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[1983] SLR (HC) 6High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL II)

BOGOLO vs. ALIEBO [1982-83] GLR 1170

15 March 1983 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 34 min read

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OSCOLABOGOLO v ALIEBO [1982-83] GLR 1170 [1983] SLR (HC) 6
APABOGOLO v ALIEBO [1982-83] GLR 1170, [1983] SLR (HC) 6 (Ghana).
BluebookBOGOLO v ALIEBO [1982-83] GLR 1170, [1983] SLR (HC) 6 (Ghana High Ct. 1983).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Bedu v. Agbi [1972] 2 G.L.R. 238, C.A.

(2) Ado v. Wusu (1938) 4 W.A.C.A. 96.

(3) Anto v. Mensah (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 218, C.A.

(4) R.v Dogbe alias Togbe (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 184.

(5) Awadzi v. Adzonu (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 469.

(6) Anane v. Krah [1966] G.L.R. 782.

(7) Majolagbe v. Larbi [1959] G.L.R. 190.

(8) Bissah v. Gyampoh III [1964] G.L.R. 381, S.C.

(9) Eduful v. Pantsil [1966] G.L.R. 27, S.C.

(10) Kponuglo v. Kodadja (1933) 2 W.A.C.A. 24, P.C.

(11) Boohene v. Ofei [1959] G.L.R. 101.

(12) Attiase v. Abobbtey, Court of Appeal, 21 July 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C. 149. (13) Rufai v. Ricketts (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 95.

(14) Serwah v. Kesse [1960] G.L.R. 227, S.C.

(15) Gawu III v. Ponuku [1960] G.L.R. 101.

[p.1173] of [1982-83] GLR 1170 (16) Nkum v. Andoh [1959] G.L.R. 358.

(17) Fiscian v. Nelson (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 21.

(18) Suleman v. Johnson (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 213.

(19) Yiboe v. Duedu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 293.

(20) Practice Note [1961] G.L.R. 1, C.A.

(21) Boakye v. Baabu (1956) 2 W.A.L.R. 183.

(22) Keteku v. Dzogbenuku (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 134.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against a judgment of the District Court Grade II, Half-Assini, wherein action for a declaration of title to a farmland was dismissed. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Bright Gaisie for the plaintiff.

James Mercer for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF ANSAH-TWUM J.

This is an appeal against the judgment of the District Court Grade II, holden at Half-Assini on 23 April 1981, in which the action was dismissed and judgment was entered for the defendant in the suit in which the plaintiff claimed as follows:

“1. The plaintiff herein claims against the defendant to declare his title on that piece or parcel of the plaintiff’s farmland situate, lying and being at a place known and called `Avosuazo’ sharing boundaries on the north by the late Annor Kundoh’, , 4. The plaintiff here seeks an interim injunction order against the defendant herein, his assignees, and servants from entering into the said farmland in dispute till final hearing and determination.

5. In default plaintiff claims ¢1,000.”

The facts of the case, as found by the trial magistrate, are sufficiently set out in the judgment from which this appeal has been brought, and it may, therefore, not be necessary to set the same out here again in extenso. I may, however, refer to the relevant portions as and when I consider it necessary.

[p.1174] of [1982-83] GLR 1170

The original grounds of appeal filed by the solicitor for the appellant (hereafter called the plaintiff) dated 19 May 1981, read as follows:

“3. (a) That on the evidence the plaintiff should have been given judgment;

(b) that the court below misconceived the issues at stake and erroneously dismissed the claim of the plaintiff;

(c) that the court received inadmissible evidence and acted thereon; and (d) that the judgment was perverse.”

Additional grounds were filed on 12 May 1982 and they read as follows:

“1. Grave irregularity affecting the merits of the case were committed by the trial magistrate as specified hereunder:

(a) after the visit to the locus in quo, the court did not re-assemble the witnesses who participated in the locus in quo, did not say on oath what part they took in the recent locus in quo;

(b) the trial magistrate made use of evidence not appearing in a witness evidence in court or in the inspection report;

(d) by not giving their evidence of the part they played in the locus in quo on oath, the appellant was denied the opportunity of testing the veracity of their evidence in cross-examination.”

Learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that the plaintiff and his witnesses having offered sufficient evidence in proof of his claim, the evidence being admissible evidence, required no corroboration and it would therefore be wrong for the trial court to reject same. Counsel refers to section 7 (3) of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323). So the magistrate erred in thinking that corroboration was required. Counsel argued further that the contention that the plaintiff’s action should fail because he failed to call adjoining land owners to testify is invalid because the plaintiff himself gave evidence showing all the boundaries of his land which was not challenged under cross-examination, the plaintiff having said repeatedly that he had no boundary with the defendant; that Bedu v. Agbi [1972] 2 G.L.R. 238, C.A. must be distinguished. Learned counsel argues further that the holding by the trial magistrate that the plaintiff slept over his rights is not supported by the evidence. That the present case is distinguishable from Ado v. Wusu (1938) 4 W.A.C.A. 96, since the principle is long possession coupled with evidence that the defendant

[p.1175] of [1982-83] GLR 1170 in possession had been made to believe that he is owner of the piece of land and has expended money either in improving or defending it.

Counsel submits further that though this appears to be a claim for a declaration of title, it is a claim in trespass only. He cites Antoh v. Mensah (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 218 at p. 222, C.A. He submits that title must be in issue, otherwise, it is a claim for trespass only; the dispute was trespass, the plaintiff proved his claim and he should have been given judgment. Learned counsel argued further that the trial magistrate erred when after a visit to the locus in quo, he failed to re-assemble the witnesses to recount their evidence given at the locus for same to be tested under cross-examination. He cites R. v. Dogbe alias Togbe (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 184 and Awadzi v. Adzonu (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 469. The court appeared to have used evidence collected at the locus in quo, yet that had not been tested under cross-examination. That failure to re-assemble witnesses after the visit to the locus in quo prejudiced the plaintiffs case and therefore the judgment against him cannot stand and that appeal must be allowed.

Learned counsel for the respondent (hereafter called the defendant) has, on the other hand, submitted that the plaintiff’s writ in this matter clearly shows that title was in issue. However, even where the claim is for trespass and the defendant disputes the plaintiff’s title to the land, title is put in issue. Counsel submitted further that the plaintiff’s claim was not dismissed solely on the ground that Amenlemah was not called, so even if the magistrate was wrong on that point, that alone could not disturb the judgment. It is also not valid to say that failure to re-assemble witnesses after visit to the locus in quo was prejudicial to the plaintiff. He cites Anane v. Krah [1966] G.L.R. 782. Counsel submits, however, that if the inspection report is relied on instead of the evidence adduced, that would be irregular. The magistrate did not, however, rely heavily on the report. Counsel submits that the inspection itself was unnecessary since at the end of his case, the plaintiff had failed to establish his case, thus meriting no inspection. The plaintiff ought to have established all the four corners of the land he claimed. He mentioned four boundary owners but he failed to call even one of them to testify.

That this amounted to failure to prove what was capable of being proved and the principle in Majolagbe v. Larbi [1959] G.L.R. 190 must be applied. While the plaintiff says one thing, his witness, the third plaintiff witness, says another thing. He cites Bissah v. Gyampoh III [1964] G.L.R. 381, S.C. The plaintiff must show the identity of the area and its confines. But the plaintiff and his witnesses conflicted on the issue of identity. The boundaries were not proved by credible witnesses and a visit to the locus in quo was unnecessary and the plaintiff ought to have been non-suited.

[p.1176] of [1982-83] GLR 1170

Counsel submits further that in a claim for trespass, where the defendant who disputes the of [1982-83] GLR 1170-1189 plaintiff’s title is in possession, the defendant must remain in possession until the plaintiff establishes a superior title. This also shows that a visit to the locus in quo was unnecessary. There the court found long possession in the defendant and in the absence of any matter which makes that finding wrong, the finding must not be disturbed. Eduful v. Pantsil [1966] G.L.R. 27, S.C. confirms long possession. Here the plaintiff failed to prove his claim and the same ought to have been dismissed, to the appeal fails.

Learned counsel for the plaintiff replies further that this is purely a claim for trespass only; and being a claim for trespass to a coffee plantation which was proved, the plaintiff succeeds on this appeal.

The first point I would wish to deal with is learned counsel’s contention that the plaintiff’s claim in this matter, is a claim in trespass and not an action for declaration of title and that the plaintiff had on the evidence, established trespass and ought therefore to have succeeded. There is no doubt that in a case of this nature, commenced in the District Court Grade II, Half-Assini, the court must look at the content rather than the form of the complaint to be able to determine whether it is a claim merely for trespass or an action for declaration of title. It appears from the plaintiff’s writ quoted (supra) that the plaintiff claims title to the piece of land described therein; he claims further that the defendant is also claiming ownership over the same piece of land and has therefore authorised his nephews to commit acts of trespass thereon by cutting off some of the plaintiff’s coffee plants growing thereon, coconut trees, palm trees and cassava.

The plaintiff led evidence to establish his root of title to the land in dispute and as to how he and his nephew, Amenleman, about twenty years ago, “planted coffee on almost the whole land leaving a small portion of secondary forest on the west.” This, he said, was over twenty years ago, and they also planted coconuts on the land. The plaintiff claims further that the defendant’s grandson, Ezomiah, and one Asua Kofi, went to the land about fifteen years ago and felled some palm trees destroying some of their coffee plants, and the matter was therefore reported to the police and they were arrested . . .

The plaintiff later left the place to engage in fishing in the Ivory Coast, since coffee was not selling in Ghana then. There is evidence also that the defendant and his tenant farmers have also occupied the land in dispute and cultivated coconut plantation and other food crops thereon for over fifteen to twenty years now. It is my view, therefore, that from the line taken by the parties in dispute, the plaintiff’s title is clearly put in issue. The defendant seems to say that though the plaintiff, some time ago cultivated a coffee plantation on a piece of land in the area, the piece of land is not the same piece, or part of the land the defendant is

[p.1177] of [1982-83] GLR 1170 occupying now. It seems to me, therefore, that for the plaintiff to succeed against the defendant he must establish his title to the land occupied by the defendant as being the land in dispute. This, to me, therefore, is an action for a declaration of title, and the plaintiff therefore assumes all the burden that rests on the plaintiff in this type of action and to succeed he must discharge that burden: see Kponuglo v. Kodadja (1933) 2 W.A.C.A. 24 at pp. 24-25 where their lordships were of the view that:

“The respondent’s claim being one of damages for trespass, and for an injunction against further trespass, it follows that he has put his title in issue. His claim postulates, in their lordships’ opinion, that he is either the owner of Bunya land, or has had prior to the trespass complained of, exclusive possession of it. The principal question to be decided in the appeal would accordingly seem to be – Has the respondent discharged the onus which rests upon him of demonstrating beyond reasonable doubt that the title to the disputed land is in him?”

Their lordships therefore held at page 29 as follows:

“In the circumstances stated, their lordships are of opinion that the respondent has failed to discharge the onus of establishing beyond reasonable doubt that the title to the disputed area, i.e. Bunya land, is his, either by gift or by exclusive possession. They are also of opinion that the respondent has failed to prove that the Delame award is binding on the applicants. That being so, the respondent’s action for damages, and for an injunction, which postulates a title in him to the land, fails in fact and in law.”

The next question to be considered is whether or not the plaintiff led sufficient evidence to discharge the burden he carried in the matter so as to entitle him to be given judgment in this case. The trial magistrate answered this question in the negative when he stated as follows:

“From the point discussed it is the view of the court that the plaintiff has not been able to prove his ownership of the land in dispute. The land does not form part of the land on which the plaintiff planted his coffee.”

The question then is, is this holding of the trial court borne out by the evidence adduced? Did the plaintiff fail to prove anything which went to the root of his claim? A critical examination of the evidence adduced before the court may assist here. But in evaluating the evidence on record, this appellate court must be mindful of the principle in Boohene v. Ofei [1959] G.L.R. 101, that the credibility of witnesses is primarily and principally a matter for the trial court, which

[p.1178] of [1982-83] GLR 1170 sees, hears and observes their demeanour. It was therefore again held in Attiase v. Abobbtey, Court of Appeal, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C. 149 as follows:

An appellate court should not reverse findings of fact made by a trial court unless those findings are not supported by the evidence, and that it is not for the appellate court to substitute its opinion on facts for the opinion of the trial court. Again, where evaluation of the evidence depends upon the credibility of witnesses, it is normally the trial court which saw and heard the witnesses who should decide which witness is considered as credible, and not the appellate court to say which witness should not be believed. It is only where it is shown that in deciding upon the credibility of a witness the trial court omitted to consider evidence which discredits the witness, that the appellate court will be bound to interfere.”

Learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted forcefully that the plaintiff here led admissible evidence which required no corroboration and he ought therefore to have succeeded on his claim. The trial magistrate therefore erred in looking for corroboration in respect of the plaintiff’s evidence. Counsel urged that the plaintiff led sufficient evidence which was not challenged under cross-examination, and therefore there was no need to call adjoining land owners to testify. Counsel submitted that the decision in Bedu v. Agbi (supra) was not applicable.

It seems to me that since, as in the case of Bedu v. Agbi (supra), the plaintiff, who led evidence to establish the boundaries on three sides of the land in dispute, i.e. the eastern, western and southern boundaries, but failed to lead evidence to establish the fourth side, i.e. the northern boundary, failed, the plaintiff in the present case ought to have called the adjoining land owners he mentioned. It is correct that the court may rely on credible evidence of a plaintiff alone to give him judgment, but where, as in the present case, the defendant who is in possession of the land in dispute also claims title to the land, the plaintiff must call corroborative evidence in proof of his title to the land or he will fail. This is because mounting the witness-box by the plaintiff only to repeat the boundaries he has pleaded without calling the adjoining landowners he has mentioned to establish the boundary features of the land in dispute, or acts of occupation or ownership of same, will not amount to proof in law as enunciated in Majolagbe v. Larbi (supra).

The plaintiff here called only one of the adjoining landowners, Manford, the third plaintiff witness, who is also referred to as Awuley, but the trial court rejected his evidence as being incredible. It

[p.1179] of [1982-83] GLR 1170 does not, in my view, even appear that the witness, Manford alias Awuley’s evidence assisted the plaintiff much. Awuley alias Manford, said in examination-in -chief, as well as under cross-examination, that he does not know whether or not the defendant has an ancestral land in the area concerned, or that the plaintiff’s uncle called Amenlemah, planted coffee on their piece of land which had common boundary with the defendant’s land.

When he, the third plaintiff witness, was cross-examined by the defendant, who asked, “Do you know Andoh Kundo? “He said.”I have no boundary with him, I do not know him.” The defendant asked further, “Do you remember I have boundary with the plaintiff’s ancestral land?” The witness answered, “I do not know.” The plaintiff himself seems to admit that Andoh Kundo has a piece of land near the land in dispute. The plaintiff gave the following answers when the defendant asked him these questions:

“Q. You remember we the Ezanzule clan have boundary with you?

A. I do not know.

Q. The Andoh Kundo who has boundary with you was given that piece of land by my grandson Gyimi Ezomia?

A. I do not know – the Andoh Kundos are two.

Q. The land owned by Andoh Kundo with whom you share boundary was given to him by my clan.

A. I do not know.

Q. You know I have boundary with your ancestral land?

A. I do not know.”

It is quite obvious that learned counsel’s contention that the plaintiff led sufficient evidence which was unchallenged under cross-examination is absolutely untenable. I think the trial magistrate was right in holding that the plaintiff’s failure to call the remaining three adjoining landowners he mentioned, amounted to failure to prove the boundaries of the land in dispute as he had set out to do. The following is quoted from the trial magistrate’s judgment:

“. . . of all the people whom the plaintiff mentioned in his writ as having boundaries with him, it was only Awuley alias Manford whom he called. He failed to call the late Andoh Kundo’s successor with whom he shares common boundary on the north, Ackah Chie with whom he shares boundary on the west, and Shia and Gorgor with whom he shares boundary on the south. The plaintiff has then failed to define his boundaries.

What the trial magistrate is clearly saying here is that the plaintiff who claims as per his writ that his piece of land in the area, of which the land in dispute is a part, failed to call not less than three of the said alleged adjoining landowners, to support his claim and he,

[p.1180] of [1982-83] GLR 1170 therefore, has failed, I do not see how the plaintiff’s case here is distinguishable from Bedu v. Agbi (supra) where it was held, as stated in the headnote at p. 238:

“(2) The onus was on the plaintiffs to establish the exact boundaries of the land in dispute so that any judgment in their favour would be related to a defined area; or at least they should have proved isolated acts of ownership over the disputed area. They failed to do either of these and the trial court was therefore right in holding that they had not discharged the onus of proof on them.”

Archer J.A. (as he then was) stated as follows at pp. 241-242:

“The real hurdle which the plaintiffs had to jump was the satisfactory proof of their northern boundary. They claimed a declaration of title to all that area edged violet on the plan while the defendants claimed the larger area edged yellow. The plaintiffs also claimed recovery of possession and damages for trespass. Surely, in such a case, the plaintiffs should be able to establish the exact boundaries of the land so that any judgment in their favour would be related to a defined area. Recovery of possession would also be restricted to that area and finally damages for trespass would be assessed by considering whether the area of trespass fell within the defined area and if so how much damages should be paid.”

The trial magistrate gave other reasons why he dismissed the plaintiff’s claim. These reasons have been criticised by learned counsel for the plaintiff in his submissions. The first of these is that the magistrate erred in looking for corroboration for the plaintiff’s own evidence. I think this criticism is mainly directed against what the trial magistrate wrote on page 21, at paragraph 4 of the record of proceedings to the effect that, “the absence of Amenlemah’s evidence in this case leaves much to be desired, and that, “this omission is fatal to the plaintiff’s case.”

This court is bound by the decision in Bedu v. Agbi (supra), and, as I am of the view that this authority applies with equal force in this case, I share the view of the trial magistrate that the plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proof in a claim for a declaration of title and that therefore the trial magistrate was right even on that ground alone to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim.

I am with learned counsel for the plaintiff that it cannot be correct for the trial magistrate to say, as it were, that certain pieces of evidence given by the first and second plaintiff witnesses can be described as hearsay. The evidence referred to cannot possibly be regarded as hearsay since the witnesses talked about matters

[p.1181] of [1982-83] GLR 1170 they themselves knew or say they witnessed. I do not, however, think that the use of the word “hearsay” has occasioned any miscarriage of justice in the circumstances of this case.

This is because, as learned counsel pointed out, what the magistrate was looking for, was a piece of credible evidence which would confirm those pieces of evidence referred to. It seems to me that there are more valid reasons why Amenlemah ought to have been called to confirm the plaintiff’s claim. This is because on the very onset the plaintiff claims that the land in dispute is part of his ancestral piece of land in the area which he and his nephew, Amenlamah, had cultivated and planted coffee thereon about twenty years ago. About fifteen years ago when the chief of Twemen felled a timber tree on the land and destroyed coffee trees, it was the said nephew, Amenlemah, who reported the matter to the police and the chief was arrested.

Amenlemah, just about the same time, made a similar report to the police when the defendant’s grandson and one Asua Kofi, the second plaintiff witness, also felled palm trees on the land and destroyed some coffees trees. The plaintiff left for Ivory Coast about fifteen years ago, or thereabout, to do fishing; but, the plaintiff led no further evidence that Amenlemah, who obviously remained behind, and , as the evidence reveals, was going to their family land, ever again complained to the police or the plaintiff himself in the Ivory Coast, that the defendant himself, his nephews, grandsons or his tenants farmers had entered upon their land and made a coconut plantation or plantations on their ancestral land for about fifteen to twenty years ago.

The plaintiff called Kwame Atta, the first plaintiff witness, who said only about three years ago, one Kwaw Mensah, engaged him to fell trees on a piece of land; he also cleared four poles of the land himself and felled trees thereon. Kwaw Mensah paid him. It was when the first plaintiff witness was cross-examined by the defendant that he said, “I do not know a coffee tree, but when Amenlemah came he told me I had destroyed coffee tree. “ Why was Amenlemah not called by the plaintiff to confirm that what the witness destroyed was, in fact a coffee tree and that the coffee tree was within the area now in dispute? Similarly, the evidence of the second plaintiff witness is inconclusive: would Amenlemah have said on oath that where the second plaintiff witness felled five palm trees fall in the area now in dispute, since Ezomia did not claim the palm trees as being on the defendant’s land?

The first defendant witness, Gyimi Ezomia, gave evidence to the effect that the defendant, his uncle, showed him the limits of their ancestral land in the area about 35 years ago. The land had boundary with the plaintiff’s coffee plantation. They started cultivating the land then, and the plaintiff, his sister, Amenlemah and one Toba saw them

[p.1182] of [1982-83] GLR 1170 cultivating the land yet none of them raised any objection. The first defendant witness stated further under cross-examination by the plaintiff, “ It is true I was arrested, but the person I sent to uproot palm trees went to the plaintiff’s coffee farm by mistake and uprooted palm trees which fell on the plaintiff’s coffee plantation.” It seems to me that evidence from Amenlemah could challege this piece of evidence which appears unchalleged. Even if Amenlemah had been called at the locus in quo he could have said whether or not the area where those five palm trees were felled, fall within the land in dispute. Again the second defendant witness, Kwesi Bengobenwo’s evidence (which appears unchallenged particularly because Amenlemah did not, for no apparent reason testify) is that the defendant’s nephew, Annor Arisi gave his (the second defendant witness’) father a portion of the land in dispute about fifteen years ago, and his father planted coconut on the land: all being about fifteen years old, and now bearing fruits. His father died only about two months ago and he has been in charge of the farm. The witness added that Amenlemah saw his father making the farm and has been passing by all these years to his farm; he has never claimed ownership of the land in dispute. He, Amenlemah, has even been visiting the witness on his father’s farm and has been drinking palm wine with the second defendant witness on his father’s farm and they have been chatting there together. He stated further that he actually took charge of his father’s farm on the land in dispute about eight years ago, and has been in possession ever since but nobody has ever since disturbed his possession thereof.

No reason has been assigned why Amenlemah was not called by the plaintiff, but, could his evidence not have at least challenge this very vital piece of evidence given by the second defendant witness? There is no doubt that these considerations rightly led the trial magistrate into rejecting the plaintiff and his witnesses’ evidence and accepting the defendant’s evidence, and thereby coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to establish his claim. Is it not strange that Amenlemah who reported a chief and the first defendant witness to the police for having damaged a few coffee plants on their land, i.e. the plaintiff and Amenlemah’s land, should stand by unconcerned while the defendant and his nephews, grandsons and tenant farmers of theirs, cut down a large area of their said coffee farm for cultivation of coconut, without raising a finger in protest or even coming to court to testify in support of the plaintiff’s claim? Is it not reasonably that Amenlemah could not in the face of these unfolded facts come to court to testify on oath denying same? I think, having failed to call the three named adjoining landowners, coupled with the obvious failure to call Amenlemah, meant a serious lack or absence of evidence showing the extent of the plaintiff’s land in the area and to show

[p.1183] of [1982-83] GLR 1170 satisfactorily that the plaintiff’s land included the very land in dispute. So, as was held in Rufai v. Ricketts (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 95 at p. 96:

“This question of the absence of evidence as to the extent of the land in respect of which the present land in dispute is alleged to be a part seems to me to be the fundamental obstacle to the plaintiff’s success in this claim . . .”

And at page 97, Webber C.J. concluded with the following words which I respectfully borrow, “This is a claim for a declaration of title to land and the onus of proving ownership is on the plaintiff.” Failure to discharge the onus amounts to failure of the plaintiff’s claim. The trial court, having held as it were that in the absence of the evidence of adjoining landowners and that of Amenlemah he found the plaintiff’s evidence unsatisfactory, was entitled, and was right, to have accepted the defendant’s evidence even on the balance of probability and to enter judgment for the defendant as the court did: see Serwah v. Kesse [1960] G.L.R. 227, S.C. where it was held, as stated in the headnote that:

“. . . in an action for declaration of title to land the onus of proof is on the plaintiff and never shifts. In title cases as in all civil cases, the preponderance of probability in favour of a party may constitute sufficient ground for a judgment in favour of that party…”

Again learned counsel for the plaintiff criticised the trial magistrate’s holding that “the plaintiff has slept over his rights (if any) for far too long and he is estopped from bringing any action against the defendant … “Counsel submits that the principle in Ado v. Wusu (supra) will not apply here since there is no evidence of long possession coupled with evidence that the defendant was made to believe that he was the owner of the land and has expended money in improving or defending his title to the land. I think there is evidence here that the defendant has been on the land in dispute for about 35 years. The trial magistrate having inspected the land in dispute with the parties and some of the witnesses filed his inspection report and made the following observations in his judgment:

“From the fourth defendant witness’ plantation the whole area, far inland, is the land in dispute. It extends over an area of about one-fourth mile square. The coconut plantations and food crops of Gyimi Ezomiah, the first defendant witness, defendant’s grandnephew, occupies about the whole of the land which the plaintiff claims as forming part of the land on which he grew coffee. Some of Ezomiah’s coconut plantation on this land are between fifteen to twenty years old. In the course of our inspection

[p.1184] of [1982-83] GLR 1170 of this disputed area we reached the coconut and oil palm plantation of one Boasi Ennor. The plantation is about 23 years old and it is not being disputed that the land was given to him by the defendant on abusa shares.”

The court obviously accepted the defendant’s evidence that he and some members of his family have been on the land in dispute to the knowledge of the plaintiff, Amenlemah and some other members of the plaintiff’s family for about 35 years. To the full knowledge of the plaintiff the defendant has put some farmers on the land in dispute, and, together with those tenant farmers, the defendant and the named members of his family have cultivated coconut and oil palm plantation on the land in dispute which is about one-fourth of a mile square. This, obviously amounted to a finding that the defendant had with the full knowledge of the plaintiff occupied the disputed land for a fairly reasonably long period of 35 years, and had expended money and labour thereon and had developed the entire land in dispute into plantations of coconut, oil palm and food crops. It is my view that apart from the principle of law stated in Ado v. Wusu (supra), which seems to support the view the trial magistrate took in this matter, there is the principle of law that if the owner of a piece of land stands by and watched another person who genuinely believes, or is under the impression that he is the owner of the land, or is entitled to same and therefore occupies the land and expends money and labour, in developing the land, for instance, by making and extensive farm or farms, like coconut plantations or oil palm plantations, or a building or buildings of substantial value, that former owner will not in law be allowed to claim back the land from the person who now occupies it and is therefore in possession thereof. Here the equitable doctrine of acquiescence comes into play; the owner of a piece of land must not stand by, knowing fully well that the occupier of his land believing that he is entitled to the land, is doing something on the land which is inconsistent with his rights to the land, or should not exhibit a conduct which may clearly amount to encouraging the occupier in his expenditure of money or in other acts which the occupier may do on the land, either directly, or by obtaining from asserting his legal rights to the land.

It follows, therefore, that if the trial court had found that the land in dispute originally belonged to the plaintiff he would, on the authorities, be held to be estopped from asserting any legal rights to the land in dispute now: see the case of Gawu III v. Ponuku [1960] G.L.R. 101 where at pp. 103-104, Ollennu J. (as he then was) said:

“Having carefully studied the record of appeal and listened to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellant, I

[p.1185] of [1982-83] GLR 1170 would say that this submission is not borne out by the evidence on the record.

The evidence reveals that the cocoa farms in dispute, as seen by the members of the local court on inspection of the land are nothing less than twenty years old, the cocoa trees being twelve to fifteen inches in circumference; while the evidence as to opposition raised to the defendant cultivating the farms, apart from being confused, shows that they could not have been raised more than one and a half to four years before the action was commenced. In other words, the farms had been in existence for about sixteen to eighteen and a half years before the plaintiffs began to question the defendant’s right to make them.

Upon these facts the only reasonable conclusion that any court of justice is bound to come to is that the plaintiffs who were in occupation of the land adjoining the land in dispute, sat by, saw the defendant enter upon the land in dispute about twenty years ago and acquiesced in his expending labour and money to develop it for about a period of sixteen to eighteen years in the honest belief that it formed part of his land; and when the farms had become fully established prosperous farms, they now come forward to say that the land belongs to them and they must recover possession of the farms made thereon by the defendant.”

The court held that even if the plaintiffs could establish title in the land, their claim for possession would be dismissed. See also Nkum v. Andoh [1959] G.L.R. 358 at p. 360 where the following was quoted from Fiscian v. Nelson [1946] 12 W.A.C.A. 21 at pp. 21-22 per M’Carthy Ag. C.J.:

“…the view was expressed by the Full Court in the Bokitsi Concession Enquiry (1902, Renner, 239) that a former owner would not be allowed to claim land where he had stood by for a long time while someone else occupied the land and incurred pecuniary commitments under the impression that he was entitled to the land, notwithstanding that prescription is unknown to native customary law and that no statutory limitation applies to the case. This obiter dictum has been followed in many decisions, and the rule it enunciated is well established. The period of time which will justify the Court in acting upon it varies greatly according to the circumstances, . . .”

If, therefore, for a period of fifteen years the plaintiff’s family have sat by and allowed the defendant’s family to occupy the land, and, in the words of M’Carthy Ag. C.J. (supra) “to incur pecuniary commitments under the impression that they were entitled to the land” (by paying money to redeem the land, and spending money to establish

[p.1186] of [1982-83] GLR 1170 villages and cocoa plantations on the land, as is established by the plaintiff’s own admissions) then I have no hesitation in holding that in the circumstances of this particular case the plaintiff’s family are estopped by their conduct.

Again a claim for a declaration of title failed in Suleman v. Johnson [1951] 13 W.A.C.A. 213 where it was held, as stated in the headnote at p. 213:

“The possession by the defendant and his predecessors was inconsistent with any title in the Oloto family.

The adverse possession existed for nearly fifty years, for the last twenty-two of which, at least, the occupiers were exercising such overt acts of ownership as would have provoked the Oloto family to assert their claim to ownership or possession. The question of any reversionary rights did not arise, and, the quantum of evidence required to establish acquiescence was less than where a reversionary right existed. In the circumstances of this case the evidence established acquiescence and the plaintiff’s claim for a declaration of title failed.”

I would only wish here to close this chapter on a claim for a declaration of title that even if learned counsel for the plaintiff’s contention that this is a claim for trespass only is correct (and I have already held that this is not so in this case), once the plaintiff’s claim has been met with a plea of ownership by the defendant who is in possession, the plaintiff’s title is undoubtedly put in issue: see the decision in Yiboe v. Deudu [1957] 2 W.A.L.R 293 at p. 296, where Ollennu J. ( as he then was) held as follows:

“In a claim for trespass, a plea of ownership by the defendant usually puts the title of the plaintiff in issue especially where the defendant is in possession. I think, however, that the principle applies where the title of the defendant must conflict with that of the plaintiff, e.g., on a claim by one subject against another subject of the same stool in respect of stool land, a claim by one member of a family against another member of the same family in respect of family land, a claim by one family against another family or a claim by one stool against another stool.”

Learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted further that the failure of the trial magistrate to re-assemble witnesses after the visit to locus in quo for cross-examination prejudiced the plaintiff’s case especially since the court appears to have used evidence collected at the locus in quo. Counsel here cited the criminal case of R.v. Togbe (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 184 and Awadzi v. Adzonu (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 469 given by the Court of Appeal as reported in [1961] G.L.R. 1 at pp. 1-2 at follows:

[p.1187] of [1982-83] GLR 1170

“The court should be accompanied by the parties and relevant witnesses to the inspection. The parties or the witnesses there point out such places and things which are material to the case, etc. If certain other persons, who may assist the court in arriving at a decision in the matter are found on the land but who have not given evidence in court, are heard, those other persons should be asked to appear before the court when it re-assembles.

Then when the court re-assembles all the persons who were used at the view must be put into the witness-box, and on oath state what part they took in the recent visit to the locus and what each did.

The parties, that is the plaintiff and the defendant are to be given an opportunity of cross-examination those witnesses who after the inspection are called by the court itself, and at that stage must be deemed to be witnesses called at the instance of the court.”

It is my view that this laid down practice as to the need for giving evidence in court after a visit to the locus in quo is really meant for cases in which the court may obtain assistance in its decision from “certain other persons” (apart from the parties and their witnesses who have already testified before the court) found on the land and heard but who have not given evidence in court. I do not think the trial court is bound to follow this practice rigidly where no such “other persons are found on the land and heard” but only the witnesses who have already testified before the court visit the locus in quo to point out such places and things in confirmation of material facts about which they have already testified before the court on oath. The trial court may only in such a situation prepare and submit an inspection report in which he may record his impressions from what those old witnesses pointed out upon a visit to the locus in quo.

The inspection report filed by the trial magistrate in this case is at pages 17 and 18 of the record of proceedings, and a perusal thereof does not show a shred of evidence from any person found on the land and who had not already testified in the matter. In fact, the report mainly contains the observation made and impressions formed by the trial magistrate during the course of the visit to the locus in quo, and the inspection he carried out with regard to the land in dispute. It is correct that the trial magistrate referred to some of the impressions he formed and observations he made upon his visit to the locus in quo, yet I do not see any piece of evidence he used in his judgment as having come from, as it were, an officious bystander. What the trial magistrate was not entitled to do was to substitute his impression for evidence adduced before him on oath. It is my view, however, that the observations he makes and the impressions he forms on a visit to the

[p.1188] of [1982-83] GLR 1170 locus in quo may assist to make correct findings of facts relevant to the decision he is called upon to make in the matter. It is my view, therefore, that it is not necessary for a trial magistrate to re-assemble after a visit to the locus where no “other persons” are found on the land on a visit, and to call the old witnesses who have already testified before him and treat them as the court’s own witnesses. The court does not cease to be a court when it pays a visit to the locus in quo and the court is entitled to watch the demeanour of every witness who had already testified and who goes to the locus in quo to point out places and things he or she had already mentioned in evidence. The conduct and demeanour of the witnesses at the locus in quo may assist the trial magistrate to decide as to whether or not that particular witness is credible. I do not think the trial magistrate took any wrong step during the visit he paid to the locus in quo or relied on any matter which was prejudicial to either of the parties in this suit and therefore this ground too must fail. I would however, like to refer to the following cases which deal with the questions arising out of the trial court’s visit to the locus in quo in land cases of this kind. In Boakye v. Baadu (1956) 2 W.A.L.R. 183, where it was held, as stated in the headnote, as follows:

“ . . . although a visit by a Native Court to a ‘locus in quo’ is sometimes useful and may indeed be essential, the members of a Native Court must guard against allowing their impressions, gained on such a visit, to replace the conclusions they should properly draw from the evidence given in court and the demeanour or the witnesses who give it. This applies to a Native Appeal Court with particular force, for such courts, which do not have he advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, must not use their own impressions, gained on such a visit, as a substitute for the reliance they should place on the conclusions drawn by the trail Native Court, which has seen and heard the witnesses.”

It is my view that when an inspection is made and filed with the court, it becomes part of the proceedings in the case; for this may contain the observation made, and the impressions formed, by the trail magistrate to which he is entitled to refer in the course of his judgment in the matter: see Keteku v. Dzogbenuku (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 134 at p. 136, where the following appears:

“If the viewer is a member of the court it is sufficient if he makes a report that can be attached to the proceedings in writing. It is unnecessary for the report to be given on oath and most undesirable that the parties should be allowed to cross-examine a member of the court. There should be nothing in the practice to give rise to any appearance of a conflict of evidence or testimony

[p.1189] of [1982-83] GLR 1170 between a member of the court and either of the parties. Members of the court should not descend into the arena of battle in this way.”

I would on the whole, conclude by saying that the plaintiff succeeds on none of the grounds advanced by learned counsel and this appeal must therefore fail. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with defendant’s costs assessed at ¢1,200.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

J. A. A.

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