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[1983] SLR (HC) 12High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

MARITIME AND DOCKWORKERS’ UNION OF THE TRADES UNION CONGRESS OF GHANA vs. STATE SHIPPING CORPORATION (BLACK STAR LINE) [1982-83] GLR 671

23 March 1983 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 25 min read

Cite as[1983] SLR (HC) 12
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OSCOLAMARITIME AND DOCKWORKERS’ UNION OF THE TRADES UNION CONGRESS OF GHANA v STATE SHIPPING CORPORATION (BLACK STAR LINE) [1982-83] GLR 671 [1983] SLR (HC) 12
APAMARITIME AND DOCKWORKERS’ UNION OF THE TRADES UNION CONGRESS OF GHANA v STATE SHIPPING CORPORATION (BLACK STAR LINE) [1982-83] GLR 671, [1983] SLR (HC) 12 (Ghana).
BluebookMARITIME AND DOCKWORKERS’ UNION OF THE TRADES UNION CONGRESS OF GHANA v STATE SHIPPING CORPORATION (BLACK STAR LINE) [1982-83] GLR 671, [1983] SLR (HC) 12 (Ghana High Ct. 1983).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood [1894] A.C. 347; 63 L.J.P.C. 74; 71 L.T. 205; 10 T.L.R.

527, H.L.

(2) R.v. Minister of Health; Ex parte Davis [1929] 1 K.B. 619; 98 L.J.K.B. 636; 141 L.T. 6; 93 J.P. 49;

45 T.L.R. 345, C.A.

(3) Minister of Health v. R. Yaffe [1931] A.C. 494; 10 L.J.K.B. 306; 47 T.L.R. 337; 75 S.J. 232, H.L. sub nom. R. v. Minister of Health; Ex parte Yaffe 145 L.T. 98; 95 J.P. 125; 29 L.G.R. 305, H.L.

(4) Republic v. Chieftaincy Committee on Wiamoasehene Stool Affairs; Ex parte Oppong Kwame [1978] G.L.R. 467, C.A. (full bench).

(5) Rolimpex Centrala Handlu Zagranicznego v. Haji E. Dossa & Sons Ltd. [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.

380.

(6) Thames Ironworks and Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. v. R. (1869) 10 B. & S.33; 20 L.T. 318.

(7) Davies v. Price (1864) 34 L.J.Q.B. 8; 11 L.T. 203; 12 W.R. 1009; affirming (1862) 6 L.T. (N.S)

713.

(8) Hamlyn v. Bettely (1880) 6 Q.B.D. 63; 50 L.J.Q.B. 1;43 L.T. 790; 29 W.R. 275, C.A.

(9) Holt v. Meddowcroft (1846) 4 M. & S. 467.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION for an order that an award made by the arbitrator appointed by the minister under the Industrial Relations Act, 1965

[p.676] of [1982-83] GLR 671

(Act 299), and duly confirmed by the minister in the Commercial and Industrial Bulletin be implemented by the management of the defendant corporation. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

O. K. Osafo-Buabeng for the plaintiffs.

Kockuvie-Tay for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.

Consequent upon an industrial dispute which erupted between the Maritime and Dockworkers’ Union of the T.U.C. (Black Star Line branch) and the management of the State Shipping Corporation (Black Star Line,) the Commissioner for Labour and Social Welfare appointed Dr. Joe K. Ansere as the sole arbitrator. His terms of reference were, “to inquire into whether or not the workers who occupy houses owned by the Black Star Line should be paid 20 per cent rent allowance.” After he had concluded the arbitral proceedings the arbitrator made his awards in the following terms:

“I therefore award that the payment of the 20 per cent rent allowance to workers while occupying corporation houses should cease with effect from 30 April 1979…Although I feel the workers occupying Black Star Line houses should not receive the 20 per cent rent allowance, I am inclined to agree that the union has a case in demanding that the workers who had been residing in the corporation’s houses be allowed to own them. I therefore award further that management take immediate steps to hand over all the houses to the workers, and this to take effect from 1 May 1979. The implication of this award is that the workers who have now become owners of the houses will be entitled to receive the 20 per cent allowance.”

These awards were duly confirmed by the Commissioner for Labour and Social Welfare on 27 July 1979 and published in the Commercial and Industrial Bulletin No. 26 on Friday, 3 August 1979. Pursuant to this award the board of directors of the defendant-corporation decided that the arbitration award should be implemented and they notified the plaintiffs accordingly by their circular letter. The plaintiffs complain that, in spite of the said arbitration award and the decision of the board of directors, the management of the defendant-corporation have failed and refused and continue to refuse to implement the said award and decision. The plaintiffs contended that the refusal of the defendant-corporation to implement the said award and decision was unlawful and wrongful and that unless they were otherwise ordered and compelled to do so by a court’s order the defendant-corporation would never implement the said award and decision. They have, therefore, sued for:

[p.677] of [1982-83] GLR 671

“An order that the defendant-corporation in compliance with the said arbitration award and the said decision should transfer the houses whose numbers are given in exhibit A (attached to the statement of claim) to the persons whose names appear in respect of the houses”.

In their defence the defendants have traversed, inter alia, that the matter in dispute which was referred to Dr. Joe K. Ansere to inquire into and resolve did not go beyond the terms of reference already set out. In respect, thereof, he awarded “that the payment of the 20 per cent allowance to workers while occupying corporation houses should cease with effect from 30 April 1979.

They say that in making the further award and directions or both the arbitrator exceeded his authority and he acted without jurisdiction or alternatively exceeded his jurisdiction, by reason whereof the said further award and directives are pro tanto bad, void ab initio and are not binding or enforceable against the defendants. Consequently, the further award and directives or both were incapable of confirmation implementation or both by the Commissioner for Labour and Social Welfare and the defendant-corporation’s board of directors or any other person or body of persons or authority. They say that the void and non-binding award and directions can be disentangled from the good, valid, binding and enforceable award referred to in their paragraph 5 and they consequently counterclaimed for:

“(1) A declaration that the award made by the said Dr. Joe K. Ansere in respect of stoppage of the payment of the 20 per cent allowance to the workers, referred to in paragraph 5 hereof is good, valid and binding on the plaintiffs and the defendant-corporation.

(2) A declaration that the further award and directives or both made by the said Dr. Joe K. Ansere in respect of the handing over of the defendant-corporation’s houses to the workers referred to in paragraph 6 hereof were and are bad, invalid, void ab initio and not-binding and unenforceable against the defendant-corporation being wholly beyond his jurisdiction.”

When the case came on for trial counsel for both parties agreed that the issues set down for trial purely involve points of law. Accordingly, they decided to argue on the law. Those matters of fact contained in certain documents which they did not dispute were admitted in evidence by consent and marked as exhibits. These were the Commercial and Industrial Bulletin which published the report of the arbitrator (exhibit A), the list of the names of those persons on whose behalf the plaintiffs have sued and the respective houses they occupy

[p.678] of [1982-83] GLR 671

(exhibit B), the board of directors’ letter implementing the arbitration award (exhibit C) and the letter from the defendants’ estate officer (exhibit D). It will be pertinent at the onset to quote the contents of exhibit C. Exhibit C was dated 11 December 1979, and addressed to the plaintiffs’ general secretary. It runs as follows:

“Dear Sir, IMPLEMENTATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD I have been directed by the board to advise you that at its meeting held on 5 October 1979, the arbitration award in respect of the dispute between the M.D.U., Tema Branch and the management of Black Star Line was considered by members who directed as follows:

(1) The award of the arbitrator that the corporation’s houses at Tema currently occupied by the junior staff ashore at Tema should be handed over to the staff members now in occupation should be implemented.

(2) The junior staff members ashore at Tema who live in houses which have been let out to the corporation on hire-purchase terms should vacate the houses and the houses when vacated should be used as the corporation’s transit quarters.

(3) The houses purchased outright by the corporation should be handed over to the occupants only on payment of the cost of any improvements made on the houses by the corporation:

(4) The occupants of the houses should be responsible for insurance and any other repairs whilst in occupation.

(5) The estate officer should liaise with the Tema Development Corporation to work out the full details of the transfer of properties.

It would be highly appreciated if you will bring this matter to the notice of all concerned.

Yours faithfully, State Shipping Corporation (Black Star Line)

(Sgd.)

A. G. Buabeng.

Ag. Solicitor Secretary.”

[p.679] of [1982-83] GLR 671

The issues settled for trial are: (1) whether or not the sole arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction in awarding further that the management of the defendant-corporation should take steps to hand over all the houses to workers with effect from 1 May 1979; (2) whether or not if it is held that the plaintiffs and the defendants submitted voluntarily to the sole arbitrator for the adjudication of the matters including the matter of the transfer of the said houses by the defendants to the plaintiffs’ union members, the defendants are estopped from challenging the said further award; and (3) whether or not those union members who have left the service of the defendant-corporation should be divested of the ownership or tenancy of the said houses.

Arguing on the contentious award, the plaintiffs’ counsel made the following submissions: ownership of the houses was raised by the union in the course of the arbitration and the management also raised their view. It was at this time that management could have challenged the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to discuss the issue. They failed to do this and by their conduct they conferred jurisdiction on the arbitrator, even if he had none.

The further award was itself incidental and relevant to the terms of reference. A term of reference can embrace all matters related to it. The question of ownership was so related as the question of allowance was determinable on whether or not one was the owner of the house. The parties voluntarily submitted to the arbitration and after the arbitrator had made his award and it had been given statutory backing, the defendants took steps to implement it by their exhibits C and D. The defendants are estopped from challenging the award. Their refusal to implement it is unlawful and wrongful and the court must direct them to do so.

Counsel for the defendants also argued to the following effect: The plaintiffs seek to enforce an award under a statutory arbitration, i.e. the Industrial Relations Act, 1965 (Act 299), and they have to establish the validity of the award to succeed. A statutory arbitration takes its character from the statute. Section 18 of Act 299 requires the issues between the parties to be set out. Where a statute confers a power, that power alone can be exercised and nothing more.

The issue whether the workers should be paid 20 per cent rent allowance and the issue whether the houses should be handed over to them are entirely different and the latter can never arise on the consideration of the former. Section 15 (2) of Act 299 clearly shows that if the award is not valid it cannot be regarded as a collective agreement under the Act. The Act, from this, takes cognisance of invalid awards. Since the second part of the award was not supported by any submission or reference within section 18 of Act 299 the award was invalid. It is a misconduct on the part of the arbitrator to purport to include matters not referred to him. If an award is a nullity, the defendant can defend an

[p.680] of [1982-83] GLR 671 action on that award on the ground that it is a nullity and unenforceable.

The combined effect of sections 15 (2), 18 and 20 of the Act is that the minister can only confirm a valid award within section 15 (2) and in compliance with section 18. The further award was invalid because no issues on them had been submitted under section 18 and the minister’s purported confirmation was a nullity as he had no power under the Act to validate what is invalid by the act of confirmation. In the same vein, the acts of the defendants’ directors and management, as contained in exhibits C and D, are invalid and a nullity insofar as they were acting upon the award.

On the question of estoppel, there is nothing in the report that the management said anything in connection with the issue about the ownership of the houses. The report says that the question was discussed with the management but there is nothing to show either that the management participated in this issue or that they consented to anything. This was a statutory arbitration, and even if the parties had consented that the arbitrator should determine the issue it would still have been invalid for want of proper appointment. In any case the principle of estoppel is inapplicable where there is a nullity. The defendants’ counsel, finally, prayed the court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ action and to grant the defendants’ counterclaim.

Counsel for the parties were by no means found wanting in advancing illuminating authorities in support of their arguments. Before I embark upon a disquisition it will be necessary to sound a caveat, which is that Act 299, which governed the arbitration between the parties excludes the application of the arbitration Act, 1961 (Act 38), to any proceedings of an arbitration tribunal under section 18 of Act 299, or to any award issued by it.

Accordingly, the body of foreign judicial decisions which have accumulated around corresponding provisions of our Act 38 will have no application herein. Under Act 299 the court, for instance, has no power to remit an award; nor has it any power to remove an arbitrator or set aside an award for misconduct. Under section 18 of Act 299 the power to initiate arbitral proceedings rests with the “Minister” by referring the issues to be determined to an arbitration tribunal appointed by him and constituted in any of the three specified ways.

Unlike an award under the Act 38, where the award made by the arbitrator or umpire, as the case may be, shall be final and binding on the parties, section 20 (1) of Act 299 provides that an award on a reference shall not take effect unless confirmed by the minister by notice published in the Gazette. It is clear, from the foregoing, that it is only the minister’s confirmation that validates or makes effective the award. In other words, by the adoption of the award by the minister, by his confirmation, the arbitrator is consigned to the back-room and the award, as it were, becomes the act of the minister.

[p.681] of [1982-83] GLR 671

Counsel for the defendants has, in effect, expressed the view that the veil can be lifted to inquire into the validity of the award because of the combined effect of sections 15 (2) and 18 of Act 299. Section 15 (2) provides:

“(2) For the purpose of this Act any valid award made on a reference to arbitration to which the representatives on a standing negotiating committee under this Act are parties shall be regarded as a collective agreement under this Act.”

The provisions in section 15 cannot be truncated to suit one’s purpose. If both section 15 (1) and (2) are read together it becomes obvious that the valid award made on a reference to arbitration applies to the award of a voluntary or optional arbitration constituted by the minister under subsection (2) of section 3 of the Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Ordinance, Cap. 93 (1951 Rev.) This is quite in contradistinction with the award made as the result of a compulsory reference to arbitration constituted under section 18 of Act 299. Section 3 (2) of the Trades Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Ordinance, Cap. 93, makes the following provisions:

“(2) Where a trade dispute exists or is apprehended the Minister may, subject as hereinafter provided, if he thinks fit and if both parties consent, refer the matter for settlement to an arbitration tribunal constituted of either — (a) a sole arbitrator appointed by the minister; or (b) an arbitrator appointed by the minister assisted by one or more assessors nominated by or on behalf of the employers concerned and an equal number of assessors nominated by or on behalf of the workmen concerned, all of whom shall be appointed by the Minister . . . or (c) one or more arbitrators nominated by or on behalf of the employers concerned and an equal number of arbitrators nominated by or on behalf of the workmen concerned and an independent chairman, all of whom shall be appointed by the Minister . . .”

The subsection provides that in (a) and (b) the award shall be issued by the arbitrator only and in (c) the matter shall be decided by the chairman as the sole arbitrator where all the members of the tribunal are unable to agree as to their award. It is significant to note that the above provisions make no room for the minister to settle any issues for reference on notice to the parties. The reference of the dispute to an arbitration tribunal can take place only where all the parties

[p.682] of [1982-83] GLR 671 consent. Except for sections 1, 13 and 14 which have been amended by the Constitution (Consequential Provisions) Act, 1960 (CA 8), Sched. 2, and section 3(1) which has been excluded by section 15(1) of Act 299, the Trades Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Ordinance, Cap. 93 still remains in our statute books. Section 5 of Cap. 93 provides that an award of an arbitration tribunal set up under section 3(2) shall not make an award which is inconsistent with or conflicts with any law on the subject of the award.

Accordingly, an award is valid (for the purposes of section 15 (2) of Act 299) if it is not inconsistent with or does not conflict with any law regulating the subject-matter of the dispute. It follows that section 15 (2) of Act 299 cannot lend its force to render the award of the arbitrator constituted under section 18 of the said Act invalid merely because there was no reference on notice of the issue about which the award was made.

I am of the view that where the minister has duly confirmed the award on a reference it shall not be competent for a party to challenge its validity thereafter by any judicial process because by the act of confirmation in the manner prescribed, the award will have absolute statutory effect. If the validity of the award is to be impugned it must be before the act of confirmation.

The defendants’ counsel, as noted before, has argued to the effect that as the statute required that all the issues were to be referred to the arbitrator before the minister could confirm the award, omission of the reference of a particular issue will render the confirmation of the award founded on that issue ultra vires. I can only support my proposition above by an analogy.

It is well known in administrative law that there is a common provision whereby rules and regulations made under an authorising section of a statute and which have been confirmed by a minister “shall have effect as if enacted in this Act.” Problems have arisen concerning the exact relation of this sub – legislation to the main objective of the parent enactment when rules and regulations are expressly given validity “as if enacted in this Act.” In Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood [1894] A.C. 347, H.L. the common provision that rules and regulations made under an authorising section “shall have effect as if enacted in this Act” became its storm-centre.

Lord Herschell L.C. held, with concurrence of a majority of the House, that the Board of Trade regulation (which was the subject of appeal to that house as to its vires) was intra vires and that the effect of “as if enacted in this Act” was to make subordinate legislation as completely exempt from judicial review as the statute itself. In R.v. Minister of Health; Ex parte Davis [1929] 1 K.B. 619, C.A. a proposed “scheme” of expropriation was brought to the test of vires. Under the Housing Act, 1925 (15 Geo. Vict., c., 14), local authorities were given power, subject to the consent of the Minister of Health, to

[p.683] of [1982-83] GLR 671 purchase compulsorily slum areas for the purpose of putting something better in their place.

In other words, the hinge of the slum clearance system was the”improvement scheme.” Certain local authorities, however, saw in the Act an excellent opportunity for acquiring compulsory town areas which they could then dispose of, exactly as they wished, as corporation property for what was deemed to be general municipal development and advantage, though not of the kind contemplated by the Act.

Not only did the Minister of Health confirm a number of these “schemes” of expropriation but he appears to have been under the impression that he was bound to interpret the Act in this manner. In this case the court held the scheme to be ultra vires and granted a prohibition to restrain the minister from confirming it. It took the view that this was appropriate remedy, for otherwise if the scheme were once confirmed by the minister, it would have effect, according to the terms of the Act, “as if enacted in this Act” and would then be beyond any kind of judicial review.

The effect of the common provision “as if enacted in this Act,” after Lockwood’s case (supra) which had followed a devious course through the undergrowth of case law, came to a capital test in Ministry of Health v. Yaffe [1931] A.C. 494, H.L. The circumstances out of which this case arose were similar to those in R.v. Minister of Health; Ex parte Davis (supra). The Liverpool Corporation had prepared a “scheme” under the Housing Act, 1925. At the public local inquiry ordered by the minister various irregularities had taken place and these were the basis of a contention that the scheme had not complied with the requirements of the Act.

The minister confirmed the scheme, but with substantial modifications which gave it the definite character, not inherent in it originally, of a “re-arrangement and reconstruction” housing scheme permitted under the Act. Whereas in the Davis case (supra) a prohibition had been obtained before the minister’s confirmation, the application in this case was for certiorari to bring up and quash the order as confirmed by the minister. With the concurrence of Talbot J., Lord Hewart C.J. took the same view he had taken in the Davis case when Yaffe’s case (supra) came before them in the Divisional Court (Swift J., dissenting) that once the order was confirmed the question of ultra vires could arise.

The Court of Appeal reversed the majority decision of the Divisional Court and rejected the argument of the Crown: see [1930] 2 K.B. 135, C.A., that once the order was confirmed no question of ultra vires could arise, however far the order diverged from the Act, and it held that, since the preliminary requirements had not been satisfied, no valid scheme had even been before the minister for confirmation, and that he could not validate it by modifying it ex post facto. It was on this aspect of the case that the House of Lords differed from the Court of Appeal, for it held

[p.684] of [1982-83] GLR 671

(Lord Russell of Killowen dissenting) that the scheme as modified by the minister was a valid scheme, despite its earlier defects.

The statutory power conferred on the minister under section 20 (2) of Act 299 whereby it is only the confirmation of the award by the minister by notice published in the Gazette which shall bring the award into effect and make it prevail over any contract of service in force at the time of the award produces, in my view, the same result as if it had been provided in the section that the confirmation “shall have effect as if enacted in this Act.” The due confirmation by the minister has the effect of the minister legislating to modify any contract of service or collective agreement as may be necessary in order to conform to the award.

It is for this reason that I apply the above cases by analogy and hold that (a) before the minister’s confirmation a party can take legal process to challenge the validity of the arbitrator’s award; and (b) after the minister’s confirmation the award will be beyond any judicial review, especially where the confirmed award is consistent with the main purpose of the Act or, at all events, not contrary to it.

Before I leave off, I shall bring into focus the potency of confirmation as exercised by an arm of the executive, or the executive itself, conferred under an enactment. Having been destooled by the Agona Ashanti Traditional Council, the Wiamoasehene appealed, and the National Liberation Council, (N.L.C.) acting under the Chieftaincy Act, 1961 (Act 81),s. 34 appointed a chieftaincy committee to inquire into the matter. The committee found the destoolment null and void and recommended that the appeal be allowed. The N.L.C., acting under section 59 of Act 81, confirmed the findings by a notice in the Local Government Bulletin which also included the phrase “that the appeal be dismissed.”

A corrective notice repeating the confirmation but using the phrase “That the appeal be allowed” was published in the subsequent Bulletin. This attempt at correction was challenged by certiorari proceedings on the ground that when the second notice was published the N.L.C. was functus officio and had no right to effect corrections after the first publication. It took the full bench of the Court of Appeal in Republic v. Chieftaincy Committee on Wiamoasehene Stool Affairs; Ex parte Oppong Kwame [1978] G.L.R. 467 to reverse the decisions of both the High Court and the Court of Appeal (ordinary bench) and to hold that the contrivance of the slip rule permitted the correction of clerical mistakes. The High Court had held that once the N.L.C. had confirmed the decision it was precluded from re-opening the matter and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.

It has already been noted that Act 299 envisages two types of arbitration, viz a voluntary arbitration constituted under section 3 (2)

[p.685] of [1982-83] GLR 671 of Cap. 93 by virtue of section 15 (1) of Act 299 and compulsory arbitration constituted under section 18 of Act 299. There can, therefore, be nothing basically amiss for disputants who have been brought together under a compulsory reference from consenting to submit some other matters to the same arbitrator appointed by the minister. Indeed counsel for the defendants adverted to this combination of statutory and consensual arbitrations in his submissions and referred the court to the passage in Russell on Arbitration (18th ed.) at pp. 9 and 10 where the learned author treats the subject as follows:

“It may sometimes happen that when the statutory arbitration is held, the parties wish to have other matters arising between them which are not compulsorily referred to that arbitration dealt with at the same time.

There would seem to be no objection to this being done, but the statutory arbitrator would also have to be appointed by agreement under the Arbitration Act. All the matters could then be dealt with at the same time, but there would in fact be two arbitrations.

This is because on the one hand the statutory arbitrator could not, even by agreement, deal under the statute with the consensual matters which would be ex hypothesi outside his jurisdiction, and on the other hand because the parties to a consensual arbitration could not necessarily, even by agreement, arrogate to themselves the procedure applicable to the statutory arbitration in question, nor give their consensual arbitrator the powers and subject him to the duties of the statutory arbitrator . . .”

Whilst the above passage may correctly state the principle it will not be necessary that where there is this combination of compulsory and consensual arbitrations under Act 299 the statutory arbitrator would also have to be appointed by agreement under Act 38. The fallacy is self-evident since Act 299 excludes the operation of Act 38. Although Russell says that there should be two awards for the combined arbitrations he recognises that a single award under both arbitrations would hardly be invalid so long as it was plain what award was made under which arbitration.

Even if I am to hold that the issue of the acquisition of the houses did not form part of the arbitrator’s terms of reference I am satisfied from the arbitrator’s report that that issue was brought up by the plaintiffs’ union before him and he inquired into it. On the argument put forward that there is nothing in the report to show that the defendants said anything at the arbitration on that issue, it is enough to say that the report amply discloses that the arbitrator discussed that issue with the defendants. Indeed, evidence given before arbitrators is generally immaterial to the court: see Rolimpex Centrala Handlu

[p.686] of [1982-83] GLR 671 Zagranicznego v. Haji E. Dossa & Sons Ltd. [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 380.

Accordingly, it is not necessary for the report to record the evidence. As the defendants listened to the plaintiffs’ union when they raised this issue as part of their case and they raised no objection when the arbitrator set out to investigate it but they continued to take part in the proceedings they cannot now be heard to say that they did not consent to the issue being investigated for determination. The decision in Thames Ironworks and Shipbuilding Co., Ltd v. R. (1869) 20 L.T. 318 is apposite here.

That case decided that where an arbitrator has, by agreement of the parties, jurisdiction to determine disputes which may arise as to certain matters specified in the agreement, and the parties submit to him for adjudication matters not within his jurisdiction, both the arbitrator and the parties being under the misapprehension that the matters so submitted are within his jurisdiction, the award of the arbitrator is good.

A further objection was taken in that case that as the arbitrator did not recite in the award any submission beyond that which was contained in the contract and specification and that as these did not comprise the entire claim of the suppliants, but only so much of it as fell strictly within the scope of the contract, the award was bad upon this ground. The court held that an award would not be vitiated by a misrecital and went on to explain that where, as in the case, an actual submission of the entire claim was established, the imperfect recital of the arbitrator’s authority was immaterial, and, therefore, did not affect the validity of the award.

Applying the Thames Ironworks decision to the instant case, I hold that the defendants must be bound by the further award in respect of the house, even if it is to be accepted that the issue raised on them went beyond the terms of reference. Furthermore, although the arbitrator’s report recited only the issue referred to him and did not include the issue submitted by consent, the awards cannot be vitiated for misrecital. Again, the Thames Ironworks case (supra) exemplifies the fact that an arbitration agreement, which originally was in writing, may be altered or added to by parol and so become a parol agreement.

The decision in Davis v. Price (1862) 6 L.T. (N.S.) 713 was cited by the defendants’ counsel to support the proposition that it is a misconduct on the part of the arbitrator to purport to include matters not referred to him. The ratio decidendi of that case (as affirmed in (1864) 34 L.J.Q.B. 8), is that if a party to a reference objects that the arbitrators are entering upon the consideration of a matter not referred to them and protests against it, and the arbitrators nevertheless go into the question and receive evidence on it, and the party, still under protest, continues to attend before the arbitrators and cross-examines the witnesses on the point objected to, he does not thereby waive his objection, nor is he estopped from saying that the arbitrators have

[p.687] of [1982-83] GLR 671 exceeded their authority by awarding on the matter. And so in Hamlyn v. Betteley (1880) 6 Q.B.D. 63 at p. 65 Lord Selborne L. C. said: “In arbitrations, where a protest is made against jurisdiction, the party protesting is not bound to retire; he may go through the whole case, subject to the protest he has made.” And also in Holt v. Meddowcroft (1846) 4 M. & S. 467 at p. 469 Lord Ellenborough C.J. said:

“We find that the defendant did protest and did all in his power to resist the proceeding. I cannot agree that it amounts to a consent on the part of the defendant, because, being tied to the stake and dragged on to trial, he endeavours to make the best of it.”

These decisions, and their authoritative statements, forcefully illustrates that the concepts of protest and non-consent are antipodal on the judicial axis. They go to support the converse that if a party does not air his protest when an arbitrator exceeds his authority but continues to take part in the proceedings he would be held to have consented.

The argument proffered by the plaintiffs’ counsel that the question touching the ownership of the houses is inextricably bound up with the terms of reference calls into question the scope of the reference. In this regard it is accepted that the arbitrator is authorised to inquire into matters not submitted to him, if that inquiry be necessary to enable him decide rightly upon the questions before him. Not only that, but if the issue flows from the terms of reference he is entitled to consider it and make it part of his award.

It is quite obvious that the question of the ownership of the houses was a collateral matter which could be considered to arrive at a just and fair decision. If a decision on it conduces to justice and fairness in relation to the decision on the 20 per cent rent allowance then that issue of ownership of the houses, to quote the plaintiffs’ reply, became relevant or related to or congruent with the terms of reference of the sole arbitrator.

It is for all, or anyone of the above reasons, that I hold that the plaintiffs’ action must succeed and the counterclaim dismissed. The question about those workers who have left the employment of the defendant-corporation is quite beside the point. The decisive point is whether they left after the confirmation of the award. If they did then they can take advantage of the a ward.

I give judgment to the plaintiffs and make the order sued for on their writ with ¢2,000 costs to the plaintiffs. I would dismiss the counterclaim.

DECISION

Judgment for the plaintiffs.

Counterclaim dismissed.

J. A. A.

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