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[1984] SLR (CA) 13Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

CATHLINE AND ANOTHER vs. AKUFO-ADDO [1984-86] 1 GLR 96

9 October 1984 · MENSA BOISON JA · ≈ 12 min read

Cite as[1984] SLR (CA) 13
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OSCOLACATHLINE AND ANOTHER v AKUFO-ADDO [1984-86] 1 GLR 96 [1984] SLR (CA) 13
APACATHLINE AND ANOTHER v AKUFO-ADDO [1984-86] 1 GLR 96, [1984] SLR (CA) 13 (Ghana).
BluebookCATHLINE AND ANOTHER v AKUFO-ADDO [1984-86] 1 GLR 96, [1984] SLR (CA) 13 (Ghana Ct. App. 1984).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Martin v. Mackonochie (1879) 4 Q.B.D. 697, C.A.

(2) Dimes v. Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 H.L. Cas. 794, H.L.

(3) R. v. Kensington Income Tax General Commissioners; Ex parte Princess Edmond de Polignac [1917] 1 K.B. 486, C.A.

(4) State v. Asantehene’s Divisional Court B1; Ex parte Kusada [1963] 2 G.L.R. 238, S.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decision of the High Court, Accra dismissing a motion praying that the trial Judge disqualify himself from the hearing of the suit on the ground of likelihood of bias. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Enoch D. Kom (with him J. K. Agyeman and George Kom) for the appellants.

Joe Reindorf (with him W.A.N. Adumua-Bossman) for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.

Mensa Boison J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. This is an appeal from a ruling dated 13 April 1984, of an Accra High Court presided over by Hayfron J. It dismissed a motion praying that the said judge should in substance disqualify himself from further hearing of a suit as instituted above.

The terms of the motion are pertinent and the operative part may be set out:

[p.99] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 96

“Take notice that this honourable court will be moved by Enoch Kom counsel for and on behalf of the defendants-appellants under section 100 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372) and the inherent jurisdiction of the court, praying this court that his Lordship Hayfron J. presiding in the hearing of the suit hereinbefore mentioned stay further proceedings therein disqualifying himself from sitting on the action and report to his Lordship the Chief Justice in order that the Chief Justice may give such directions as may be necessary for the said action to be transferred to another judge for hearing and determination.”

In their affidavit supporting the motion, the appellants charge the presiding judge with likelihood of bias in favour of the respondents as the ground for his disqualification. The facts as deposed to may be briefly rehearsed: at all times material to the motion the appellants as the executors to the will of one O. P. Ofori-Atta, are defendants in the suit herein, which the respondent, a uterine sister of the testator aforesaid, seeks to challenge the bequests made by the testator of shares in Beyeeman Freezing Co. Ltd. Pending also before the same court was an action in which the same executors, as the plaintiffs, sought an order for his removal as a director of the said Freezing Co. of one Edward Akufo-Addo alias Bumptie, a son of the respondent in this appeal. For clarity the suit now appealed from will be referred to as suit A. and the other as suit B.

On 2 November 1983, suit A came on for continued hearing. The court must have risen somewhat late; for although counsel for the parties and their retinue had all gone away, Madame Dinah Twum, a supporter of the appellants in suit A, was about 2.30 p.m. still in the precincts of the court building, waiting for her car. She is styled as an aunt of one of the beneficiaries under the will of the testator. She it was who saw Bumptie at the driving wheel come back to the court, between that time and 3 p.m., to collect the presiding judge and a lady, who turned out later to be Mrs Hayfron. Before Bumptie could seat and drive out his two passengers, Madam Twum was by the car and remonstrated on the conduct of the judge. The judge might well not have taken in what the lady was about, as he expressed no reaction. Bumptie drove away to drop the judge and his wife at their residence.

By a letter, exhibit A, dated 7 November 1983 Madam Twum complained of the incident to the Chief Justice, expressing her fears of the outcome of the case as the judge was accepting car lifts from the son of their adversary. Madam Twum was not on the record of the suit in any capacity, but the office of the Chief Justice deferred to deal with her, and replied to her on November 14 as in exhibit B:

[p.100] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 96

“Dear Madam, Adeline Akufo-Addo v. Cathline & Anor The Chief Justice acknowledges receipt of your letter of 7 November 1983, and wishes me to say that he regrets the unfortunate events that you describe therein. They may have occurred as a result of the acute transport problems now being experienced by the judges.

His Lordship understands, however, that the judge has asked both sides to the case to advise him and he hopes a solution satisfactory to both sides will be reached.

Yours sincerely (Sgd) etc”

Exhibit B gave no ray of hope for solving any transport difficulty.

It did not invoke any sympathy either for the plight of “the judge”, nor did the proffered “negotiation” yield any reconciliation as far as the executors, the appellants were concerned. Their letter exhibit C articulated their rebuke. The transport problem was not unique to the judges. According to them no other judges accepted car lifts from litigants and their family after court hearings. They could not excuse the conduct of the presiding judge; and read into it more than meets the eye. They recited a catalogue of adverse rulings in suits A and B which they insinuated could only be explained by the judge’s unwitting fraternisation with the respondent’s family. They made their fears known to and pressed upon the Chief Justice for a transfer of the suit to some other court. These matters, and much more, the appellants later repeated in their affidavit in support.

In her affidavit in reply the respondent admitted the car lift of 2 November 1983. That was the solitary occasion her son Bumptie had done so, and that was on the direction of her leading counsel. The said counsel had, as a personal friend, been assisting the presiding judge out of transport difficulty in getting home at times after court hearings. On that 2 November counsel himself was without a car. The judge had asked him for a lift home. So when Bumptie had dropped counsel at his house, counsel had requested if Bumptie could oblige by going back to the court to collect the judge to his residence. The respondent conceded the transport problems of the judge, which had not made for the dispatch of the hearing. She would even now agree to a workable arrangement whereby the parties might fetch the judge in and out of court on the day of hearing. She was confident that mere car lifts would not be such pottage as would induce a judge of that standing to violate his solemn judicial oath of doing justice. The respondent denied the

[p.101] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 96

allegations that the judge was a close friend of her family. She herself could not remember ever meeting the judge, nor did she know of any associations between members of her family and the judge. These allegations, she was certain, were trumped up by Madam Twum, whose diverse threats, taunts and machinations to intimidate the respondent from prosecuting this action were notorious facts. As far as the respondent was concerned, she still had confidence in the integrity of the presiding judge.

It is not quite clear on the affidavits what transpired when the parties were supposed to have met the judge as suggested in exhibit B. But it is reasonable to assume they could not be reconciled on the situation created by the car lift, and so the appellants launched out their motion herein. After arguments the learned judge ruled dismissing the motion as already stated.

We would permit ourselves to surmise that had the suit been pending before an inferior tribunal, the appellants would have sought to remove the case from that tribunal by way of prohibition. For not only as to jurisdiction, but prohibition is also the remedy where “something” has been done, “contrary to the general laws of the land” or “so vicious as to violate some fundamental principle of justice”: per Thesiger L.J in Martin v. Mackonochie (1879) 4 Q.B.D. 697 at 732, C.A. Such would include bias or interest arising from proprietary or personal interest: see Dimes v. The Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 H.L. Cas. 794, H.L.

To obtain the relief the applicant must comply with the rules under Order 59 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). In particular the applicant must obtain leave under rules 2 and 3; the application for leave being accompanied by a statement setting out, among other things, the grounds on which the relief is sought. Also required would be an affidavit verifying the facts relied upon.

The courts have been exacting in their observance of these conditions. Thus R v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners; Ex parte Princess de Polignac [1917] 1 K.B. 486, C.A shows that where an applicant has not shown uberrima fides in her affidavits upon which leave had been obtained, the application may be dismissed on that score. So also in the State v. Asantehene’s Divisional Court B1; Ex parte Kusada [1963] 2 G.L.R. 238, S.C where the applicant had been given leave upon an oral application to apply for an order of certiorari, Korsah C.J observed at 245:

“In my view the contention of the respondent’s counsel raises objections in limine which must precede considerations for the grant of leave, and inasmuch as the appellant has failed to comply with the conditions precedent (a) for the application for an

[p.102] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 96

extension of time, and (b) for the application for leave to apply for the writ of certiorari, the High Court should not have entertained the application.”

It may be noticed that the two cases referred to deal with certiorari, but the points raised therein apply with equal force to applications for orders of prohibition.

We refer to these matters above to point out some of the formalities required in disqualifying even an inferior tribunal. The fact of the matter is that prerogative writs (new orders) were originally remedies employed only by the Crown in pursuit of its rights; and strict observance of rules was demanded. In time, however, these remedies became available to the citizen; but never against the royal judges.

It therefore appears to us somewhat novel that the appellants sought by their prayer that the judge should disqualify himself from further hearing of the suit by such summary motion under section 100 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372).

To put section 100 of Act 372 in its proper perspective mention may first be made of section 99, which reads:

“99. (1) Subject to the provisions of the Constitution the Chief Justice may by order under his hand at any time or stage in the course of any proceedings and either with or without application from any of the parties to the proceedings, transfer any case from any Judge or Magistrate to any other Judge or Magistrate and from a Court referred to in this Act to any other competent Court.

(2) The order may be general or special; and shall state the nature and extent of such transfer, and in any case of urgency the power of transfer may be exercised by means of a telegraphic or telephonic communication from the Chief Justice…”

Then follows the section in issue, i.e. 100:

“100. (1) Any Judge of the High Court may on his own initiative or on application by any person concerned, report to the Chief Justice any case, civil or criminal pending before him, which in his opinion ought for any reason to be transferred from him to any other Court or Judge.

(2) If the Chief Justice is satisfied that a transfer is desirable he shall specify the Court to which or the Judge to whom that case is to be transferred for hearing and determination and give such other directions as may be necessary.”

Section 101 gives the like powers of the Chief Justice as contained in section 99 to a judge of the High Court with respect to cases pending before a district court, but such that by section 101 (2):

[p.103] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 96

“(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to restrict the power of transfer vested in the Chief Justice;

and an order of transfer made by a Judge under this section shall have no effect where the Chief Justice has transferred the case in question or the Judge has, at the time of the making of the order, notice of an application to the Chief Justice for a transfer.”

Read in the context of the other sections quoted above, we are persuaded to the view that when section 100 speaks of “on application of any person concerned” the section does not envisage an application by motion in court. In exercise of his powers under section 99 we have not known of cases where petitioners apply to the Chief Justice by motion. And we think it a sound rule of construction that the word “application” should bear the same meaning in section 100 as in section 99, and the related sections. Again, our hierarchy of courts does not constitute the office of the Chief Justice as a court. The “report” to the Chief Justice enjoined by section 100 therefore, will necessarily be administrative. That also in our view indicates that the intendment of section 100 is purely administrative and consequently no motion was intended. Furthermore, to construe the word “application” in section 100 to include an application by motion, would result in absurdity. For whereas at common law, or by the traditional view, a superior court is not amenable to an order of prohibition, or prerogative orders in general, section 100 may achieve that effect. A case of letting in fools where angels had feared to tread.

Lastly, section 100 (2) of the Act, by the words “if the Chief Justice is satisfied”, confers a discretion. It is a statutory duty cast on the Chief Justice to direct where or by whom the case must be tried, should he consider it proper to have the case transferred at all.

No decision or order by the High Court judge must be such as to pre-empt or stultify the discretion given to the Chief Justice under section 100 (2). For a distinction must be drawn between a report by “the Judge of the High Court” as used by the section, and “his court.”

Should the word “application” in section 100 be construed to include “a motion”, the decision or order resulting thereby, becomes a decision or order of the High Court. That cannot be interfered with by the Chief Justice by virtue of the discretion given him under section 100 (2). Consequently, a court decision or order renders section 100 (2) nugatory and inoperative. The Chief Justice would thus, contrary to the intendment of sections 99 and 100 of the Act, be rendered impotent. That appears to be exactly the situation created here by the ruling of Hayfron J. when the appellants’ advisers proceeded by motion.

[p.104] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 96

It is a sound rule, where the words admit, that an enactment should be construed such that the mischief it seeks to cure is remedied, but no more. In our opinion the word “application” as used in section 100 means a request to the High Court judge, in the administrative sense, otherwise than by “a motion” in court. We think any other interpretation of the word “application” which stultifies the full effect of the provisions of section 100 (2) must be wrong.

We hasten to observe that the common law view that the High Court is not subject to process of prerogative orders needs qualification. By article 119 of the Constitution, 1979, it is enacted:

“119. The Supreme Court shall have supervisory jurisdiction over all other Courts in Ghana and over any adjudicating authority; and in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction shall have power to issue directions, orders or writs including writs or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory powers.”

The provisions of the said article are not relevant here. For the present we are of the opinion that the appellants were out of court, and as this issue should precede any consideration of the merits, the appeal should be dismissed as the appellants were out of courts.

DECISION Appeal dismissed.

M. C. N. -N.

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