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[1981] SLR (CA) 17Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

REPUBLIC vs. ACCRA CIRCUIT COURT; EX PARTE APPIAH [1982-83] GLR 129

6 May 1981 · FRANCOIS JA · ≈ 83 min read

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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v ACCRA CIRCUIT COURT; ex parte APPIAH [1982-83] GLR 129 [1981] SLR (CA) 17
APAREPUBLIC v ACCRA CIRCUIT COURT; ex parte APPIAH [1982-83] GLR 129, [1981] SLR (CA) 17 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v ACCRA CIRCUIT COURT; ex parte APPIAH [1982-83] GLR 129, [1981] SLR (CA) 17 (Ghana Ct. App. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Obeng v. Ampofo, Court of Appeal, Accra, Cyclostyled Judgments, January-June 1958, 143.

(2) Amegbe v. Tepa [1960] G.L.R 7, C.A.

(3) Joseph v. Jebeile Brothers, Court of Appeal, Accra, 5 May 1969, unreported; digested in (1969)

C.C. 98.

(4) R. v. Paddington North and St. Marylebone Rent Tribunal; Ex parte Perry [1956] 1 Q.B. 229;

[1955] 3 W.L.R. 744; [1955] 3 All E.R. 391; 119 J.P. 565; 99 S.J. 816; 53 L.G.R. 670, D.C.

(5) Asor II v. Amegboe [1978] 1 G.L.R. 153, C.A.

(6) Baldwin & Francis Ltd v. Patents Appeal Tribunal [1959] A.C. 663; [1959] 2 W.L.R. 826; [1959] 2 All E.R. 433; 103 S.J. 451; [1959] R.P.C. 221, H.L.

(7) R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw [1952] 1 K.B. 338; [1952] 1 All E.R. 122; [1952] 1 T.L.R. 161; 116 J.P. 54; 96 SJ. 29; 50 L.G.R. 193, C.A. affirming [1951] 1 K.B. 711; [1951] 1 All E.R. 268; [1951] 1 T.L.R. 270; 115 J.P. 79; 95 S.J. 76.

(8) Conway v. Rimmer [1968] A.C. 910; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 998; [1968] 1 All E.R. 874; 112 S.J. 191 reversing [1967] 1 W.L.R. 1031; [1967] 2 All E.R. 1260; 111 S.J. 479; [1967] C.L.Y. 3142, C.A. (9) Anisminic Ltd v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 163;

[1969] 1 All E.R. 208; 113 S.J. 55 reversing [1968] 2 Q.B. 862; [1967] 3 W.L.R. 382; [1967] 3 All E.R. 986; 111 S.J. 374, C.A.

(10) Republic v. Sagoe-Nkansah, Court of Appeal, Accra, 17 February 1981, unreported. (11) Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 W.L.R. 965; 100 S.J. 566, P.C.

(12) Glinski v. Mclver [1962] A.C. 726; [1962] 2 W.L.R. 832; [1962] 1 All E.R. 696; 106 S.J. 261, H.L. affirming [1960] Crim.L.R. 428; [1960] C.L.Y. 1952, C.A. reversing [1959] Crim.L.R. 56; [1959] C.L.Y. 2025.

(13) R. v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd. [1922] A.C. 128; 91 L.J.P.C 146; 127 L.T. 437; 38 T.L.R. 541; 27 Cox C.C. 253, P.C.

(14) R. v. Minister of Health [1939] 1 K.B. 232; [1938] 4 All E.R. 32; 108 L.J.K.B. 27; 159 L.T. 508;

102 J.P. 497; 55 T.L.R. 4; 82 S.J. 869; 37 L.G.R. 1, C.A.

[p.134] of [1982-83] GLR 129 (15) R. v. Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ltd.

[1924] 1 K.B. 171; 93 L.J.K.B. 390; 130 L.T. 164; 88 J.P. 13; 39 T.L.R. 715, 68 S.J. 188, C.A. (16) Matthews, Re; Ex parte Powell (1875) 1 Ch.D. 501; 45 L.J. Boy 100; 34 L.T. 224; 24 W.R. 378, C.A.

(17) Parker, Re; Ex parte Turquand (1885) 14 Q.B.D. 636; 54 L.J.Q.B. 242; 53 L.T. 579; 33 W.R. 437;

1 T.L.R. 284, C.A.

(18) Legatt v. Tollervey (1811) 14 East 302; 104 E.R. 617.

(19) Doe d. Egremont (East) v. Date (1842) 3 A.B. 609; 11 L.J.Q.B. 220; 6 Jur. 990. (20) R. v. Leatham (1861) 3 E & E 658; 30 L.J.Q.B. 205; 3 L.T. 777; 25 J.P. 468; Jur. N.S. 674; 9 W.R.

334; 8 Cox C.C. 498.

(21) Kuruma v. R. [1955] A.C. 197; [1955] 2 W.L.R. 223; [1955] 1 All E.R. 236; 119 J.P. 157; 99 S.J.

73; [1955] Crim.L.R. 339, P.C.

(22) Calcraft v. Guest [1898] 1 Q.B. 759; 67 L.J.Q.B. 505; 78 L.T. 283; 46 W.R. 420; 42 S.J. 343, C.A. (23) Lloyd v. Mostyn (1842) 10 M & W 478; 2 Dowl N.S. 476; 12 L.J. Ex 1; 6 Jur. 974. (24) Myers v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1965] A.C. 1001; [1964] 3 W.L.R. 145; [1964] 2 All E.R. 881; 128 J.P. 481; 108 S.J. 519; 48 Cr.App.Rep. 348, H.L.

(25) Instrumatic Ltd v. Supabrase Ltd. [1969] 1 W.L.R. 519; [1969] 2 All E.R. 131; 113 S.J. 144, C.A. (26) Poyser and Mills’ Arbitration, Re [1964] 2 Q.B. 467; [1963] 2 W.L.R. 1309; [1963] 1 All E.R. 612 sub nom Poyser v. Mills 107 S.J. 115.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the ruling of the High Court, Accra, wherein it affirmed the ruling of the Circuit Court, Accra, admitting certain bank documents in evidence in the trial of the appellant for extortion. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Francois J.A.

COUNSEL

E. D. Kom (Gbeho with him) for the appellant.

A. L. Djabatey, Deputy Attorney-General (C.H.A. Tettey, Solicitor-General, Joyce Asiedu and Perpetual Tuffour with him) for the Republic.

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.

This appeal from the refusal of Anterkyi J. to quash by certiorari, a ruling of an Accra Circuit Court, raises very narrow but important issues on the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323).

[p.135] of [1982-83] GLR 129

The special prosecutor of the special tribunal stood trial at the circuit court on charges of extortion. It was part of the prosecution’s case that certain persons appearing before the special tribunal had been induced to part with sums of money which had gone to swell the accused’s bank account at Barclays Bank International, Cockspur Street, London. Proof was attempted by tendering in evidence five original documents, namely.

(1) Two Barclays Bank International, London, cheques for £100 each, numbered respectively 156773 and 156774.

(2) Giro paying-in-slip dated 12 December 1979 for £1,000.

(3) Giro paying-in-slip dated 11 January 1980 for £10,000.

(4) A bank statement No. 1980/1.

The tender was resisted and this led to a legal wrangle proceeding from the circuit court, through the High Court to this court. It is anybody’s guess whether its force is yet spent.

The thrust of the appellant’s protest was that the prosecution witness who tendered the documents was neither a bank official nor was he connected in any way with the issue of the said documents. As an investigator of crime, he had merely discovered the documents on his desk as a routine incident in the process of investigations. The crux of the contest therefore was whether the witness in those circumstances could validly tender the documents without offending NRCD 323.

Before the circuit court, a lengthy legal argument was advanced by the appellant to demonstrate the error of such a course; the contrary view was pressed with equal enthusiasm by the prosecution. Some sympathy must be expressed for the circuit judge who was inundated by the plethora of legal learning. He chose a course which might have appeared wise to him by being as non-committal in his view of the law as he could, but this only served to fuel the flames of further complaint.

In a very pithy ruling, he decided to admit the documents. He expressed himself as follows:

“I have heard the submission of counsel for the defence in his objection to the tendering of the above documents in evidence. I have also heard the submission of the learned Deputy Attorney-General in reply to the submission in support of the objection by counsel for the defence. It is my humble opinion that the documents be admitted in evidence. I therefore overrule the objection of counsel for the defence. Case to continue.”

It need hardly be observed that the processes of reasoning were not disclosed. Piqued by what may have appeared an off-handed [p.136] of [1982-83] GLR 129 disposal of a matter of considerable legal substance, the appellant commenced certiorari proceedings to test his view of the matter. His stand was formulated on two basic propositions: First, that there was error on the face of the record and second, that the circuit judge had acted in excess of jurisdiction. There is no dispute that these are good grounds for certiorari, but they must be established. Anterkyi J. was unmoved by arguments addressed to him and declined to interfere with the circuit court’s ruling.

The arguments have been repeated before us. In summary they embrace three facets: (1) the admission of inadmissible evidence; (2) the wrongful exercise of judicial discretion, the specie of which was the failure to exclude prejudicial material and (3) the crowning sin of all, the failure of the circuit judge to give reasons for his ruling.

I would have wished first to dispose of the fundamental issue of error on the face of the record, but since opinion is divided on this issue both in our domestic courts and the English courts I shall deal with that aspect of the matter later in this judgment.

I wish therefore to examine the contention that the five documents, marked in the court below as exhibits U, V, W, X and Y, were inadmissible. The argument urged was that since the prosecution witness who tendered the disputed documents did not work in the bank from where they originated and knew nothing about them, he was not the proper person to tender them. He could not assert anything, let alone the truth, in relation to any of those documents. The argument consequently was that, the hearsay rule provided for their exclusion.

Under Part VIII of NRCD 323, a definition of hearsay is given under section 116 (c) as follows:

“(c) ‘hearsay evidence’ is evidence of a statement, other than a statement made by a witness while testifying in the action at the trial, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.”

There is no doubt that by definition the five disputed documents qualify as hearsay. Section 117 of the Decree makes hearsay evidence inadmissible “except as otherwise provided by this Decree or any other enactment or by agreement of the parties.”

It would be noted that NRCD 323 makes substantial inroads into the rigid, sacrosanct common law rule proscribing hearsay except in very narrow parameters. Our concern, however, relates only to the admission of documents in the nature of the five disputed bank documents. It must be observed that sections 118 to 134 provide exceptions to the hearsay rule.

Of the exceptions which are relevant to this case, sections 118 and 125 seem significantly apposite. Those two sections are set out in this

[p.137] of [1982-83] GLR 129 judgment, the latter before the former for a proper appreciation of the argument which derives from them. Section 125 states:

“125. (1) Evidence of a hearsay statement contained in a diagnosis is not made inadmissible by section 117 if—

(a) the writing was made in the regular course of a business.

(b) the writing was made at or near the time the act or event occurred, the condition existed, the opinion was formed, or the diagnosis was made; and

(c) the sources of the information and the method and time of preparation were such as to indicate that the statement contained in the writing is reasonably trustworthy.

(2) Evidence of the absence from records of a business of a record of an alleged act, event or condition is not made inadmissible by section 117 when offered to prove the non-occurrence of the act or event, or the non-existence of the condition, if – (a) it was the regular course of that business to make records of all such acts, events or conditions at or near the time the act or event occurred or the condition existed and to preserve those records; and (b) the sources of information and method and time of preparation of the records of that business were such that the absence of a record is a reasonably trustworthy indication that the act or event did not occur or that the condition did not exist.

(3) For the purpose of this section a ‘business’ includes every type of regularly conducted activity, business, profession, occupation, governmental activity, or operation of an institution, whether carried on for profit or not.

(4) A hearsay statement admissible in evidence under this section is not made inadmissible by the fact that it is not based on the personal knowledge of the declarant.”

Section 118 also states:

“118. (1) Evidence of a hearsay statement is not made inadmissible by section 117 if— (a) the statement made by the declarant would be admissible had it been made while testifying

[p.138] of [1982-83] GLR 129 in the action and would not itself be hearsay evidence, and

(b) the declarant is:

(i) unavailable as a witness, or (ii) a witness, or will be a witness, subject to cross-examination concerning the hearsay statement, or (iii) available as a witness and the party offering the evidence has given reasonable notice to the court and every other party of his intention to offer the hearsay statement at the trial and that notice gave sufficient particulars (including the contents of the statement, to whom it was made, and, if known, when and where) to afford a reasonable opportunity to estimate the value of the statement in the action…

(5) Evidence of a hearsay statement offered under clause (b) (i) of subsection (1) of this section shall not be admissible if the declarant is unavailable as a witness because the exemption, preclusion, disqualification, death, inability, absence or failure of recollection of the declarant was brought about by the wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the declarant from attending or testifying.”

There is enough evidence to stamp the five disputed documents with the character of business records. They are all bank documents dealing with the accused’s account at his Barclays Bank International, Cockspur Street, London. The requirements of regularity in the compilation of the record, contemporaneousness and reasonable trustworthiness, are in my view all satisfied. Though no issue of authentication was directly raised to call in question the requirements of proof in terms of section 136 of NRCD 323, it must be noted that the permissible range of authentication was not circumscribed by the Decree.

From the starting point of relevancy, the documents were likely to render more probable the existence of facts which were of consequence in the determination of the action, and by section 51 (2) “All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by any enactment. “ Consequently, hearsay admitted under section 125 is not improperly admitted nor can it be said to offend evidential rules.

Under section 118, hearsay statement can be admitted, if the statement could have been properly tendered by the bank as a declarant, and if such a declarant is unavailable as a witness. “Unavailability” is defined in section 116 (e) as follows:

[p.139] of [1982-83] GLR 129

“(e) ‘unavailable as a witness’ means that the declarant is:

(i) exempted or precluded on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the matter to which his statement is relevant; or (ii) disqualified as a witness from testifying to the matter; or (iii) dead or unable to attend or testify at the trial because of a then existing physical or mental condition; or (iv) absent from the trial and the court is unable to compel his attendance by its process; or (v) absent from the trial and the proponent of his statement has exercised reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his attendance by the court’s process; or

(vi) in such a position that he cannot reasonably be expected in the circumstances (including the lapse of time since the statement was made) to have any recollection of matters relevant to determining the accuracy of the statement in question.”

To my mind, the definition contained in section 116 (e) (i), (iv) and (v) impinge on this case. Firstly, foreign banks seem to be among the category which may be exempted or precluded on the ground of privilege from testifying in this matter; secondly, they are not amenable to the coercive directions of our courts, and thirdly, no known process of our courts can compel the attendance of such foreign banks in our domestic forum. It is pertinent that the Decree distinguishes between our banks and foreign banks: see section 176 (5).

In all these three examples of “unavailability” the court can take judicial notice of the facts involved. For if a fact is generally known and not subject to reasonable dispute, it can be judicially recognised. Section 9 (3) of the Decree states that judicial notice may be taken whether requested or not.

It was urged that the prosecution had a duty to demonstrate that it had made an attempt to procure the witness and failed, consequently the measure of “unavailability” should be co-extensive with the reasonable diligence exercised. With that view I am respectfully unable to agree. Even if it were to apply to a witness within our territorial confines, the legislature must be deemed to be aware that the court’s process does not extend beyond our shores; hence the requirement of demonstrating reasonable diligence in the procurement of a witness, cannot be said to extend beyond our jurisdiction. Under section 116 (e) (iv) it is the court itself which must be satisfied

[p.140] of [1982-83] GLR 129 whether it is able or not to compel the attendance of the witness. Similarly, questions of privilege or exemption from a court’s jurisdiction should be a matter in the bossom of judge. We need not draw on the amplitude of the experience of courts and tribunals in this country to recognise the reluctance of foreign banks to assist inquiries aimed at disclosing the bank accounts of their clients. The curtain of a mixed weave of privilege and banking custom has concealed from prying eyes the state of their client’s accounts. We should be burying our heads in the sands if we do not judicially notice that it would be the negation of confidentiality if banks regularly revealed the state of their client’s account to third parties.

Furthermore, to require an official of Barclays Bank International of Cockspur Street, London to travel to Accra to give evidence in this case would be asking that considerable expense and delay should be incurred in this case. No doubt the appellant would think it worth it, but in my view section 178 (4) would be immediately breached by such a course. That section says; “This Decree shall be interpreted and applied so as to achieve a consistent law of evidence and the most just, expeditious and least costly administration of the law.” (The emphasis is mine.) In my view the provisions relating to the “unavailability” of a witness are custom-tailored to suit cases where witnesses are beyond the seas and are not amenable to our jurisdiction.

The Evidence Decree is of recent birth and must necessarily show birth-pangs as well as weaning problems; but I do not think the issue of expense and delay that would be involved in bringing a bank official from London to Accra admits of much dispute. It is of such limpid transparency that the court itself must apply its discretion to save costs and ensure an expeditious trial.

The second issue counsel for the appellant urged on us was the wrongful exercise of judicial discretion. The claim was made that under section 52 prejudicial evidence must be excluded even if probative. Section 52 reads:

“52. The court in its discretion may exclude relevant evidence if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by – (a) considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence; or (b) the risk that admission of the evidence will create substantial danger of unfair prejudice or substantial danger of confusing the issues; or (c) the risk, in a civil action, where a stay is not possible or appropriate, that admission of the evidence will unfairly surprise a party who has not had reasonable ground to anticipate that such evidence would be offered.”

[p.141] of [1982-83] GLR 129

It cannot be doubted that a customer is best placed because of the personal and peculiar nature of bank transactions to have intimate knowledge of his own accounts. He should be in a position readily to challenge spurious documents, to supply his own copies of what he regards as authentic and to call for legitimate extracts from the bank ledgers to disclose a true picture of the state of his wealth. A comparison between a customer’s own copy and a spurious document would readily lay bare any departure from the genuine.

The difficulty of establishing by regular means, or ordinary processes of evidence, what is peculiarly within the knowledge of a customer and his foreign bank, having regard to the confidential nature of the banking business, has led the legislators in their wisdom to provide ‘sections 133 and 134 as safeguards to remove injustice. I refer particularly to section 133 which provides:

“133. Whenever hearsay evidence has been admitted – (a) evidence of a statement or other conduct by the declarant that is inconsistent with the declarant’s hearsay statement is not inadmissible for the purpose of attacking the credibility of the declarant though he had no opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistency because he was not called as a witness, and (b) any other evidence offered to attack or support the credibility of the declarant is admissible if it would have been admissible had the declarant been a witness in the action.”

(The emphasis is mine.) In simple terms, nothing precludes the accused from refuting spurious documents by the tender of authentic ones. What could be fairer?

The argument would still apply if the thrust is not at authenticity but at issues like amounts being paid in without the customer’s knowledge, for his own copy of the accounts would show whether he had knowledge of the state of his accounts or not and if there were unexplained credits, inquiries made concerning them would be of probative value.

Since the Evidence Decree makes all relevant evidence admissible unless prohibited by other statutory bars, I consider the said sections 133 and 134 of prime importance in enabling any injustice to be immediately redressed. In my view, it lies very ill in the mouth of the accused who should have all the personal records to set any doubts at rest to holler about unfairness. Such a stance might previously have been possible under the general rule that the prosecution must prove its case and the accused need not lift a finger in the process. But where the law has recognised situations of difficulty, born of

[p.142] of [1982-83] GLR 129 experience, and has provided a judicious balance by catering for the prima facie admission of documents in those circumstances, while providing machinery for attacking such admitted documents, a charge of unfairness can hardly be sustained. Section 52 merely reflects the common law rule that evidence disproportionately harmful in relation to the proof sought, may be excluded in the interest of fairness. If the issues at the trial may be confused or bogged down by irrelevancies they may also be rejected. But these do not apply here.

For one thing, I fail to see what possible prejudice or surprise the accused can suffer from the disclosure of his own bank account; saving embarrassment at the revelation of its colossal or diminutive size, I can see no harm it can engender; to have a bank account abroad at all should be enough embarassment in view of our fiscal laws, but that has not embarrassed any one in this matter. The relevancy of these documents already commented upon disposes of any argument that issues are likely to be confused.

As the documents constituted the gravamen of the charge the accused faced, there could be no element of genuine surprise in their tender, especially as a notice to produce part of the account had been received by the appellant (exhibit J). Section 52 clearly gives the court a discretion in the matter. The ambit of such a discretion cannot be arbitrarily circumscribed. Provided the discretion is exercised judicially, that is fairly and in conformity with the relevant legal provisions, the discretion cannot be questioned. In my view, there was no failure in the circuit judge in the exercise of his discretion in this matter.

The third matter of concern to the appellant was the failure to assign reasons for the circuit judge’s ruling. Though this charge was seriously made, no effort was made to show where a mandatory direction had been violated. It is true the superior courts have time and again urged that reasons must accompany decisions. These exhortations, equally honoured by their breach as by their observance, have been directed at judgments or final decisions. Lord Denning’s view put in an address to the Law Society of England, springs to mind:

The Master of the Rolls said: “Give the reasons for your decisions; for if you give no reasons, it will be considered as a judgment given without reason and an unreasonable one.” One must note he was referring to judgments and not a ruling in the course of a trial. In any event, the argument that that objection was premature can be validly made. For there are scores of occasions when full reasons for a ruling, given in the course of proceedings, are given at the conclusion of the trial and incorporated in the final judgment.

In my view, if a conclusion is wrong, the failure to give reasons will not alter that fact. Similarly, I cannot conceive of a correct

[p.143] of [1982-83] GLR 129 conclusion being set aside because of a failure to record the reason unless statute in the plainest language so decrees. Indeed, in the course of our legal history, where conclusions are right but have been arrived at by the wrong route, the courts have redirected the route and not interfered with the decision.

In my view, if a matter is erroneous it should be patently and obviously so; it must not depend on an ambivalent issue like a failure to give reasons, where no statutory injunction exists. This third ground cannot be a matter of real importance.

This would in normal circumstances have been the end of the matter out the vexed question whether there was error of law on the record, as the appellant contended, must be answered, and I proceed to do so now.

A court of competent jurisdiction may decide questions before it rightly or wrongly. Procedures for correcting wrong decisions exist. The procedure of appeal is one such avenue for redress. But the remedies of appeal and certiorari are different and must not be blurred. That certiorari and appeals are not alternative remedies but rather are mutually exclusive is restated in Obeng v. Ampofo, Court of Appeal, Cyclostyled Judgments, January-June 1958, 143. Again in Amegbe v. Tepa [1960] G.L.R. 7, C.A., the Court of Appeal deplored the indiscriminate use of prerogative writs.

The exhortation was that they should be used carefully and not abused. In Joseph v. Jebeile Brothers, Court of Appeal, 5 May 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C. 98, a decision that has been relied upon in this appeal, the unanimous conclusion, despite the differences in opinion, restated the rule that “In certiorari proceedings the court acts as a supervisory court and not as an appellate court. Certiorari cannot be made a cloak for an appeal.” Azu Crabbe J.A., as he then was, went on to say that the supervisory powers of the court could only be exercised where an error of law was disclosed on the face of the record; unlike an appellate court, the court does not interfere merely because the decision is wrong in law. The error must be manifest on the face of the record. Authority for that proposition was cited in the case of R. v. Paddington North and St Marylebone Rent Tribunal; Ex parte Perry [1956] Q.B. 229, D.C.

In the instant appeal, the certiorari proceedings were instituted on the basis that there was error on the face of the record. This needs to be examined closely, as Anterkyi J. found no such error.

The difficulty that has arisen has been over the definition of record, on which the error is founded. In Asor v. Amegboe [1978] 1 G.L.R. 153 at p. 163, C.A. the full bench of the Court of Appeal held that:

[p.144] of [1982-83] GLR 129

“The record is that which the inferior court or tribunal physically keeps as a formal record of its proceedings, and where it is alleged that there was an error of law in the proceedings the superior courts will not intervene unless the error is on the face of the record; see Baldwin & Francis Ltd. v. Patents Appeal Tribunal [1959] A.C. 663, H.L.”

The error, it was said, must be palpable and apparent or one that can be legitimately inferred.

Counsel for the appellant insists that the record in this case must consist of a conglomerate of (a) submissions of counsel; (b) evidence of the witness who tendered the disputed documents; (c) the documents themselves; and (d) the ruling of the court. This cannot wholly be so. How, may it be asked, can counsel’s misapprehension of the law create an error, unless the court has adopted those submissions as its own. Similarly, unless incorporated, the testimony of a witness should have no place in the definition of a record. The admitted documents are the result of the debate and not part of the basis of the ruling or grounded on them and should not in the true sense form part of the record. There is of course, considerable argument as to what is a document. This uncertainty has been implanted in our jurisprudence as an outcrop of the English decisions we have often borrowed. In the Jebeile case (supra), the Court of Appeal accepted the statement of law in R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw [1952] 1 K.B. 338 at p. 352, C.A:

“The record must contain at least the document which initiates the proceedings; the pleadings, if any; and the adjudication; but not the evidence, nor the reasons, unless the tribunal chooses to incorporate them, If the tribunal does state its reasons, and those reasons are wrong in law, certiorari lies to quash the decision.”

Pausing for a moment, it seems odd that the appellant should found a ground of the application on the non-statement of reasons. The result of Lord Denning’s researches also received warm approval in the Jebeile case (supra).

As has been previously observed there has been considerable disagreement on this definition of a document and the House of Lords has even declined to give its opinion till a more opportune moment arises. For our purpose, since the documents were admitted on the basis of arguments “outside” than “within” them, the decision could not be said to be grounded on them.

A point that is often overlooked is that most of the English cases cited in certiorari proceedings deal with the exercise of supervisory powers over administratively set up tribunals whose decisions cannot be appealed against. The English courts therefore have embarked on a

[p.145] of [1982-83] GLR 129 process (where no right of appeal exists) to safeguard the public interest by ensuring the proper balance between ministerial discretion and individual rights for the proper administration of justice: see Conway v. Rimmer [1968] A.C. 910, and Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 W.L.R. 163, H.L. where the House of Lords held that a privative clause does not prevent judicial review. What is happening here cannot be viewed without concern. The right of appeal is jettisoned frequently for an immediate tryst with prerogative proceedings. I think the time has come when the distinction should be punitively maintained. In my view, Anterkyi J. was right in declining to quash the ruling of the circuit judge in this matter.

Before finally concluding with this appeal, I must state my reasons for rejecting the preliminary argument of the Deputy Attorney-General which sought the dismissal of this appeal in limine on the grounds that no right of appeal enured to the appellant.

In my view the certiorari proceedings which terminated against the appellant in the High Court, constituted a “matter” creating a right of appeal in a dissatisfied litigant. Article 122 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, confers this right and no lengthy discourse in expatiation is required. This court in Republic v. Sagoe-Nkansah, Court of Appeal, Accra, 17 February 1981, unreported ruled on the rights of appeal accruing to an aggrieved person under article 122 (2) aforesaid, and it is a matter of regret that the Deputy Attorney-General, who urged similar preliminary submissions, did not advert to that decision, or seek to distinguish it.

The appeal however fails and it is dismissed.

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.

I have had the privilege of reading before hand the judgment just read by the president and that of my brother Roger Korsah J., yet to be read. The lucid reasoning of both has, I confess, persuaded me to alter my views on some aspects of the matter. I regret however, that I have found myself unable to agree with them on the main conclusion.

My stand does not in the least affect the court’s rejection of the preliminary objection to our jurisdiction taken by the learned Deputy Attorney-General. I fully subscribe to the very succinct reasons now given (and to be given) for overruling the objection. There is nothing more I can usefully add on that.

In the criminal proceeding against the appellant-applicant for extortion by a public officer, before the Circuit Court, Accra, presided over by his Honour Owusu-Sekyere, the evidence of the sixth prosecution witness was objected to without avail, and eventually resulted in the admission of certain five documents in evidence. These documents were exhibited as U, V, W, X and Y. In substance, they

[p.146] of [1982-83] GLR 129 were variously cheques and giro pay-in-slips and a bank statement alleged to be in respect of the applicant’s banking transactions with a branch office of Barclays Bank International in London.

Against the ruling of the trial circuit judge that these documents were admissible, the applicant by counsel moved the High Court for an order of certiorari to quash the ruling. By his ruling dated 12 January 1981, Anterkyi J. dismissed the application and it is from his ruling that the appellant has now appealed to this court.

The sixth prosecution witness was one Tetteh Opata, Superintendent of Police, who described himself as attached to the Criminal Investigation Department Headquarters of the Ghana Police Service. He appears to have been giving evidence as the investigator. The impugned evidence together with the judge’s ruling is, of course, exhibited with the applicant’s motion as exhibit A; but for clarity of my judgment, I am obliged to set out here such parts of his evidence as are relevant to the admission of the contested documents. These are:

“(a) On 22 August 1980, I had instructions to see Commissioner of Police, Mr. V. A. T. Marbel. I saw him and he asked me to see the second prosecution witness. I saw the second prosecution witness accordingly, who told me something and gave me a report on this case written by the second prosecution witness himself together with some other documents. The documents are a bank statement bearing the name of the accused person, exhibit H; a cheque with a No. 156773 and bearing account No. 210940501, exhibit M; another cheque with a No. 156774, exhibit N; a document enumerating the account of the accused in manuscript, exhibit O; a bank giro cheques for 1,000 pounds, exhibit L; another bank giro cheque for 10,000 pounds, exhibit K and a bank statement exhibit J.

I examined the documents very closely and found that exhibits M, N, K and L, which are cheques, reflect in exhibit H, the bank statement. I also observe that exhibit J had got the edges out as against exhibit H which has computer numbers. (At this stage Kom… raises objection regarding observations of witness . . .

(b) My observation further revealed that exhibits H, J, K, L, M, N bore something in common, that is they have account No. 21094501 of the accused person, his name and the address of Barclays Bank International, London. Then an exhibit H, that is a bank giro credit form which bears the account number of the accused for an amount of 1,000 pounds with a signature which appears to be that of Henry Kojo Djaba which I knew (know) very well.

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I have caused the signature on exhibit H to be examined with the signature of Mr. Henry Kojo Djaba and other documents from the known signature of Mr. Henry Kojo Djaba.

(c) On 25 August 1980, I received an envelope in my office and addressed to me containing the originals of exhibits L, K, M, N and exhibit H which I wish to tender in evidence ‘(At this stage Mr. Kom . . . objects to the tendering of the documents in evidence)’ . . .”

As already stated the objection was overruled and the originals were admitted as exhibits U, V, W, X and Y. In upholding the ruling of the circuit court, Anterkyi J. rested on three principal grounds, namely:

(a) that the five documents were relevant to the issue;

(b) that the hearsay statements in the documents were admissible as exceptions; and (c) that flowing from (a) and (b) above, there was no error of law on the face of the record.

I would like to deal with the first ground that the statements impugned were hearsay and that the learned judge erred in holding the contrary.

Now by our law of evidence, i.e. section 116 (c) of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323) (hereinafter referred to as the Decree), hearsay evidence is defined as “evidence of a statement, other than a statement made by a witness while testifying in the action at the trial, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated. “And section 117 enjoins that “Hearsay evidence is not admissible except as otherwise provided by this Decree or any other enactment or by agreement of the parties.”

In the more homely language of the common law, “Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement but the fact that it was made.”

See Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 W.L.R. 965 at p. 969, P.C.

To start with, there appears to be some overlapping of terms in respect of the concept of “relevancy” of evidence tendered and the province of the prohibition against the hearsay rule. When by section

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51 (2) and (3) the Decree provides: “(2) All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by any enactment” and (3) No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence,” it does not in any way supersede the rule against hearsay under section 117, because the provision is an “exception as otherwise provided” under section 117 (2).

It seems to me that for our present purpose the matter may be resolved by paraphrasing the two rules broadly thus: “To be admissible all evidence must be relevant; but it must at the same time not be hearsay evidence.” Relevancy for short is a requirement that evidence tendered must be probative. The rule against hearsay evidence is a requirement that the proper witness must tender the relevant evidence.

In my opinion the issue raised by the ground here is not a question of “relevancy “ as such. We are faced squarely with whether the sixth prosecution witness, not being the “declarant of the statements” contained in exhibits U, V, X, W and Y, offended the rule against hearsay; or whether he was covered by any rule of exception.

A discussion on the rule of relevancy as Anterkyi J. was led to embark on, was in my respectful opinion beside the point. In particular, the fact that exhibit J (the bank statement sheet No. 1980/4) had been legally received earlier in evidence should not be a basis for the reception of “any other evidence oral or documentary which tends to relate exhibit J itself or to facts in exhibit J as being considered as relevant to a fact relevant to the issue before the court” when the objection is that exhibits U, V, W, X and Y were hearsay.

The sixth prosecution witness admittedly, was himself not the declarant of any of the statements contained in the five exhibits. The question then is, were those statements being proffered to establish the truth of the statements therein stated or merely for the fact that those statements were made? The test in my opinion is objective and according to commonsense. In the case before the circuit court the basis of the prosecution seems to be that the appellant, as a public prosecutor, was alleged to have obtained moneys by way of giro pay-in slips from certain two persons, in order to permit his conduct as such prosecutor to be influenced in respect of some “cases” involving those two persons, then pending for prosecution or action in the tribunal to which the applicant was attached. The sums were respectively 1,000 pounds and 10,000 pounds.

It would seem to be part of the case of the prosecution that these two giro pay-in slips were reflected in the bank statement, exhibit J, and had put an otherwise depleted account into funds. In those circumstances, it is plain to my mind that the five documents, inclusive of the alleged bank statement of the applicant for the period, were not being tendered to show the fact of the various statements contained

[p.149] of [1982-83] GLR 129 having been made, but for the purpose of establishing the truth of their contents. That being my view, I am satisfied that the sixth prosecution witness was in fact called to establish the truth of the contents of exhibits U, V, W, X and Y.

Indeed, the contents of exhibits U, V, W, X and Y had been disclosed to the trial court in advance by the sixth prosecution witness. This was done by the subterfuge of getting the sixth prosecution witness to tell the court of his personal “examination and close observation” of the copies L, K, M, N and H and of the conclusions he formed. In effect, it was to get the sixth prosecution witness to give what in reality was hearsay evidence as though it was nothing of the sort. That style of advocacy is, of course, not permissible, and as mentioned by Devlin L.J., in Glinski v. Mclver [1962] A.C. 726 at p. 780, H.L., it consists among others:

“ . . . in not asking what was said in a conversation or written in a document but in asking what the conversation or document was about; it is apparently thought that what would be objectionable if fully exposed is permissible if decently veiled.”

It may here be observed that exhibits L, K, M, N and H, as copies, were admitted earlier in the proceedings by the circuit judge for a “limited purpose.” This “limited purpose” naturally excluded their being tendered as proof of the truth of their contents. That means their contents were at no time in evidence. When therefore the sixth prosecution witness, by the device of “personal examination and observation”, gave evidence of his conclusions of certain common relationship of exhibits K, L, M, N and H he was in fact giving hearsay evidence of their contents, which was outside the limited purpose for which they had been accepted in evidence.

Anterkyi J. in my opinion, was equally misled into thinking that the contents of exhibits K, H, L, M and N were in evidence when he ruled at p. 292 post:

“Each of exhibits H, J, K, L, M and N bore on them;

(a) the account No. 21094501 of the accused;

(b) the name of the accused; and (c) the address of Barclays Bank International, London.

The conjoined relationship thus established between exhibits H, J, K, L, M and N afforded evidence that they respectively referred to an account No. 21094501 of the accused at Barclays Bank International, London.

They had properly earlier been admitted in evidence as facts in issue, i.e. the alleged criminal charge against the accused before the trial court. Hence any other

[p.150] of [1982-83] GLR 129 evidence, oral or documentary, which is relevant to each of these documents, and which is not excluded on another legal ground of objection must be accepted in evidence if so tendered.”

Thereupon Anterkyi J. after discussing several sections of the Decree, ruled at p. 297 post:

“All the controversial documents, exhibits U, V, W, X (and if there was any Y as contended by the applicant) were legally admissible upon the relevancy stated, that they were the originals of exhibits L, K, M, N and H and upon the earlier evidence they bore certain features of relationship”

The learned judge appeared to have lost sight of the fact that those earlier exhibits had been received in evidence not for their contents, but for some limited purpose. Therefore they could not be relevant to the contents of U, V, W, X and Y. All this would not have been immaterial with respect to the final conclusion of the learned judge as regards his finding on the hearsay; but for the opinion I would express hereafter.

In dealing directly with the ground on hearsay, the learned judge without saying so in so many words, conceded the point that the tendering of exhibits U, V, W, X and Y from the sixth prosecution witness was hearsay evidence, but were properly admitted as an exception under the Decree. This was because the “declarant” of the statements contained in exhibits U, V, W, X and Y presumed to be Barclays Bank International, London, was unavailable as witness.” The emphasised term is defined by the NRCD 323, s. 116 (e) (iv) in so far as it relates to the facts of this case to mean “the declarant is absent from the trial and the court is unable to compel his attendance by its process.

The definition in my opinion imports the fact that the prosecution were desirous of getting Barclays Bank as a witness, had indeed made approaches which had been refused, or at least found any approach impracticable, and in absence of any process to compel the witness the bank was absent at the trial. For the import of “compulsion” is a refusal to oblige voluntarily.

I may go along with Anterkyi J. in taking judicial notice of the face of the bank statement procured from the applicant that the bank was an English concern resident in London. Again the learned judge, and if I may say so, rightly took note of the law that there was no known process to compel the bank to attend the trial as a witness. But on the question of whether the prosecution intended and were desirous of having the bank as witness, or had made any request at all it appeared to have been assumed by the trial court, if it was within its contemplation, and by Anterkyi J.

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In my opinion the provisions of section 116, in relaxing the strict rule of direct evidence, requires the prosecution to lead evidence from which the court would infer or come to a conclusion that the prosecution had brought themselves within the purview that their witness was unavailable.

If indeed the provisions of section 116 were within the contemplation of the prosecution, it was an easy matter to lead the sixth prosecution witness to say that the prosecution had intended to have the bank as a witness but had not succeeded in getting their co-operation, and that the prosecution could not issue any witness subpoena either.

In my respectful view, this was not a matter for the court to assume or take judicial notice of. Matters of judicial notice of such facts should in my opinion be matters of notoriety within the common knowledge and experience of mankind, and not specialised knowledge to a limited class of persons. Among bankers and may be their clientele it may be common place that a bank would not concede to give evidence where its own interest would not be hurt. But it is by no means common knowledge to the man in the street.

I am obliged to take this view because a look at the other conditions under section 116 (e) on which a court must be satisfied that a witness is unavailable, appear to require evidence or at least a statement at the Bar. For example that the declarant is:

“(e) (i) exempted or precluded on ground of privilege from testifying…

(ii) disqualified as a witness from testifying to the matter; or (iii) dead or unable to attend or testify at the trial because of a then existing physical or mental condition . . .”

Matters to establish the ground that a person was unavailable as a witness in my opinion are a necessary foundation to entitle the sixth prosecution witness to give evidence of the contents of the exhibits U, V, W, X and Y. Nowhere in the proceedings did the sixth prosecution witness venture to lay such foundations, nor was there any statement to that effect at the Bar. In my opinion the absence of the necessary foundation was fatal and the learned judge could not resort to section 116 to save the day.

There was another hurdle for the prosecution to enable the sixth prosecution witness to tender the aforesaid exhibits. In the Decree no provision was made specifically for foreign banks for the simple reason that the Decree is a municipal legislation.

One may sympathise with Mr. Kom, but his lamentations and concern that the strict requirement of evidence imposed by section 176 on municipal banks should be the least yardstick as regards

[p.152] of [1982-83] GLR 129 foreign banks, is in my opinion untenable, because the legislation does not cover foreign banks in that regard.

In classifying “hearsay” statements emanating from the business transactions of any such bank, the only available provision, and that which I think applicable, appears to be that on “business records”; namely section 125. That section, as relevant provides:

“125. (1) Evidence of a hearsay statement contained in a writing made as a record of an act, event, condition, opinion or diagnosis is not made inadmissible by section 117 if –

(a) the writing was made in the regular course of a business;

(b) the writing was made at or near the time the act or event occurred, the condition existed, the opinion was formed, or the diagnosis was made; and

(c) the sources of the information and the method and time of preparation were such as to indicate that the statement contained in the writing is reasonably trustworthy.

(3) For the purpose of this section a “business” includes every type of regularly conducted activity, business, profession, occupation, governmental activity, or operation of an institution, whether carried on for profit or not.

(4) A hearsay statement admissible in evidence under this section is not made inadmissible by the fact that it is not based on the personal knowledge of the declarant.”

The point of the matter is that the admission of hearsay evidence is a statutory indulgence. And it seems to me that the provisions are conditions of the licence to proffer evidence of “business records” where, for very practical reasons, direct evidence is almost always impossible or impracticable to obtain. In my opinion, compliance with the conditions is in accord with the general principle of law that he who claims an exemption from a general rule must bring himself within the conditions.

The application of the conditions set under section 125 and the nature and extent of the evidence to satisfy the court, will of course depend on the facts of each case. On the facts here there was “evidence” that “exhibit M, N, K, L which are cheques (or giro slips) are reflected in exhibit H, being a bank statement bearing the name of the accused person.”

I envisage that evidence to satisfy the conditions would be that:

(a) the writing was made in the regular course of business;

[p.153] of [1982-83] GLR 129 (b) the sources of the information in exhibit H and the method and time of preparation were such as to indicate that the statement contained in exhibit H is reasonably trustworthy.

Trustworthy here, in my view, is used in the sense that a jury might feel the record was reasonably reliable. It has no reference to authenticity.

There is, I concede, not an iota of such evidence from the prosecution as foundation to satisfy the requirement under section 125. The practical difficulty in getting such evidence on the facts of this case does not relieve the prosecution. Nor does that afford excuse to the court to relax or abandon observance of the requirement of section 125. It may well be that such difficulties could not have been anticipated by the legislation. Equally the legislation did not expect that documents of business records, as in this case, would be picked up from the street by any pedestrian and deposited before a trial court. In any case, the answer is not to abandon the protection which an accused citizen has always had under our law of having his guilt proved by accepted rules of evidence as codified in the Decree.

Each case will, it seems, depend on the facts. Here the question appears to be, to what extent can a jury assess the contents of the aforesaid exhibits to be reasonably trustworthy, from the nature of the business and the character of the records as comprised in the documents to be tendered?

To start with, exhibit J furnished by the applicant to the prosecution may be said to have been adopted by him. It indicates a conduct on the part of the applicant as treating documents of the bank as being reliable. Besides, common experience of ordinary men shows that banks have a long established custom of keeping records in the form of writings in the regular course of their business, and that these writings are made contemporaneously or near enough to the act or event. That in my view, might well enable hearsay evidence to be given as satisfying the requirements of section 125, as to relieve the prosecution from calling formal oral evidence to that effect.

Although I rule for the respondent on this leg, in my judgment the absence of proper foundation to qualify the bank as an “unavailable witness” made the exhibits in question inadmissible. In my opinion therefore the learned judge fell into error in holding that they were properly admitted by the circuit judge.

Before I leave this aspect of the appeal as to admissibility, there is a matter of procedure on which a word must be said. The point arises because in resisting the admissibility of exhibits U, V, W, X and Y before the trial court, Mr. Kom had canvassed the ground under section 52; in effect that the admission of the contested exhibits “would create substantial danger of unfair prejudice.”

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Section 52 provides:

“52. The court in its discretion may exclude relevant evidence if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by— (a) considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence; or (b) the risk that admission of the evidence will create substantial danger of unfair prejudice or substantial danger of confusing the issues; or . . .”

The learned judge appeared to have found the submissions of the learned Deputy Attorney-General on this aspect, that matters of discretion in this regard (and would seem relevancy) are considered by the court after admission or reception of the evidence, attractive. Consequently, the learned judge in his ruling stated at p. 289 (post):

“It is submitted by this court that under section 51, if the evidence is relevant it is admissible, and that such evidence must first be admitted before its probative value can be assessed with regard to section 52 (a) and (b) above referred to, and that the exercise of such discretion only comes into play when the weight of the evidence is being appraised by the court.

And I must observe that in the instant original proceedings against the applicant in the trial court, as the court could not at that stage be said to have knowledge of the breadth or width of the overall evidence the prosecution would offer, the provisions under section 52 could not legally be applied. The discretion to exclude relevant evidence is for the trial court which must be deemed to know when it is exercisable.

There was nothing in the proceedings, exhibit A, to indicate that at the stage of tendering these documentary exhibits a matter had arisen which fell under the provisions of section 52 (a) and (b) and which therefore warranted the exercise of the discretion…”

In my opinion, the gist of the proposition above is far from the correct practice and not in accord with the provisions of the Decree. The discretion of the court under section 52 may be and is generally agitated by counsel. When counsel prays a court to exercise its discretion to exclude evidence, albeit relevant and not hearsay, it amounts to objection to the admission of that evidence on the ground that it is prejudicial; in the sense that there was the risk of substantial danger occurring to the case of the party affected and that the probative value of the evidence was negligible.

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Like every objection to admission of evidence (and indeed to other matters) it is taken at the earliest opportunity when the matter arises. That is the law as provided by section 6: viz “In every action, and at every stage thereof, any objection to the admissibility of evidence by a party affected thereby shall be made at the time the evidence is offered.” And when the objection is made and argued, section 6 requires further that the objection “shall be … ruled upon by the court as a matter of course.”

That, I think, means the court should state its decision whether it upholds the objection and so rejects the evidence offered, or it overrules the objection and so admits it. This is, of course, determined before the proceedings move any further. By this means the court, whether with a jury or without, carries along as the hearing proceeds, in the full view of the parties, only such evidence as has been ruled upon to be admissible, where objection has been taken.

This procedure applies whether the ground of objection is relevancy, hearsay, incompetence of a witness or a leading question, etc. Indeed, the words of section 52 (b) speak of “the risk that admission of the evidence will create substantial danger”, and that should mean nothing else but that the evidence should not be admitted at all if the court concludes there is that risk. Any suggestion that an objection under section 52 is to be left with the trial judge, first to admit the evidence, and when he comes to write his judgment to assess its probative value as to whether to exclude it or use it, will amount to turning a judge into an oracle whose divinations cannot be foretold. The parties are entitled at the close of the case to know what evidence the court, with or without a jury, has accepted and can legally act upon.

Be that as it may, since the ruling of the circuit judge was not a speaking order, it is impossible to say whether in fact he did or did not exercise his discretion under section 52.

That leads me to the gravamen of the ground and requirement of the application for the order of certiorari before Anterkyi J., namely, that the wrongful admission of exhibits U, V, W, X and Y in evidence by the circuit judge was an error of law, and was one apparent on the face of the record. Tied on to this ground were two other grounds of error of law, namely (a) that the trial judge wrongfully exercised his judicial discretion under section 52; and (b) that his failure to give reasons for his decision was an error of law.

The learned judge of the High Court having held that the contested exhibits were legally admissible in evidence ruled adversely against the two other grounds of error of law as well.

The present state of the law, as I understand it, is that error of law committed within the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal can only be

[p.156] of [1982-83] GLR 129 complained of on certiorari if the error was apparent on the face of the record: see R. v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd. [1922] 2 A.C. 128 at p. 156, P.C. and R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw[1952] 1 K.B. 338, C.A. On the complaint then that the judicial discretion conferred by section 52 of the Decree, to exclude relevant but prejudicial evidence was wrongly exercised, it may be first noted that a discretion is nonetheless exercised even though adversely, against the party affected in its result. To say that the discretion was wrongfully exercised is not the same as a failure to exercise it.

When the circuit judge gave the sphinx-like ruling, namely”… It is my humble opinion that the documents be admitted in evidence. I therefore overrule the objection of counsel…” there could be no means of indicating that he had or had not exercised his discretion under section 52. He might well have and found the exhibits not prejudicial. There is no way to tell. No valid complaint can therefore be taken that he failed to exercise the discretion simply because there are no reasons given to point to that.

The failure to give reasons is itself complained of as amounting to error of law on the face of the record. In substance the submission of Mr. Kom was that as there were several provisions of the Decree under which an objection on the hearsay rule may be defeated, the law obliges the trial court to state its reasons for its decision, in order to reveal on which ground the objection failed. I do not find it necessary to discuss the case relied on for the submission as I think the provisions of section 6 (2) settle the point.

Section 6 (2) as may be conceded, confers a discretion. In Wharton’s Law Lexicon (13th ed.) at pp. 472-473 “Judicial discretion” is explained in one sense as, “Such matters in the course of a trial as are to be decided summarily by the judge, and cannot be questioned afterwards, are said to be within his discretion.” And the general principle is that courts are not obliged to give reasons for decisions in the exercise of their judicial discretion; see Professor de Smith’s Judicial Review of Administrative Law (2nd ed.), pp. 133 and 179. If, however, voluntarily, reasons are given for a decision and they disclose error of law the High Court will be justified to quash it by certiorari. Further, where there is a duty, arising from an enactment, on an inferior tribunal to give reasons for its decision certiorari may lie to quash the decision if no reasons are given or if the reasons given disclose error of law. The duty may be express or implied in the enactment governing the subject-matter. In the instant case, section 6 (2) requires that “Every objection to the admissibility of evidence shall be recorded and ruled upon by the court as a matter of course, “I am unable to construe the subsection as imposing an express or

[p.157] of [1982-83] GLR 129 implied duty to give reasons. On this reasoning, I think the learned judge rightly dismissed that ground.

Now to the main question of wrongful admissions of evidence as a ground of apparent error of law. From the dictum of Greer L.J. in R. v. Minister of Health [1939] 1 K.B. 232 at p. 246, C.A. it is clear that in general, in cases of improper reception of inadmissible evidence by a tribunal where the proceedings are regular upon their face and the magistrates had jurisdiction, the superior court will not grant the writ of certiorari. To this however is the important qualification as noted in the Northumberland case (supra) at p. 351, per Denning L.J. that:

“It will have been seen that throughout all the cases there is one governing rule: Certiorari is only available to quash a decision for error of law if the error appears on the face of the record.”

As I have earlier given it as my opinion, exhibits U, V, W, X and Y were inadmissible and the wrongful admission was consequently an error of law. The question then to be answered and the one which the learned Deputy Attorney-General resists is whether the error is apparent on the record. Now in the Northumberland case (supra) record was defined to include something more than the decision of the court. Again at p. 352 Denning L.J. said:

“What, then, is the record? It has been said to consist of all those documents which are kept by the tribunal for a permanent memorial and testimony of their proceedings … It appears that the Court of the King’s Bench always insisted that the record should contain, or recite, the document or information which initiated the proceedings and thus gave the tribunal its jurisdiction; and also the document which contained their adjudication.”

Before the High Court were the evidence of the sixth prosecution witness, the arguments of counsel, the ruling of the trial judge and as it appears, was admitted, the charge initiating the original proceedings. For the exercise of jurisdiction on certiorari it seems to me the evidence of the sixth prosecution witness, which is complained of and the ruling or decision of the trial judge must form the record in the present case. In my opinion, the argument of counsel, for this purpose, is not part of the record. But it will be unrealistic to limit the record to only the bare ruling of the trial judge, or to exclude any reference to the Decree. The point is well illustrated by the Northumberland case (supra). There the contention of the applicant, Mr. Shaw, was that his retirement compensation should be calculated on all the years of his service with the Gosfort Urban District Council and not limited to his period with the council’s hospital board.

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The argument depended on the interpretation of the word “service” as contained in regulation 2 of the National Health Service (Transfer of Officers and Compensation) Regulations, 1948. Although the regulation it seems, did not appear on the face of the decision of the appeal tribunal, the error of the compensating authority having wrongly interpreted the word “service” was held to be error on the face of the record. The judgment of Singleton L.J. brings out the point in the following passage at pp. 344-345:

“The decision of the tribunal in the first paragraph gives the tribunal’s determination of Mr. Shaw’s service with the hospital board as from October 7, 1936, to March 31, 1949. In the third paragraph it sets out the compensating authority’s contention that the compensation payable should be limited to the actual dates of service, that is, service with the board from October 7, 1936, to March 31, 1949. The tribunal, in the fourth paragraph, agrees that the only service to be taken into account is that between October 7, 1936, and March 31, 1949, that is, service with the hospital board.

It does not set out the contentions put forward on behalf of Mr. Shaw, but it is, I think, clear that he was asking for other service to be taken into account, and the decision of the tribunal is that the only service to be taken into account is his service with the hospital board. Regulation 2 of the National Health Service (Transfer of Offices and Compensation) Regulation, 1948, contains a definition of ‘service’ from which it is clear that there are many types of service which may have to be considered in arriving at the amount of compensation to be awarded. If the tribunal by its decision says: ‘We are only going to consider the actual dates of service with the hospital board,’ there is, I think, error on the face of the decision – and that is what the tribunal has done.”

In my opinion, in the instant case, on looking at the evidence of the sixth prosecution witness, the objection of counsel (without the arguments) and the decision by the trial court to admit the exhibits, the records would reveal to one instructed in the law as contained in NRCD 323, that the necessary evidence of foundation under section 116 (e) of NRCD 323 was absent from the evidence of the sixth prosecution witness, and that the decision to admit (albeit as an exception) was an error apparent on the face of the record. That being my respectful view, I am of the opinion that certiorari properly lies to quash the admission as error of law on the face of the record.

It is for the above reasons that I would conclude that the appeal ought to be allowed, and the ruling of the circuit court dated 3 November 1981 quashed. With it the contested exhibits ought to be marked as rejected.

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JUDGMENT OF ROGER KORSAH J.

My lords, the appellant is the special prosecutor of the special tribunal. He stands charged with the offence of extortion contrary to section 239 (1) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). It is alleged that he demanded and received from Mr. H. K. Djaba and Mr. E. K. Owusu the sums of 1,000 pounds and 10,000 pounds respectively.

At his trial on 3 November 1980, the prosecution sought to tender through the sixth prosecution witness, what they claimed to be the originals of the following documents:

(a) a bank statement bearing the name of the appellant and account No. 21094501; (b) a cheque with a serial number 156773 and bearing account No. 21094501 for 100 pounds; (c) a cheque with serial number 156774 and bearing account No. 21094501 for 100 pounds; (d) a bank giro credit form for 1,000 pounds and bearing account No. 21094501; and (e) a bank giro credit form for 10,000 pounds and bearing account No. 21094501.

Counsel for the appellant objected to the reception in evidence of these documents upon the following grounds:

(i) that the documents sought to be tendered are bank documents and as such caught by section 176 of the NRCD 323;

(ii) that some at least, of the documents infringe section 165 of NRCD 323;

(iii) that no foundation or sufficient foundation has been laid for the tendering of the documents. (iv) that as the witness was not the author of the documents, he cannot be cross-examined as to the contents of them;

(v) that the documents cannot and should not be admitted as proof of their contents; and (vi) that since these documents originate outside the jurisdiction of the courts of Ghana a much stricter proof is required other than those stipulated in section 176 of the Evidence Decree, before they can be admitted as proof of their contents.

In a short ruling delivered on 5 November 1980, the learned circuit judge held that these documents were admissible in evidence. He said:

“I have heard the submission of counsel for the defence in his objection to the tendering of the above documents in evidence, I have also heard the submission of the learned Deputy Attorney-General in reply to the submission in support of the objection by

[p.160] of [1982-83] GLR 129 counsel for the defence. It is my humble opinion that the documents be admitted in evidence. I therefore overrule the objection of counsel for the defence. Case to continue.”

Counsel lost no time in filing an application for an order of certiorari to quash the rulings of the circuit judge dated 8 October 1980, 13 October 1980 and 5 November 1980 on the grounds that there was error on the face of the record and secondly, that the court had exceeded its jurisdiction.

On 12 January 1981, Anterkyi J. dismissed the appellant’s application for an order of certiorari in these terms at pp. 301-302 post:

“The application for an order of certiorari for ‘error of law on the face of the record’ was based on the grounds of:

(i) admitting inadmissible evidence;

(ii) wrongful exercise of judicial discretion; and (iii) failure to give reasons, by giving inadequate reasons to fulfil an express duty to give reasons.

All three grounds fail and founder with the application itself, on the grounds that:

(1) the documentary exhibits U, V, W, X and Y are legally relevant and admissible;

(2) there was neither wrongful exercise of discretion, nor wrongful failure to exercise discretion, to exclude them; and (3) the trial court was under no express or implied duty to give reasons for a simple ruling that documents were admissible when it was patent that they were relevant, and therefore admissible as there is no legal ground for their exclusion.”

It is against this ruling by the High Court that the appellant now appeals to this court on the grounds that:

“(1) The trial judge erred in holding that there was no error of law on the record.

(2) The learned High Court judge erred in law in holding that even though the documents were hearsay they were nonetheless admissible.

(3) The trial judge erred in holding that the trial circuit judge was not under a duty to give reasons for his ruling.

(4) The trial judge erred in holding that the circuit court judge did not err in failing to exercise his discretion under section 52 (1) (b) of the Evidence Decree, 1975.”

Although there was a threat to file further grounds of appeal, none was in fact filed.

A narration of this background to the present appeal has been compelled, in part, by a preliminary objection raised by the learned

[p.161] of [1982-83] GLR 129

Deputy Attorney-General. To him, the decision of the High Court which has been appealed, is not a judgment, decree or order of the High Court. To him, a judgment, decree or order must conclude whatever proceeding has been instituted. He argues that the real proceeding in this matter is the trial of the appellant in the circuit court. He claims that the omission of a provision, such as section 10(5) of Act 372, which permits appeals from any interlocutory order or decision made or given by the High Court or circuit court, has taken away the right of appeal where a cause or matter is still pending before a court and has not been determined. To him, the application for certiorari was used to circumvent what was properly an interlocutory appeal, which has been abolished by omission under article 122 of the Constitution, 1979. He concludes, therefore, that as no appeal lay, no proceedings for certiorari ought to have been entertained by the High Court and no appeal from the certiorari proceedings is properly cognisable by this court under article 122 (1) of the Constitution, 1979.

The power of the High Court to control abuses of the powers conferred on inferior tribunals has always been recognised. It is now enshrined in our Constitution by article 126 which recites that:

“126. The High Court of Justice shall have supervisory jurisdiction over all inferior Courts in Ghana and any adjudicating authority and in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction shall have power to issue such directions, orders or writs including writs or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory powers.”

This article is the individual’s guarantee to the fundamental human rights assured us in chapter six of the Constitution. This power of supervision through the writ of certiorari is not the same as or in substitution of an appeal. It is wider. Certiorari lies for a number of causes where an appeal may not lie. One example would suffice. Certiorari will lie to quash the decision of an inferior tribunal for want of jurisdiction even though statute provides that no appeal lies from a decision of that tribunal: see Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147, H.L.

I subscribe to the view expressed by Atkin L.J. in Republic v. Electricity Commissioners [1924] 1 K.B. 171 at pp. 204-205, C.A. that certiorari and prohibition may issue wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority.

[p.162] of [1982-83] GLR 129

Generally speaking, certiorari will lie wherever an inferior tribunal has acted in excess of jurisdiction, or where there has been a breach of the rules of natural justice, or where there is an error of law on the face of the record, or where the judgment of the court has been procured by fraud or collusion. The appellant’s application for certiorari was based on the grounds: (a) that there was an error on the face of the record and (b) that the court has exceeded its jurisdiction. His right to apply to the High Court for a remedy upon these grounds cannot be disputed whether or not he has a right of appeal from any decision or order made by the trial circuit court. His right to apply for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the circuit court complained of is conferred by article 126 of the Constitution.

By article 122 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution, an appeal lies as of right from a judgment, decree or order of the High Court of Justice to the Court of Appeal in any cause of matter determined by the High Court of Justice.

By Order 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), “cause” is defined as including any action, suit or other original proceeding between a plaintiff and a defendant. And “matter” is said to include “every proceeding in court not in a cause.” To my mind the certiorari proceedings before the High Court was either a cause or matter and an appeal lies from either to the Court of Appeal. In my view, the preliminary objection is without substance and I now turn to the substantive grounds of appeal.

By section 178 of the Evidence Decree 1975 (NRCD 323), the Decree applies in every action whether civil or criminal; and the courts are enjoined to interpret and apply it so as to achieve the most just, expeditious and the least costly administration of the law.

For our purposes, the next section of the Decree which engages attention is section 176, which provides for the admissibility of copies of records of a bank made in the ordinary course of business, if the copy is testified to be a correct copy by a witness who has compared it with the original. Such testimony may be given by a representative of the bank. But if the bank is not a party to the action, a representative of the bank is not a compellable witness unless the court considers that fairness and justice demand such compulsion. The courts are also empowered under the section to order a bank to allow an inspection, by a party, of any records which concern the action, and to take copies of such records provided reasonable notice is given to the bank. All these provisions apply only to those banks registered in Ghana as banks. They do not apply to external banking establishments which do not operate in Ghana.

[p.163] of [1982-83] GLR 129

Mr. Kom has contended that if such stringent measures must be complied with in order to make admissible records of a local bank or copies thereof, then more stringent measures must be imposed to make copies of records of a foreign bank admissible in evidence. He argues that any relaxation of these measures, in respect of documents alleged to issue from a foreign bank, would put the party against whom they are used in a disadvantageous position. A forged document may be admitted in evidence as the truth of the facts related therein without the party against whom it is used having the opportunity to prove the forgery, if the maker or representative of the bank from which it emanates is not available as a witness.

Two reasons why the stringent measures imposed by section 176 cannot be extended to foreign banks suggest themselves to me. The first is: The power of the courts to order an inspection of books or to compel attendance is circumscribed by the power to compel obedience to these orders. We cannot commit a manager of a foreign bank resident out of the jurisdiction for contempt if he flouted an order for inspection or refused to appear as a witness. Our Constitution gives us no extra-territorial jurisdiction to commit for contempt persons who reside outside Ghana. It will therefore avail us nothing if we stretched the provisions of section 176 to cover foreign banks. The second is: banks occupy a fiduciary position vis-a-vis their customers. Unless they can be compelled to divulge information relating to their dealings with any particular customer, they will not release such information if they are not parties to the suit. If any bank did, the trust which its customers repose in it would fade. The customers may withdraw their accounts and commence banking with other financial houses. And that would be bad for business.

The question then is: If in respect of foreign banks, bankers books and copies of their records are not admissible in evidence under section 176 of NRCD 323, then, are they admissible at all under any of the provisions of that Decree?

Cheques and pay-in slips are records of business transactions between a bank and the customer named therein as payer or payee. A bank statement is nothing more than a chronological record of business transactions between a bank and the customer whose account the statement affects. They are all business records. And business records are dealt with by section 125 of NRCD 323. On this point section 125 (3) is particularly instructive. It recites that: “For the purpose of this section a ‘business’ includes every type of regularly conducted activity, business, profession, occupation, governmental activity, or operation of an institution, whether carried on for profit or not.”

Thus, the documents sought to be tendered are admissible, if at all, under the provisions of section 125 of NRCD 323. This is to

[p.164] of [1982-83] GLR 129 say, in the tendering of them, the prosecution has to satisfy all the conditions of section 125 (1) as well as any other condition stipulated by the Decree which affects the adduction of such evidence.

The section admits that such a statement is a hearsay statement because the various persons whose industry made the compilation possible are not put forward as witnesses, to testify to the truth of the entries made by each of them. But it makes such a statement nonetheless admissible if:

“(a) the writing was made in the regular course of a business;

(b) the writing was made at or near the time the act or event occurred, the condition existed, the opinion was formed, or the diagnosis was made; and (c) the sources of the information and the method and time of preparation were such as to indicate that the statement contained in the writing is reasonably trustworthy.”

Such statements as business records are receivable in evidence because their probative value does not depend upon the credit of an unidentified person, but rather on the circumstances in which the record is maintained and the inherent probability that they would be correct. When such a statement is admitted in evidence, section 134 (1) of the Decree confers on any party adverse to the party who introduced it, a right to call and examine the declarant, as if under cross-examination, concerning the statement. And section 134 (4) declares that: “Hearsay evidence that is otherwise admissible is not made inadmissible by this section because the declarant who made the statement is unavailable for examination under this section.” The phrase “unavailable as a witness” has been given statutory definition by section 116 (e) of the Decree. It includes a person who is absent from the trial and the court is unable to compel his attendance by its process.

In my view, from the above quoted sections, business records to the same extent as official records, made in discharge of duty in the ordinary course of business or professional employment, are receivable in evidence, where such evidence would be admissible if given orally, and whether the supplier of the information therein is available or unavailable as a witness.

A word of caution must here be struck. It is not every entry made in the course of business that is admissible. An entry gratuitously made by a man, even in the ordinary course of business, merely for his own satisfaction and not in the discharge of any duty, will not be admissible in evidence if he is unavailable as a witness. The entry must be an entry of a transaction effected or done by the person making the entry, and should be made contemporaneously with the

[p.165] of [1982-83] GLR 129 transaction thus effected or done, that is to say, the entry must be the last step in a continuous chain of duty, and made in the usual course or routine of that duty.

Let us now apply this principle to each of the documents which are the subject-matter of this appeal. For a document to be received in evidence, it must satisfy all the conditions imposed by section 125 of the Decree. In obscure cases, it will be necessary to adduce evidence to establish that a writing was made in the regular course of business, and that the writing was made at or near the time the act or event occurred, and the sources of information and the method and time of preparation were such as to indicate that the statement in the writing is reasonably trustworthy. When, however, business usages have been frequently proved in the superior courts, which may be shown by reported cases, they will be judicially noticed without evidence: see Ex parte Powell; Re Matthews (1875) 1 Ch.D. 501 and Ex parte Truquand; Re Parker (1885) 14 Q.B.D. 636.

It has been repeatedly established that banking houses keep records in the regular course of business, and that those records are based on writings made contemporaneously with the act or event recorded, and the sources of information are usually supplied by the customer or, on his behalf, by some other person. In such circumstances, I am of the view that judicial notice ought to be taken of the conditions under which bank records are prepared. Their adduction in evidence will therefore not require proof by a witness as to the mode of their preparation.

Learned counsel for the appellant says the accused is aggrieved and dissatisfied with the manner in which these exhibits were introduced into evidence. His first complaint is that they did not come from a person who should, in the normal run of things, have custody of such documents. And no proper foundation was laid as to how he came by them. His second, is that these exhibits had not been authenticated or identified as issuing from the source from which it is alleged they emanate.

These exhibits were tendered in evidence by Mr. Tetteh Huadji Opata. Mr. Opata is a policeman attached to the Criminal Investigations Department of the Ghana Police. On 22 August 1980, he received instructions to investigate an allegation of extortion against the accused. Together with those instructions came the following exhibits:

Exhibit H, i.e. a copy of bank statement bearing the name of the accused person and bearing account No. 21094501.

Exhibit M, i.e. a copy of a cheque for 100 pounds with a serial number 156773 and bearing account No. 21094501.

[p.166] of [1982-83] GLR 129

Exhibit N, i.e. a copy of a cheque for 100 pounds with a serial number 156774 and bearing account No. 21094501.

Exhibit O, i.e. a copy of a document enumerating the accounts of the accused in manuscript.

Exhibit L, i.e. a copy of a bank giro credit form for 1,000 pounds and bearing account No. 21094501.

Exhibit K, i.e. a copy of a bank giro credit form 10,000 pounds and bearing account No. 21094501.

Exhibit J, i.e. a bank statement sheet No. 1980/4 bearing account No. 21094501.

Exhibit J was furnished by the accused himself to members of the special tribunal. Mr. Opata observed that all the other documents bore certain characteristics common to exhibit J. They all bore the name of the accused, his account number – 21094501 – and the address of Barclays Bank International, London. He observed further, that all such documents as are cheques, i.e. exhibits M, N, K, L, were reflected in exhibit H — the bank statement bearing the name of the accused as well as his account number 21094501.

Now a giro statement is a computer generated statement. It is automatic. Instead of drawing a cheque, a debtor may arrange to make payments by bank giro credit transfer. He need not be a customer of a bank to use this facility. All he has to do is to fill in a form giving the name and bank of the payee and the amount to be transferred. If he is not a customer of the bank he pays for the use of this facility.

Mr. Opata apparently confronted the accused with these exhibits. According to learned counsel for the accused, when the accused was confronted with these exhibits, he claimed that some of the entries on exhibit H – the bank statement – were not genuine. That is to say, they were errors or forgeries.

Exhibits H, M, N, O, L, K and J were tendered in evidence, not by Mr. Opata, but by some other person earlier in the proceedings. The objection raised by counsel to Mr. Opata’s evidence relating to these documents was in regard to Mr. Opata’s observations in relation to the documents. Counsel moaned that these documents had been admitted for a limited purpose and therefore it is improper for the witness to give evidence as to the truth of their contents. Exhibits H, M, N, O, L, K and J were facsimile copies of the documents which are the subject-matter of this appeal. The learned trial judge made short shrift of the objection proffered by counsel, for Mr. Opata was not giving evidence as to the truth of the contents of those documents, but rather giving reasons for preferring charges against the accused. Those reasons were based on his observations on the material he had at hand.

[p.167] of [1982-83] GLR 129

Mr. Opata then proceeded with his testimony. He said that on 25 August 1980, he received, in his office, an envelope addressed to him and containing the originals of exhibits L, K, M, N and H. It was at this stage that Mr. Kom for the accused objected to the originals of exhibits L, K, M, N and H being tendered in evidence.

These exhibits came from the custody of Mr. Opata. He had explained how he came to possess them. They were obviously relevant to the proceedings before the court. Now by section 51 (2) of NRCD 323, all relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by any enactment. Indeed, it has more than once been laid down that where papers and other subjects of evidence are illegally taken from the possession of the party against whom they are offered, or are otherwise unlawfully obtained, it constitutes no valid objection to their admissibility, provided they be pertinent to the issue. For the court will not take notice of whether they were obtained lawfully or unlawfully, nor will it raise an issue to determine that question: see Legatt v. Tollervey (1811) 14 East 301 and Doe v. Date (1842) 3 A.B. 619. In R. v. Leatham (1861) 8 Cox C.C. 498 at p. 501, Crompton J. said: “It matters not how you get it; if you steal it even, it would be admissible. “In Kuruma v. R. [1955] 1 All E.R. 236 at p. 239, P.C. Lord Goddard C.J. emphasised that:

“. . . the test to be applied in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the court is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained.”

Even with regard to copies of original documents, if an instrument which is privileged from production comes accidentally into the hands of a stranger, who makes a copy of it; or if a solicitor, in violation of his duty, permits a stranger to take a copy of an instrument with which he was confidentially entrusted, the secondary evidence so obtained is admissible if notice to produce the original is duly given and the production is resisted on the ground of privilege: see Calcraft v. Guest [1898] 1 Q.B. 759 and Lloyd v. Mostyn (1842) 10 M. & W. 478. It goes without saying, that where a party seeks to tender originals he need not serve his adversary with a notice to produce. What can the adversary produce if the originals are not with him, and the party intending to tender them is cognisant of the fact?

Learned counsel for the appellant has prayed in aid section 52 of NRCD 323 and submitted that by the provisions of that section, Kuruma v. R. (supra) is no longer good law and that even if these exhibits are relevant they should nonetheless be excluded. Section 52 provides:

[p.168] of [1982-83] GLR 129

“52. The court in its discretion may exclude relevant evidence if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by – (a) Considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence; or (b) the risk that admission of the evidence will create substantial danger of unfair prejudice or substantial danger of confusing the issues…”

(The rest of the section is specifically limited to civil actions only.)

Counsel for the appellant concedes that the accused was confronted with copies of the documents sought to be tendered and was invited to comment thereon. The appellant was, therefore, not surprised with the contents of these documents which, being original, notice to produce any of them was unnecessary.

It is conceded that an accused person is not obliged by our law to prove his innocence. But he cannot by that token preclude the prosecution from adducing relevant evidence in its endeavour to establish a prima facie case, because the evidence adduced would prejudice his defence. Were it so, the gun by which a victim of a crime is shot cannot be produced in evidence; and the letter which expresses the intention of an adversary to commit an unlawful act cannot be accepted in evidence as evidence of mens rea.

It seems to me that evidence that will create substantial danger of unfair prejudice should be limited to such irrelevant matters as tend to show that a person has conducted himself in such manner on some previous occasion, that he is, therefore, likely to have committed the offence with which he is charged. And confusion of issues is likely to occur where there is a multiplicity of side issues or detailed evidence of small probative value. The documents objected to are not in proof of the conduct of the appellant on some previous occasion. They are alleged by the prosecution to be the very basis of the case against the appellant. They are not side issues or evidence of small probative value, they constituted the gravamen of the case for the prosecution. In any case, the risk of unfair prejudice and confusion of issues are most likely to have heavy weight in cases tried by a jury, than in cases tried by a professional judge sitting alone. In my view, the trial judge, in deciding to admit these exhibits in evidence, exercised the discretion reposed in him by the statute judicially.

If the appellant claims that the exhibits, the subject-matter of this appeal, are forgeries, it is only when they are in evidence that he can establish that they are forgeries. In my view, he is no way prejudiced by their acceptance in evidence. And he is not precluded by their acceptance, from challenging and proving them to be absolute forgeries.

[p.169] of [1982-83] GLR 129

I now turn to Mr. Kom’s second complaint. It is that a representative of the bank from which these exhibits issued, is the only person who can produce and tender them in evidence. He contends that custody of them should properly be in the said bank. And adduction of them into evidence from any other source leaves them unauthenticated and unidentified. To him, unless their authenticity as well as the contents are proved, their reception in evidence offends the rule against hearsay. To him, these documents must be proved to have issued from the alleged bank; and if it is sought to establish the truth of the facts related in them, the maker must be called.

This view is an accurate representation of the hearsay rule at common law. And great disinclination has been evidenced by the courts both here and in the United Kingdom to relax the rigours of that rule: see Myers v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1965] A.C. 1001, H.L. But by the Criminal Evidence Act, 1965, the United Kingdom Parliament altered substantially the common law rule in the United Kingdom. And in Ghana, the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323), now regulates the authentication and admissibility of such documents.

At first blush, it would appear that section 149 (1) of NRCD 323 lends support to Mr. Kom’s submission. It provides:

“149. (1) Authentication or identification of writings made or kept in the regular course of a business may be by the testimony of a representative of the business who is responsible for keeping the records or familiar with them even though he did not make the writing or see it made.”

I shall not dwell on the nuances of the word “may”, because it does not appear to me that such verbal gymnastics would be apposite for a proper appreciation of this section. I would rather call attention to the rule of interpretation which enjoins the courts to have regard to all sections of a statute and their interaction or interdependence on each other.

Section 136 (1) of the Decree provides that:

“136. (1) Where the relevancy of evidence depends upon its authenticity or identity, so that authentication or identification is required as a condition precedent to admission, that requirement is satisfied by evidence or other showing sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims”

(The emphasis is mine.)

It is in attempt to satisfy this requirement which made Mr. Opata testify that all the exhibits, bore the name of the accused, his account number and the address of Barclays Bank International; all of which

[p.170] of [1982-83] GLR 129 are characteristics common to an exhibit (exhibit J) furnished by the appellant himself.

The section does not require that a representative of the business must be called to authenticate or identify a record prior to its reception in evidence. All it demands is a sufficient showing to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. And for the avoidance of doubt, section 136 (2) provides that: “Permissible means of authentication or identification include but are not limited to, those provided in sections 137 to 161. “Section 149 which provides that a representative of the business may be called to identify a record issuing from the business house, only offers one of the means by which authentication may be effected. It does not limit the mode of identification.

Indeed, section 144 which provides that authentication or identification may be by evidence of distinctive characteristics, appearance, contents, substance or internal patterns makes it clear that, even with regard to business records, the mode of authentication or identification is not limited to the testimony of a representative of the business. Evidence or other showing, sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims, is the sole requirement of the law.

“Authentication”. declares the Commentary on the Evidence Decree at pp. 114-115 “is the process of making a preliminary showing that an object is what its proponent claims.” Authenticity means not that the object is not bogus, but it is what it is claimed to be.” So instructive is the remainder of this passage on authentication that I quote it here in full. “Authentication is not a guarantee of admissibility. The evidence once authenticated must still overcome all the other bars to admission — privilege, best evidence, hearsay, etc.

Cross, Evidence (3rd ed. 1967) Chapter XXI, 495 — Nor is authentication any guarantee that a finding of genuineness will be made by the trier of fact [Ababio v. Tutu [1962] 1 G.L.R. 489, S.C.]. Authentication is merely a preliminary showing of genuineness. Contrary evidence showing forgery, mistake or the like may be admitted and may persuade the trier. Authentication simply allows the evidence to be presented to the trier; all that the judge has determined is that there has been sufficient showing of authenticity to permit the trier to find that the article is authentic. The judge will make a preliminary determination whether a particular object has been authenticated. But even in a case tried by a judge without a jury the judge is free to find an object not to be genuine even though he has held that there has

[p.171] of [1982-83] GLR 129 been a sufficient preliminary showing of genuineness to allow the object to be admitted in evidence.

Authentication, as a question of relevancy, requires evidence of facts from which it can be inferred that a particular matter is what its proponent claims. There can be no limit to these possibilities of logical inference, and so the Decree does not limit the permissible means of authentication.”

It is evident from the above quoted passage that calling a representative of the bank who is responsible for keeping these records is not the only means by which they can be authenticated.

Before I turn to other issues of law, I think it appropriate to express my views on certain purely procedural matters concerning which there may be some doubt.

The allegation before the trial circuit court was that the exhibits complained of emanated from Barclays Bank International, Cockspur Street, London. Opata said so in his evidence. And exhibit J, which was furnished by the appellant, proclaimed that such a bank indeed existed, and was situated outside the jurisdiction of the court. The question is how is a court to be made aware that the declarant of a statement is “unavailable as a witness?”

As far as I am aware, it has always been the task of counsel in charge of the conduct of a case to decide upon the evidence which ought to be led in support of his client’s case, and then to endeavour to secure such witnesses as can testify to the facts to be proved at the trial. In criminal matters, as the instant one before the circuit court, such witnesses would be served with witness summonses to attend court if they are within the jurisdiction. Witness summonses have no efficacy outside the jurisdiction of our courts because the courts cannot compel obedience to them. They are thus never sent outside the jurisdiction.

In the case of witnesses within the jurisdiction the prosecutor may instruct the police investigator to issue them with such summonses. With regard to witnesses out of the jurisdiction it is the prosecutor himself who endeavours to procure them by invitation to come and testify. He alone it is, who can inform the court whether a witness is available or unavailable – in the sense that the witness is ‘absent from the trial and the court cannot compel his attendance by its process.” The prosecutor, in my experience, does so from the Bar and not by adducing evidence from a witness. He simply informs the court that, try as he may, he cannot produce the best evidence.

All the indicia of evidence proclaim that Barclays Bank International, Cockspur Street, London, is a London based bank carrying on business in London. As everyone knows, the servants of such a business house who compile the records of the business in the regular

[p.172] of [1982-83] GLR 129 course of business would naturally be resident where the course of the business is being conducted. That being so, the servants of Barclays Bank International, Cockspur Street, London would be outside the jurisdiction of our courts and absent from the trial, and the court cannot compel their attendance by its process. Can anyone doubt that counsel would resort to secondary evidence when the best evidence is available and at hand?

In any case, section 117 of NRCD 323 provides that: “Hearsay evidence is not admissible except as otherwise provided by this Decree or any other enactment or by agreement of the parties.” This section, to me, is clear and explicit. It means that if there is any provision in NRCD 323 or any other enactment permitting the admissibility of a hearsay statement, such a statement is admissible in evidence.

Now, section 125 (1), under which the prosecution tendered these documents, recites that:

“125. (1) Evidence of a hearsay statement contained in a writing made as a record of an act, event, condition, opinion or diagnosis is not made inadmissible by section 117 if—

(a) the writing was made in the regular course of a business;

(b) the writing was made at or near the time the act or event occurred, the condition existed, the opinion was formed, or the diagnosis was made; and

(c) the sources of the information and the method and time of preparation were such as to indicate that the statement contained in the writing is reasonably trustworthy.”

Section 125 (1) lifts out of the general rule governing the inadmissibility of hearsay statements, a business record which satisfies the three conditions stipulated. It is unpardonable and heretical to read into this section an intent that a representative of the business must be proved to be unavailable as a witness before the records of the business would be receivable in evidence. Nowhere in the section is this made a condition.

Section 118 which requires that a declarant must be unavailable as a witness before a hearsay statement is received in evidence is in relation to first-hand hearsay which, is either not in writing, or if in writing, does not form part of a record compiled under a duty imposed either by business practice or by law. Section 118, in short, deals with hearsay statements other than business records. Business records

[p.173] of [1982-83] GLR 129 difference between sections 118 and 125 cannot be over-emphasised. Whereas section 118 relates to hearsay statements which are not made in the regular course of business, section 125 is concerned with hearsay statements made under a duty to do so in the regular course of business. One must not lose sight of this distinction.

The prosecution is, therefore, not obliged to tender any evidence that a representative of the bank is absent from the trial and is unavailable as a witness. Banking institutions are under a duty by law, in Ghana and everywhere else, to keep records of all business transactions. In fact, with regard to this practice of keeping records, so old is the custom in relation to banks that, in my view, it behoves anyone who avers that the custom has not been observed by any bank to come and prove it. Tested against all the salient rules of evidence, these exhibits are receivable in evidence as what the proponents claim them to be. The appellant is at liberty to prove that they are forgeries or contain errors.

The wheel has gone full circle, and the rule stands unimpeached: That business records, to the same extent as official records, made in discharge of duty in the ordinary course of business or professional employment, are receivable in evidence, where such evidence would be admissible if given orally, and whether the supplier of the information therein is available or unavailable as a witness.

It is settled law that certiorari lies to quash a determination that is erroneous in law if the error goes to jurisdiction, or if the error is apparent on the face of the record, or if, notwithstanding that the error is neither jurisdictional nor patent, a right of appeal on points of law lies to a court in respect of a determination.

The learned Deputy Attorney-General’s preliminary objection to this appeal takes root from the last limb of this statement. To him, if no right of appeal on points of law lies to a court in respect of a determination, proceedings by way of certiorari cannot be entertained. This was why he was at pains to establish that no appeal on points of law lies either from the determination of the circuit court to admit the exhibits complained of, or from the decision of the High Court that there was no error apparent on the face of the record. The objection fails to take into consideration the other limbs of the statement. It mirrors a complete misunderstanding of the appellant’s application.

The appellant’s application for certiorari was not based on the ground that he had a right of appeal on points of law from the determination to admit these exhibits, but rather on the ground that there was an error of law apparent on the face of the record.

Errors of law may take various forms, but the errors which the appellant complained of in his application embraced three factors:

(i) admitting inadmissible evidence,

[p.174] of [1982-83] GLR 129

(ii) wrongful exercise of judicial discretion, and

(iii) failure to give reasons for the ruling of the court.

Certiorari will lie to quash a determination if any one of these is established.

In the body of my judgment, I believe I have amply demonstrated the admissibility of the exhibits complained of. I have also touched on the exercise of the discretion reposed in the court by section 52 of the Evidence Decree, 1975. I agree with Mr. Kom, learned counsel for the appellant, that under section 52, the time for the exercise of the judge’s discretion is not when he is writing his judgment, but when a document is being tendered. But the erroneous view expressed by the judge in the certiorari proceedings does not appear to me to apply to what transpired at the trial when the exhibits were being tendered. One cannot pin on the trial judge an error committed by the judge in the certiorari proceedings and expect an appellate court, sitting on the certiorari proceedings, to declare the trial judge in error.

What occurred at the trial court has been set out in full in the body of my judgment. When Mr. Kom objected to the reception of these exhibits, the trial judge in a short ruling, in which no reasons were expressed, but for which conclusion he must be deemed to have exercised a discretion, held that the documents were admissible in evidence. I say he must be deemed to have exercised his discretion because it it invariably the case that when a person is faced with two alternatives and he elects to act in one way instead of another, he exercises a discretion, albeit wrongly.

I agree with Mr. Kom that if a judge is under a duty to exercise a discretion and he fails or exercises it wrongfully certiorari will lie to quash the decision: see Instrumatic Ltd. v. Supabrase Ltd. [1969] 1 W.L.R. 519, C.A. A tribunal may be held to have failed to hear and determine according to law through basing its decision on a wrong legal principle or on irrelevant grounds or through failing to take relevant considerations into account. But unless the vitiating defect is apparent from the form of the order itself or is exhibited in a statement of reasons, it is impossible to say that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. And certiorari will not lie to quash the order on the ground that the discretion was exercised on the basis of incorrect legal principles. Except where the error is apparent on the face of the record, the improper reception of the inadmissible evidence by an inferior court is not a ground for certiorari: see R. v. Minister of Health [1939] 1 K.B. 232 at p. 246, C.A. In this appeal, no defect is apparent from the form of the order appealed, and no statement of reasons was given in which it can be said the vitiating defect was exhibited.

[p.175] of [1982-83] GLR 129

To overcome this hurdle that the error must be apparent on the face of the record, the appellant contends that the circuit judge was under a duty to give reasons for the decision to receive in evidence the exhibits complained of. The rule, as far as I can understand it, is that certiorari will lie to quash a decision where an inferior court, being under an express duty to give reasons, has given reasons which disclose faulty legal reasoning or which are inadequate to fulfil that duty: see Re Poyser and Mills’ Arbitration [1963] 1 All E.R. 612, where section 12 (1) of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958 of the United Kingdom provided, in relation to a large number of tribunals, that where any such tribunal gives any decision, it shall be the duty of the tribunal, if requested to furnish a statement, either written or oral, of the reasons for the decision.

The arbitrator was requested by the tenant to give his reasons for his decision which run thus: “I award and determine that the notice to quit dated February, 27th 1962, is a good notice. “The arbitrator in giving his reasons for the above decision did not consider the relevant issues raised individually, but merely stated that he “found as a fact that there was a sufficient work required in the notice which ought to have been done and was not done on the relevant date to justify the notice to quit.” Megaw J. held that the award, including the reasons so stated, did not by virtue of section 12 of the Act of 1958, comply with the proper form and therefore was an error on the face of the record. He continued at p. 617 of the report:

“I do not want it to be thought for a moment that I am saying that any minor or trivial error, or failure to give reasons in relation to every particular point that has been raised at the hearing, would be sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this court. Far from it. There must be something wrong and inadequate in the reasons that are given in order to enable the jurisdiction of this court to be invoked.”

The appellant in his application before the High Court, and indeed before us, failed to establish that there was an express duty cast on the circuit court to state the reasons for admitting or rejecting documents tendered as evidence in any case. I am myself not conversant with any statute which imposes such a duty on any court. It is desirable, of course, that a court of law should give reasons for any major decision arrived at over an issue which is disputed. But the failure to state reasons, where there is no express duty to do so, in my judgment, is not in itself an error of law.

For these reasons, it seems to me that the appellant has failed to show that certiorari will lie to quash the order of the circuit court that

[p.176] of [1982-83] GLR 129 the exhibits complained of are receivable in evidence. In my view, this appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.

DECISION Appeal dismissed.

D. R. K. S.

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