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[1979] SLR (HC) 4High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

BRUTUW vs. AFERIBA AND ANOTHER [1979] GLR 566

1 February 1979 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 9 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 4
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OSCOLABRUTUW v AFERIBA AND ANOTHER [1979] GLR 566 [1979] SLR (HC) 4
APABRUTUW v AFERIBA AND ANOTHER [1979] GLR 566, [1979] SLR (HC) 4 (Ghana).
BluebookBRUTUW v AFERIBA AND ANOTHER [1979] GLR 566, [1979] SLR (HC) 4 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Selig v. Lion [1891] 1 Q.B. 513; 60 L.J.Q.B. 403; 64 L.T. 796; 39 W.R. 254.

(2) Republic v. Committee of Inquiry (R.T. Briscoe (Ghana) Ltd.); Ex parte R. T. Briscoe (Ghana) Ltd.

[1976] 1 G.L.R. 166, C.A.

(3) Willow Wren Canal Carrying Co., Ltd. v. British Transport Commission [1956] 1 W.L.R. 213;

[1956] 1 All E.R. 567; 100 S.J. 150.

(4) Palmer (In re) (1882) 22 Ch. D. 88.

(5) Hinckley and South Leicestershire Permanent Benefit Building Society v. Freeman [1941] Ch. 32;

[1940] 4 All E.R. 212; 110 L.J.Ch. 36; 164 L.T. 399; 57 T.L.R. 71; 84 S.J. 620.

(6) Robertson v. Cilia [1956] 1 W.L.R. 1502; [1956] 3 All E.R. 651.

(7) Wilson v. Church (No. 2) (1879) 12 Ch.D. 454; 41 L.T. 296; 28 W.R. 284, C.A. (8) Seldon v. Davidson [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1083; [1968] 2 All E.R. 755, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for stay of proceedings of plaintiff’s action founded on existence of fraud, pending the hearing and determination of an appeal against the refusal of the High Court to grant the defendants’ application to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim in limine. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

J.B. Short for the defendants-applicants.

Ewusie-Wilson for the plaintiff-respondent.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.

On 7 November 1978, this court dismissed the defendants’ motion which sought for an order from the court to strike out the plaintiff ‘s action in limine. By the endorsement on her writ the plaintiff’s claim against the defendants is for a declaration that the judgment of the court dated 26 August 1975 and confirmed by the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 16 June 1977 should be set aside on the ground of fraud. The defendants have since then lodged an appeal to the Court of Appeal against the ruling of this court dismissing their motion. They have now come to court by this motion praying that the proceedings should be stayed pending the result of their appeal to the Court of Appeal. In the affidavit supporting their application the defendants raised the following [p.568] of [1979] GLR 566 pertinent matters as their bedrock:

“4. That the appeal raised questions of law of much complexity and general interest and it is desirable that the Court of Appeal should pronounce on them.

5. That if the action herein were to continue in this honourable court and a decision given it would in the first place render futile any decision by the Court of Appeal.

6. That the proceedings would in fact be proceeding in competition with that before the Court of Appeal.

7. That considering the nature of the suit it would be proper for the hearing to be suspended pending the decision by the court since the question whether the statement of claim herein disclosed a triable cause of action will be decided by the Court of Appeal.”

The plaintiff has filed an affidavit in opposition wherein she maintains, among other matters, that her action is brought on the ground of fraud which she can abundantly prove. According to her, the motion is only brought to stop this court from hearing the case.

Our rules of court, the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), do not make any provisions to cover the instant application. Despite this want of statutory authority it is well recognised that a court of justice has inherent jurisdiction to stay its own proceedings which are an abuse of its process, such as frivolous, vexatious or harrassing proceedings or those which are manifestly groundless or in which there is clearly no cause of action. But apart from staying its own proceedings (in the sense of a discontinuance, in which case cadit quaestio, as explained in Selig v. Lion [1891] 1 Q.B. 513) the court has an inherent jurisdiction to stay or suspend its proceedings pending the determination of the Court of Appeal. This jurisdiction of the court which is, of course, discretionary, would only be exercised if there were special circumstances warranting it. In Republic v. Committee of Inquiry (R.T. Briscoe (Ghana) Ltd.); Ex parte R. T. Briscoe (Ghana) Ltd. [1976] 1 G.L.R. 166, C.A. the Court of Appeal held that the mere allegation that there had been misdirection or a series of them would not be deemed special circumstances to grant a stay of proceedings pending an appeal. So also will the court not stay proceedings in the hope that the appeal may succeed. In the analogous case of Willow Wren Canal Carrying Co., Ltd. v. British Transport Commission [1956] 1 All E.R. 567, where the defendants sought to stay proceedings until a Bill, which was then before Parliament and which in its then form would relieve the defendants of their statutory obligations might become law the court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to have their action tried and that the court would not take into account the possible effect of the Bill then before Parliament. Upjohn J. at p. 569 made the following pertinent remarks:

“I have no doubt that the action will be of a very heavy nature and will take many days to hear; … and I accept at once that it will be a most expensive action to try. It is said that at the end of that action a judge would be bound to suspend an injunction, if he thinks that

[p.569] of [1979] GLR 566

the plaintiffs have established their right to one, until the fate of the Bill is known. It is argued that the proper course, therefore, is to let this action be stayed until the fate of the Bill is known. A preliminary objection is taken to that, which seems to me to be fatal to the application, and it is this: sitting in this court, it is my duty to see that litigants have their cases tried, as they are entitled to, and I cannot take into account the possible effect of some Bill now before Parliament which, if passed into law in its present form, may have some effect on the rights of the parties. That seems to me to be a correct formulation of the law … [T]he plaintiff is entitled to come to this court and say, ‘In the normal course of events my action will very soon be ripe for hearing. I desire that the court should hear it.’ It is plain . . . that it is not right for this court either now or at the hearing to take into account the possible effect of a Bill which is at present before Parliament and which, so far as this court is concerned, may never become law . . . In other words, it is a matter of speculation on which this court will not embark . . .”

In my view the defendants’ application must be considered in the spirit ventilated by Upjohn J. Accordingly, those questions of convenience and savings in time and money, which the applicant’s counsel impressed upon the court, will be of no avail where the plaintiff insists on her right of audience.

The defendants’ application is asking this court to stay the trial of what is obviously an issue of fact, i.e. whether or not the defendants perpetrated fraud on the court, whilst they test on appeal some question of law. This will not be allowed by the court without strong reasons: see In re Palmer (1882) 22 Ch. D. 88.

By paragraph 6 of their affidavit the defendants confess to the possible delay in their appeal being heard and also to uncertainty of the date it will be heard. The result of these situations is that in order to accommodate, the proceedings must be adjourned indefinitely. To do so will be quite arbitrary and defeat the plaintiff’s right to resort to the court for redress, as justice delayed is justice denied. In Hinckley and South Leicestershire Permanent Benefit Building Society v. Freeman [1940] 4 All E.R.212 at p. 216, Farwell J. explaining the general propositions underlying an adjournment said:

“The proposition that this court has not power to adjourn any matter on any proper ground is new to me. No doubt the court cannot postpone the hearing of a matter indefinitely, because, if a court did so, it might thereby lead to defeating justice altogether, and a mere arbitrary refusal to hear a particular case is not a matter which, when dealing with litigation, would ever become a recognised thing. I cannot conceive any judge taking a course of that sort.”

The above dictum was applied in Robertson v. Cilia [1956] 3 All E.R. 651 and led the court to hold (as stated in the headnote at pp. 651-652) that:

“(i) the court had no jurisdiction to stand the matter over generally, without the mortgagee’s consent, even on terms, because

[p.570] of [1979] GLR 566

to do that (a) would be to force on the parties an agreement which they had not made, and (b) would amount to an arbitrary refusal to hear the case, as it would postpone indefinitely the mortgagee’s right to have her claim for possession tried.

(ii) although the court had jurisdiction to adjourn the matter for a reasonable time to give the mortgagor an opportunity of making an offer acceptable to the mortgagee or of discharging the loan completely, yet an adjournment for a year would not be reasonable in the circumstances, and, therefore, an order for possession would be granted.”

Another argument advanced by the applicants’ counsel is that if the proceedings are not suspended their appeal may come to nothing should it succeed. It is in truth the proper rule of conduct for the exercise of the judicial discretion that “when a party is appealing, exercising his undoubted right of appeal, this court ought to see that the appeal, if successful, is not nugatory”: per Cotton L.J. in Wilson v. Church (No. 2) (1879) 12 Ch.D. 454 at p. 458, C.A. This principle will generally apply when some property stands to be lost to the successful party on appeal. I cannot see how the applicants stand to suffer any irretrievable damage if they should ultimately succeed since, as was indicated in the Briscoe Committee of Inquiry case (supra) an order of certiorari would then lie to quash the proceedings and the judgment of this court. Although I much sympathise with the applicants and feel with them that it would perhaps have been convenient to stay the proceedings and save the court and the parties the tedium of a trial which may, for all the world, end in smoke, yet a mere balance of convenience is not a sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of his right to prosecute his cause before our courts, if it is otherwise properly brought. In my view Edmund Davies L.J. does not only utter the last word but he also inflicts the coup de grace to the application when he said in Seldon v. Davidson [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1083 at p.1089, C.A.:

“If, . . . whenever a judge makes a ruling . . . the party against whom that ruling is given [has the right to have the case adjourned for the ruling to be tested in the Court of Appeal] it may well be that a chaotic state of affairs would arise.”

And this is what the courts must forestall. Having regard to the above principles which so heavily militate against the applicants on all fronts, I firmly dismiss the motion.

DECISION Application dismissed. S. Y. B. – B.

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