EDUSEI vs. DINERS CLUB SUISSE S.A. [1982-83] GLR 809
24 March 1983 · FRANCOIS JA · ≈ 10 min read
[1983] SLR (CA) 6Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Accra Furniture and Rubber Foam Co. Ltd. v. Indart S.P./A of Rome [1973] 2 G.L.R. 289 C.A.
(2) Wilson v. Smith [1980] G.L.R. 152, C.A.
(3) Cordell v. Second Clanfield Properties Ltd. [1969] 2 Ch. 9; [1968] 3 W.L.R. 864; (1968) 3 W.L.R.
864; [1968] 3 All E. R. 746; 112 S.J. 841.
(4) Attorney-General v. Levandowsky & B.A.S.E. Group [1971] 2 G.L.R. 58, C.A.
(5) Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation v. Vincenta Publications [1971] 2 G.L.R. 24 C.A.
(6) Compania Merabello San Nicholas S.A. Re [1973] Ch. 75; [1972] 3 W.L.R. 471 [1972] 3 all E.R.
448.
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(7) Bishop (John) (Caterers) Ltd. v. National Union Bank Ltd. [1973] 1 All E.R. 707.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against a decision of a trial High Court judge wherein he gave summary judgment in favour of the respondents, a foreign limited liability company, in an action for recovery of a liquidated debt. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Francois J.A.
COUNSEL
D. O. Lamptey for the appellant.
V. L. Buckle for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.
The Diners Club of Switzerland is “a body corporate incorporated and organised under the laws of Switzerland.” That is how the writ describes the plaintiffs; and that description has not been controverted on the pleadings. The club provides credit cards to its members, who according to its constitution, must been of repute and of good financial standing. These cards enable their holders to enjoy credit facilities in many parts of the world, thus obviating the cumbersome necessity of carrying huge amounts of money about.
Mr Krobo Edusei, the defendant-appellant, hereafter called the appellant, does not deny enjoying these facilities as a member of the respondents’ association. Indeed, a letter whose admissibility is pointlessly attacked in this appeal, demonstrates beyond doubt that the appellant made full use of the facilities offered to the tune of about 12,000 pounds sterling. It was his failure to meet the corresponding obligation of a good member, that is, of satisfying his debt, that he was sued.
The burden of Mr Edusei’s complaint is that he had been wrongly sued in his person and in this jurisdiction. First, he contends that he was introduced to the club by a person who required his services, and was beholden to him. The arrangement was that this third party should shoulder responsibility for any debts he, Edusei, incurred; consequently liability should have been transferred to him. He urges further that the contract should have been performed in Zurich, so the matter was not justifiable by the courts in Ghana. These matters do not exhaust Mr Edusei’ complaint. He sees a disparity between the claim and what the disputed letter of his said he owed. In these circumstances, he urges that the procedure afforded by Order 14 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), for summary judgment on liquidated claims should not be available to the respondents.
Again the affidavit in support of the application, sworn to by a Ghanaian solicitor who had no personal knowledge of the facts he attested thereto, he claims, is incompetent and subversive of the well-established rule in Accra Furniture and Rubber Foam Co., Ltd. v. Indart S.P./A. of Rome [1973] 2 G.L.R. 289, C.A. of the need for
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personal knowledge. Finally he submits that the respondent company not being registered in Ghana, or doing business here, cannot issue a valid writ in Ghana.
Having enjoyed on a lavish scale, the services extended by the club to its members “of good financial standing,” these criticisms appear ill in the mouth of the appellant; however, all the matters raised are given the consideration they deserve in this judgment.
It must be first noted, that the appellant failed to adopt the provisions of Order 16 of LN 140A to introduce into these proceedings the third party he claimed should shoulder the liability. Neither did he make any real disclosures nor produce unmistakable evidence that the liability of a third party was in issue. On the contrary, the appellant’s signature as a member who had contracted to pay his bills incurred on a non-transferable credit card, fixed him clearly and primarily with liability. This judgment, however does not foreclose any indemnity he may possess against any third party though it is but a small crumb of comfort.
The issue of jurisdiction was well thrashed out in the court below.
There was nothing on the evidence to show that Zurich was intended as the exclusive forum for the settling of disputes between the parties. Besides, by appearing unconditionally to the writ, the appellant is deemed to have waived any issue relating to the appropriateness of a forum.
The question of a disparity in the respondents’ claim and the figure in the appellant’s disputed letter, is an illogical misreading of the evidence. By that letter the appellant instructed his bankers to pay a certain sum to the respondents. That sum might be a fraction of the amount due; the appellant could have increased further his indebtedness after the instructions were issued. The letter was put in to show the appellant’s acknowledgment of a personal debt, and expose the lie in his denial of liability. The true amount sued upon, consisted of undisputed bills. As a defence therefore, there is no merit whatsoever in this red-herring.
The objection to the procedure which was utilised under Order 14 is likewise unmeritorious in the light of the clear signed acknowledgement of the bills in issue, while with regard to the affidavit sworn to by the respondents’ solicitor in Ghana, the requirement of personal knowledge of facts attested to, has undergone some modification since the Indart case (supra) was decided in 1973. By the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) No. 2) Rules, 1977 (LI 1129), a new Order 14 set out in the Schedule was promulgated. Rule 4 of the new Order 14 provides: “Unless the Court otherwise directs, an affidavit given under rule 2 or 3 may contain statements of information or belief with the sources and grounds thereof.”
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In the recent case of wilson v. Smith [1980] G.L.R. 152, C.A. it appears the Court of Appeal followed their early decision in Accra Furniture and Rubber Foam Co., Ltd. v. Indart S.P./A of Rome (supra) without considering the effect of the new Order 14, r. 4 set out in the Schedule to LI 1129. This forces an invidious choice on us of obeying precedent or complying with the terms of statute. In my view, where there are competing calls on a court, as to which authority to comply with, obeisance is due to statute rather than the decision of a higher court however exalted. I respectfully adopt the words of Megarry J. in Cordell v. Second Clanfield Properties Ltd. [1968] 3 W.L.R. 864 at p. 871.
“I should, of course, bow to authority. But as one judgment did not refer to the subsection and the other, although referring to it, made no mention of the particular words in question, I think that I must discharge my double duty of obedience to case law and to statute by giving effect to the statute.”
In my view, the affidavit of Vidal Lushington Buckle, therefore was impeccable.
The final ground of appeal is the only ground that merits serious consideration. It is formulated as an additional ground as follows:
“The respondents’ statement of claim revealed that the respondents were a foreign firm unincorporated in Ghana and NOT carrying on business in Ghana. The respondents were therefore precluded by law from issuing a writ in Ghana under the firm’s name as plaintiff. The learned High Court judge erred in law in not declaring the writ of summons null and void and dismissing it.”
In arguing this ground of appeal, learned counsel for the appellant relied on the Attorney-General v. Levandowsky & v. B.A.S.E. Group [1971] 2 G.L.R. 58, C.A. and Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation v. Vincenta Publications [1971] 2 G.L.R. 24, C.A. both judgments incidentally delivered by Archer J.A. (as he then was). Both cases essentially dealt with partnerships tracing their history in litigations in our courts as well as in other jurisdictions. The appellant argued that the principle extended to any artificially created persona like a limited liability company. The respondents canvassed a contrary view, and maintained that the parameters could not be extended beyond partnerships whose historical antecedents created the difficulties that the two local cases sought to resolve.
It is obvious that a court must be satisfied that the parties appearing as suitors before it, did exist as legal personae whether human in form or artificially created. In the latter class of cases, the court must see whether the legal indices that constitute the clothing really adorn a
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legally acceptable fictional character, permitting it access to our courts.
The English decisions follow a similar train of thought. One perceives for instance , serious attempts made at preliminary stages of the trial of English cases, to obtain the fullest disclosures of the identity of the foreign artificial persona before trial: se Re Compania Merabello San Nicholas S.A. [1972] 3 All E.R. 448 at p. 450 where the opening words of Megarry J.’s judgment reads, “The company was incorporated in Panama. . . and all the details about the company have been obtained from the Panama public registry.”
In the present appeal, no challenge was made to the fictional character of the respondents as a limited liability company. The challenge was made to their recognition as a foreign company in the Ghanaian courts. This was expressed in paragraph 1 of the statement of defence as follows, “The defendant says that plaintiff has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings in this honourable court since the plaintiffs are not incorporated under the laws of Ghana.” The attack is not against the plaintiffs’ incorporation simpliciter but against non-incorporation under the laws of Ghana. It is one thing to deny a company legal status, another to disqualify it from appearing in our courts.
It is clear therefore that no dispute was raised as to the respondents’ status as a limited liability company as such and the correct inference from the facts and the pleadings is that the appellant acknowledges the existence of the respondents as a limited liability company. The simple task of the appellant therefore is to satisfy this court that under Ghanaian law, a company so limited in its liability but which is not registered or carrying on business in Ghana is debarred from suing in our courts. Apart from citing the Levandowsky and Vincenta cases, learned counsel for the appellant made no effort to bring to our attention, any authority (statute law or case law) where a foreign limited liability company has been denied access to our courts.
In the Merabello case (supra), it was held that a foreign limited liability company need not have carried on business or have had a place of business in England to be amenable to English jurisdiction on winding-up proceedings provided it had assets to be dealt with within the jurisdiction. The Levandowsky and Vincenta cases involved partnerships or firms, not limited liability companies. The decisions derive their viability from the interpretation of Order 48A of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A). That Order permits partnership actions to be prosecuted in our courts, where it is disclosed that the partnerships are either registered or doing business here and the suit is by an identifiable human persona suing for the partnership. But with a limited liability company, the identity of the
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company is known at law. It is a legal persona; that is why the preliminary hurdle, in other jurisdictions, of making quite sure the company exists, is undertaken.
Where the identity is known, a necessary assumption follows that a fictional entity created by law exists and that body can pursue legal actions. The only hostage to fortune that the courts in their discretion impose is security for costs. This is only fair so that the party sued, if he won, would not be damnified in seeking relief from the plaintiff who was chasing a mirage in foreign climes: see eg. Bishop (John) (Caterers) Ltd. v. National Union Bank Ltd. [1973] 1 All E.R. 707.
It seems that this obeisance to fairness was complied with by the court below when first it ordered the judgment debt to be deposited in court, and when on a review of its order it made the defendant pay costs of ¢7,000 into court and enter into a bond to honour the judgment debt should he lose the appeal. On all counts therefore, this appeal is without merit and it should fail.
An appeal from this decision can only go to the Supreme Court. I think the ends of justice would be met if the appellant pays the judgment debt and all costs outstanding into court within a fortnight of the date hereof. The respondents would be at liberty to withdraw this sum after three months if no appeal has been lodged or if the appeal has been disposed of in their favour, by then. If the appellant fails to comply with this order within the time stipulated, the respondents would be at liberty to go into execution.
JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.
I agree.
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.
I also agree.
DECISION Appeal dismissed. J. A. A.
