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[1979] SLR (HC) 36High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

GYATO vs. PIPIM [1980] GLR 71

9 February 1979 · ROGER KORSAH J · ≈ 8 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 36
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OSCOLAGYATO v PIPIM [1980] GLR 71 [1979] SLR (HC) 36
APAGYATO v PIPIM [1980] GLR 71, [1979] SLR (HC) 36 (Ghana).
BluebookGYATO v PIPIM [1980] GLR 71, [1979] SLR (HC) 36 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASE REFERRED TO

Ocansey v. Teiko [1973] 1 G.L.R. 203.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION by a tenant for stay of execution of ejectment order in an action for ejectment commenced under section 17 (1) (a) of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220). The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.

COUNSEL

D. K. Duku for the respondent.

K. Berchie-Antwi for the applicant.

JUDGMENT OF ROGER KORSAH J.

The defendant-applicant-appellant, hereinafter referred to as the applicant, was a tenant to the respondent. On 9 August 1977, the respondent commenced an action for ejectment against the applicant under section 17 (1) (a) of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), for non-payment of rent. The said section, in effect, forbids any court of competent jurisdiction from making an order for recovery of possession or ejectment against any tenant in accordance with the provisions of any other enactment for the time being in force except in circumstances provided under section 17; section 17 (1) (a) gives statutory authority to a landlord to apply for recovery of possession or ejectment, “where any rent lawfully due from the tenant has not been paid or tendered within one month after the date on which it became lawfully due.”

The applicant admittedly was, at the time of the issue of the writ, eleven months in arrear with his rent, but had by 18 August 1977, that is, before the commencement of hearing of the action, paid up all the arrears, leaving only the mesne profits outstanding.

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Were it not for the exclusion by section 17 “of the provisions of any other enactment for the time being in force” no problem would be posed by section 111 (1) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), which provides (among other things) that section 212 of the English Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 (15 & 16 Vict., c. 76), is a statute of general application in Ghana. The said section 212 of the Common Law Procedure Act reads:

“If the tenant or his assignee do or shall, at any time before the trial in such ejectment, pay or tender to the lessor or landlord, his executors or administrators, or his or their attorney in that cause, or pay into the Court where the same cause is depending, all the rent and arrears, together with the costs, then and in such case, all further proceedings on the said ejectment shall cease and be discontinued; and if such lessee, his executors, administrators, or assigns, shall, upon such proceedings as aforesaid, be relieved in equity, he and they shall have, hold, and enjoy the demised lands, according to the lease thereof made, without any new lease.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

I intend first, to consider the law governing forfeiture for non-payment of rent under the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), before I turn to the effect that section 212 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, has on that law, if any.

Under the Rent Act, 1963, the landlord’s right to commence proceedings for recovery of possession or ejectment for non-payment of rent accrues to him where any rent lawfully due from the tenant has not been paid or tendered within one month after the date on which it became lawfully due. Once this cause of action has accrued to the landlord and he has commenced proceedings for recovery of possession or ejectment, the subsequent payment or tendering to the lessor or landlord of the arrears of rent claimed by his writ does not abate the cause of action. Indeed, any payment of rent made after the commencement of action for recovery of possession or ejectment for non-payment of rent, must be construed as an admission that the plaintiff’s action was well-founded and that he is entitled to judgment.

The harshness of the law is, however, mitigated by the provision in section 17 (3) that:

“(3) The Magistrate or Judge making or giving any order or judgment for the recovery of the possession of any premises or for the ejectment of a tenant therefrom may stay or suspend execution of any such order or judgment or postpone the date of possession for such period or periods as the Magistrate

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or Judge thinks fit and subject to such conditions if any, in regard to payment by the tenant of arrears, of rent, mesne profits and such other sums as the Magistrate or Judge thinks fit and if such conditions are complied with, the Magistrate or Judge may discharge or rescind such order or judgment.”

(The emphasis is mine.) Clearly, this section bestows on a magistrate or a judge, who makes an order for recovery of possession or ejectment, a discretion to discharge or rescind the order or judgment for recovery of possession or for the ejectment of a tenant therefrom, if conditions imposed by the magistrate or judge, for the payment by the tenant of arrears of rent, mesne profits and such other sums as the magistrate or judge thinks fit, have been complied with.

Thus, even where at the date of judgment arrears of rent are still outstanding, the magistrate or judge may, having regard to the circumstances of the case, grant the tenant relief against the order or judgment for recovery of possession or ejectment, if conditions imposed by the court have been fulfilled.

Various sections of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, including section 212, were considered to be of general application in Ghana before Act 220 became law. And it is reasonable to suppose that the provision in Act 220 that no court shall make an order for recovery of possession or ejectment against any tenant in accordance with the provisions of any other enactment for the time being in force except as provided under section 17 of Act 220, was intended to exclude the application of section 212 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852. For whereas section 212 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, conferred on the tenant a statutory right to have such an action terminated, by himself paying all arrears of rent, mesne profits and costs at any time before trial, Act 220 bestowed on the tenant no such right, but vested in the court a discretion exercisable in accordance with the provision under section 17 (3) of that Act. If section 212 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, applied to abate the cause of action, then the situation may never arise where the magistrate or judge may be called upon to exercise his discretion under section 17 (3) of the Rent Act, 1963, unless it is considered that the discretion bestowed on the court is exercisable only in the case of tenants who plead for time within which to pay up the arrears of rent outstanding.

These sections in both Acts relate to relief against forfeiture, and it would be wrong to treat them in isolation to the other sections of the enactments of which they form a part. Section 210 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, which is one of the sections preserved by section 111 (1) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), as a statute of

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general application, provides that the landlord, (a) where one half-year’s rent is in arrear, (b) and he has a right to re-enter for non-payment, (c) and proves that no sufficient distress can be found on the premises, may recover judgment and execution as if the rent had been legally demanded, in the manner pointed out by that section, which also bars the lessee from relief against forfeiture, unless proceeded for “within six months after such execution executed.”

The relief against forfeiture granted to the tenant in section 212 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, is in relation to the cases envisaged under section 210 of the said Act and not to all cases falling under section 17 (1) (a) of the Rent Act, 1963, where the landlord’s right to commence proceedings accrues to him when the rent is a month in arrear. Whereas section 210 gives the landlord a right to recover judgment, section 17 (1) only bestows a right of action.

In my view, section 212 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, abates the immediate right to judgment and execution granted to the landlord by section 210 of that Act, and not the right to commence proceeding given under section 17 of the Rent Act, 1963. Furthermore, at the time of the trial of the instant action, although the arrears of rent claimed on the writ had been paid, the mesne profits and costs of the action had not been liquidated, and the applicant could not, therefore, have prayed in aid section 212 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852.

The trial magistrate, I am persuaded to hold, rightly exercised his discretion under section 17 (3) of the Rent Act, 1963, when, in refusing the application for stay of execution in the lower court, he stated that the defendant-applicant herein was “a chronic rent defaulter and his continued stay in the house would make his plight worse.”

Counsel has also drawn my attention to the case of Ocansey v. Teiko [1973] 1 G.L.R. 203 in which Sarkodee J. applied section 212 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, to grant the defendant in that case relief against forfeiture. It is not clear from the report whether the plaintiff in that case brought his action under section 210 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, or section 17 (1) (a) of the Rent Act, 1963; for that reason and also for the reason that I am not bound by that decision, I decline the invitation to apply it in this case. To my mind, the relief against forfeiture granted by section 212 applies to cases commenced under section 210 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, and the relief against forfeiture granted by section 17 (3) of the Rent Act, 1963 applies to cases commenced under section 17 (1) (a) of that Act. In the premises, I am of the view that the chances of success of this appeal are set at

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naught and nothing would be achieved by granting this application for stay of execution.

The application is accordingly dismissed with costs of ¢30 to the respondent.

Court below to carry out.

DECISION Application dismissed. D. R. K. S.

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