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[1983] SLR (HC) 5High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL II)

BOUSIAKO CO., LTD. vs. GHANA COCOA MARKETING BOARD; KWABO-OSEKYERE CONSTRUCTION WORKS LTD. vs. GHANA COCOA MARKETING BOARD (CONSOLIDATED) [1982-83] GLR 824

29 March 1983 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 34 min read

Cite as[1983] SLR (HC) 5
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLABOUSIAKO CO., LTD. v GHANA COCOA MARKETING BOARD; KWABO-OSEKYERE CONSTRUCTION WORKS LTD. v GHANA COCOA MARKETING BOARD (CONSOLIDATED) [1982-83] GLR 824 [1983] SLR (HC) 5
APABOUSIAKO CO., LTD. v GHANA COCOA MARKETING BOARD; KWABO-OSEKYERE CONSTRUCTION WORKS LTD. v GHANA COCOA MARKETING BOARD (CONSOLIDATED) [1982-83] GLR 824, [1983] SLR (HC) 5 (Ghana).
BluebookBOUSIAKO CO., LTD. v GHANA COCOA MARKETING BOARD; KWABO-OSEKYERE CONSTRUCTION WORKS LTD. v GHANA COCOA MARKETING BOARD (CONSOLIDATED) [1982-83] GLR 824, [1983] SLR (HC) 5 (Ghana High Ct. 1983).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Gyampo v. Evans, Court of Appeal, 26 June 1972, unreported.

(2) Bolton (H.L.) (Engineering) Co., Ltd. v. T.J. Graham & Sons Ltd. [1957] 1 Q.B. 159; [1956] 3 W.L.R. 804; [1956] 3 All E.R. 624, C.A.

(3) Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass [1972] A.C. 153;[1971] 2 W.L.R. 1166; [1971] 2 All E.R.

127, H.L.

(4) Pickard v. Sears (1837) 6 Ad. & EI 469; 2 Nev. & P.K.B. 488; Will. Woll. & Dav. 678; 112 E.R.

179.

(5) Sasu v. Nyadualah [1973] 1 G.L.R. 221, C.A.

(6) Edwards v. Skyways Ltd. [1964] 1 W.L.R. 349; [1964] 1 All E.R. 494.

(7) Balfour v. Balfour [1919] 2 K.B. 571; 35 T.L.R. 609, C.A.

[p.827] of [1982-83] GLR 824

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

AN ACTION for breach of contract for the payment of ex-gratia awards. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

J. K. Mensah (with him G. K. Barimah) for the plaintiffs.

Akuamoah Boateng (with him Miss Phyllis Christian) for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.

The above cases were tried separately. I have decided, however, to consolidate them for the purpose of this judgment as the transaction which originated the cause of action as well as the issue for determination remain the same. For clarity, and to distinguish them on specific matters, Messrs. Bousiako Co., Ltd. will be referred to as the first plaintiffs and Kwabo-Osekyere Construction Works Ltd. will be designated as the second plaintiffs. By their amended writ of summons the first plaintiffs’ claim against the defendants is for:

1. ¢2,255,306.11 being the amount due to the plaintiffs by the Cocoa Marketing Board as a result of the effect of inflation on the original contract prices duly executed by the plaintiffs for which Cocoa Marketing Board has refused or failed to pay despite repeated demands.

2. ¢454,523.37 being the accrued interest since 17 June 1981 on the above debt on the overdraft taken by the plaintiffs from their bankers as a result of Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board letter dated 17 June 1981.

3. Interest calculated from 18 November 1982 up to the date of judgment based on current bank rate. 4. Interest on the sum of ¢2,255,306.11 less the interest on the overdraft facility from the 17 June 1981 to the date of judgment and on the basis of the prevailing bank rate.

The second plaintiffs also sue the defendants for:

1. ¢3,242,790.10 being amount due to the plaintiffs by Cocoa Marketing Board as result of the effect of inflation on original contract prices duly executed by the plaintiffs for which Cocoa Marketing Board has refused or failed to pay despite repeated demands.

2. ¢701,529 being the accrued interest since October 1982 on the above debt on the overdraft taken by the plaintiffs from their bankers as a result of Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board letter dated 17 June 1981.

3. Interest calculated from November 1982 up to the date of judgment based on current bank rate. 4. Interest on the sum of ¢3,242,790.10 less the interest on the overdraft facility from the 17 June 1981 to the date of judgment on the basis of the prevailing bank rate.

[p.828] of [1982-83] GLR 824 The undisputed facts are that between 1977 and 1980 the defendants awarded separate contracts to both plaintiffs — specifically, four contracts to the first plaintiffs and five to the second plaintiffs. Both plaintiffs were to pre-finance the execution of the various contracts. The ever spiralling trend of inflation, the bane of our national economy, had its full impact on the contracts. For what with the escalating cost of materials, plant hire and labour the contract prices ran out of gear and became unreal. In the course of the contracts the plaintiffs wrote several letters to the defendants complaining about the rising cost in carrying out the contracts and praying for the “fluctuations” of the contract prices.

By a letter dated 17 June 1981 and signed by Dr. K. G. Erbynn as a member of the defendants’ Interim Management Committee and chairman of its Central Tender Board, the plaintiffs were informed that their company’s accounts with the defendants had been credited with the amounts stated against each contract as “ex-gratia award.” The letter to the first plaintiffs ran as follows:

“Dear Sir, GCMB EX-GRATIA AWARD ON CONTRACTS WHICH WERE UNDER CONSTRUCTION FROM 1 JULY 1978 TO DATE The Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (GCMB) has just concluded an exercise aimed at streamlining the method of calculating ex-gratia awards to building and road contractors engaged on GCMB projects since 1 July 1978. The payment of ex-gratia awards became necessary because of the effect of inflation on original contract prices.

2. We are happy to inform you that your company’s account with the GCMB has been credited with a total amount of ¢2,255,306.11 (two million, two hundred and fifty-five thousand, three hundred and six cedis, eleven pesewas) being ex-gratia award(s) for the under-listed project(s).

3. Arrangements are being made to pay you this amount by cheque in the joint names of your company and your bankers, if applicable.

4. We hope you will continue to give good service to the board.

Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) Dr. K. G. Erbynn Member Interim Management Committee Chairman Central Tender Board. cc: Chairman, IMC/GCMB, Accra.

Dr. K. Gyamfi, Member, IMC/GCMB, Accra.

Financial Controller, GCMB, Accra.

Chief Development Officer, GCMB, Accra.

Secretary, Central Tender Board, GCMB, Accra.”

Amount due to Project Date of Award Region Contractor Remarks Fahiakobor-Nsata feeder road 19 Feb 1980 Ashanti 1,493,092.20 almost completed Anyiasuso-Betiako 9 Mar 1978 Ashanti 227,502.63 completed Danyame feeder road 1 Nov 1978 Ashanti 506,012.98 completed Juaho-Asuhyae Bosukese feeder road 21 Sep 1977 Ashanti 28,698.30 completed District office for P.I.D. at Kaase ¢2,255,306.11

The letter to the second plaintiffs followed the same format except that for the amount in paragraph 2 we have ¢3,242,790.10 and the details of the award as set out below are as follows:

Amount due to Project Date of Award Region Contractor Remarks Akokoaso Boso Villa 1 Dec 1978 Eastern 276,899.44 completed Akropong-Asibirim Phase 1 22 Jun 1979 Central 476,016.86 completed Akropong-Asibirim Phase II 14 Jan 1980 Central 827,861.56 completed Akropong-Asibirim Phase III 7 Nov 1980 Central 1,485,758.8 very good progress

[p.830] of [1982-83] GLR 824

Tarkwa-Bankyemu Abompinso Phase I 1 Mar 1978 Western 176,253.44 completed ¢3,242,790.10

The plaintiffs say that with these letters they approached their bankers for overdraft facilities but that as the defendants failed to honour their undertaking to credit their said accounts with the said amounts the plaintiffs’ bankers began to stir. The first plaintiffs’ bankers wrote to them the following letter of demand dated 2 April 1982:

“Dear Sir,

OVERDRAFT FACILITY—A/C NO. 100111

We refer to the temporary overdraft facility granted to your company on the understanding that GCMB would pay you about ¢2.2 million cedis being ex-gratia award for projects you had executed for them.

We are very much concerned about your delay in paying the debt which now stands at ¢418,050.87 (four hundred and eighteen thousand and fifty cedis, eighty-seven pesewas) and this amount excludes interest for March 1982.

To avoid any future embarrassment, we request that you settle your indebtedness without any further delay.

Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) Victor Adu Manager.”

The second plaintiffs’ bankers, the Social Security Bank Ltd., addressed their letter dated 17 August 1982 to the defendants. This letter also ran as follows:

“The Chief Executive, Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board, P. O. Box 933, Accra.

[p.831] of [1982-83] GLR 824

Dear Sir,

M/S KWABO-OSEKYERE CONSTRUCTION WORKS LTD.

We advanced some moneys to our above customers based on your letter C/CON.15/20 dated 17 June 1981 signed by the Chairman of your Central Tender Board addressed to our above customers.

The facility is long overdue and we seek your confirmation on when we may receive payment to enable us advise our management.

Your early attention to this shall greatly be appreciated.

Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) J. E. Frimpong Manager. cc: M/S Kwabo-Osekyere Construction Works Ltd., P. O. Box 7637, Accra-North.”

The upshot of these letters from the plaintiffs’ bankers was to excite the defendants into some activity, for on 18 November 1982 they addressed identical letters to both plaintiffs in which they advised them to submit to the defendants’ bank statements of their accounts with the particular banks from the date of the defendants’ letter of 17 June 1981 which they had used to secure the overdraft facility. According to the defendants’ letter, they required these bank statements to take a decision on their complaint that the defendants’ failure to release or pay the amounts awarded had resulted in heavy charges levied on the overdraft they had taken. The plaintiffs say that although their bankers forwarded the bank statements as requested, the defendants have failed to pay them a pesewa.

The plaintiffs admit that they had received the letter from Alhaji Bawumia, chairman of the defendants’ Interim Management Committee (and dated 22 July 1981) in which he sought to withdraw the defendants’ letter of 17 June 1981 and announced that any consideration for payment of ex-gratia award had been suspended pending the completion of further investigation into the matter.

The defendants’ defence inexorably evinces their intention not to pay to the plaintiffs a pesewa by way of fluctuation or “ex-gratia award.” They completely disown the letter of 17 June 1981 because they say that the letter was null and void. In paragraph 4 of the

[p.832] of [1982-83] GLR 824 statement of claim, the plaintiffs had averred that they had completed the contracts award in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Paragraph 6 of the statement of claim adverted to the letter of 17 June 1981. I quote hereunder the pertinent paragraphs of the defence which make articulate the stand of the defendants:

“3. In answer to paragraph 5 of the statement of claim, the defendants say that it is true that the plaintiffs wrote to them but it was on the question of payment of “ex-gratia” awards.

4. The defendants vehemently deny the averment in paragraph 6 of the statement of claim and say that the letter of 17 June 1981 purported to have been written by Dr. Erbynn was not only without basis but also unauthorised and accordingly null and void, of no effect and not binding on the defendants.

5. The defendants, in further answer to paragraph 6 of the statement of claim, say that the Central Tender Board of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board does not award contracts or take decision as to payments thereof; its role is purely and strictly advisory and accordingly it can only make recommendations which are subject to the final decision of the then management of the board.

6. The defendants say further that the Central Tender Board’s advice contained in its letter of 17 June 1981 was unacceptable to management and was accordingly repudiated and that the decision of management was duly communicated to the plaintiffs in their letter No. C/IMC/177/V.1/G/GSM/47 of 22 July 1981.

7. The defendants say, in answer to paragraph 7 of the statement of claim, that in view of the defendants’ letter of 22 July 1981, the plaintiffs could not claim to have taken an overdraft on the strength of the Central Tender Board’s letter of 17 June 1981.

8. Paragraph 8 of the statement of claim is denied by the defendants.

9. The defendants admit writing to the plaintiffs on 18 November 1982 but deny that they undertook to pay the interest payable on bank overdrafts or at all.

10. The defendants say that the plaintiffs have been paid the agreed contract sums less penalties exigible and that while they admit that they have for some time been considering petitions by the plaintiffs for the payment of “ex-gratia” awards they did not and do not think that there was any basis for the payment of some or the review of the contract sum already paid by the defendants.

11. Wherefore the defendants say that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any or all the reliefs sought or at all.”

[p.833] of [1982-83] GLR 824

Paragraph 8 of the statement of claim in each case states the accrued interest on the overdraft as from 17 June 1981 up to October 1982.

The issues settled for trial are:

“(a) whether or not the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board letter dated 17 June 1981 and signed by Dr Erbynn was with the authority of Cocoa Marketing Board;

(b) whether in that above letter the Cocoa Marketing Board acknowledge their indebtedness to the plaintiffs, which they referred to as either fluctuation or ex-gratia award;

(c) whether or not the plaintiffs acted and relied on that same letter dated 17 June 1981 and irrevocably got overdraft from the plaintiffs’ bankers to complete contracts awarded by the Cocoa Marketing Board to the plaintiffs;

(d) whether or not Cocoa Marketing Board letter dated 22 July 1981 could effectively exonerate Cocoa Marketing Board from their liability to the plaintiffs in view of the changed position of the plaintiffs financially;

(e) whether or not Cocoa Marketing Board letter dated 18 November 1982 further strengthened the Cocoa Marketing Board’s indebtedness to the plaintiffs; and (f) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to their claim as per the writ including the bank interest accrued on the overdraft by the plaintiffs from their bankers.”

The defendants called their chief development officer to testify as the first defendants’ witness. He was followed in the witness-box by their senior legal officer who, at the material time, was a member/secretary of the Central Tender Board. Their evidence, supported by the relevant documents tendered, amply demonstrated that the whole question about the purported decision of the Central Tender Board to pay ex-gratia awards to the defendants’ contractors, and how much was due to each contractor, did not descend just out of the blue but that it was the result of a carefully thought out research, study and deliberations by the Central Tender Board. The primary right of the contractors to demand the increase of the “contract sum,” where applicable, is firmly bottomed in clauses 14 and 28 of the common form contract which the defendants entered into with each of the plaintiffs. In clause 14 (1) for instance, the contractor is under an obligation to pay his employees under the contract not less than the minimum government rate of wages including overtime and allowances ruling in the district for each class of work. In clause 28, which deals with fluctuations, sub-clause (1) provides that the contract sum should be deemed to have been calculated by taking into consideration the existing rates of wages including overtime and allowance as defined in clause 14 and also the current market prices at the date

[p.834] of [1982-83] GLR 824 of the contract of the materials or goods as listed and priced in appendix II to the conditions of the contract. Sub-clauses (2) and (3)(a) of clause 28 are quite pertinent. They provide:

“(2) If the aforesaid rates of wages including overtime, allowance and/or employers contribution to social welfare scheme or any other statutory enactment shall be increased or decreased after the date mentioned in sub-clause 1 (a) . . . then the net amount of such increase or decrease shall be added to or deducted from the contract sum as the case may be.

(3) (a) If during the progress of the works the market price of any of materials or goods listed in appendix II to these conditions varies from the basic price thereof then the difference between the basic price and the market price payable by the contractor and current when such materials or goods are bought shall be added or deducted from the contract sum as the case may be.”

If, from the foregoing, the plaintiffs have the right to call for an increase of the contract sum under the fluctuation clause and the defendants are under the correlative duty to pay the increase, then it is a misnomer to designate such payments as ex-gratia awards. In my view, the first plaintiffs hit the nail right on the head when in their letter dated 16 November 1982 to the defendants, exhibit E, they exposed them that they had deceptively termed as ex-gratia their claims in respect of the price variations of the contracts.

The minutes of the first meetings of the Central Tender Board held on 18 and 25 March 1981 are quite instructive. They disclose that a report showing the effects of wage increase and general inflation on the board’s contractors was discussed. This report had been prepared on the authority of the Central Tender Board by the development department assisted by Mr. Saffo, the Engineer-in-chief of the P.W.D. who was also a member of the Central Tender Board. This report presented by the chief development officer could not be dealt with fully by the board on the first day and it was, therefore, directed that a three-member committee, which included the second defendants’ witness, should study it in detail and report. When the board met on 25 March 1981 the report of the three-member committee was presented and deliberated upon. The Central Tender Board adopted the report and decided that a paper should be drafted to the chairman and copied to Dr. Erbynn explaining the premises for the increases in contract payments. This draft, according to the Central Tender Board, was to serve as a guide for all who sign contract claims and it was also to assist the committee on vetting claims. It was also decided that the principle enunciated by the three-member committee and adopted by the Central Tender Board should be communicated to all

[p.835] of [1982-83] GLR 824 consultants engaged in C.M.B. projects and that their bills should reflect these laid down principles. The chairman of the Central Tender Board, when these decisions were taken, was Dr. K. Gyamfi, who together with Alhaji Mumuni Bawumia and Dr. E. G. Erbynn constituted the defendants’ interim management committee.

Following the above decision of the Central Tender Board (contained in their minutes tendered as exhibit 3) Dr. K. Gyamfi, as chairman of the Central Tender Board, addressed his memorandum dated 18 May 1981 to both the chairman and Dr. K. G. Erbynn. A photostat copy of the memorandum was tendered as exhibit 2 and 1 quote it hereunder in extenso:

“CHAIRMAN/DR. K. G. ERBYNN C.M.B. EX-GRATIA AWARDS FOR CONTRACTORS Following several representations made by our building/roads contractors on the need for upward revision of contract prices due to the general inflationary situation of the economy, as well as the government’s approval for a review of contract prices of on-going buildings/roads projects, the Tender Board undertook a study of the CMB contract prices with a view to recommending appropriate and fair increases to compensate for the general increase in prices of building/roads projects.

2. The recommended prices were based on the following calculated assumptions:

(a) In the construction industry, the component costs in putting a building consist of:

(i) Material — 70 per cent of the cost.

(ii) Machinery — 5 per cent of the cost.

(iii) Labour — 25 per cent of the cost.

(b) However, as a result of the general inflation, the component costs in above have increased in the following manner:

(i) Material cost increased 2.0 times or 200 per cent.

(ii) Machinery cost increased 1.25 times or 12 per cent.

(iii) Labour cost increased 3.0 times or 300 per cent.

3. (a) In the case of road projects, the component costs are made up of:

(i) Material — 15 percent of the cost.

(ii) Machinery — 60 per cent of the cost.

(iii) Labour — 25 per cent of the cost.

(b) These costs have also been affected by the general inflation at the following rates:

(i) Material cost increased 2.0 times.

(ii) Machinery cost increased 1.25 times.

(iii) Labour cost increased 3.0 times.

[p.836] of [1982-83] GLR 824 (c) Thus, the following contract prices emerged.

Component Original percentage Percentage increase New total Percentage before inflation due to inflation increase due to inflation Building Road Building Road Building Road

Material 70.00 15.00 200.00 200.00 140.00 30.00 Machinery 5.00 60.00 125.00 125.00 6.25 75.00 Labour 25.00 25.00 300.00 300.00 75.00 75.00 100.00 100.00 221.25 180.00 Excess due to inflation, therefore: 121.50 80.00

4. The committee knocked off 21.5 per cent from the new total for buildings so that the overall excess due to inflation remained at 100 per cent for buildings and 80 per cent for roads; and on that basis, determined that:

(i) Road contracts awarded between 1 July 1978 and 31 October 1980, were to attract ex-gratia payments of 40 per cent above the original award price, and the remaining 40 per cent borne by the contractor.

(ii) Building contracts awarded between 1 July 1978 and 31 October 1980, were to attract ex-gratia payments of 50 per cent above the original award price, and the remaining 50 per cent borne by the contractor.

(iii) Payments due on awards as from 1 November 1980, were to attract ex-gratia awards at the rate of 80 per cent above the original award price for roads, and 100 per cent for buildings, equivalent to the full inflationary excess.

(iv) Projects to be commenced or contracted for as at 1 November 1980 would be revalued at 180 per cent pre-November price in the case of roads; and 200 per cent in the case of roads; and 200 per cent in the case of buildings.

[p.837] of [1982-83] GLR 824

(v) All ex-gratia estimates were to be paid, less any fluctuation sums previously paid, and all projects completed by 30 June 1978, are not affected by this exercise.

5. Except you have contrary views, we are directing the chief development officer to apply paragraph 4 (i-v) when submitting claims on behalf of contractors.

(Sgd.) Dr. Kwame Gyamfi Chairman Tender Board Committee cc: Chief Development Officer.

All Tender Board Members.”

On 5 May 1981 Alhaji Mumuni Bawumia reacted to the above memorandum by requesting that he be advised on the following matters: (a) whether all the contracts referred to in the memorandum have been fully executed by the contractors; (b) if not when were these contracts scheduled. He also asked the financial controller to let him know the total amount involved if the recommendations were accepted. He concluded his directives by stating that further considerations would only be given to the recommendations when these details were provided. The first defendants witness told the court that it was upon the same data set out in paragraph 4 of the memorandum (exhibit 2) that he was authorised by the Central Tender Board to compute the entitlements due to the contractors. On 17 June 1981, Dr. K. G. Erbynn, in his dual capacity as member, Interim Management Committee and Chairman, Central Tender Board, announced to the contractors the decision of the defendants to pay the ex-gratia awards.

The decision of Alhaji Mumuni Bawumia to withdraw Dr. Erbynn’s letter of 17 June 1981 was preceded by an obvious explosion within the top hierarchy of the defendants’ management. For on 21 July 1981 Dr. Kwame Gyamfi addressed the following memorandum to Alhaji Mumuni Bawumia, Chairman, Interim Management Committee:

“ALHAJI MUMUNI BAWUMIA, CHAIRMAN IMC. INTERVIEW WITH THE IMC MEMBERS BY CONTRACTORS ENGAGED ON CMB PROJECTS Your memorandum C/IMC/177/Vol.1/G/GSM/40 of 20 July 1980 refers.

I think there is a procedural problem here. If the memorandum referred to above is your reply to the contractors’

[p.838] of [1982-83] GLR 824 request to meet the members of the Interim Management Committee, then I fail to see why you addressed it to me. If on the other hand, the memorandum is meant to remind me of an exercise I have failed to carry out, then I fail to see why you copied what is clearly an internal memorandum to other people.

3. At any rate, the answers to the queries raised in your memoranda C/IMC/177/V.1/GSM/19 of 25 May 1981 and C/IMC/177/V.1/G/GSM/23 of 26 June 1981 are available in the files of the Central Tender Board. I do not think it is correct for me to personalise the ex-gratia affair by insisting to continue to write on behalf of the Central Tender Board when I am no more a member.

4. I have to observe that when you rushed to the press (see Ghanaian Times of 29 June 1981) with statements about me which you had reason to know were false and libellous, you clearly, by that act, succeeded to stretch the ex-gratia affair to cover more issues than those enumerated in your memoranda.

(Sgd.) Dr. Kwame Gyamfi Member Interim Management Committee 21 July 1981. cc: Dr. K. G. Erbynn, member, IMC.

Miss Christine Namon, Snr. Legal Officer.

Messrs. Antwi Boakye Yeboah, contractors engaged on C.M.B. Projects.

Mr A. A. Danful, Chief Dev. Officer, C.M.B.”

The day after exhibit H above had been addressed to Alhaji Mumuni Bawumia, he dispatched the letter repudiating the awards. Looking at these two letters, one cannot help but agree with the feeling expressed by the plaintiffs’ counsel that Alhaji Mumuni Bawumia wrote to vindicate his superior power.

The defendants made a bold bid to establish that the Central Tender Board, let alone Dr. K. G. Erbynn, had no power to approve the payment of fluctuation or ex-gratia awards to the plaintiffs. Indeed, they contended that the role of the Central Tender Board was advisory. In this regard they tendered their office signed copy of the letter appointing Dr. K. Gyamfi, member of the Interim Management Committee, as chairman of the re-constituted Central Tender Board. In that letter the terms of reference of the Central Tender Board have been set out. These included consideration of contracts for building

[p.839] of [1982-83] GLR 824 and road construction; ensuring that contracts awarded are properly executed on schedule and as far as possible at the approved contract price. It also states that all the recommendations would be subject to approval of the chief executive.

The appointing letter was itself signed by Alhaji Mumuni Bawumia as Chairman, Interim Management Committee. The vexing question is: who was the chief executive during the period under discussion when the management of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board was headed by a three-member committee with Alhaji Mumuni Bawumia as its chairman? The second defendants witness told the court that it was commonly accepted among the defendants’ employees that Alhaji Mumuni Bawumia was the chief executive. The designation of an important status like that of a chief executive in an important organisation like the defendants’ cannot be left to the imagination of the employees. The members of this three-man committee did not foist themselves on the defendants. Their authority derived from some appointing source and it is to that source that the court must look to find out whether Alhaji Mumuni Bawumia was designated as chief executive. If there was any such authority defining his status as chief executive as well, I daresay that the defendants, in consonance with their liberal and commendable attitude in the production of documents, would not have hesitated to produce such a document that would have assisted their defence. The failure to produce any such document to the effect that he was appointed chief executive in addition to his substantive post as the chairman of the Interim Management Committee disapproves his appointment as chief executive: see Gyampo v. Evans, Court of Appeal, 26 June 1972, unreported, which recognised the principle that if the defendant had in his possession certain documents to establish his defence and he failed to produce them, then the proper inference to be drawn is that the documents never existed or, if they did, they did not contain the averments he testified about.

I find that there was no appointed chief executive in the defendants’ organisation whose fiat was required to put the final seal on the decisions of the Central Tender Board. The exhibits tendered in court disclose that in all important matters initiated by any one member of the Interim Management Committee he kept the other members informed. For instance Dr. K. G. Erbynn’s letter to the plaintiffs announcing the ex-gratia awards was copied to the chairman, Interim Management Committee/GCMB and to Dr. K Gyamfi; Dr. K. Gyamfi’s letter which lambasted Alhaji Mumuni Bawumia was copied to Dr. K. G. Erbynn; Alhaji Mumuni Bawumia’s letter withdrawing Dr. K. G. Erbynn’s letter was copied to Dr. K. G. Erbynn and Dr. K. Gyamfi; Alhaji Mumuni Bawumia’s letter appointing Dr. Gyamfi as chairman of the Central Tender Board was copied to Dr. K. G.

[p.840] of [1982-83] GLR 824

Erbynn; Alhaji Mumuni Bawumia’s memorandum to Dr. K. Gyamfi, Chairman, Central Tender Board asking for clarification of his memorandum was copied to Dr. K. G. Erbynn; Dr. Gyamfi’s memorandum on the ex-gratia awards was minuted to both the chairman and Dr. K. G. Erbynn.

It does not appear that memoranda minuted to, or copied to the other members of the Interim Management Committee sought for their final approval of the subject under discussion but that, where applicable, they sought only for their views on the matter. Such was the memorandum minuted to his two colleagues by Dr. K. Gyamfi. Alhaji Mumuni Bawumia’s memorandum which raised the queries and presumptuously, in my view, decided that further consideration would only be given to the recommendations when the details he was after were provided was bound to plant a time-bomb within their ranks. It is no wonder that Dr. K. Gyamfi detonated the bomb by his memorandum of 21 July 1981.

I have no doubt that Dr. Erbynn who wrote as the chairman of the Central Tender Board and also as a member of the Interim Management Committee had the fullest authority to write on behalf of the defendants to announce the awards. If he had no such authority his two colleagues on the committee to whom he had copied the letters would have come out to protest immediately. Alhaji Mumuni Bawumia’s letter withdrawing it was not on the ground that Dr. Erbynn had no authority to write it. I quite agree with the plaintiffs’ counsel that by referring to Dr. Erbynn’s letter as “our letter reference number C/CON.13/20 dated 17 June 1981” Alhaji Mumuni Bawumia acknowledged its authenticity. The fact that Dr. Erbynn was at least, the de facto chairman of the Central Tender Board cannot be disputed. There was enough evidence before me that the Central Tender Board had been taking decision without reference to any outside body or person for final approval. Certain payment vouchers were tendered showing that the Central Tender Board approved those payments to the second plaintiffs without any final authority from any chief executive or even the chairman of the Interim Management Committee. The minutes of the Central Tender Board which were tendered also abound with statements which show that the Central Tender Board took their own decisions without approval from an outside body.

I have no doubt that Dr. Erbynn’s letters which announced the awards and informed the plaintiffs that their accounts with the defendants were being credited with the stated amounts were gilt-edged securities in their hands which they immediately exploited to raise the bank overdraft. The overdraft facilities granted them on the strength of those letters have been confirmed by their respective bankers. It took over one month after those letters had been written for Alhaji Mumuni Bawumia to write withdrawing the letters, by which time the plaintiffs had already taken out the bank overdrafts. At any rate his letter, in my view, was revoked by the

[p.841] of [1982-83] GLR 824 defendants when they wrote, per their director of finance, requesting the plaintiffs to submit their bank statements on their claim about the heavy interest charges.

It was argued by counsel for the plaintiffs that as the plaintiffs had entered into a contract with the defendants and had dealt in good faith with them they had the right to assume that the acts within the constitution and powers of the defendants had been duly performed and that the plaintiffs are under no obligation to inquire whether acts of internal preliminaries and management had been regularly performed. Sections 139(a) and 140 of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179) regulate the above proposition. By section 139 it is provided, among others, that any act of the board of directors or managing director, for instance, while carrying on in the usual way the business of the company should be treated as the act of the company itself; and accordingly the company shall be civilly liable therefore to the same extent as if it were a natural person.

The company shall, however, not incur civil liability to any person if that person had actual knowledge at that time of the transaction in question that the board of directors, or managing director, as the case may be, had no power to act in the matter or had acted in an irregular manner or if, having regard to his position with, or relationship to the company, he ought to have known of the absence of power or of the irregularity. Section 140 also provides for situations when the acts of any officer or agent of a company shall be deemed to be acts of the company. These are, for instance, when the company, acting through its board of directors, or managing director, shall have expressly or indirectly authorised such officer or agent to act in the matter or shall have represented the officer or agent as having its authority to act in the matter. In any of these events the company shall be civilly liable therefore to the same extent as if it were a natural person. The company shall, however, not incur civil liability to any person if that person had actual knowledge at that time of the transaction in question that the board of directors, or managing director as the case may be, had no power to act in the matter or had acted in an irregular manner or if, having regard to his position with, or relationship to the company, he ought to have known of the absence of power or of the irregularity.

The effect of the provisions of sections 139 and 140 of Act 179 is to protect third parties against the unfair operation of the ultra vires doctrine. In so far as there has been an express authorisation to act it is not difficult to hold a company liable for the acts of such officer. Section 137 of Act 179, for instance, expressly provides for the division of powers between its members in a general meeting on the one hand and its board of directors. These two bodies may also

[p.842] of [1982-83] GLR 824 expressly act through their appointed officers or agents. Section 138 also permits the delegation of the powers of the board of directors to committees and managing directors. It is when we come to consider who those officers are who have the implied authority to act on behalf of the company that the problem of ascertainment arises. In this connection reference has frequently been made to the judgment of Denning L.J. (as he then was) in H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd. v. T.J. Graham and Sons Ltd.[1957] 1 Q.B. 159, C.A. where he said at p. 172:

“A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools and act in accordance with directions from the centre.

Some of the people in the company are mere servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others are directors and managers who represent the directing mind and will of the company, and control what it does. The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as such.”

The House of Lords considered the above dicta in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass [1972] A.C. 153, H.L. and explained that Lord Denning’s words cannot necessarily apply to all servants of a company whose work is brain work, or who exercise some managerial discretion under the direction of superior officers of the company. Lord Reid at page 171 emphasised that Lord Denning only referred to those who “represent the directing mind and will of the company, and control what it does.” Lord Reid went on to explain at the same page:

“Normally the board of directors, the managing director and perhaps other superior officers of a company carry out the functions of management and speak and act as the company. Their subordinates do not. They carry out orders from above and it can make no difference that they are given some measure of discretion.

But the board of directors may delegate some part of their functions of management giving to their delegate full discretion to act independently of instructions from them. I see no difficulty in holding that they have thereby put such a delegate in their place so that within the scope of the delegation he can act as the company.”

Upon the principle that Dr. K. G. Erbynn was one of those officers who represented the other two “directing mind” of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board, his act will fully be the act of the defendants.

[p.843] of [1982-83] GLR 824

The question of absence of authority in Dr. K. G. Erbynn to write the letter does not, accordingly, arise. Even if it does arise the onus was on the defendants to prove that the plaintiffs had actual knowledge that Dr. K. G. Erbynn had no authority to write, or that having regard to their position with, or relationship to the company, they ought to have known of such absence of authority. The plaintiffs have shown that their business relationship with the defendants have been through the chief development officer and the Central Tender Board.

The chief development officer himself who heads his own department confessed his lack of sufficient knowledge about matters of management outside his department. I cannot conceive, therefore, how the plaintiffs should be expected to know of the internal management of the defendants’ vast organisation. Most of the very many documents the plaintiffs called for in their notice on the defendants to produce those documents obviously came to their knowledge after they had commenced this action, otherwise they would have capitalised on them in their pleadings. In my view the defendants have failed to prove that knowledge in the proviso to sections 139 and 140 of the Companies Code which would disentitle the plaintiffs to take advantage of those provisions.

I may state here and now that I was far from satisfied with the evidence of the two witnesses who testified for the defendants. The first defendants witness was quite open and frank when he testified for the defendants in suit No. 46/83. When he came to testify in the second case, the impression he exuded was that of someone who was haunted by the spectre that he had opened his mouth too wide and he was therefore minded to give positive evidence on what happened at his department and to be evasive on other matters outside his department.

In spite of the assuring confidence of the second defendants witness’ testimony-in-chief in the case involving the first plaintiffs, she made surprising denials on matters in cross-examination which could not be controverted because they were documented and so popular. She denied knowledge of the decisions taken by the Central Tender Board during their meeting held on 18 and 25 March at which she was present and she had recorded the minutes. As we have already noticed, that meeting was decisive on the issue of the payments of ex-gratia awards. She also denied receiving documents which were copied to her. She tried to convince the court that Dr. Erbynn on his own, conceived the payment of the ex-gratia awards and took steps to effectuate them.

In paragraph 6 of their reply the plaintiffs say in answer to paragraph 7 of the defence that the defendants are estopped from denying that the plaintiffs got overdraft because of the letter of 17 June 1981. Indeed the defendants are estopped by their conduct from repudiating

[p.844] of [1982-83] GLR 824 the letter of 17 June 1981 and from also denying that the plaintiffs were induced to take the overdraft because of their letter of 18 November 1982. This type of estoppel by conduct was stated in the case of Pickard v. Sears (1837) 6 Ad. & El. 469 as follows:

“Where one by his word or conduct wilfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on the belief so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time.”

After the defendants had written to the plaintiffs that they were entitled to so much as ex-gratia awards and they had been induced thereby to alter their position they were estopped from writing subsequently to withdraw or suspend their letter and declare it to be of no effect on their present stand that it was written without authority. Again, they are estopped by their letter calling for the bank statements from making the denial in paragraph 7 of their defence: see Sasu v. Nyadualah [1973] 1 G.L.R. 221, C.A. From all the foregoing, I answer issues (a), (b), (c) and issue (e) in the affirmative and issue (d) in the negative.

The plaintiffs are entitled to sue on the amounts awarded to them following from the terms of the contract between them and the defendants. Even if they are ex-gratia awards, pure and simple, the plaintiffs are still competent to sue upon the authority of Edwards v. Skyways Ltd. [1964] 1 W.L.R. 349, a unique decision of Megaw J. which adumbrated the principle of law involved. In that case the board of an airline company by resolution empowered its secretary “on his discussions with the British Airline Pilots Association to agree should circumstances require to the payment to redundant aircrew members of an ex-gratia amount approximating to the company’s contributions for each member of the pension and superannuation fund.” A meeting subsequently took place between representatives of the association and of the company when the principle was accepted that “pilots declared redundant and leaving the company would be given an ex-gratia payment equivalent to the company’s contribution to the pension fund. They would, of course be entitled to a refund of their own contributions to the fund.” That decision was published in the association’s “Newsletter.” The plaintiff, employed by the company, was declared redundant and left the company’s service. Having been informed by the assistant secretary of the company of what his pension would be if he chooses to draw it, and of what he would receive on a refund of his contribution and the ex-gratia payment, he informed the company that he had decided to take the refund and the ex-gratia payment. The company first paid the plaintiff the amount of

[p.845] of [1982-83] GLR 824 his own contributions. And on the following day the board resolved to rescind its previous decision to make ex-gratia payments to redundant aircrew.

In an action by the plaintiff to recover the amount of the ex-gratia payment, in which, although it was conceded there was consideration for the company’s promise, the company contended that he had no legally enforceable right to it. It was held, as stated in the headnote at p. 349:

“(1) that where, as here, an agreement was reached in the course of business relations, and there was an intention to agree, there was a heavy onus on the party alleging that it was not intended to give rise to legal obligations . . .

(2) that the words ‘ex-gratia’ in a promise to make a payment, although indicating that pre-existing legal liability was not admitted, did not carry a necessary or even probable implication that the promise was intended to be without legal effect . . .; and, there being no special circumstances whereby such an implication could be given to the words, the company had failed to establish that the parties affirmatively intended not to enter into legal relations in respect of the company’s promise to pay . . .

The plaintiff, therefore, was entitled to recover the contributions paid by the company to the fund for him.”

In the course of the judgment Megaw J. distinguished between cases where the subject-matter of the agreement is some domestic or social relationship or transaction, as in Balfour v. Balfour [1919] 2 K.B. 571, where the law would deny legal consequences to the agreement and cases where the subject-matter of the agreement is related to business affairs and the parties may, by using clear words, show that they intended to make the transaction binding in honour only, and not in law, and the courts will give effect to the expressed intention.

It now becomes apparent from the foregoing reasons that the first and second plaintiffs must succeed on their claims. The award of interest on a liquidated sum payable by a defendant is not so much on the basis that the plaintiff has been induced to take an overdraft from his bankers but rather on the principle that if the amount had been paid immediately when it became due and it had been invested in the bank it would have yielded the interest exigible. It is on this basis that I do not really comprehend whether the whole sum claimed in their indorsement (2) really represents the interest on the whole amount claimed in their indorsement (1) or it represents the interest on so much of the whole amount they took as overdraft or that it included the interest on their previous overdraft facilities. The first plaintiffs rely on exhibit E to support their interest in indorsement (2) and the second plaintiffs, it seems, are relying on exhibit G in support.

[p.846] of [1982-83] GLR 824

The safest guide is to order the interest to be calculated on the total sum awarded in their indorsement (1) at the bank rate existing as from 17 1981 up to the date of this judgment. In the result, I give judgment to the plaintiffs on their indorsement (1). I further give judgment to them on so much as would represent the interest on the sum disclosed in their indorsement (1) and calculated at the existing bank rate. Afterall, their claims in indorsements (2), (3) and (4) of their amended statements may yield the same result. [The court after examining the various amounts which ought to be paid to the plaintiffs as fluctuations or ex-gratia awards continued.] These are intricate figures but I have no doubt that the defendants would fully understand them.

As they have laid down the guiding policy in the payment of the ex-gratia awards it is the defendants’ duty to satisfy the plaintiffs in full of what is their just award without recourse to any further wasteful litigation on what is legitimately due to them. It is quite obvious that the 25 per cent and the 30 per cent fluctuations paid to the first and second plaintiffs respectively were offered as tranquilisers as they fell far short of the expected 80 per cent. I strongly urge the defendants to check up these figures and pay up the plaintiffs’ entitlements. I accordingly give judgment to each of the plaintiffs in the above terms and order that the defendants pay forthwith to the bankers of the plaintiffs disclosed to them, their cheques to cover these amounts so as to liquidate the outstanding heavy bank charges. I would award to the first plaintiffs ¢50,000 costs and to the second plaintiffs ¢50,000 costs.

DECISION

Judgment for the plaintiffs with costs.

J. A. A.

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