BUAFUL vs. CONSTRUCTION PIONEERS [1982-83] GLR 1058
13 March 1983 · WUAKU J · ≈ 9 min read
[1983] SLR (HC) 7Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Sawyer & Vincent v. Window Brace, Ltd. [1943] 1 K.B. 32; [1942] 2 All E.R. 669; 112 L.J.K.B.
23; 167 L.T. 367; 59 T.L.R. 43.
(2) Sharp Brothers & Knight v. Chant [1917] 1 K.B. 771.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION to recover money from the defendants as payment for gravel dug in excess of the amount contained in an agreement between them and the plaintiff. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
E. F. Short for the plaintiff.
Kocuvie-Tay for the defendants.
JUDGMENT OF WUAKU
The original parties to the suit herein were Nana Kofi Amanyi III and Carl Ploetner Engineering Construction (Ghana) Ltd. The original plaintiff died before the hearing of the case could be started and was substituted for by Opanyin Kweku Buaful. It appears that the original defendants too for one reason or the other have
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ceased to operate in Ghana and have been replaced by Construction Pioneers.
The plaintiff’s claim is based on an agreement dated 21 February 1977 whereby the defendants had agreed to pay ¢2,000 for the removal of 6,000 cubic yards of gravel from the plaintiff’s land. The plaintiff’s case is that the defendants had paid the ¢2,000 for the 6,000 cubic yards of gravel or soil taken but had not paid for the gravel or soil taken in excess of the 6,000 cubic yards agreed upon. The plaintiff says that in all, the defendants took 117,000 cubic yards of gravel and the defendants are therefore liable to pay to him for 111,000 cubic yards of gravel at the rate of ¢2,000 per each 6,000 cubic yards.
The defendants admit the existence of the agreement but plead that what they took from the plaintiff’s land was mineral which is vested in the government and that they paid the ¢2,000 under a mistake of law or fact. They have thus sought the Attorney-General to be joined as a third party to represent the Lands Department which they say had advised them not to pay any money to the plaintiff.
The third party notice was duly served on the Attorney-General who without entering appearance, delivered a defence. The Attorney-General, apart from delivering the defence aforesaid, never took any other part in the proceedings although served with hearing notices and a written order of the court to appear to defend the action.
The defendants took part in the proceedings up to the close of their defence, since then, they stopped attending court and thus did not address the court. In my view, there was no need to serve the defendants with hearing notices before attending court once they were in court when the case was adjourned. And as in this case, where the defendants have a counterclaim to prosecute, if they mean to defend and or prosecute their counterclaim, they should have taken it upon themselves to find out the next hearing date if they are not already aware of it.
However, on 18 November 1982 upon the order of the court, the registrar of this court wrote to the defendants and the third party to attend court on 8 December 1982, but they failed to do so, the case was adjourned from that date to two other subsequent dates, but still they failed to attend court. Therefore on the last adjourned date which was 14 January 1983, the court asked counsel for the plaintiff to address the court notwithstanding the absence of the defendants and the third party.
The defendants are a firm of civil engineers of international fame and repute. I am surprised that they should as hereinafter mentioned seek to abrogate an agreement properly entered into by them on the ground that what they themselves had described as gravel, or base soil or earth is afterall mineral and therefore are not bound by the agreement. Even when Ghana was called Gold Coast our roads and streets
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were not paved with the well-known minerals as we know them such as gold, bauxite or diamonds, etc. Today, in our history, I think, to put it very mildly, such minerals will be the last thing that anybody will think of using to construct our roads. I mean mineral in the sense we all understand it. The Minerals Act, 1962 (Act 126), defines minerals to include “minerals and ores of all kinds including precious stones, coal, mineral oil and gases.” This definition does not include gravel which are small stones with coarse sand, as used for roads and paths: see The Advanced Learners Dictionary of Current English (2nd ed.) by Hornby Gotenby & Wakefield. If the legislator had wanted to include gravel in the definition of “minerals” he would have done so.
To win for minerals, one must obtain a mining licence; the defendants admit that they have no mining licence. I hold that what the defendants dug from the Brafo Yaw burrow pit was not mineral as defined under Act 126, and that what was dug cannot be described as minerals. I hold further that the defendants dug for what they agreed to dig under the agreement, exhibit A, entered into between them and the plaintiff and are therefore liable under the agreement to pay for what they had dug.
Under the agreement the defendants are to pay ¢2,000 for 6,000 cubic yards of gravel. The plaintiff says that instead of 6,000 cubic yards the defendants have dug 117,000 cubic yards, i.e: 111,000 cubic yards more. In support of this claim the plaintiff called one George Kwandoh, a former employee of the defendants’ company. The witness said that he left the defendants’ company in March 1981. He gave evidence on 6 May 1982.
Whilst in the defendants’ employment, he was one of those who recorded the quantity of soil or gravel that were removed from burrow pits. He gave a list of such pits. He spoke from memory and that the defendants took in all 117,000 cubic yards of earth or gravel from the plaintiff’s land. If this witness was still in the defendants’ employment, I would have taken him seriously. He was merely relying on his memory and memory can at times play tricks with people and I think under the circumstances, to rely on the memory of the witness (particularly when he never stated that he had prepared the figure purposely for this litigation which he could not in any way have anticipated) will be dangerous.
The defendants’ representative could not give any figure for earth or gravel removed from the plaintiff’s land. He stated that the project covered a distance of about 54 kilometres, with many burrow pits along the road and they used about 2,500 cubic yards to cover one kilometre of the road. Their documents got lost when the Ghana Highway Authority collected the records on the project from them.
In a letter dated 11 March 1978 addressed by the plaintiff’s solicitor to the defendants, the plaintiff was claiming that the defendants
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had removed about 61,000 cubic yards, presumably, after taking account of the payment made for the initial 6,000 cubic yards. The plaintiff in that letter asked the defendants to confirm the figures if correct. The defendants wrote back to say that the correct figure was 21,060.95 cubic yards. This, to me, at first seems a bit ambiguous, because it never stated whether that figure represents the grand total or the total after deducting the initial 6,000 cubic yards.
The defendants’ letter was dated 14 March 1978. At that time the defendants had already paid ¢2,000 for the 6,000 cubic yards of gravel removed. The defendants were contending that they were liable to pay for 21,061.95 at 0.075 pesewas per cubic yard and not to the plaintiff but to the Lands Department. I am of the view that the 21,061.95 cubic yards is exclusive of the initial 6,000 cubic yards of gravel dug. I think that the plaintiff accepted this figure hence the first action: see exhibit 2.
The defendants have counterclaimed for the refund of the sum of the ¢2,000 which they paid for the 6,000 cubic yards removed from the plaintiff’s Brafo Yaw land. It seems to me that the defendants are blowing hot and cold. In their letter dated 21 March 1978 addressed to the plaintiff’s solicitor, the defendants said this:
“ . . . the amount of ¢2,000 we paid to your client was a compensation for damages caused within the gravel pit such as uprooting cassava trees, coconut and other edible vegetables of commercial value and not for 5,000 – 6,000 cubic yards as contained in your letter.”
This, in my opinion casts a lot of doubt, to say the least, on the defendants’ credibility.
In their pleadings, the defendants averred that the ¢2,000 was paid for 6,000 cubic yards of gravel and that the payment was made under a mistake of law and fact. There is no mistake of fact. The defendants bargained to dig for gravel, they succeeded in doing so. In order to avoid their legal obligation they are now saying that what they dug was mineral. As I have already held, it was not mineral that was dug. And if the ¢2,000 was paid as compensation, then it contradicts the defence and the counterclaim.
Again in my view, the defendants did not pay the money under a mistake of law and fact. I think it will be sheer nonsense for one who has by agreement dug gravel or earth or sand for some constructional work to turn round when payment is due to say that what was bargained for was mineral, that he would not pay. That is not how minerals are mined for in this country and nobody uses minerals known in the ordinary sense for filling roads which was precisely what the defendants did with the gravel dug.
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It seems that the defendants are not sure whether to plead that they paid the money under mistake of law or fact. I do not think it can be both; it can only be one of them. In Sawyer & Vincent v. Window Brace, Ltd. [1943] 1 K.B. 32 at p.34, Croom-Johnson J., restating the law, said that “a voluntary payment made under a mistake of law cannot be recovered.” And in Sharp Brothers & Knight v. Chant [1917] 1 K.B. 771 where a tenant paid and the landlord received an increased new rate of rent, both parties unaware of the passage of a Rent Restriction Act, which made any such increase in rent irrecoverable by the landlord, it was held that the money had been paid under a mistake of law and that the tenant could neither sue for it nor deduct it from any future payments to his landlord: see also Cheshire & Fifoot, Law of Contract (7th ed.), p.589.
I hold therefore that even if there is a ground for the counterclaim, the ¢2,000 was paid under a mistake of law and is not recoverable. Again if the defence is based upon the interpretation of Act 126, which is not pleaded, the ¢2,000 would still be irrecoverable as it would have been paid under a mistake of law.
The defendants failed to substantiate their defence or counterclaim or both. Nobody from the Lands Department came to testify for them confirming their assertions or allegations. The third party failed to come to defend their action. In my opinion, the counterclaim was not made out and I would dismiss it with costs in favour of the plaintiff assessed at ¢100 against the defendants.
I hold the plaintiff has locus standi to bring the action representing his family and against the defendants. There is no evidence before me that the Brafo Yaw land from which the gravel was removed is a stool land.
In the opinion of the court, the plaintiff succeeds upon his claim. The amount recoverable for the 21,061.95 cubic yards of gravel under the agreement is ¢7,020.65. Judgment is entered in favour of the plaintiff for ¢7,020.65 plus costs of ¢400 against the defendants.
DECISION
Judgment for the plaintiff
Defendants’ counterclaim dismissed.
M. C. N.-N.
