreme Court under section 3 (1) of the First Schedule, can only sit with three members. And this contention is being made in the absence of any constitutional provision or enactment prohibiting the Court of Appeal from sitting with more than three; and notwithstanding the deliberate omission of the “duly constituted” phrase from section 3 (1) of the First Schedule. With respect, we reject that contention as untenable and unreasonable.
(12) Apart from the language of the relevant articles and section 3 (1) of the First Schedule quoted above, the following other considerations impel us to the conclusion that it was neither illegal nor unconstitutional, nor unreasonable for the defendant to empanel a Court of Appeal consisting of five justices to hear the Tuffuor v. Attorney-General case:
(a) For one thing, there was ample justification and precedent for the defendant empanelling a court of five. It is indisputable that in an identical situation under the Constitution, 1969, his eminent and learned predecessors in office regularly empanelled the Court of Appeal made up of five members to hear cases brought under section 8 of the First Schedule of the Constitution 1969, which is in pari materia with section 3 (1) of the First Schedule of the Constitution, 1979—excepting of course the enhanced jurisdiction already alluded to above.
At least two members of the present court, sat as members of the earlier transitional court; while a third member participated as Attorney-General in one or two memorable cases when the Court of Appeal sat with five members. No objection was taken to the court’s composition; and to the best of our recollection, the members of the former court, as well as the legal profession generally never once complained about the court’s practice of sitting with five members.
(b) Apart from these specific instances of the Court of Appeal sitting with five members to exercise jurisdiction identical with that created by section 3 (1) of the First Schedule of the Constitution, 1979, one may also refer to the Court of Appeal’s inherent residuary power to determine its practice and procedure, where
[p.43] of [1981] GLR 24 no other provision has been made by its rules: see rule 38 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (LI 218).
(c) The cases of Motayo v. Commissioner of Police (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 114 and Asare v. The Republic [1968] G.L.R. 37, C.A. (full bench): coram Ollennu, Azu Crabbe,Apaloo, Lassey JJ.A. and Edusei J. (as he then was), are illustrative instances where the appellate court (in one case the West African Court of Appeal and in the other the Ghana Court of Appeal) itself took the initiative and referred suo motu important points of law raised in an appeal before the ordinary bench of three to be considered by the full bench of five in the interest of justice and the liberty of the subject. Admittedly, in the Ghana case, the Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84), para. 6 (1), set up an ordinary bench of three and a full bench of five exercising important review jurisdiction under paragraph 7 (1) thereof; while the West African Court of Appeal Order-in-Council, 1948 (S.I. No. 1330 of 1948), s. 13 enacted that “the Court shall be duly constituted if it consists of an uneven number, not being less than three of the Judges of the Court.” It would, therefore, seem that the court was entitled in each case under its respective parent enactment to sit with five members. Nevertheless, it was the ordinary bench of the court, suo motu, which decided to refer the important matters being canvassed to the court of five in the interest of justice. As was held in the Asare case (as stated in the headnote at p 39):
“(5) Whenever a court of appeal had formed an opinion that important points of law raised in an appeal before it, required, in the interest of justice, to be considered by the full bench, the practice and procedure it had employed was the same as was followed by the ordinary bench in this case, that is, direct that it be listed before the full bench. Apart from the fact that the practice had a rational basis and had existed all these years without its validity being questioned, it was based upon sound foundation and was well within the competence of the court.”
(d) It is also undeniable that in the past, statute has never limited nor prescribed the maximum quorum for the highest court, though it has been the practice to specify the minimum quorum. Perhaps, this is a deliberate policy on the part of the law-makers to allow the highest court a certain flexibility and freedom in deciding when to field a full complement of members depending on the gravity of the case and the need for a reconsideration of the law.
It is a beneficent rule which tends to ensure that in the adjudication of matters of importance, e.g. affecting the liberty of the
[p.44] of [1981] GLR 24 subject and the Constitution, as many judicial minds as possible should be involved in settling the law and making a definitive pronouncement of the law.
(e) Convenience and prudence, if not strict logic, dictate that when the highest court for the time being is exercising some of the most important and fundamental functions, embracing the whole of its appellate, interpretation and enforcement jurisdictions, it should sit, like the Supreme Court itself, as a court of five. If only three justices of the Court of Appeal were to sit when exercising jurisdiction under section 3 (1) of the First Schedule and performing selected functions of the Supreme Court, we would have a situation where in practice a minority of members of the Court of Appeal, as established, would be laying down the law in such critical and vital areas as constitutional interpretation and enforcement which would be binding on the potentially more numerous members of the same court. The need for certainty in law, uniformity of its application and for sheer symmetry would be better advanced if a fuller, uneven complement of the court, say five, is empanelled for the court’s exercise of jurisdiction under section 3 (1).
(f) Again, it is enacted by section 5 of the First Schedule that:
“5. Any review pending before the full bench of the Court of Appeal immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution shall, subject to section 3 of this Schedule, be deemed to be an appeal pending before the Supreme Court.”
(Our emphasis)
We will deal shortly with the legislative history and jurisdiction of the full bench of the Court of Appeal; but suffice it to say for the present that “the full bench of five” was a creature of statute—N.L.C.D. 84, para. 6 (1) and NRCD 101, s. 3—exercising for the most part review jurisdiction in respect of decisions of the ordinary bench of three in two stated cases involving questions of law and miscarriage of justice. It is clear from section 5 of the First Schedule that with the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979, on 24 September 1979, this statutory “full bench of the Court of Appeal” was abolished: see the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Annous v. Appoh [1980] G.L.R. 883, C.A. The reviews which were pending before the erstwhile full bench of the Court of Appeal thereupon became “appeals pending before the Supreme Court” by virtue of section 5 of the First
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Schedule; and since they were expressly brought within the purview of section 3 of the First Schedule, these appeals could also be heard by the Court of Appeal as established under article 114 (5)—at least before appointment of the minimum number of justices of the Supreme Court within twelve months of 24 September 1979.
To us, it is inconceivable and obviously not in conformity with the intention of the law-makers that these reviews-turned-appeals should be heard during the transitional period by a Court of Appeal of three members only. It is more reasonable and in keeping with normal practice for an appeal from a court of three justices to lie to a court of five justices; especially since the former review body, “the full bench of the Court of Appeal,” and its ultimate successor under section 5 of the First Schedule, the Supreme Court, both sit normally with five justices. It is more reasonable to insist in practice that the same number of justices, i.e. five, should sit over these pending reviews now converted into appeals before and after the due constitution of the Supreme Court. The above consideration further fortifies us in our conviction that the Court of Appeal, as established under article 114 (5) and exercising jurisdiction under section 3 (1) of the First Schedule, was intended to sit with five members and not three.
(13) Learned counsel for the plaintiff also dealt with the abrogation by the Constitution of the full bench of the Court of Appeal. He submitted that after the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979, the full bench of five became unknown to law. Our earlier analysis of the practice and procedure of the Court of Appeal in sitting with five members instead of three when occasion demanded demonstrates that the justification for the empanelling of a five-member court in the Tuffour case is not to be found from either the Courts Decree, 1966 (NLCD 84), para. 6 (1) or the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101), both of which created a full bench of the Court of Appeal with well-defined jurisdiction contained in paragraph 7 (2) of the former and section 3 (2) of the latter.As already observed, the significant jurisdiction conferred on the full bench of five was review jurisdiction in respect of decisions of the ordinary bench of three in two stated cases involving questions of law and miscarriage of justice. Additionally, N.R.C.D. 101 which abolished the Supreme Court established under the Constitution, 1969, added jurisdiction in chieftaincy appeals from the National House of Chiefs and jurisdiction over pending appeals before the defunct Supreme Court to the review jurisdiction of the full bench of the Court of Appeal
[p.46] of [1981] GLR 24 sitting with five members. It is clear from the nature and scope of its jurisdiction that the full bench of the Court of Appeal under both Decrees was intended to, and did, in fact, fill the vacuum created by the abolition of that Supreme Court. Since the same court of three could not properly be appointed to hear appeals from their own decisions, the device was adopted of conferring a limited right of review on aggrieved parties in glaring cases of miscarriage of justice and misdirection in law. The said enactments became spent with the promulgation of the Constitutions, 1969 and 1979, respectively; in the former case, the Constitution (Consequential and Transitional Provisions)
Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 406), Sched. 11 expressly repealed it; while in the latter, section 5 of the First Schedule of the Constitution, 1979, transferred all pending review cases before the full bench to the Supreme Court, subject to section 3 of the Schedule; while its remaining jurisdiction in chieftaincy appeals and pending appeals were conferred on the Supreme Court.
Notwithstanding the abrogation of N.L.C.D. 84 by N.L.C.D. 406 in September 1969, the Court of Appeal which sat under section 8 of the First Schedule of the Constitution, 1969, and exercised jurisdiction identical in one respect to that conferred by section 3 (1) of the Constitution, 1979, did in practice sit regularly as a court of five. The justification for this practice has been already stated. It der been consistently followed by eminent former Chief Justices with the approval of their learned brethren of the court and it has never once been questioned by any member of the legal profession who has appeared in the said fifteen previous cases.
Ten of these have been published in (1970) C.C. 12, 18, 35, 36, 41, 54, 55 and 100; (1970) 2 G. & G. 527 and [1971] 1 G.L.R. 30. In following this hallowed practice in the Tuffuor case, the defendant, in our judgment did not contravene any constitutional provision. He acted correctly, lawfully and in accordance with respected precedent and practice and after duly taking the stated preference of the learned Attorney-General (the defendant in that case) for the empanelling of a court of five into consideration. In our judgment, that court of five was regularly and legally constituted and acted within jurisdiction. It was not an unconstitutional court. On the contrary, it fell within the category of “the Court of Appeal as established under clause (5) of article 114 of
[p.47] of [1981] GLR 24 the Constitution,” as prescribed by section 3 (1) of the First Schedule. In the circumstances, we find no merit in the plaintiff’s first submission and would dismiss it accordingly together with the claims for declaration based thereon, i.e. claims (i), (iii) and (iv) of the writ.
The Second Issue
The second issue of controversy, it would be recalled, was about the competence of the five judges who heard the Tuffuor case. The plaintiff accused them of “serious judicial impropriety, bias and prejudgment” by accepting the defendant’s invitation to sit on the case. We must say frankly that we find no justification or substance whatsoever in this accusation. No scintilla of evidence was adduced in support of this grave charge levelled against their lordships; and we cannot fault them for having discharged their judicial functions in that case. Their judicial oath enjoins them to perform the functions of their office “truly and faithfully, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.” In our view, it is irresponsible and scandalous for the plaintiff to level such serious charges against them in his pleadings after a press publication of same; and then fail to substantiate them at the trial. This action was brought under article 2 of the Constitution, 1979, for the ostensible purpose of enforcing the Constitution.
It is indeed inexplicable, strange and ironical that the plaintiff himself ignored and violated the constitutional immunity conferred on justices of the Superior Court of Judicature under article 114 (9) “from any action or suit for any matter or thing done by him in the performance of his function as such Justice.”
Judicial immunities from suit are conferred not for the benefit of judges but for the benefit of the administration of justice. At common law, the policy reasons behind judicial immunity from civil actions were well-stated by Kelly C.B. in the leading case of Scott v. Stansfield (1868) L.R. 3 Ex. 220 where it was stated at p. 223:
“It is essential in all courts that the judges who are appointed to administer the law should be permitted to administer it under the protection of the law independently and freely, without favour and without fear. This provision of the law is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.”
In this connection, it must be observed that it is also in the public interest that at common law absolute privilege attaches to words used by the parties, counsel and witnesses in the course of judicial proceedings and that jurors cannot be punished for their verdict.
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And it is likewise the demand of public interest and the need for frank discussions uninhibited by the fear or threat of legal actions for statements and acts done in the performance of their parliamentary duties that members of Parliament also enjoy under article 97 of the Constitution, 1979, similar immunity from civil or criminal proceedings.
Adequate constitutional provisions, of course, exist under article 128 for the institution of proceedings for the removal from office of a justice of the Superior Court of Judicature for stated misbehaviour and other specified causes. But neither the common law nor the Constitution, 1979, permits a person to abuse the legal process or else bring the administration of justice into contempt by scandalising a court or judge in any action or suit for any matter or thing done by a judge in the discharge of his duties as a judge. It was largely for the above reasons, especially the above-quoted constitutional immunity of judges from action or suit entrenched in article 114 (9), that we struck out and dismissed the Court of Appeal from this suit as not being a proper party to the suit on 25 March 1981.
Other grounds in support of our ruling dismissing the Court of Appeal as a co-defendant in this suit will also be found in jurisprudence and on a true construction of the word “person” in article 2 (1) of the Constitution.
Coke classified “persons” into two main categories:
“Persons are of two sorts, persons naturally created by God . . . and persons incorporate or politique created by the policy of men (and therefore they are called bodies politique); and these be of two sorts, viz. either sole or aggregate of many.”
A corporation aggregate is an incorporated group of co-existing persons and has several members at a time, e.g. a limited liability company consisting of all shareholders; while a corporation sole is an incorporated series of successive persons which has only one member at a time, e.g. the sovereign and certain office holders so named by statute. In neither of these forms of incorporation is the legal person identical with any human being; for example, a company is in law something different from its shareholders or members: see Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] A.C. 22 at p. 51, H.L. The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum.
By contrast, an unincorporated partnership or firm is not a person in the eye of the law, being nothing else than, the sum of its individual members. There is no legal entity, standing over against the partners, as a company stands over against its shareholders; and the property and debts of the firm are those of the partners. Salmond, to whose classic work on Jurisprudence (8th ed.)
[p.49] of [1981] GLR 24 we are indebted for this short analysis, defines a legal person at p. 336 as “any subject-matter [other than a human being] to which the law attributes a merely legal or fictitious personality.” The learned author further states at pp. 336-337:
“The law, in creating legal persons, always does so by personifying some real thing… Personification, however, conduces so greatly to simplicity of thought and speech, that its aid is invariably accepted. The thing personified may be termed the corpus of the legal person so created; it is the body into which the law infuses the animus of a fictitious personality.
Although all fictitious or legal personality involves personification, the converse is not true . . . Legal personality is a definite legal conception; personification, as such, is a mere artifice of speech devised for compendious expression.”
And he illustrates the point by reference to such terms as “the estate of a deceased person”; a “firm”; none of which is a legal person even though in popular parlance they are loosely regarded as “persons.” And he continues at p. 337:
“We speak of a jury, a bench of judges, a public meeting, the community itself, as being itself a person instead of merely a group or society of persons. But legal personality is not reached until the law recognises, over and above the associated individuals, a fictitious being which in a manner represents them, but is not identical with them.”
(The emphasis is ours.)
Being a legal document, the Constitution, 1979, is presumed to use words with fixed legal meaning in their familiar legal sense and connotations. A Court of Appeal consisting, in popular parlance, of a bench of judges, is not a legal person in the juristic sense. It is not legally recognisable as a single entity standing over against the individual judges who may constitute it for the time being; neither does it represent them; nor has it any of the attributes of a legal person, e.g. a right of action, capacity to sue or be sued, power to hold property or ability to enter into contractual arrangements. It is a mere artifice of speech to personify the Court of Appeal; in law, however, that court lacks personality.
Furthermore, in popular parlance the meaning of the term “court’ is variable and not constant. The Oxford English Dictionary gives clear different meanings. Among these meanings are, “the place where justice is administered” and “the person who exercises judicial function under legal authority.” Our constitutional dictionary
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(article 213) defines “Court” to mean “a court of competent jurisdiction established by or under the authority of this Constitution.” Articles 114 (5), 121 and 122 established respectively a Court of Appeal and defined its composition and jurisdiction. Nowhere in the Constitution, 1979, or in any other enactment has the law conferred the status of legal personality on the Court of Appeal—in the way, for example, that public corporations have generally been personified by their instruments of incorporation.
On a due consideration of the nature and scope of article 2 of the Constitution, we fail to see how the Court of Appeal can be properly sued as a defendant for, inter alia, a declaratory relief. Apart from its lack of legal personality, it is inconceivable what legal interests of the learned judges of the court who adjudicated the Tuffuor case can be said to be in any way affected by the plaintiff’s present claim; and we cannot fathom what joint or several conduct of theirs could be affected by a judgment in his favour, assuming his success in this action.
What is being attacked is really the decision in the Tuffuor case. Their lordships surely have no personal interest in that. Apart from their immunity from suit under article 114 (9), they became functus officio once they handed down their decision in their judgment. As to the question, who are the proper parties to declaratory proceedings? the answer, as stated in de Smith’s Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th ed.), p. 510, is that:
“not only must there be a plaintiff whose legal interests are affected sufficiently to enable him to sue; the defendant must be one whose legal interests are sufficiently affected by the plaintiff’s claim (or whose conduct could be sufficiently affected by judgment in the plaintiff’s favour) to render him a competent party to defend the action.”
Applying this test to the panel that sat on the case, we have no hesitation in holding that they are not competent defendants. It was for the above reasons that the Court of Appeal was struck out of the action.
Turning to the allegation of bias with particular reference to Mr. Justice Francois, we must say at once that it was not made out. The fact that he wrote to the Parliamentary Appointments Committee — as he was perfectly entitled to do — stating his frank views on the proper meaning of “approval” in article 127 (1) and the form that in his view the approval should take and his reason for his inability to appear before that august body on the day arranged, while leaving the door open for any further communication, was held against him as a disqualifying factor in a suit in which parliamentary
[p.51] of [1981] GLR 24 vetting or “approval” of justices of the Supreme Court under article 127 (1) was not even in issue, directly or indirectly. And it was further alleged against him that he failed an unspecified moral test. We are afraid there is no factual basis or legal justification for this wild attack on his integrity and character; and we would accordingly reject it as being baseless and reprehensible.
The Third Issue With regard to the third issue, namely, the defendant’s position as the Chief Justice and his competence to empanel the Court of Appeal for the Tuffuor case during the constitutional controversy over his official position as the Chief Justice, the plaintiff relied on article 127 (5) of the Constitution, 1979, and invited us to hold that on its true construction, the defendant was then “unable to perform the functions of his office” and ought accordingly to have delegated his constitutional duty of empanelling the court to the most senior justice of the Supreme Court. Besides, it was contended, he had a personal interest in the outcome of the Tuffuor case and ought accordingly to have disqualified himself from acting in his official capacity. Article 127 (5) enacts:
“127. (5) Where the office of the Chief Justice is vacant or where the Chief Justice is for any reason unable to perform the functions of his office, then, (a) until a person has been appointed to and has assumed the functions of that office, or (b) until the person holding that office has resumed the functions of that office, as the case may be, those functions shall be performed by the most senior for the time being of the Justices of the Supreme Court.”
The above clause clearly provides for a situation where the office of the Chief Justice is vacant or he is unable to discharge his official duties for any reason; in such an eventuality, the most senior justice of the Supreme Court takes over from him immediately by operation of law and is empowered to discharge those official duties of the Chief Justice pending either a fresh appointment or resumption of duties by the incumbent Chief Justice. It is but a reproduction of article 115 (5) of the Constitution, 1969. Both constitutional provisions may be contrasted with the Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84), para. 3 (2) which provides, “The Council [i.e. N.L.C.] may nominate a Justice of Appeal to act in the office of Chief Justice in the event of his illness or absence from Ghana”; and with the Courts Act, 1960 (C.A. 9), s. 2 (1) which also provides:
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“2. (1) When the office of the Chief Justice is vacant the most senior of the other Judges of the Supreme Court holding office for the time being shall have and exercise all the powers and authorities vested in the Chief Justice under this Act or any other enactment for the time being in force.”
The Republican Constitution, 1960, did not contain any provisions on the matter.
It would be seen that the law-makers have progressively enlarged the occasions for a temporary take-over of the Chief Justice’s functions – from “vacancy in the office” (1960) through “his illness or absence from Ghana” (1966) to “vacancy or his inability for any reason to perform his functions” (1969) and (1979). Having regard to the broad and unrestricted phrase “for any reason” unable to perform the functions of his office, in article 127 (5) of the Constitution, 1979, it would be unwise and probably impossible to attempt a definition of all conceivable occasions for the applicability of the clause.
Obviously, his absence either from the country, or from post on account of illness or suspension in the course of proceedings for his removal under article 128 (a), would be covered by that phrase. Beyond that, it would neither be easy nor prudent to foretell.
In the law of evidence there is a rebuttable presumption that official duty has been regularly performed: see the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 323), s. 37 (1). The onus of rebutting that presumption is on the party alleging the contrary. In this case the plaintiff assumed the onus of proving that the defendant was unable to perform the functions of his office for a specified reason; and it was not for the defendant to justify his due and regular performance of official duty in his capacity as the Chief Justice. Incidentally, it was not disputed by the plaintiff that the defendant was at the material time the Chief Justice.
He conceded that he was the Chief Justice over the Court of Appeal; and that it was part of his official duty to empanel that court. The only allegation of impropriety in the defendant’s discharge of his official duty alleged was his empanelling of the Court of Appeal which heard the Tuffuor case. This duty is undoubtedly a ministerial duty as distinct from a judicial or quasi — judicial one and no adjudication is involved in the empanelling of a court.
There can therefore be no question of either reasonable suspicion or real likelihood of bias arising in the discharge of such a ministerial, non-judicial duty. The rule against bias is expressed in the natural justice rule that no man should be a judge in his own cause; for the essence of a fair judicial decision is that it shall have been made by an impartial judge. In our view, in discharging his official ministerial duty of empanelling the court that heard the
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Tuffuor case, the defendant neither performed a judicial or quasi-judicial duty nor assumed the mantle of a judge deciding his own cause. He could not by any stretch of the imagination be said to have committed any breach of natural justice in the event.
Again in discharging his mandatory duty of empanelling of a court, the Chief Justice does not exercise a discretionary power. Article 214 regulating the mode of exercise of discretionary power is therefore inapplicable to the discharge of that duty. Be that as it may, in this case no allegation has been made or established of the defendant’s abuse of his powers in any material particular.
Furthermore, the fact that certain people held the view at one time that the defendant was not the de jure Chief Justice does not mean that in the eye of the law and on a true construction of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, he was not the de jure Chief Justice at all material times. What the declaratory judgment in the Tuffuor case did was merely to resolve the doubts of the doubting Thomases and to restate what had in the contemplation of law been the existing constitutional position all along.
The judgment in effect restated a constitutional fact; it did not create it. The pendency of the Tuffuor case did not affect, and indeed could not have affected, his constitutional position as the Chief Justice. In the circumstances, it cannot be said with any legal or constitutional justification that the defendant was unable to perform the functions of his office immediately before or even during the pendency of the Tuffuor case. In any event, the plaintiff in our judgment has woefully failed to rebut the presumption of omnia praesumuntur solemniter et rite esse acta enacted in simple English language by section 37 (1) of the Evidence Decree, 1975.
The Fourth Issue
The last declaration sought by the plaintiff in his writ has already been quoted in full. In essence, the relief sought is for a declaration to quash the entire judgment and the reasons therefore in the Tuffuor case delivered by the Court of Appeal on 23 September and 23 October 1980 respectively, on the ground that it is a nullity since the whole trial and judgment were inconsistent with or in contravention of article 44 (9) of the Constitution, which confers immunity from suit on the President while in office (save in two instances) for the performance of his functions or for any act done in the performance of his functions under the Constitution or any other law.
To us, the fourth issue sounds in appeal. The plaintiff, having by his writ invoked this court’s original jurisdiction under article 2(1) (b), has tagged to it an appeal going to the merits of the decision in
[p.54] of [1981] GLR 24 the Tuffuor case, wherein he criticises the Court of Appeal for having allegedly contravened article 44 (9). Neither the plaintiff himself nor the defendant in the instant case was a party to the earlier Tuffuor case. That case is res inter alios acta. The defendant, in our view, is not a proper party to a claim for declaration in this court to have the Tuffuor case quashed on an alleged ground of constitutional contravention which was neither contrived nor perpetrated by him; and there is no privity between him and the parties to the original Tuffuor case.
Furthermore, article 2 (1) (b) which the plaintiff invokes in support of his fifth claim contemplates either an “act” or omission” of a person which is alleged to be inconsistent or in contravention of a constitutional provision. Where, as in this case, no such act or omission of a person is specified in the pleadings or in evidence, an action under article 2 (1) (b) is not maintainable.
It would be noticed that article 44 (9), relied on by the plaintiff, itself does not create a right of action; it merely confers a qualified immunity from suit on the President while in office; but significantly saves actions brought under article 2 and by prerogative writs. Article 44 (9) is not a sword of attack; it provides a shield of defence for the President.
In the circumstances we would dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for the fifth declaration based on articles 2 (1) (b) and 44 (9); since the defendant is not a proper party thereto and no act or omission of his is being called into question thereunder; and since in any event the fifth claim is in reality a ground of appeal masquerading as an action for declaration.
For the above reasons, we would dismiss the plaintiff’s action in its entirety since none of the claims for declaration has been made out.
Before concluding this judgment, we must comment briefly on some unsavoury aspects of the case. While learned counsel for the plaintiff properly confined his oral arguments to the above issues of law, unfortunately his pleadings extended beyond them and raised completely irrelevant matters which tended to scandalise the courts and judges generally and to bring into contempt the machinery and administration of justice itself.
Worse still, it was disclosed in the statement of defence and admitted by the plaintiff in his reply that prior to the hearing of the case in this court, a press conference was launched by the plaintiff in Accra on 4 February 1981 whereat, it is alleged, utterances
[p.55] of [1981] GLR 24 were made tending to defame not only the defendant but other judges as well. Mercifully, learned counsel for the plaintiff thought the better of his client’s pre-trial public utterances and newspaper advertisements and steered clear of them in presenting his legal arguments. He is to be commended for his restraint. There was consequently no opportunity for the defendant’s counsel to advert to these extraneous but serious matters, which tend to scandalise the courts and judges and destroy the public confidence in the administration of justice. Publications imputing bias and improper motives to judges are regarded as contempt and are duly punished. This court will in future not hesitate to exercise its undoubted constitutional powers (see article 114 (6) of the Constitution, 1979) and mete out fitting punishment to offenders where their contempt is established.
This warning is, however, not intended to stifle legitimate and reasoned criticism of a judgment in any case or of the administration of justice generally; for we acknowledge the legitimacy and indeed the need for reasoned criticism in a democracy. If such criticism is informed, pertinent, fair and not malicious, it can only assist us in improving on our methods and in improving the administration of justice.
Obviously reasoned criticism of judgment made in good faith is in the public interest; but scurrilous abuse and the unwarranted imputations of bias and improper motives to judges are not conducive to the public good and can only destroy the public confidence in the judiciary and in the administration of justice generally. We cannot condemn it too strongly. We fully endorse Lord Denning M.R.,’s wise dicta on reasoned criticism of judges and judgments in R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis; Ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 Q.B. 150 at p. 155, C.A.:
“We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more important at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech itself.
It is the right of every man, in Parliament or out of it, in the Press or over the broadcast, to make fair comment, even outspoken comment, on matters of public interest. Those who comment can deal faithfully with all that is done in a court of justice. They can say that we are mistaken, and our decisions erroneous, whether they are subject to appeal or not. All we would ask is that those who criticise us will remember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot reply to their criticisms. We cannot enter into public controversy.
Still less into political controversy. We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own vindication.”
One final comment. Even though the plaintiff’s action appears in form to be an action to invoke the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under article 2 (1) for a declaration, yet it seems to us that the action
[p.56] of [1981] GLR 24 is in substance and reality one instituted to vacate the Court of Appeal’s judgment in the Tuffuor case.
The plaintiff’s pleadings and his learned counsel’s skilful arguments in support leave us in no doubt about that. Obviously nothing should be done to hinder litigants who wish to bring genuine cases falling squarely within the ambit of article 2 of the Constitution; nevertheless it would be wrong and counterproductive to extend by illegitimate constitutional stratagem the right of appeal regulated by enactments which are well-known to the profession.
Where for example, there is no right of appeal or else the time for appealing has passed under the relevant enactments, it would be inadmissible and unjustified to invoke this court’s original jurisdiction by pleading under article 2 (1) (b) constitutional inconsistencies or contraventions on account of an imagined “act” or “omission” of a “person,” legal or otherwise. If this warning is not heeded and the undesirable practice continues with the filing of frivolous and vexatious suits, there would be a real danger of the Constitution itself being abused and its authority being weakened. That would be a tragedy indeed.
In the first judgment of this court, Yiadom I v. Amaniampong [1981] G.L.R. 3, S.C. we had course to decline jurisdiction in a suit which was in substance, a chieftaincy dispute but had been dressed up as a constitutional action for the interpretation of the term “public officer.” We would commend the observations then made by the court on this issue to all and sundry.
Finally, we would for the reasons already stated dismiss the plaintiff’s action. The defendant would be entitled to his costs.
JUDGMENT OF ADADE J.S.C.
I have read the majority opinion just delivered by my brother Anin J. S. C. I propose to comment very briefly on just one issue: The constitution of the court which tried Tuffuor v. Attorney-General. The third of the five declarations sought by the plaintiff reads:
“(iii) that the said Court of Appeal was not duly constituted having regard to article 121 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, when five judges instead of three judges sat, heard and determined the said suit and consequently the constitution of the said Court of Appeal was irregular, illegal and unconstitutional.”
Arguing this leg of his case, Mr. Obeng-Manu urged that there is no such thing as a full bench under the Constitution, 1979; that a duly constituted Court of Appeal, under article 121 (2) shall be a [p.57] of [1981] GLR 24
Court of three, no more, no less. He says that the term “duly” in “duly constituted” means completely, thoroughly, rightly, sufficiently, properly, fitly, etc. and that where 121 (2) talks of the Court of Appeal as being “duly constituted by any three Justices thereof” it means that the court shall be completely and fully constituted by three judges, and it is not open to any one to add to that number, without infringing article 121 (2) and thus creating a new court unknown to the Constitution.
He says where the Constitution wants a smaller or a higher number of judges to sit, it uses language clear enough to indicate its intention. Thus under article 123 the Constitution allows a single judge to discharge certain limited functions. Then also under article 124 (2) the High Court, normally “duly constituted” by one justice, shall be “duly constituted” by:
(a) any one justice thereof; or
(b) any one justice thereof and a jury, for the trial of an offence on indictment or an offence, other than treason, the punishment for which is death or imprisonment for life; or
(c) by three justices thereof for treason trials.
In each of these situations, Mr. Obeng-Manu argues, the numbers set for a “duly constituted” High Court cannot lawfully be added to or subtracted from. He also refers to article 115 (2) where the Supreme Court shall “be duly constituted… by not less than five Justices thereof.” Language sufficiently clear to entitle the Supreme Court to sit more than five.
He says that a clear intention to abolish the full bench of the Court of Appeal is shown in section 5 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, whereby all reviews pending before the full bench of the Court of Appeal on the coming into force of the Constitution were automatically transferred to the Supreme Court, as substantive appeals. Mr. Obeng-Manu invites the court to hold that the Court of Appeal which heard the Tuffuor case was improperly constituted and therefore lacked the jurisdiction exercisable under section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions.
Nana Akufo-Addo’s answer to these arguments is that the figure 3 appearing in article 121 (2) is only “a quorum qualification and not an absolute figure.” He referred to article 121 (1) which sets the membership of the Court of Appeal at, at least six, viz. the Chief Justice and “not less than five Justices of the Court of Appeal.” This number six may be increased from time to time, as a result of invitations issued by the Chief Justice to “other Justices of the Superior Court” to sit in the Court of Appeal, by virtue of powers conferred on him under article 121 (1) (c). Nana Akufo-Addo says that as a matter of principle all the members of the Court of Appeal are entitled to sit at any one time, save that an even number,
[p.58] of [1981] GLR 24 he says, is not “amenable to judicial decision-making,” hence the court normally sits with an odd number, usually five.
The Court of Appeal is required under section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions to perform the functions of the Supreme Court contained in articles 51, 117 and 118 of the Constitution. Article 51 deals with the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to hear petitions challenging the election of the President; article 117 relates to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; and article 118 the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Attention has already been drawn to section 5 of the transitional provisions converting reviews pending before the Court of Appeal into substantive appeals before the Supreme Court.
Nana Akufo-Addo argues that if the contention that the figure 3 in article 121 (2) is an absolute figure is correct, it would mean that in exercising the appellate jurisdiction under article 117 or section 5 of the transitional provisions, a Court of Appeal of three justices will be sitting on appeal over a decision given by the same court of three justices. This could never have been the intention of the Constitution-makers. He says, in practice, whenever an appeal has been allowed from a lower court it has always gone to a higher forum of a larger number of justices. The same regime has been maintained in this Constitution.
Hence from a High Court of one judge, an appeal goes to a Court of Appeal of three, and then to a Supreme Court of five judges. He says that the decision of the Court of Appeal under section 3 of the transitional provisions has the same finality and conclusiveness as a decision of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court sits five, why not the Court of Appeal which is discharging functions for the Supreme Court? Furthermore it is a fundamental requirement of public policy that grave legal issues are settled by a full court of five justices as far as the Court of Appeal is concerned, and, by implication, of seven justices for the Supreme Court. Indeed, paragraph 13 of the defendant’s case reads:
“13. The Court of Appeal, sitting pursuant to the provisions of section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, performs the gravest of the Supreme Court’s functions – the interpretation and enforcement of the Constitution. Public policy and commonsense, even if not constitutional prescription, dictate that the Court of Appeal should in such circumstances sit with its full complement of five judges.
Indeed, operating under the identical provisions of section 8 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1969, and under the leadership of two successive Chief Justices, the predecessor Court of Appeal, sitting with its full complement of five
[p.59] of [1981] GLR 24 judges, performed the functions of the Supreme Court in fifteen different suits. No issue was ever made of the numerical composition of the Court.”
The issue at stake therefore is whether the Court of Appeal which sat in the Tuffuor case, sitting five and not three, was or was not properly constituted. If it was properly constituted it had jurisdiction; if it was not, then it was not duly constituted in conformity with article 121 (2) of the Constitution and therefore did not have jurisdiction.
To answer this question, it has been necessary to look at the history of the full bench, at times referred to as the full court of the Court of Appeal. I propose to go no further back than 1957, being the year when we got our independence. At the commencement of that year the operative enactment was the Court’s Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.) in force since 1 July 1935. It established by section 3, just one court,”. . . a Court which shall be called the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast, and shall constitute, . . . the Supreme Court of Judicature for the Gold Coast.” The membership of this court comprised under section 4:
“the Chief Justice of the Gold Coast, and so many Puisne Judges as the Governor may, from time to time, appoint by letters patent… in accordance with such instructions as he may receive from Her Majesty, and also the Chief Justices and Judges of the Supreme Court of Nigeria… Sierra Leone … and the Gambia…”
This Ordinance equated the Supreme Court with our High Court. Appeals went from this court to the West African Court of Appeal (W.A.C.A.).
The Courts (Amendment) Ordinance, 1957 (No. 17 of 1957), passed to take effect on the 6 March 1957, the first day of independence, inserted by section 2, a new section 3 (2) into Cap. 4, to read:
“(2) The Supreme Court shall be a Court of Record and shall consist of— (a) The High Court of Justice; and (b) The Court of Appeal.”
So for the first time we had a Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal was to replace the West African Court of Appeal (W.A.C.A.) which was to cease to operate in independent Ghana. Hence by a new section 2A, reference to W.A.C.A. in any Ordinance in force at the date of commencement of Ordinance No. 17 of 1957, i.e. 6 March 1957, were to be read and construed as references to the Court of
[p.60] of [1981] GLR 24
Appeal. Similarly, references to the Supreme Court were to be read as references to the High Court. Section 6 of Ordinance No. 17 of 1957 adding a new section 20B to Cap. 4, reads:
“20B. (1) The Court of Appeal shall be duly constituted if it consists of an even number, not being less than three, of the judges of the Supreme Court.
(2) The determination of any question before the Court shall be according to the opinion of the majority of the members of the Court hearing the case.”
(The emphasis is mine.) The language of this provision clearly permitted the Court of Appeal to sit with either three justices or more than three. The figure three here was clearly a quorum qualification. But whether the Court sat three or five or even seven, it had the same jurisdiction, conferred by the new section 20A – observe the genesis of that interesting and charming phrase duly constituted; it would seem, even for a young nation such as ours, to be of respectable antiquity.
Barely four months after independence, the Legislative Assembly passed a Courts (Amendment) Act, 1957 (No. 8 of 1957), taking effect on 20 July 1957. Section 4 (1) of this Act gave the membership of the Court of Appeal as the Chief Justice and not more than two Justices of Appeal, and the Puisne Judges of the Supreme Court. For our purposes, the relevant provision is section 4 (2) by which the Court of Appeal was “duly constituted” “if, “it consists of an uneven number, not being less than three of the Judges of the Court of Appeal of whom one shall be the Chief Justice or a Justice of Appeal…”
(The emphasis is mine)
Again under this provision, the Court of Appeal could sit more than three. There was, as under Ordinance No. 17 of 1957, no talk here of a full bench or an ordinary bench. The Court of Appeal simply had a discretion to empanel a court of three or more than three, provided the numbers were odd and either the Chief Justice himself or else a Justice of Appeal was present.
On 1 July 1960 Ghana became a Republic. Two days before this date, i.e. 29 June 1960, the Court’s Act, 1960 (C.A. 9), had been passed, to come into force at the same time as the Constitution of 1960, i.e. 1 July 1960. CA 9 repealed the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4, as amended. It did not, however, make any significant changes in the hierarchy of courts created by Cap. 4 (as amended) and section 1 described this hierarchy as:
“(a) the Supreme Court;
(b) the High Court; and (c) the Circuit Courts.”
[p.61] of [1981] GLR 24
The Supreme Court became the equivalent of the Court of Appeal under Cap. 4. However, section 7 (1) of Cap. 9 which is relevant provides in part:
“7. (1) The Supreme Court when exercising appellate jurisdiction, whether civil or criminal, or any other jurisdiction shall be deemed to be a duly constituted bench if such court comprises three or five of the Judges of the Supreme Court.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
Attention may here be called to the change of phraseology. The court is no longer duly constituted by “not less than three judges”; it is now duly constituted if it “comprises three or five of the Judges of the Supreme Court.”
It would seem clear to me that under C.A. 9, the Court of Appeal could be constituted in only one or the other way, i.e. (three or five), and no other. The figures given being two absolute figures, a lower and a higher one. The Act itself does not use the terms “ordinary bench” and “full bench” but it would be quite natural for lawyers (by which I include the judges themselves) in describing a court of the permissible maximum number of five judges to refer to it as the full bench or full court; the court comprising the permissible minimum number of three automatically becoming the ordinary bench. This notion is reflected in proviso (b) to section 7 (1) which reads:
“(b) such Court shall be deemed to be a duly constituted bench, notwithstanding any vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice or any other Judge, so, however, that there are at least three Judges to constitute a proper bench…”
(The emphasis is mine.) The proviso speaks of a proper bench of three. Since both benches three and five are proper, in the sense of permissible under section 7 (1), it is easy to see why the proper bench of three in proviso (b) will be regarded as the ordinary bench, to distinguish it from the other equally proper bench of five, which then becomes the full bench.
Was there any distinction between these courts in terms of jurisdiction? As in previous enactments, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal under section 8 of CA 9 was the same whether it sat with three judges or five, subject in all cases to the special powers conferred on a single judge. This was the state of the law up to the coup d’etat of 1966.
The soldiers who took over the reins of government enacted a courts legislation of their own: the Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84). Made on 21 September 1966, the Decree came into force on 1
[p.62] of [1981] GLR 24
October 1966: see L.I. 522 of 1966. By section 95, N.L.C.D. 84 repealed the Courts Act, 1960 (C.A. 9), as amended, and proceeded significantly, to abolish “the Courts established under that Act with effect from the date of the commencement of this Decree.” It then by paragraph 1 (1) set up its own hierarchy of courts, comprising:
“(a) a Supreme Court of Judicature, consisting of the Court of Appeal and the High Court, which shall be the Superior Courts of Ghana; and (b) the . . . Inferior Courts . . .”
Paragraph 6 (1) of N.L.C.D. 84 provided for a Court of Appeal of an ordinary bench comprising three Justices of Appeal or a full bench comprising five justices of appeal. Then follows the proviso (b) to paragraph 6 (1) which reads:
“(b) such Court shall be deemed to be a duly constituted bench, notwithstanding any vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice or any other Justices of Appeal so, however, that there are at least three Judges to constitute a proper bench . . .”
(The emphasis is mine.)
We have met this language already in the proviso to section 7 (1) of CA 9. But for the first time since independence we have the phrases ordinary bench and full bench given statutory recognition. Even so, the enactment maintained the restriction on the membership of the court: three and no more for an ordinary bench, or five and no more for a full bench. As under CA 9 there can be no other properly constituted Court of Appeal. The phrase “not less than” which we met in the Courts (Amendment) Act, 1957, does not find a place here, and section 7 (1) then describes the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal “whether comprising a full bench or an ordinary bench . . .” and then proceeds, under paragraph 7 (2), to deal with “the jurisdiction of a full bench of the Court of Appeal” as:
“(a) a review and determination of a decision of an ordinary bench of such Court… and (b) a review and determination of any other decision of an ordinary bench of such Court where it appears to a full bench of such Court that there has been a miscarriage of justice.”
Then for the sake of emphasis, paragraph 7 (2) concludes, “This jurisdiction shall not be exercised by an ordinary bench of such Court.” Thus when the full court came to be recognised as such at law, not only was its membership clearly defined, but its jurisdiction was also equally defined. It was set up as a court of last resort, even though it was a court within a court. It exercised concurrent jurisdiction with the ordinary bench and in addition exercised review jurisdiction over the ordinary bench. There was no court over and above the full bench. It was the last court within a hierarchy.
The Constitution, 1969, of the Second Republic came into force on 22 August 1969. Article 102 thereof established a new order of courts, viz. the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Courts, as the superior courts of record “to constitute one Superior Court of Judicature…” and the inferior courts. Article 109 (1) gave the membership of the Court of Appeal Justice, not less than five justices of Appeal the Chief and other Justices of the Superior Court of Judicature invited by the Chief Justice. And by article 109 (2), “The Court of Appeal shall be duly constituted by any three thereof . . .”
There was here no mention of a full bench or an ordinary bench. Under section 14 (1) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1969, the National Liberation Council was set up as a caretaker Government to “continue to exercise the legislative power of the State until the meeting of the National Assembly immediately following the formation of the cabinet.” By virtue of this power, the National Liberation Council on 30 September 1969 passed the Constitution (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 406), to operate from 1 October 1969. N.L.C.D. 406 repeals paragraph 6 (1) of N.L.C.D. 84, leaving paragraph 6 (2) as the new paragraph 6 of N.L.C.D. 84 . Paragraph 7 of N.L.C.D. 84 was also repealed, and a new paragraph 7 substituted.
The effect of these repeals was to sweep away the division of the Court of Appeal into a full bench and an ordinary bench, and also, under the new paragraph 7, to abolish the special jurisdiction conferred on the full bench. The idea was to bring the law into conformity with the constitution, 1969. As its title goes, N.L.C.D. 406 was made “in consequence of” the constitution, which, not intending to have a full bench operate concurrently and side by side with the new Supreme Court, had in section 13 (2) of the transitional provisions, transferred all review matters pending before the full bench immediately before 22 August 1969, to the Supreme Court as substantive appeals.
The question therefore is whether under article 109 (2) of the Constitution, 1969, the Court of Appeal could sit with more than three justices. Notice the language of article 109 (2) again, “The Court of Appeal shall be duly constituted by any three Justices thereof . . .” At the time the Constitution-makers formulated this rule, N.L.C.D. 84 was the regulating statute, all preceding enactments having been swept aside and repealed in the course of time. Paragraph 6 (1) of N.L.C.D. 84 had drawn a distinction between
[p.64] of [1981] GLR 24 an ordinary bench and a full bench; paragraph 7 had assigned jurisdiction to each of these.
All this was known to, or at least, must be deemed to have been known to, the framers of the Constitution. Armed with this intelligence, and indeed, in spite of it, they proceeded to use the language such as we have it in article 109 (2) and not only that, but to make provision, in section 13 (2) of the transitional provisions, for the further handling of matters pending before the then full bench. In addition, the Constitution, 1969, made no provision for a review of decisions of the Court of Appeal. On the controversy, appeals were to go from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court.
Taking all this into consideration, more particularly the language of article 109 (2), I am of the opinion that there was every intention, in article 109 of the Constitution, 1969, to discontinue the full bench. The figure three used in article 109 (2) was an absolute figure: it was not intended to be added to, or substracted from. The court was to be a court of three, and no more.
By contrast, we may look at article 103 (2) of the same Constitution, dealing with the Supreme Court:
“(2) The Supreme Court shall . . . be duly constituted for the dispatch of its business by not less than five Justices thereof.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
This language preceeds article 109 (2) and also deals with the constitution of one of the courts established by that same document. If the intention was to enable the Court of Appeal (the second court coming immediately after the Supreme Court) to sit with more than three justices, article 109 (2) would have used language similar to article 103 (2), even if there was no intention of perpetuating the notion of a full bench and an ordinary bench. (See, e.g. section 7 (1) of C.A. 9; section 20 B (1) of Cap. 4 and section 4 (2) of Act No. 8 of 1957).
In the course of arguing this case, Nana Akufo-Addo drew the court’s attention to N.L.C.D. 84, para. 6(1). In answer to a question whether the figures three and five stated in N.L.C.D. 84, para. 6 (1) are quorum figures or absolute figures, Nana Akufo-Addo, replied that they are absolute figures; they cannot be added to, but this is because, he explained, the paragraph uses the word “comprising” and not “duly constituted by.”
I am not attracted by this argument. I think the word “comprising” in paragraph 6 (1) N.L.C.D. 84 has the same meaning as “duly constituted by.” Indeed the marginal note to the paragraph 6 reads, “Duly constituted Court of Appeal.” I concede that the marginal note is not part of the enactment, but in appropriate situations it can be aid to interpretation: see, e.g. Nicholson v. Fields (1862) 31 L.J.Ex. 223 at p. 236. Using the marginal note as a
[p.65] of [1981] GLR 24 guide only, and nothing more, I am confirmed in my view that “comprising” has the same meaning as “duly constituted by.” Hence article 109 (2) of the Constitution, 1969, instead of reading, “The Court of Appeal shall be duly constituted by any three justices thereof . . .” may equally well read, “The Court of Appeal shall comprise any three Justices thereof . . .” without loss of meaning. This rendering further supports the view that the figure three used in article 109 (2) is an absolute figure.
The purpose of interpretation is to try and make clear language which is not clear. The first principle to apply is to give the language used its ordinary everyday meaning. If this yields a reasonable result, you do not go further. In Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.) Vol. 36, p. 392, para. 587 it is stated:
“Words are primarily to be construed in their ordinary meaning or common or popular sense… Where the words used are familiar and are in common and general use in the English language, then (1) it is inappropriate to try to define them further by judicial interpretation and to lay down their meaning as a rule of construction, and the only question for a court is whether the words are apt to cover or describe the circumstances in question in a particular case, and (2) evidence that they are used in some special and peculiar sense is not admissible.”
And at p. 393, para. 589 it is further stated: “Worde in a statute must be taken to be used correctly and exactly, and the onus on those who assert that they are used loosely or inexactly is a heavy one.”
The language we are called upon to interpret is in article 121 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, “The Court of Appeal shall be duly constituted by any three Justices thereof…” (The emphasis is mine.) And we are being invited to say that “any three Justices” means “more than three Justices.” I would decline this invitation. Surely, if a primary school teacher should ask a pupil to take out “any four chairs” from the classroom to the verandah the pupil would understand the teacher to be asking for four chairs, and not more than four chairs. The position would be the same as though the teacher had merely ordered the pupil to remove “four chairs,” without the word “any.” I am not an expert in semantics, but I would like to think that in this context, the word “any” is a surplusage. Any “four chairs” has the same meaning as “four chairs,” and in both phrases “four” is an absolute figure.
Bringing the same reasoning to bear on the task before me, I am forced to the conclusion that “any three Justices” means exactly
[p.66] of [1981] GLR 24 what it says: three justices and no more. I am not prepared to erect any blocks and impediments on any road to understanding such simple everyday language as that used in article 109 (2) of the Constitution, 1969, and for the matter, article 121 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, which is in exactly the same language, word for word, as article 109 (2) of the Constitution, 1969, and as far as I am concerned, admits of the same interpretation as article 109 (2).
Next in the line of statutes comes the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), passed by the Parliament of the Second Republic on 22 September 1971. It was passed to consolidate the law with respect to the courts established by the Constitution, 1969, and for other purposes connected therewith. It was to consolidate all existing pieces of legislation, up-date them and bring them into line with the Constitution, 1969.
These laws were N.L.C.D. 84 with its several amendments, and those parts of N.L.C.D. 406 which dealt with the courts. After accomplishing its task, Act 372 dutifully repealed N.L.C.D. 84 (together with all six amendments, viz. N.L.C.D. 105, 123, 201, 250 and 277). It also repealed the “Courts” portions of N.L.C.D. 406. Act 372 repeated the courts hierarchy of the Constitution, i.e. Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court; and as far as the Court of Appeal is concerned, section 9 (3) repeated article 109 (2) in relation to the constitution of that court, namely “. . . by any three Justices thereof . . .” Act 372 deserves no further comment.
But the position was again disturbed by the National Redemption Council which had seized power on 13 January 1972. It abolished the Supreme Court established by Act 372, thus reducing the three-tier superior court system to a two-tier system —the Court of Appeal and the High Court. In the process it found it necessary to re-introduce the motion of the full bench, to, as it were, assume the role and functions of the third-tier Supreme Court. The relevant enactment is the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.L.C.D. 101), made on 5 september 1972. By paragraph 3 (1) of N.R.C.D. 101, the full bench was duly constituted “by five Justices thereof.”
Paragraph 3 (2) set out in detail the jurisdiction of this court. It is the same as paragraph 7 (2) of N.L.C.D. 84, plus: appeals from the National House of Chiefs under section 22 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), and appeals that were then pending before the abolished Supreme Court. This jurisdiction was enlarged by section 2 of the Presidential Elections (Challenge) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 2), to enable the Court of Appeal to hear petitions challenging the election of the President. The Decree did not say which Court of Appeal—the full bench or the ordinary bench. On the face of this Decree the petition [p.67] of [1981] GLR 24 could have gone to either. The position is now governed by article 51 of the Constitution, 1979.
The re-introduction of the full bench by N.R.C.D. 101 is further support for the view that with the repeal of paragraph 6 (1) of N.L.C.D. 84, the idea of a full bench had died and had been buried. It was unknown under N.L.C.D. 406, the Constitution, 1969, or Act 372. It had to be deliberately and statutorily reinstated by N.R.C.D. 101 to fill the vacuum created by the abolition of the Supreme Court, and it became part of Act 372 till 1979 when the new Constitution came into force.
It is said that statute has never specified the maximum quorum for the highest court. This is an indefensible generalisation; it is demonstrably wrong. For when, in 1960, C.A. 9, s. 7 (1) set up a Supreme Court of “three or five” judges, it was specifying for that court both the minimum size of the court, as well as its maximum size. It cannot be reasonably contended that the number five could have been lawfully exceeded. And in 1960 the Supreme Court was the highest court.
Similarly, in 1966 under N.L.C.D. 84 the ordinary bench of three judges was both the smallest ordinary bench and at the same time the largest ordinary bench that ever could have been, under that law; the number three could not have been lawfully increased. And for the full bench, the number five was equally both the minimum quorum as well as the maximum. Hence for the “two courts” (ordinary bench and full bench) of the Court of Appeal, N.L.C.D. 84 specified the maximum number of judges who could sit. Here again, in 1966, the Court of Appeal was the highest court. It is simply incorrect, and cannot be sustained.
The Constitution, 1979, in all particulars relevant to a decision of this case, reproduced the provisions of the Constitution, 1969, and as stated earlier, the full bench was unknown to the Constitution, 1969; it is also unknown to the Constitution, 1979. Not only that: the figure three used in article 121 (2) is, like its counterpart, article 109 (2) of the Constitution, 1969, an absolute figure: It cannot be exceeded or reduced.
It has been argued that section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Appeal as established under article 114 (4), and not the Court of Appeal “as duly constituted”; that the Court of Appeal as established has a membership of at least six. Therefore to perform the functions under section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions, the Court of Appeal can have five members. I must confess I find it extremely difficult to follow the logic of this argument.
Article 114 (5) establishes all the courts of the superior court hierarchy; it does not deal with the Court of Appeal alone. The
[p.68] of [1981] GLR 24 membership or composition of each of the court is spelt out in different other articles; for the Court of Appeal it is article 121 (1). Therefore if section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions had in mind the composition of the Court of Appeal, as is being contended, would it not have been the easiest of drafting exercises to have conferred the jurisdiction on “the Court of Appeal composed under article 121 (1)?”
Why should the draftsmen go by way of article 114 (5) and leave the question of “composition” to the ingenuity of an interpreter? I find the argument a non sequitur, I reject it. To my mind the jurisdiction in section 3 (1) is conferred on the Court of Appeal as established under article 114 (5), whose total membership is found in article 121 (1), and whose working strength is controlled by article 121 (2). This is plain enough to be controverted, and I do not think that any amount of ingenuity can displace this interpretation of the relevant provisions.
The only matter open to debate is whether article 121 (2) allows a working strength of more than three. But Nana Akufo-Addo says that as far as he knows the Court of Appeal had all the time, sat three or five at will, and no one has ever complained. This may well be so. But it will be observed from the preceding analysis that from 1957 right up to the 22 August 1969 when the Constitution, 1969, came into force, one can cite statutory justification for a Court of Appeal of more than three justices.
The language of all the controlling enactments during the period was so clear that no one could ever have taken any issue with the Court of Appeal on that score. The same can be said of the period 5 September 1972 till 24 September 1979 when Act 372 operated subject to the modification introduced by N.R.C.D. 101. Nana Akufo-Addo’s statement can therefore be taken to relate to the three-year period 22 August 1969 to 4 September 1972, i.e. from the constitution, 1969, up to the passage of N.R.C.D. 101, and from 24 September 1979 to the present.
He adds that all the members of the court are entitled to sit. I cannot accede to this argument. For if it were so, there would have been no need for the special provisions in article 121 (2). Article 121 (1) gives the total membership of the court generally; article 121 (2) gives the membership of the same court “at work”. Naturally, the general membership is larger than the working group. Although each of the members is qualified to sit, all of them cannot sit at the same time, and pretend to be the court contemplated under article 121 (2).
An analogous situation arose in Republic v. Western Nzima Traditional Council; Ex parte Nana Kpani Ackah III [1973] 2 G.L.R. 107. There the Western Nzima Traditional Council assembled all
[p.69] of [1981] GLR 24 its 29 or so members to try what they must have regarded as a singularly difficult chieftaincy cause. They needed more minds to deliberate on grave issues of customary significance. By statute, however, such a cause could only have been handled by the council’s judicial committee of three or five members only. Even though each of the members of the council was eligible to serve on the judicial committee, the court (High Court, Sekondi) held that the adjudication was bad.
Similarly, although under article 124 (1), the High Court has at least thirteen members, a working High Court of two justices will be contrary to article 124 (2) (a). Nor can it be successfully contended that because treason is generally of grave public importance, the High Court can competently assemble five justices to deal with it. Such a court of five will clearly be in conflict with article 124 (2) (c). It cannot be too much emphasised that these courts are all creatures of statutes. Statute prescribes their name, their total membership, their working strength, their powers and even their places of sitting. Any departure from any statutory requirement renders a court incapable of exercising the jurisdiction given to it.
Some attempt has been made to justify the five-member panel in the Tuffuor case by reference to the practice and the rules of court. It is said that the justification for the five-member court cannot be found in the substantive law; it derives from the inherent practice and procedure of the Court of Appeal, from the court’s own rules and from some other general sources. Reference is made to the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218). Rules of court are meant to govern the procedure of a properly constituted court; they do not govern the establishment of the court; nor its constitution, nor even its place of sitting.
These are regulated by substantive law, not rules of procedure. It is conceded that substantive law may at times leave room for the exercise of discretion in certain areas, via rules of procedure. These areas are usually the times and places of sitting, mode of filing papers, etc. Even so, the discretion is conferred by substantive law.
I am yet to come across a rule of procedure which regulates the due constitution of a superior court. To my mind the statement in the majority opinion that the five-member Court of Appeal cannot be justified by reference to any substantive law, is tantamount to an acknowledgment that it cannot be justified at all, which I dare say represents the truth. I do not think that any recourse to public policy, convenience, or practice, however hallowed, can bail us out of this situation.
It is an acknowledgement that the point raised by Mr. Obeng-Manu, touching the constitution of the court, is unanswerable and must be gracefully conceded to him. This I do. But it is said that the Court of Appeal has been sitting five all the time, and no one
[p.70] of [1981] GLR 24 has raised a finger. That does not mean that a finger can never be raised. It has been raised now, and we cannot force it down. If, in my reckoning, an error was committed then, there is no reason why that error should be perpetuated simply because it has been done with impunity in the past.
“Public policy and commonsense” pleaded by the defendant, cannot be suffered to oust the operation of what, in my view, are the clear prescriptions of constitutional provision.
After carefully considering not only the wording of article 121 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, but also its historical antecedents, it is my opinion that the contention of the plaintiff that the Court of Appeal which heard the Tuffuor case was not duly constituted is well founded, and must be upheld. In my judgment the five-member Court of Appeal which heard Tuffuor v. Attorney-General was not properly and lawfully constituted. It was not the Court of Appeal contemplated under article 121 (2) of the Constitution, 1979. Accordingly it could not exercise the jurisdiction conferred on a duly constituted Court of Appeal by section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions. Consequently, the proceedings before that court, were a nullity, and I so declare them. This, in my view, disposes of the case.
As I indicated at the beginning of this brief opinion, I do not propose to comment on any other aspect of this suit. On all other issues, I share the views expressed by my brother Anin J.S.C. which views he has expressed (if I may say so respectfully) with characteristic lucidity and erudition.
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C.
I wish to preface this judgment by stating that I am used to expressing myself in as frank a language as I am capable of and for that reason I suspect I have a cast of mind that disables me from achieving restraint. I am sorry for this failing. I do not mean any harm. I wish therefore to ask beforehand for forgiveness of the lawyers and parties in this case and also my brothers, if my language is considered unbecoming. It is not my intention to hurt the feeling of any person. My intense desire to protect the Constitution, 1979, in accordance with my judicial oath and convictions and my anxiety to be uncompromising on what I believe is right, may perhaps lead me to inadvertent use of strong language. I do not intend to give offence and I apologise unreservedly in case any expression of mine does give offence.
With this preliminary observation, I wish to remark that, I have had the advantage of reading beforehand the judgment of the majority which has just been read by my brother Anin J.S.C. With the exception of the reasoning supporting our earlier decision to strike out the Court of Appeal as a defendant in this suit, I regret to say that I am compelled with all due respect to dissent from the other
[p.71] of [1981] GLR 24 reasoning and conclusions which have found favour with the majority. In my humble opinion the course which the majority of the court has taken today does violence to well-known and established concepts underlying our legal system and our principles for the interpretation of documents. The result is that the constitutional order established on 24 September 1979 has been seriously undermined. I shall articulate these views in my reasoning supporting the contrary conclusion that the plaintiff’s action is well-founded.
We decide now for the present and future generations of our people. Our decisions will without doubt be projected into the future. I would not wish to be a part of a decision that can be demonstrated, as I propose to do presently, to be legally unsound and seriously vulnerable upon analysis. Such decisions do not survive the ravages of time.
I have also had the privilege of reading beforehand the judgment of my brother Adade J.S.C. I am happy to say that I agree completely with his reasoning on those aspects of this case which he dealt with. I find his reasoning and conclusions impeccable. I now come to grips with the issues brought before us in this case.
The plaintiff invokes the original jurisdiction of this court under article 2 (1) (b) of the Constitution, 1979, and seeks by virtue of that provision a declaration in these terms:
(i) that Mr. Justice Fred Kwasi Apaloo acted in contravention of article 114 (5), section 3(1) of the transitional provisions and article 121 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana in appointing five judges to sit, hear and determine the suit: Tuffuor v. Attorney-General in the Court of Appeal in or around the month of September 1980;
(ii) that the five judges who sat, heard and determined the said suit did not constitutionally hold valid nominations to sit on the said suit in that the act of Mr. Justice Fred Kwasi Apaloo who nominated or selected them was inconsistent with or in contravention of articles 127 (5) and 214 of the Constitution, 1979 of the Republic of Ghana; and at any rate the said five judges were guilty of serious judicial impropriety, bias and prejudgment;
(iii) that the said Court of Appeal was not duly constituted having regard to article 121 (2) of the Constitution, 1979 of the Republic of Ghana, when five judges instead of three judges sat, heard and determined the said suit and consequently the very constitution of the said Court of Appeal was irregular, illegal and unconstitutional;
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(iv) that by so irregularly, illegally and unconstitutionally sitting with five judges after the Constitution, 1979 of the Republic of Ghana, had come into force, the said Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the said suit having regard to sections 3 (1) and 5 of the transitional provisions thereof;
(v) that the purported declaration, judgment or decision and the reasons thereof of the said Court of Appeal in the said suit, namely, Tuffuor v. Attorney-General made or delivered on 19 September and 23 October 1980 respectively, was null and void and of no legal effect in that the whole trial and the decision founded upon it were inconsistent with or in contravention of article 44 (9) of the Constitution, 1979 of the Republic of Ghana.
The basis of the plaintiff’s claim for a declaration is contained in a statement of his case which accompanied his writ both of which were filed in this court on 27 February 1981 pursuant to the provisions of rule 46 of the Supreme Court, Rules 1970 (C.I. 13). The said statement of case verified by affidavit followed the pattern of a statement of claim in proceedings in the High Court. The defendant disputed the claim to the declaration and in a statement of his case verified by affidavit and filed on 13 March 1981 in purported reliance on rule 48 (1) of the said rules, he endeavoured to answer the plaintiff’s case paragraph by paragraph in the fashion of pleadings in a superior court of first instance. On 19 March 1981, the defendant swore and filed a further affidavit in support of further facts in his statement of case.
Thereafter on 20 March 1981, the plaintiff filed a reply in which he challenged the stance of the defendant in his case, a course of action reminiscent of pleadings.
It would seem that the parties probably misconceived the procedural steps which they ought to take before the hearing after the writ and the statement of case had been filed. In any case it seems to me that a reply or further affidavit as was filed in this suit is not sanctioned by the rules.
A close study of Part IV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), shows that what is required of each party is essentially a brief containing the statement of his case embodying the facts in issue or the agreed facts and the arguments with the necessary decided cases, statutory law or constitutional provisions which support his case. If for any reason a statement of case filed is found to be inadequate an application should be made to the court for amendment: see rule 49 of C.I. 13. The indiscriminate filing of papers after filing statements of cases without leave as was done in this case by the parties is to be frowned upon.
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Be that as it may, in this case, a close study of the apparent pleadings or so-called statements and the proceedings and judgment in the Tuffuor case reveal that the contentions of both parties are founded upon central facts, in some cases documentary, that are hardly in dispute. However, many of the facts filed and sworn to and on which issues were apparently joined are clearly unnecessary and cannot in any meaningful manner help to determine the crucial matters of law alleged to be in controversy between the parties. I have therefore ignored most of these irrelevant matters in this judgment but later on, in the course of this decision, one or two of such matters may be identified and commented upon.
The relevant facts germane to this case and given in chronological order for ease of appraisal are as follows: On 15 June 1977, the defendant, Mr. Justice Fred Kwasi Apaloo, was appointed the Chief Justice of the Republic of Ghana during the military regime of the Supreme Military Council. On 24 September 1979, the Constitution, 1979, came into force, and on 16 July 1980, the President of the Republic Dr. Hilla Limann nominated for the approval of Parliament, the defendant as the Chief Justice of the Republic and as a member of the new Supreme Court established by the Constitution, 1979. On 16 August 1980, Parliament vetted the defendant by summoning him to appear before a committee of Parliament.
They subjected him to examination and after debate, they refused to approve of his appointment as the Chief Justice although they approved the appointment of four other judges as judges of the Supreme Court. On 2 September 1980, one Dr. Kwame Amoako Tuffuor, a citizen of Ghana and a lecturer of the University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, filed a writ at the Supreme Court, against the Speaker of Parliament and the Attorney-General. It was as he put it a “writ to invoke the original jurisdiction” of the Supreme Court under “articles 2 (1) (b) and 118 (1) (a) of the Constitution“ for a declaration that:
(i) on the coming into force of the Constitution of the Third Republic on 24 september 1979, the Hon.
Mr. Fred Kwasi Apaloo was deemed to have been appointed Chief Justice of the Republic and, as such, became the president and member of the Supreme Court;
(ii) the purported nomination by the President of the Republic of the Hon. Mr. Fred Kwasi Apaloo for approval by Parliament of his appointment as the Chief Justice of the Republic and member of the Supreme Court and his purported vetting and rejection by Parliament as such on 16 August 1980 were each acts effected in contravention
[p.74] of [1981] GLR 24 of the Constitution and laws of the Republic and were therefore all null and void and of no effect;
(iii) Hon. Mr. Fred Kwasi Apaloo remains the Chief Justice of the Republic and, thereby the President of the Supreme Court.”
Some time in the early part of September 1980, the defendant as the Chief Justice constituted what he described in the statement of his case as a full bench of the Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court and empanelled two judges of the Supreme Court, two judges of the Court of Appeal, one judge of the High Court, making five judges to hear the suit. On 19 September 1980, the said full bench of the Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court, made orders, inter alia, that the Speaker ought not to be a party and accordingly discharged the Speaker as a defendant.
While the case was pending before the said full court and before judgment was delivered on 23 September 1980, Mr. Justice Francois, a nominee for appointment to the Supreme Court and one of the members of the court so empanelled wrote to Parliament on 20 September 1980 expressing his fundamental disagreement with the parliamentary procedure under article 127 (1) by which an appointee to the Supreme Court is vetted or subjected to an examination before approval of his appointment.
In his letter he stated, inter alia, concerning article 127 (1), “May I … state my conviction that the requirement of ‘approval’ contained in that article, is limited to setting the official seal of acceptance or otherwise. It is not co-extensive with vetting or subjecting to an examination.” (The emphasis is mine.) He therefore indicated his inability for those reasons to appear before Parliament for vetting prior to approval.
On 23 September 1980, the said full bench of the Court of Appeal (sitting as the Supreme Court) after having heard arguments gave judgment for the said Tuffuor and reserving its reasons declared:
“(a) that on the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979, the person who was the Chief Justice immediately before such commencement became the Chief Justice of Ghana;
(b) that the Chief Justice, under our system, is sui juris and he is appointed as such;
(c) that consequently, his nomination for consideration and that consideration by the Judicial Council, as well as the submission by the incumbent Chief Justice of himself for approval by Parliament, were each unlawful under the Constitution;
(d) that the provisions of article 96 of the Constitution confer a positive protection afforded to justices of the Superior
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Court of Judicature by the provisions of clause (9) of article 114 of the Constitution; and therefore the writs of our courts cannot, and do not, extend into Parliament;
(e) that the submission of the incumbent Chief Justice of himself for approval did not, as would have been the case of a non-constitutional right, deprive him of the rights of office conferred on the holder of the office of Chief Justice by the provisions of clauses (8) and (9) of article 127 of the Constitution, and the protection thereby afforded him by the provisions of article 128 of the Constitution relating to removal from office;
(f) that in the circumstances of this case the next course of action, in view of his submission to Parliament, albeit under protest, remains with the Chief Justice. Having said all that we think the constitutional position remains as we have already indicated.”
On 23 October 1980, the said full bench of the Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court under section 3 (1) of the First Schedule to the Constitution, 1979, gave its reasons for its judgment. And on 27 February 1981 the plaintiff herein commenced this suit by issuing out a writ accompanied by a statement of his case asking for the declarations as already indicated in this judgment.
I think it may be necessary to make some comments on some of the irrelevant materials I have already referred to, which have found their way into the statement of case of the parties. For instance the plaintiff instead of just stating what is relevant, namely that the defendant’s nomination for the office of Chief Justice was disapproved, he maintained in a purported descriptive appraisal of Parliament’s action that the defendant was “rejected” by Parliament “on moral grounds” and the defendant naturally retorted by a statement supported by affidavit:
“that the so-called moral grounds on which Parliament purported to reject his nomination were spurious and untenable, comprising the decision of only the members of the majority party in Parliament and that in any event, the purported vetting and rejection were unconstitutional, null and void.”
It seems to me that the parties are here calling on us, inter alia, to decide on the nature and sufficiency of the grounds on which Parliament can reject nominees for the Supreme Court. I would have thought this is a political matter within the exclusive competence and prerogative of Parliament and it is not a burden for this court within the framework of the Constitution, 1979. Clearly this is an invidious
[p.76] of [1981] GLR 24 task tending to embroil this court in an unnecessary political confrontation such as will distort the true function of the judiciary and undermine the independence of the legislature. I do not think such an invitation can respectfully be accepted or even responsibly considered, since it has nothing to do with the grant or refusal of any of the five declarations which the plaintiff seeks in this action.
The next complaint by the defendant, clearly not material to any issue before us but to some extent justifiable, is his allegation that the plaintiff published statements in the newspaper the Believer dated 11 January 1981 threatening him with removal from office at a time when he contemplated instituting this action in court. An action which indeed he did commence on 27 February 1981. In my opinion, persons who intend to set the machinery of the law in motion in the law courts in vindication of their rights must realise that they are choosing the proper legal forum to settle the differences between them and their adversaries.
Going to the press for the same or some collateral purpose is but an invidious and useless duplication of strategy and an unnecessary dissipation of energy that cannot but subvert the proper and fair administration of justice. It manifests the spectacle of a plaintiff putting forward mere allegations against his opponent as if they are proven facts. If such statements are untrue they are libellous. At the actual trial the court’s attention might be deflected from the task in hand to consider these collateral libellous matters which are irrelevant to the question in controversy.
Furthermore, the defendant complained that the plaintiff criticised the conduct of the judges of the said full bench of the Court of Appeal in the papers before filing his statement of case and apparently repeated the criticism in his statement of case; he averred that this is scandalising the court. I have not come across a single reported decision of our own courts on this question of what are the ingredients of this species of contempt of court.
I do not think we should be deflected from considering the case in hand and by an academic sojourn in that field but look at the complaint of the defendant; and speaking for myself, I think criticism is good for a healthy development of our law and for that reason, I would wish to associate myself with that great liberal judge, Lord Atkin, who in a classic exposition of the citizen’s right to criticism said in Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago [1936] A.C. 322 at p. 335, P.C.:
“The path of criticism is a public way: the wrong headed are permitted to err therein: provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism, and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the [p.77] of [1981] GLR 24 administration of justice, they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men.”
I think this matter is better left alone and I would resist the temptation to give further consideration to it.
There were other minor irrelevant materials; in most of them the parties as I have said did not seek leave to so include them in their brief and we also did not give them leave to so include or to argue them; in the result it will be wrong to consider them as issues and to make any pronouncement whatsoever on them without hearing the parties. I have accordingly disregarded all of them.
Before dealing with the declarations, however, it seems to me that I must clear one matter very quickly. In paragraph 14 of his statement of case the defendant stated, inter alia, “The convocation of the full bench of the Court of Appeal to determine the suit of Tuffuor v. Attorney-General was effected at the express request of the Attorney-General . . .”
(The emphasis is mine.)
And in paragraph 10 he stated, inter alia, “If a decision of the Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court is like a decision of the Supreme Court itself, it is final and conclusive . . .” In my view, the Constitution by its article 114 impliedly abolished the full bench of the Court of Appeal which was created by the military regime by the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101), and section 5 of the transitional provisions converted cases pending before the full bench, to appeals and transferred these cases to the Supreme Court. In the circumstances it is unconstitutional after 24 September 1979 to talk of the full bench of the Court of Appeal under the present Constitution and I cannot help thinking that probably due to the conservative nature of the judicial mind, the defendant was still thinking of the erstwhile full bench of the Court of Appeal under the military regime.
Furthermore, no Court of Appeal was given power by any provision of the Constitution, 1979, to sit as the Supreme Court. Certainly not by section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions. I am therefore firmly of the view that there is no such court as “full bench of Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court” in our new constitutional set up as it has existed from 24 September 1979.
As I indicated earlier, I have had the advantage of reading beforehand the majority decision in this case, and I note that that decision did not resist this view. On the contrary, it cited the relevant provisions of the Constitution as well as the case of Annous v. Appoh [1980] G.L.R. 883, C.A. as authority to support the view that by the Constitution, 1979, “the statutory ‘full bench of the Court of Appeal’ was abolished.”
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Coming now to the declarations sought, I propose to consider declaration (iii) first, because if the contention of the plaintiff is well-founded, a decision in his favour will substantially dispose of this case. The gravamen of the constitutional violation complained of by the plaintiff is that the defendant empanelled a Court of Appeal composed of five judges instead of three judges as is demanded by the Constitution.
Is this complaint well-founded? I would have thought that since the defendant in his statement of case has conceded that he did set up a full bench of the Court of Appeal to sit as the Supreme Court and since the majority decision is that such a court has been abolished, the matter is settled. The majority view (supporting as it does) the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant set up a court not sanctioned by the Constitution, means that the complaint of the plaintiff is well-founded.
In spite of this clearly implied logical conclusion contained in the majority decision that the complaint of the plaintiff is well-founded, the majority, nevertheless, expressly finds that the complaint of the plaintiff is not well-founded. I am unable to understand this volte-face. However, a study of the legislative history of the words used in formulating the composition and constitution of the Court of Appeal by whatsoever name called either as a “final appellate court” or an “intermediary appellate court” within the hierarchy of our superior court system from the period before independence to the present time, can also provide a conclusive answer.
Under section 13 of the West African Court of Appeal Order-in-Council, 1948 (SI 1330), it is provided, “The court shall be duly constituted if it consists of an uneven number, not being less than three Judges of the Court.” (The emphasis is mine.) At independence on 6 March 1957, the courts (Amendment) Ordinance, 1957 (No. 17 of 1957), which received the Governor’s assent on 1 March 1957, amended the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.), and introduced by section 6, section 20B (1) to Cap. 4 as follows, “The Court of Appeal shall be duly constituted if it consists of an uneven number, not being less than three, of the Judges of the Supreme Court.” (The emphasis is mine) After independence on 20 July 1975, the courts (Amendment) Act, 1957 (No. 8 of 1957), S. 4 introduced section 4A (1) and (2) to Cap. 4 as follows:
“4A. (1) The Court of Appeal shall consist of the Chief Justice of Ghana and not more than two Justices of Appeal, appointed by the Governor . . .
(2) The Court of Appeal shall be deemed to be duly constituted… if it consists of an uneven number, not being less than three of the Judges of the Court of Appeal…”
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(The emphasis is mine.)
Before the demise of the First Republic on 24 February 1966, the Republic an Constitution, 1960, had made provisions for the composition and constitution of the superior courts. The superior courts were then two: The Supreme Court and the High Court. It is the Supreme Court that is relevant in the study of the court history in these proceedings and article 43 of the said First Republican Constitution provided:
“43. Provisions shall be made by the law for the composition of superior courts in particular proceedings:
Provided that no appeal shall be decided by the Supreme Court unless the court hearing the appeal consists of at least three Judges, of whom at least one is a Judge of the Supreme Court; and no question whether an enactment was in excess of the parts conferred on parliament by or under the Constitution shall be decided by the Supreme Court unless the Court considering the question comprises at least three Judges of the Supreme Court.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
In keeping with the requirement of the said article 43 a provision was in fact made by law in section 7 of the Courts Act, 1960 (C.A. 9), as follows:
“7 (1) The Supreme Court when exercising appellate jurisdiction, whether civil or criminal, or any other jurisdiction shall be deemed to be a duly constituted bench if such court comprises three or five of the Judges of the Supreme Court:
Provided that — (a) such Court shall be deemed to be a duly constituted bench, notwithstanding that it includes a Judge of the High Court temporarily invited by the Chief Justice to sit on such bench or a person appointed under the Judicial Service Act, 1960, not being a judicial or executive officer;
(b) such Court shall be deemed to be a duly constituted bench, notwithstanding any vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice or any other Judge, so, however, that there are at least three Judges to constitute a proper bench; and (c) the preceding provisions of this section shall not be construed to be in derogation of the powers conferred upon a single Judge under this Act.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
It is note worthy that the term “full bench” and “ordinary bench”
[p.80] of [1981] GLR 24 appeared for the first time in this year, and this structural design of a two-tier hierarchy of the superior courts, consisting of the Court of Appeal and High Court, continued until the promulgation of the Constitution, 1969 on 22 August 1969. On that date the two-tier hierarchy of the judiciary was abolished and an entirely novel scheme spelt out in article 102 (4) of the Constitution, 1969 came into force, namely:
“(4) The Judiciary shall consist of the Supreme Court of Ghana, the Court of Appeal and the High Court of Justice which shall be the superior courts of record and which shall constitute one Superior Court of Judicature, and such other inferior and traditional Courts as Parliament may by law establish.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
The Supreme Court thus established by the Constitution, 1969, was a new creation but the Court of Appeal was a successor to the Court of Appeal in existence before the Constitution, 1969, came into force. Article 109 (1) and (2) of this Constitution provided:
“109. (1) The Court of Appeal shall consist of (a) the Chief Justice;
(b) not less than five Justices of the Court of Appeal; and (c) such other Justices of the Superior Court of Judicature as the Chief Justice may, for the determination of any particular cause or matter by writing under his hand, request to sit in the Court of Appeal for such period as the Chief Justice may specify or until the request is withdrawn.
(2) The Court of Appeal shall be duly constituted by any three Justices thereof and when so constituted the most senior of such Justices shall preside.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
The provisions of article 109 (1) and (2) were repeated in section 9 (1) and (3) respectively of the Courts Act, 1971. The composition and constitution of the new Supreme Court were set down in article 103 and on 22 September 1971, the Parliament of the Second Republic passed the Courts Acts, 1971, (Act 372), which introduced in its section 1 some new provisions additional to those in article 103 as follows:
“1. (1) In accordance with article 103 of the Constitution the Supreme Court shall consist of—
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(a) the Chief Justice who shall be the President thereof;
(b) not less than six other Justices of the Supreme Court; and
(c) such other Justices of the Superior Court of Judicature not being more in number than the number of Justices of the Supreme Court sitting as such, as the Chief Justice may, for the determination of any particular cause or matter (including an interlocutory matter) by writing under his hand, request to sit in the Supreme Court for such period as the Chief Justice may specify or until the request is withdrawn.
(2) Subject to subsection (3) of this section the composition of the Supreme Court shall be deemed to be lawful and the said Court shall have power to discharge its functions notwithstanding the occurrence of any vacancy in its membership as prescribed by subsection (1) of this section.
(3) The Supreme Court shall, except as otherwise provided in this Act and in article 108 of the Constitution be duly constituted for the despatch of its business by not less than five Justices thereof.
(4) The Chief Justice shall preside at the sittings of the Supreme Court and in his absence the most senior of the Justices of the Supreme Court as constituted for the time being shall preside.
(5) The determination of any question before the Supreme Court shall be according to the opinion of the majority of the bench hearing the case.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
This new court system operated in this country from 22 August 1969, but on 5 September 1972, the National Redemption Council passed a Decree, the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101), which came into force on 13 September 1972 by which it abolished the Supreme Court, which it had previously continued in existence by the Proclamation, 1972. By section 2 of that Decree, it was provided, inter alia, that “for every reference to the ‘Supreme Court’ in any enactment there shall be substituted a reference to the ‘Court of Appeal.’” Article 103 and 109 of the suspended Constitution, 1969, which had been saved by the proclamation, 1972, were revoked and section 9 of the Courts Act, 1971, was in effect repealed. New provisions, clearly additional to the provisions contained in section 1 of the Courts Act, 1971, providing for the constitution
[p.82] of [1981] GLR 24 and jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal so set up, were enacted in section 3 of N.R.C.D. 101 as follows:
“3. (1) For the purposes of this section the Court of Appeal shall be duly constituted for the despatch of its business by five Justices thereof (in this section referred to as a ‘full bench’).
(2) A full bench of the Court of Appeal shall have jurisdiction— (a) to review and determine a decision of the Court of Appeal or any Justice or Division thereof upon a question of law, where such Justice or Division gives leave for such review and determination;
(b) to review and determine any other decision of the Court of Appeal or any Justice or Division thereof, where it appears to a full bench of such Court that there has been a miscarriage of justice;
(c) to hear and determine any matter in respect of which the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction under section 22 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370) by virtue of section 2 of this Decree;
(d) to hear and determine any appeal which had been duly filed with the Supreme Court before the commencement of this Decree.
(3) The jurisdiction conferred by this section on a full bench of the Court of Appeal shall not be exercisable other than by a full bench of such Court.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
I think at this stage in its history the combined effect of N.R.C.D. 101 and Act 372 on the constitution of the Court of Appeal for the despatch of its business is that although a full bench has been given special jurisdiction and it must needs sit with five judges, an ordinary bench in exercising its jurisdiction sits with three or more judges and this conclusion in relation to the ordinary bench is justifiable in view of section 3 (1) of N.R.C.D. 101 and by virtue of section 1 (3) of Act 372 as amended by section 5 (2) of NRCD 101. The said section 1 (3) of Act 372 as so amended reads:
“(3) The Court of Appeal shall, except as otherwise provided in this Act and in article 108 of the Constitution, be duly constituted for the despatch of its business by not less than three Justices thereof.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
The reason for the use of the expression “not less than three
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Justices” is quite clear from a study of the scheme introduced by N.R.C.D. 101. The one Court of Appeal is now given jurisdiction to sit in a panel of three, four or five for the conduct of its ordinary business, but when that business falls within its jurisdiction as is provided in section 3 (2) of N.R.C.D. 101, then it can only sit with a bench of five, no more no less. And this position continued until 24 September 1979 when the Constitution of the Third Republic, our present Constitution, came into force.
That Constitution re-introduced the Supreme Court and thus a three-tier superior court system that had existed under the Constitution, 1969, before its subsequent abolition on 13 September 1972. The composition and constitution of the Supreme Court as are contained in articles 103 (1) (a) and (b), (2) and (3) of the Constitution, 1969, are in substance, form and wording practically the same as article 115 (1) (a) and (b), (2) and (3) respectively of the Constitution, 1979.
The modalities also of the composition and constitution of the Court of Appeal as are contained in article 109 of the Constitution, 1969, are in all respect identical with the provision in article 121 of the Constitution, 1979. Thus articles 109 (1) and (2) of the Constitution, 1969, are the same provisions introduced as articles 121 (1) and (2) respectively of the Constitution, 1979.
The study of this history from 1948 to 1981 does show that the law-makers have been singularly familiar with these expressions:
(1) “shall be duly constituted … of an uneven number not being less than three judges”: see section 13 of SI 1330 of 1948; section 6 of Ordinance No. 17 of 1957 and section 4 of Act No. 8 of 1957.
(2) “consist of the Chief Justice and not more than two Justices”: see section 4 of Act No. 8 of 1957.
(3) “at least three Judges”: see proviso to article 43 of the Constitution, 1960; section 7 (1) (b) of Courts Act, 1960 (CA 9); and paragraph 6 (1) (b) of N.L.C.D. 84.
(4) “duly constituted bench … so, however, that there are at least three Judges to constitute a proper bench”: see section 7 (1) (b) of C.A. 9.
(5) “duly constituted . . . by not less than three Justices”: see section 1 (3) of Act 372 as amended by section 5 (2) of N.R.C.D. 101.
(6) “duly constituted by five Justices”: see section 3 (1) of N.R.C.D. 101.
(7) “duly constituted . . . by not less than five Justices”: see article 103 (2) of Constitution; 1969; section 1 (3) of Act 372; and article 115 (2) of Constitution, 1979.
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(8) “consist of . . . five Justices”: see paragraph 6 (1) (b) of N.L.C.D. 84.
(9) consist of . . . three Justices”: see article 116 (5) (a) of Constitution, 1969; paragraph 6 (1) (a) of NLCD 84 and article 128 (8) (a) of the Constitution, 1979.
(10) “consist of . . . not less than . . .”: see article 109 (1) (b) of Constitution, 1969; section 9 (1) (b) of Act 372 and article 121 (1) (b) of the Constitution, 1979.
(11) “duly constituted by any three Justices”: see article 109 (2) of the Constitution, 1969, section 9 (3) of Act 372; and article 121 (2) of Constitution, 1979.
(12) “constituted by three Justices”: see article 108 (b) of the Constitution, 1969; and article 120 (a) and (b) of the Constitution, 1979.
The persistent use of these expressions for 33 years and the varying forms in which they are formulated raise questions as to their precise meanings: For instance do “consist of . . . five Justices” in paragraph 6 (1) of N.L.C.D. 84 and “consist of . . . not less than five Justices” in section 9 (1) (b) of Act 372 have the same meaning, and if not, what is the difference in meaning? Or take the expression “duly constituted . . . by five Justices” as is used in section 3 (1) of N.R.C.D. 101 and “duly constituted . . . by not less than five Justices” as appears in article 103 (2) of the Constitution, 1969, section 1 (3) of Act 372 and article 115 (2) of the Constitution, 1979; do they convey the same idea? Or again take “duly constituted by any three Justices” as appears in article 121 (2) of Constitution, 1979, and “duly constituted . . . by not less than three Justices” as appears in section 1 (3) of Act 372 as amended; are they synonymous? By what canons of interpretation does one resolve these questions?
For over one hundred years after the Americans had adopted their Constitution, the language of their Constitution was read in the light of the common law and the common law principles of interpretation were freely resorted to, and they continue to be so used in interpreting their Constitution subject, of course, to the American experience. In 1897 Mr. Justice Gray of the American Supreme Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark 169 U.S. 649 at p. 654 (1898) restated and appraised the position, “The language of the Constitution as has been well said, could not be understood without reference to the common law.”
The reason is obvious: The American Constitution was fashioned on a common law foundation and it sprouted and was nurtured and encouraged to thrive and grow in a common law environment. Our Constitution, on a close reading, would seem to have similar claims subject, of course, to any contrary course indicated by our Constitution and our experience.
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Consider the specific incorporation of the common law into our Constitution by article 4 thereof and the contemplated influence of the common law cannot be doubted.
Under the canons of interpretation as have been developed by the common law and expostulated by the great masters of that discipline, there is a general presumption, but only a presumption, that the same word or phrase or expression bears the same meaning throughout the same statute or document and that a change in wording, is a further presumption of a change in meaning. This principle is an old one indeed. Ten years before the reception of the common law into the body of our law in Hadley v. Perks (1866) L.R. 1 Q.B. 444 at p.457 the principle as we were to inherit it, was succinctly stated by that great master of the common law, Blackburn J.:
“It has been a general rule for drawing deeds and other legal documents from the earliest times, which one is taught when one first becomes a pupil to a conveyancer, never to change the form of words unless you are going to change the meaning, and it would be as well if those who are engaged in the preparation of acts of parliament would bear in mind that that is the real principle of construction. But in drawing acts of parliament, the legislature, as it would seem, to improve the graces of the style, and to avoid using the same words over and over again, constantly change them.”
As has been consistently maintained by all the authorities without exception this principle of construction is inapplicable if it appears that the law-giver or the draftsman may be trying to avoid inelegance occasioned by repetition rather than change of meaning: see the views of Lord Denning L.J. in Hopes v. Hopes [1949] P. 227 at p. 237, C.A., Lord Goddard C.J. in Lines v. Hersom [1951] 2 K.B. 682 at p. 686, where he pointed out that modern statutes as they pass through the parliamentary process may end up as the product of many minds and this may weaken the presumption that the change in wording connotes a change in meaning. As he put it at p. 686 referring to the British Parliament:
“A statute as we know, has to pass through committee in both Houses of Parliament and amendments are moved from time to time, and it is quite possible to find that an amendment which is moved to an early section in the statute may be worded in one way, while an amendment which is moved to a later section having exactly the same idea is worded in another way; but it does not at all follow that the legislature intends something different because the language of the two sections is not exactly the same.”
[p.86] of [1981] GLR 24
Having adverted my mind to this principle, I ask myself whether there is a difference between the expression “duly constituted… by not less than three Justices” and that of “duly constituted . . . by any three Justices?” The two expressions have prima facie different meanings. If from a basket of mangoes, A speaking truly says he has “not less than three” of the mangoes in his bag and B also speaking truly says he has “any three” of the mangoes in his bag, the person who equates “any three” with “not less than three” will get a rude shock when he discovers that B has seven mangoes and C has three mangoes and both have spoken the truth. My brother Adade J.S.C. gives a very simple and graphic example of a school child asked to bring “any three” chairs.
I think the child will never bring more than three chairs, much more bring five chairs. “Not less than three” without more can on no logical or pragmatic ground be equated with “any three.” Such an endeavour will do violence to language and be an affront to commonsense. If the expression had been “not more than three nor less than three,” that can be said to mean “any three” and the change in wording is obviously for elegance of language. In the absence of any further consideration “any three” is clearly not the same as “not less than three.”
To hold otherwise is an abuse of language for the language of one does not permit the equation, and as there is clearly a change of expression so a presumption arises of a change in meaning. Can this presumption be resisted by a contention that the law-giver wanted to avoid inelegant language? I think not. That will be a cynical and rather fanciful claim too extravagant to be taken seriously.
No doubt the Constitution, 1979, is a product of many minds. Is there any evidence or any indication within or extraneous to the Constitution which would lead to the conclusion that their several efforts were calculated to provide or inadvertently provided that “duly constituted by any three Justices” was intended to mean “duly constituted by not less than three Justices?” I find none. What then are the respective meaning of the two expressions, distinct and different, as I have held they must be?
I take first “duly constituted by any three Justices”: “duly” means “properly” that is “in a right or suitable manner” and “constitute” means “to form or make up” or “ to give being to.” Any standard dictionary will confirm these meanings. The central concept in constituting anything is bringing together the elements that compose it; “duly constituted by any three Justices” in relation to the Court of Appeal therefore means the court is properly a Court of Appeal when it is made up of any three justices. Logically therefore if it is made up of more justices or less justices, it may very well be the
[p.87] of [1981] GLR 24 Court of Appeal, but it is not a properly made up one; it is not a duly constituted one! If these meanings are rejected then with the new constitutional order, far from damping it, we give a new lease of life to the cynicism of the critics of our judicial system.
I now take “duly constituted by not less than three Justices.” This means the court is a proper Court of Appeal when its members are three or more but never when less. If the expression had contained five instead of three then the court would be a proper court when its members are five or more but never less.
This then brings us to the membership of the Court of Appeal that was to exercise the functions of the Supreme Court under section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979. The section reads:
“3. (1) The required number of Justices for a duly constituted Supreme Court as established under clause (5) of article 114 of this Constitution shall be appointed within twelve months after the coming into force of this Constitution, and until the appointments are made, the Court of Appeal as established under that clause shall perform the functions of the Supreme Court contained in articles 51, 117 and 118 only of this Constitution.”
Clearly it is the Court of Appeal established under article 114 (5) of the Constitution, 1979, that was authorised to exercise the functions of the Supreme Court contained in articles 51, 117 and 118 only of the Constitution. The modality for a constituted Court of Appeal it will be recalled, is contained in article 121 (2), “The Court of Appeal shall be duly constituted by any three Justices thereof and when so constituted the most senior of the Justices shall preside.” (The emphasis is mine.) It was said in the majority decision at p. 41 that:
“If it had been the intention of the law-makers to confine the exercise of the special jurisdiction created and conferred by section 3 (1) of the First Schedule of the Constitution on the Court of Appeal to a ‘duly constituted court of three members only ..’ no court the phrase ‘Court of Appeal as duly constituted’ would have been used in section 3 (1) instead of ‘Court of Appeal as established’.”
I am unable to follow this reasoning. Having clearly set out in article 121 (2) of the Constitution itself, the constitution of the Court of Appeal, I cannot see the need to repeat its constitution again. The argument is clearly untenable and the reasoning is faulty. Surely, the Court of Appeal as established under article 114 (5) is used in clear contra-distinction to the Court of Appeal existing under the old order. In any case as the majority conceded, the full bench of the
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Court of Appeal was abolished by the Constitution. I cannot see how they can by this argument permit the defendant to resuscitate it and thus in effect defy the Constitution.
In my considered opinion only three of the judges can constitutionally compose a lawful court. If the framers of the Constitution intended that any number exceeding three can also lawfully constitute a court, I cannot understand why they did not provide that there should be “at least three justices” or “not less than three justices” as for example, “The Court of Appeal shall be duly constituted by not less than three Justices thereof and when so constituted the most senior of the Justices shall preside.” This will certainly achieve such purpose and it is a devise they are familiar with and which have been used time and time again for over 30 years from 1948 to 1979. It is my view that a Court of Appeal sitting with more than three justices thereof is a court unknown to the Constitution, 1979, and it is therefore not a lawful court within the contemplation of the present Constitution. Its deliberations will consequently be logically a nullity and its decisions by the canons of logic also void.
I am reminded of the classic statement of the great American jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes in his famous book The Common Law at p. 1 where he said, “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.” Commenting incisively on this statement another equally great and eminent American judge and jurist, Benjamin Cardozo, in his equally famous book The Nature of the Judicial Process at p. 33, reminded us:
“But Holmes did not tell us that logic is to be ignored when experience is silent. I am not to mar the symmetry of the legal structure by the introduction of inconsistencies and irrelevancies and artificial exceptions unless for some sufficient reason, which will commonly be some consideration of history or custom or policy or justice. Lacking such a reason, I must be logical . . .”
I fear the reasoning of the majority opinion equating “any three” with “not less than three” contains inconsistencies, irrelevancies and artificial exceptions. It ignores logic for expediency but is there any sufficient reason, why logic must give way to expediency?
In an attempt to dislodge logic, an argument was advanced on behalf of the defendant that under the Constitution, 1969, the Court of Appeal, the predecessor of the Court of Appeal under the Constitution, 1979, sat in fifteen cases with a panel in each case of five justices at a time when the Constitution, 1969, provided for three justices sitting and therefore a practice has grown up which must be considered to have legalised the empanelling of five justices to constitute the Court of Appeal under the present Constitution instead
[p.89] of [1981] GLR 24 of the three justices specifically provided for.
It seems to me that argument ought not to be countenanced. Apart from the fact that it was not shown that objections were taken to the composition of those courts for the question of the legality of their constitution to be resolved, the argument is to the effect that a practice can run counter to a clear constitutional provision and receive the collective sanction of the judiciary. I must emphatically dissent from this. I can understand the argument in the case of a practice not specifically provided for by the Constitution, 1979, or statute, a practice not impugned specifically by the Constitution or statute; such a practice, if forged by the courts for the efficient administration of justice and indulged in for a reasonable time, will pass off as good law.
Indeed we have done that before: We have in practice adopted the judges rules propounded by the English judges in 1912. We have no statutory or constitutional basis for the adoption. They do not contravene any provisions of our laws and Constitution. But a practice that challenges our Constitution, our fundamental law, must be roundly condemned and strongly repudiated. It cannot exist in our legal system.
Any other conclusion which will establish the proposition, sponsored by counsel for the defendant, that some persons or institutions or authorities under the Constitution can introduce practices which are inconsistent with or in contravention of provisions of our Constitution but which must nevertheless override the said provisions, is fallacious and clearly subversive of our constitutional order.
Even laws inconsistent with provisions of the Constitution are to the extent of the inconsistency declared void and of no effect by article 1 (2) of the Constitution. How then can acts of individuals, not even the legislature, laying pretentious claims to override the Constitution, fare better? In my view there is no jurisdiction in this court or in its practice to legalise any act of any individual no matter his status, or any Act of Parliament which is inconsistent with the Constitution. The whole foundation of our jurisdiction under article 2 (1) of the Constitution, is a complete and categoric rejection of this delusive claim of the defendant in as clear a constitutional language as can be devised.
The majority opinion in this case came to a contrary conclusion. It rightly pointed out at p.40 that, “comparing the language of article 211 (2) with that of article 115 (2) one detects a change” and then set out to find whether it was intended to convey a different intention on the part of the law-makers; it drew attention to the similar wording in articles 103 (2) and 109 (2) of the Constitution, 1969, and then without more, unless I misunderstand them, came to the startling conclusion at p. 41 that:
[p.90] of [1981] GLR 24
“ . . . the language used in both Constitutions to prescribe the due constitution of the Supreme Court defines a minimum quorum without fixing the maximum; whereas the words employed in both constitutions for the definition of a duly constituted Court of Appeal provides for the courts quorum simpliciter. The maximum number of members who can sit on the Court of Appeal has not been specified. It has been left deliberately open.”
They then held further at p. 43:
“It is also undeniable that in the past, statute has never limited or prescribed the maximum quorum for the highest court, though it has been the practice to specify the minimum quorum.”
This conclusion is unfortunate as it draws a sharp distinction between a so-called minimum quorum and a so-called maximum quorum. The concepts of minimum quorum and maximum quorum are an aberration. They are impossible concepts and contradictions in terms. A quorum as any standard English dictionary will show is: “a minimum number of persons necessary for transaction of business in any body”: see Chamber’s Twentieth Century Dictionary (1964 ed.).
There is therefore no such thing in the English language as a “minimum quorum” or “maximum quorum.” The conclusion by this device that “duly constituted by any three Justices” means the same as “not less than three Justices,” is without any doubt whatsoever clearly non sequitur as it utterly failed to point to the legal principle which enabled the legal presumption that a change in wording connotes a change in meaning to be resisted. The conclusion has obviously been arrived at by conjuring up non-existent so-called “maximum quorum” and “minimum quorum”; clearly this is untenable. These twins “maximum quorum” and minimum quorum” are without doubt whatsoever unable to make “any three Justices” to be equal to “not less than three Justices.” I am afraid I cannot subscribe to these impossible and illogical notions.
Furthermore the reasoning of the majority rested the empanelling of five instead of three also to: “convenience and prudence if not strict logic.” I fear the trinity: convenience, prudence and even logic can never override clear constitutional provisions. They will be usurpers and I am therefore unable to accept their pretensions as I have been unable to accept another pretender – the alleged practice in fifteen cases, eleven or twelve years old, said to date from 1969, by which it is said the erstwhile transitional Court of Appeal of the Constitution, 1969, sat with five and not three justices as the former Constitution provided, thus setting a precedent which we are supposed to follow.
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Perhaps the examination of the proper approach adopted in other jurisdictions which I have conducted may be helpful. The examination does show that if a precedent is set which is clearly legally wrong, the proper thing to do is to overrule it: It is for this reason that the American Supreme Court in Leisy v. Hardin 135 U.S. 100 overruled Peirce v. New Hempshire 5 How 504 a decision which was 42 years old. In Graves v. New York ex rel O’Keefe 306 U.S. 466, the court overruled Collector v. Day 11 Wall 113, a decision 68 years old; and Swift v. Tyson 16 Pet 1 which was then 95 years old was overruled in Erle R. Co. v. Tompkins 304 U.S. 64 by the United States Supreme Court.
Coming to more familiar grounds. The House of Lords in Bowman v. Secular Society Ltd. [1917] A.C. 406, overruled a long line of cases going back to Briggs v. Hartley (1850) 19 L.J. Ch. 416. In Bourne v.
Keane [1919] A.C. 815, H.L. many cases going back to the decision of Lord Cottenham in 1835 in West v. Shuttleworth (1835) 2 My. & K. 684 were overturned. In Perrin v. Morgan [1943] A.C. 399, H.L. the rule of over 200 years old in Shelmer’s case (1725) Gilb.Ch. 200 was finally abolished by the House of Lords.
The instances can be multiplied. The Privy Council has also on occasions done the same thing. Our alleged decisions are less than twelve years old. They were decided between 1969 and 1971 only. They flouted the Constitution, 1969; they dare not defy our present Constitution. In fact, since they have no ratio decidendi at all they have no claim to precedent and therefore they must be overruled in the respectful traditions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the British House of Lords as cases decided per incuriam for lack of jurisdiction.
I hold therefore that the empanelling of five judges to sit in the Court of Appeal to hear the case of Tuffuor v. Attorney-General is unconstitutional and cannot be justified by any alleged practice. By the analogy of the directive principle in article 1 (2), the acts and deliberations of such a court together with its decisions are null and void and of no effect.
There was an argument that the judges who sat on the case committed serious judicial impropriety, bias and prejudgment. No doubt this was the reason why the plaintiff joined the Court of Appeal as the second defendant and in his action sought the second declaration in terms of his argument. He must have realised that as against the justices he is completely and peremptorily restrained by the language of article 114 (9) from maintaining an action. The article provides:
“(9) A Justice of the Superior Court of Judicature shall not be liable to any action or suit for any matter or thing done by him in the performance of his function as such Justice.”
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Faced with this constitutional bar, the plaintiff avoids the impasse by proceeding against the Court of Appeal and dropping the justices of appeal. We have already decided that the Court of Appeal is not a proper person to be sued in terms of article 2 and we have accordingly struck out the Court of Appeal from these proceedings, but we reserved our reasons. Speaking for myself, I think there is a very simple reason why the Court of Appeal cannot be a defendant in suits under article 2 of the Constitution.
The argument pressed on us by counsel for the plaintiff is that he was proceeding against the court because the court had committed improprieties. He pointed out that the Court of Appeal has functions to perform and he argued that if it contravened the Constitution in the course of performing its functions, a plaintiff is entitled under article 2 to mount an action for a declaration. Now let us assume that the plaintiff is right and that he can proceed against the Court of Appeal but not its members. Assuming that he succeeds in an action and has a declaration against the Court of Appeal with a consequential order or direction from the Supreme Court.
Suppose the order or direction were not obeyed, the Court of Appeal would be guilty of high crime under article 2 (4) and the punishment, under article 2 (5), is “imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years” and the convict “shall not be eligible for election, or for appointment, to any public office for a period of ten years beginning from the date of the expiration of the term of imprisonment.”
It is difficult to imagine how the Court of Appeal can go to prison and suffer the penalties prescribed by the Constitution. The Court of Appeal is to be ineligible for elections or appointment to public office. This is so preposterous and so extravagant a result as to be a clear indication that the Court of Appeal is not a person within the language of article 2 (1) to be made a defendant in a suit under the said article. It is in fact considerations of this nature that led Mr. Justice Black of the U.S. Supreme Court in Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson 303 U.S. 77 (1938) and later Mr. Justice Douglas in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander 337 U.S. 562 (1949) to hold in dissenting judgments that as a matter of language the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is applicable to human beings and does not contemplate corporations. Clearly the Court of Appeal cannot be a defendant within the language of article 2. It is also difficult to imagine the Court of Appeal bringing an action as a plaintiff for a declaration, but as this matter does not arise here, it is not necessary to make any pronouncement on it. In the result, this is the reason for my concurring in striking out the Court of Appeal from this suit and for this reason it is my opinion that the plaintiff
[p.93] of [1981] GLR 24 will not be entitled to the second declaration he seeks, in the form in which it is formulated.
I think a fundamental impediment to the grant of the second declaration as formulated is that it will be an indirect way of circumventing the absolute or mandatory constitutional prohibition of suits or actions against justices of the superior courts and I take it to be the law that a result which the law directly and specifically impugns cannot be supported if it is achieved by a circuitous and indirect mode.
This reasoning leads me to a consideration of the nature of the action which the plaintiff in the Tuffuor case brought against the Attorney-General. Substantially that suit in effect is for a declaration (as formulated by the plaintiff) that:
“The…nomination by the President of the Republic of Fred Kwasi Apaloo for approval by Parliament of his appointment as Chief Justice of the Republic and member of the Supreme Court and his purported vetting and rejection by Parliament on 16 August 1980 were each acts effected in contravention of the Constitution and laws of the Republic and were therefore null and void and of no effect.”
What is it really which the plaintiff seeks here? It is difficult to disguise it. It is beyond question that he seeks two declarations: (1) that the President acted unconstitutionally in the performance of his official duty in purporting to nominate Fred Kwasi Apaloo for office of Chief Justice; and (2) that Parliament in its deliberation on the matter acted unconstitutionally by purporting to vet and reject the nomination. As I see it the only two institutions whose conduct or acts are being called in question are the President and Parliament. The inference is clear that in issuing the writ against the Attorney-General and the Speaker, the intention was to have the Attorney-General to appear for the President and the Speaker for Parliament. I am unable to draw any other inference as to who the defendants intended to be reached by the action.
Indeed an examination of the second declaration which the plaintiff in the Tuffuor case asked for in his writ clears the point beyond peradventure. The said declaration therefore needs to be repeated for emphasis:
“the purported nomination by the President of the Republic of Fred Kwasi Apaloo for approval by Parliament of his appointment as the Chief Justice of the Republic and member of the Supreme Court and his purported vetting and rejection by Parliament as such on 16 August 1980 were each acts effected in
[p.94] of [1981] GLR 24 contravention of the Constitution and laws of the Republic and were therefore all null and void and of no effect.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
The Attorney-General and the Speaker were merely nominal defendants, and thus no acts of theirs are being called in question. It is rather the acts of the President and Parliament which the plaintiff was challenging in the Tuffuor case. If that is so, I can understand the reason why the plaintiff chose his forum squarely and specifically as the Supreme Court. His writ was filed in the Supreme Court; he invoked, inter alia, the original jurisdiction under article 2 thereof and he sought declarations which only the Supreme Court can grant under article (2) 1. Is there any other court in the hierarchy of our courts which can grant the declarations he seeks under article 2 (1)? I think not. Yet the defendant, contrary to article 2 of the Constitution and without assigning any reasons, apparently suo motu put the case before a full bench of the Court of Appeal. It is said that he is right, I think the Constitution says he is wrong.
The express exclusion of the declaratory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, from the jurisdictional matters listed in section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions, shows clearly that article 2 jurisdiction ought never to be exercised by the Court of Appeal either directly or indirectly. Thus Best C.J. in Churchill v. Crease (1828) 5 Bing 177 at p. 180 said.:
“I should have thought…that where a general intention is expressed, and the act expresses also a particular intention incompatible with the general intention, the particular intention is to be considered in the nature of an exception.”
Applied to the respective jurisdictions of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, it is clear that the Court of Appeal was never intended to assume jurisdiction under article 2 (1). In the Tuffuor case the court completely accepted this position and held that it could not exercise jurisdiction under article 2 (1). In the light of the court’s own holding, let us consider how it dealt with jurisdictional bar in relation to Parliament. The court in the course of hearing the Tuffuor case expressed its inability to adjudicate on the matter involving Parliament and its authority for declining jurisdiction and striking off Parliament represented by the Speaker from the suit, was conceded by it to be article 96 of the Constitution which provides,
“There shall be freedom of speech, debate and proceedings in Parliament and that freedom shall not be impeached or questioned in any Court or place out of Parliament.” Article 91 (1) of the Constitution also provides that, “Subject to the provisions of this
[p.95] of [1981] GLR 24
Constitution, Parliament may regulate its procedure.” Having regard, inter alia, to these provisions the Court of Appeal in the Tuffuor case held at pp. 650-651:
“Of particular importance to us are the provisions of article 96 of the Constitution. They confer on Parliament freedom of speech, of debate and of proceedings in Parliament. The article also states categorically: ‘that freedom shall not be impeached or questioned in any Court or place out of Parliament.’ The courts cannot therefore inquire into the legality or illegality of what happened in Parliament. In so far as Parliament has acted by virtue of the powers conferred upon it by the provisions of article 91 (1), its actions within Parliament are a closed book.”
It seems to me that the statement that the court cannot inquire into the legality or illegality of what happened in Parliament is too wide to be nonchalantly accepted without any qualifications. There has to be some qualifications. It is not necessary to consider the matter for the purpose of this case but I fear I must protest. Surely it is freedom of speech, of debate and of proceedings and no more which our Constitution seeks to protect. What if murder is committed in the course of proceedings, will that too be a closed book? This and other matters which it is not necessary to analyse for the purpose of this decision leads me to doubt the correctness of the entire reasoning.
I prefer to adopt the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court in Tenney v. Brandhove 341 U.S. 367 (1951), when he said at pp. 381-382 of a similar provision contained in article 1 (6) of the U.S. Constitution:
“I agree with the opinion of the Court as a statement of general principles governing the liability of legislative committees and members of the legislatures. But I do not agree that all abuses of legislative committees are solely for the legislative body to police.”
Consider what happened in the Tuffuor case. The court having held emphatically that it had no jurisdiction to make declarations under article 2 (1) and while maintaining that it has also no power to inquire into what happened in Parliament, the assembly of the people’s representatives, nevertheless made declarations that the vetting and the rejection which happened in Parliament are unlawful. Clearly it has exercised power under article 2 (1) and has inquired into what happened in Parliament and saying that what happened in Parliament is a closed book is merely paying lip-service to article 96 of the Constitution. It has done the very things it professes it could not do and should not be done!
[p.96] of [1981] GLR 24
This may very well be an unnecessary political entanglement. It was Mr. Justice Frankfurter of the American Supreme Court, who in his dissenting judgment in Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186 (1962) indicated why unnecessary political confrontation must be avoided by courts. As he put it at p. 267:
“The Court’s authority – possessed of neither the purse nor the sword — ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court’s complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political settlements.”
Although I must not be taken as agreeing with every word in the reasoning of the Court of Appeal regarding Parliament’s participation as a defendant in the Tuffuor case, nevertheless it does substantially indicate the consideration which impelled the court to renounce jurisdiction and to strike out the Speaker as a defendant. Having regard to this approach what ought to be the effect of article 44 (9) of the Constitution. The article reads:
“(9). Without prejudice to the provisions of article 2 of this Constitution, and subject to the operation of the prerogative writs, the President shall not, while in office, be liable to proceedings in any Court for the performance of his functions, or for any act done or omitted to be done, or purported to have been done or purporting to be done, in the performance of his functions, under this Constitution or any other law.”
It seems to me that in the regime of our new constitutional order, all our courts with the exception of the Supreme Court, are mandatorily prohibited by article 44 (9) from calling into question, the acts or purported acts of the President when they do not involve breach of fundamental human rights or the operation of prerogative writs. In this case, the complaint of the plaintiff would seem to be that the defendant breached article 44 (9) of the Constitution, 1979, by empanelling a Court of Appeal to question such acts in the circumstance of the case.
I think his complaint is unanswerable. By article 44 (9) only the Supreme Court, the highest court in the land, can make declarations affecting presidential action. This it seems to me is the only way to ensure the dignity of the Presidency and secure the harmonious operation of the new dispensation.
Operating under a constitutional regime somewhat analogous to ours, the American Supreme Court described the office of the President in terms, I would wish to think, apply equally to ours. Speaking for the court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343 U.S.
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579 (1952) the famous steel seizure case, Mr. Justice William Douglas said at p. 633:
“The great office of President is not a weak and powerless one. The President represents the people and is their spokesman in domestic and foreign affairs. The office is respected more than any other in the land. It gives a position of leadership that is unique. The power to formulate policies and mould opinion inheres in the Presidency and conditions our national life.”
Under our constitutional scheme, he is the Head of State, Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; and he takes precedence over all other persons in Ghana. It is in this light that one can understand the constitutional provision restricting the forum in which his official or purported official actions can be challenged: to the Supreme Court and to no other court. Surely if every court in the judicial hierarchy in every part of the country can exercise judicial power over the Head of State it will undermine the integrity of the Presidency. I hold therefore that under article 44 (9) when the issue has nothing to do with the prerogative writs or fundamental human rights as in the Tuffuor case, then the Supreme Court and only the Supreme Court can exercise judicial power, over the Presidency and if necessary enforce the provisions of the Constitution against him and this exercise is only sanctioned by article 2 of the Constitution.
Consider the declaration which the so-called full bench of the Court of Appeal sitting erroneously as the Supreme Court made in its judgment of 23 September 1980:
“We accordingly declare (c) that … his nomination for consideration and that consideration by the Judicial Council as well as the submission by the incumbent Chief Justice of himself for approval by Parliament were each unlawful under the Constitution.”
Clearly a declaration is here made against the President for his act in nominating the defendant for vetting by Parliament and this act of his has been declared unconstitutional by a court empanelled by the defendant which the Constitution has deliberately deprived of power under article 44 (9) to make such adjudication. Declarations are here being made against persons who are all not parties and who have not been heard and in particular against the President, whose actions the Court of Appeal is debarred by the Constitution from questioning. It is clearly the declaration of the Court of Appeal which is unconstitutional and the act of the defendant in empanelling such a court
[p.98] of [1981] GLR 24 and ignoring the forum specifically chosen by Dr. Tuffuor, is in my view unconstitutional.
In the majority judgment the complaint that the defendant breached article 44 (9) is dismissed summarily on three points: Firstly, it is said that it “sounds in appeal”; secondly, that it is “res inter alios acta”; and thirdly, it is said that “no act or omission” of the defendant “is specified” in the statement of his case. It seems to me that this view completely misconceives the relevance of article 44 (9) and this misconception is singularly significant because the majority decision accepted the true legal position when it held at p. 54 that article 44 (9): “confers a qualified immunity from suits on the President while in office; but significantly saves actions brought under article 2 and by prerogative writ.”
This is perfectly correct and since the complaint is that the empanelling was done by the defendant, then the immunity the majority decision concedes applies. I am therefore unable to understand the “appeal” and “res inter alios” argument. With all due respect I fail completely to appreciate their significance.
I think the Supreme Court has power to consider whether any case cited before it, has been properly decided by a court of competent jurisdiction and the inherent suggestion by the majority decision that the Tuffuor case cannot be so considered, is clearly an error. In my respectful and humble opinion, the majority view although accepting the legal effect of article 44 (9) completely failed to ensure that the Court of Appeal gave effect to it.
Clearly any court, apart from the Supreme Court, that purports to exercise or empanelled to exercise judicial power over the President, whether directly or indirectly, is engaged in a futile and an unconstitutional exercise and its proceedings, adjudication and decision (by virtue of article 44 (9) and the act of the empanelling authority, will be unconstitutional and when such a case comes before this court, we can suo motu vacate the judgment. This is the view and decision of Akufo-Addo C.J., one of the greatest Chief Justices this country has ever known. In Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337 at p. 342, S.C. he said:
“The law, as I have always understood it, is that where a court or a judge gives a judgment or makes an order which it has no jurisdiction to give or make or which is irregular because it is not warranted by any enactment or rule of procedure, such a judgment or an order is void, and the court has an inherent jurisdiction, either suo motu or on the application of the party affected, to set aside the judgment or the order.”
[p.99] of [1981] GLR 24
It seems to me that that is what happened here in the Tuffuor case and we can question and vacate it. The Tuffuor case has been determined by the Court of Appeal ostensibly against the Attorney-General who has not been accused of breaching any constitutional duty. The action clearly was against the President. The forum is wrong and therefore the decision is null and void. This view is consistent with the reasoning which I have already adopted in this case in the course of pointing out why the justices of the Court of Appeal cannot be reached by circuitously suing the Court of Appeal, and consequently, why the Court of Appeal was struck out. As I have already said in this judgment, “A result which the law directly and specifically impugns cannot be supported if it is achieved by circuitous and indirect mode.”
There is, I find in this case a logical dilemma, call it conundrum, blocking and creating in me an impasse to any enthusiastic acceptance of the Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction in the Tuffuor case with equanimity. On this matter I have not succeeded in drawing out any assistance from counsel or any other source and I am beginning to wonder whether mathematics, my first love as a young engineering student, over 30 years ago, is once again at its old tricks playing possum with my peace of mind and attempting to blur my vision.
The problem as I see it is this: At the date when the so-called full bench of the Court of Appeal was empanelled to adjudicate on the Tuffuor case, the members of the Supreme Court who had been appointed following approval by Parliament were four, namely, Mr. Justice Sowah, Mr. Justice Archer, Mr. Justice Anin and Mr. Justice Crabbe. If on that date Mr. Justice Apaloo is accepted as a Justice of the Supreme Court, then the number of justices appointed, he, by the Constitution, and the others, by the President, will be five. In that state of affairs section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, completely deprives the Court of Appeal of jurisdiction to deal with any matter arising under articles 51, 117 and 118 of the Constitution.
Their jurisdiction to adjudicate is constitutionally founded on the number of justices of the Supreme Court being less than five when they proceed to deal with the case. The existence at any point of time of five or more justices of the Supreme Court pre-empts their jurisdiction. Therefore if on the date they assume jurisdiction the defendant is a member of the Supreme Court, then since there will be five Supreme Court judges, they will not have jurisdiction. The majority decision recognises and accepts this position very clearly. In the very first sentence of the majority judgment, my brother Anin J.S.C. writing for the majority says:
[p.100] of [1981] GLR 24
“The case of Tuffuor v. Attorney-General [1980] G.L.R. 637, C.A., sitting as S.C., is unique as being the only one heard by the Court of Appeal under section 3 (1) of the First Schedule to the Constitution, 1979, before that section became spent with the appointment of the required number of justices for a duly constituted Supreme Court.”
I shall deal with this matter again but it seems to me that the majority holding in effect that the existence of five judges of the Supreme Court pre-empts the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal is sound and cannot be assailed. I agree with it.
Now, the existence without doubt of only four members of the Supreme Court, means that if their decision is that Mr. Justice Apaloo is not a Supreme Court judge, then the exercise of jurisdiction is unexceptionable; if their decision, however, is that he is and has been all along, then by their decision, they destroy their jurisdiction. Faced with such a contingency, I have no doubt that the interests of justice demand that the Court of Appeal decline jurisdiction. No court should be put to such a precarious election; it is an invidious and untidy position and it undermines the integrity of the judicial process.
To me the matter is so clear like a logical syllogism that I am at a loss to understand how its implication can possibly be resisted by any conceivable argument. Since they did sit and adjudicated and decided in effect that the defendant is a Supreme Court judge, they in effect destroyed their jurisdiction. Their holding therefore is a holding to the effect that they have no jurisdiction and never had jurisdiction and consequently their decision is null and void and of no effect. I am supported in this view by a holding in the majority decision. My brother Anin J.S.C. writing for the majority says at p.53:
“[T]he fact that certain people held the view at one time that the defendant was not the de jure Chief Justice does not mean that in the eye of the law and on a true construction, of the relevant provisions of the constitution, he was not the de jure Chief Justice at all material times. What the declaratory judgment in the Tuffuor case did was merely to resolve the doubts of the doubting Thomases and to restate what had in the contemplation of the law been the existing constitutional position all along the judgment in effect restated a constitutional fact; it did not create it. The pendency of the Tuffuor case did not affect, and indeed could not have affected, his constitutional position as the Chief Justice.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
This holding is categorically stating that at the relevant time when the Court of Appeal was empanelled, there existed five members of the
[p.101] of [1981] GLR 24
Supreme Court. Under article 3 (1) of the transitional provisions, no Court of Appeal can then be empanelled and by virtue of this holding in the majority judgment, it is clear that the supposed full bench of the Court of Appeal empanelled is an unconstitutional one. I do not know how, in the light of the majority view, this conclusion can be avoided.
This is a constitutional case and I would not wish to decide any issue which has no relevance to any of the declarations sought. Declarations (i), (iii), (iv) and (v) were clearly dependent on the constitutional status and jurisdiction of the court that heard the Tuffuor case. Although declaration (ii) is ostensibly based on the true and proper construction of article 127 (5) of the Constitution, yet it would seem on close examination, to be a declaration sought against the justices who sat in the Tuffuor case, in spite of the constitutional protection which the justices have under article 114 (9) of the Constitution. The plaintiff moreover complains that Mr. Justice Francois was biased because he wrote to Parliament on 20 September before the judgment of 23 September 1980, complaining in effect that in his view “vetting” by Parliament is unconstitutional.
Since this is a constitutional issue and the matter can adequately to dealt with under article 114 (9), I would prefer to avoid a multiplicity of adjudication and rest the matter on the constitutional effect of the said article 114 (9). I note, however, that the majority dealt with the matter and—although clearly on 20 September 1980, Mr. Justice Francois wrote to Parliament expressing his views, before judgment on 23 September 1980, that vetting is unconstitutional—they came to the conclusion that his conduct is unexceptionable.
I am not sure it is right to decide this matter. I think English cases like R. v. Huggins [1895] 1 Q.B. 563;
Cottle v. Cottle [1939] 2 All E.R. 535, D.C. and the view of Lord Denning M.R. in Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon [1969] 1 Q.B. 577 at p. 599, C.A. do show that reasonable suspicion of bias founded on the apprehension of reasonable men aware of the facts, will disqualify a judge from sitting. In this case one of the issues to be tried was whether vetting was constitutional.
I think the matter is not free from doubt, and but for the fact that the majority dealt with the matter I would have been content to leave it alone. In any case since a decision on it will not affect the declarations actually sought, I make no decision apart from merely expressing my doubts on it especially as a declaration ought not to be made which would in effect amount to treating the judge as a defendant contrary to the provisions of article 114 (9) which protects him from suit. Such a declaration without hearing the judge will be unlawful.
[p.102] of [1981] GLR 24
I must say also that in this case having regard to the fact that the President and Parliament would seem to have accepted the position, it would have been expedient to let sleeping dogs lie. On the other hand, constitutional propriety cannot be sacrificed for expediency. Surely any decision that would substitute “any three Justices” for “not less than three Justices” or that will countenance a practice by which five justices sit instead of three as is specifically provided by the Constitution, or that will ignore article 44 (9) is in effect amending the Constitution. The words of a great American judge may here remind us of our responsibility. Mr. Justice Harlan of the United States Supreme Court, in a vigorous dissenting opinion in Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. 533 (1963) elaborated on the proper function of a court like ours in interpreting a Constitution like ours. He said at p. 625:
“The Constitution is an instrument of government, fundamental to which is the premise that in a diffusion of governmental authority lies the greatest promise that this Nation will realize liberty for all its citizens. This Court, limited in function in accordance with that premise, does not serve its high purpose when it exceeds its authority, even to satisfy justified impatience with the slow workings of the political process. For when, in the name of constitutional interpretation, the Court adds something to the Constitution that was deliberately excluded from it, the Court in reality substitutes its views of what should be so for the amending process.”
I cannot help feeling that, since the plaintiff in the Tuffuor case deliberately chose the Supreme Court and asked for a declaration which only the Supreme Court could give, it is the action of the defendant in changing the venue to another court which had no jurisdiction which has given rise to this difficulty.
There is one other feature of the Tuffuor case which also casts grave doubts as to whether the Court of Appeal had, in fact, jurisdiction to entertain that case. The great principle of the common law is that under an adversary system like ours, a plaintiff seeking redress in court, must show that he has locus standi in the suit. There must be actual controversy peculiar to the parties. The plaintiff must show that he has a particular grievance against the defendant over and above the rest of the public and that he is not a mere busybody as the plaintiff in the Tuffuor case seems to be. The locus classicus is the statement of the principle in 1880 by Lord Justice James, a distinguished English judge in Sidebotham’s case (1880) 14 Ch. D. 458 at p. 465, C.A. and the principle was recently affirmed by the House
[p.103] of [1981] GLR 24 of Lords in Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers [1978] A.C. 435.
The principle is well known in all common law jurisdictions where the jurisprudence of the British has had a footing. In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organisation 426 U.S. 26 at p. 37 (1976), Mr. Justice Powell writing for the United States Supreme Court said:
“No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the Constitutional limitation of federal court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies . . . The concept of standing is part of this limitation.”
See also Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S. 83 at p. 98 (1968) and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War 418 U.S. 208 at p. 228 (1974)—all decisions of the United States Supreme Court upholding the concept of locus standi.
If the plaintiff in the Tuffuor case had come to the Supreme Court as he obviously intended, the question of locus standi may perhaps not arise because of the peculiar wording of article 2 (1) of the Constitution. The matter is debatable and I will therefore decline to make any definitive pronouncement on that since it is in any case a hypothetical situation whether the Tuffuor case ought to have been dealt with at the Supreme Court.
I have grave doubts as to whether even if the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction, Tuffuor did have locus standi but as the matter was not argued before us I would also refrain from further pronouncements. My decision, however, based as it is, on lack of jurisdiction has nothing to do with the merits of his case or the status of the defendant.
In all the circumstances of this case and having regard to what to me is an undoubted legal and constitutional position, I would grant declarations (i), (iii), (iv) and (v) but I make no pronouncement on the second declaration as the action can be disposed off without that declaration.
DECISION
Action for a declaration quashing the Court of Appeal decision in Tuffuor v. Attorney-General dismissed.
J. K. E. E.
