ESHUN AND OTHERS vs. JOHNFIA [1984-86] 1 GLR 105
5 November 1984 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 7 min read
[1984] SLR (CA) 17Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Manu v Kuma [1963] 1 GLR 464, SC.
(2) Richardson v Fynn (1909) Earn 13.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the decision of the High Court, Sekondi dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim for a share in the rents accruing from their deceased father’s self-acquired property. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Mrs Adu-Mante for the appellants.
Kwesi Winney for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.
Abban J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. The appellants in the High Court, Sekondi sought a declaration that they were entitled to an interest in the self-acquired properties of their late father and the said interest included rent income accruing from the said properties.
The appellants are sui juris and are presently engaged in the business of petty trading for their living. Their late father, one Ato Kwamina Essuman, who was a Fanti died intestate in Sekondi. During his lifetime, the late Ato Kwamina Essuman acquired several building plots and put up houses on six of them. On his death intestate, the respondent, who was his maternal nephew, was appointed his successor by the family in accordance with Fanti customary law.
Since the death of their father the appellants have been living in one of the houses-No 70/8, Third Street, Sekondi with the respondent. But the respondent has let out the remaining five houses to tenants. It is the
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rent income from these houses that the appellants claimed that they were entitled to a share of during their lifetime. The High Court on 8 June 1981 dismissed the claim.
In this appeal only one ground was argued, namely that the learned High Court judge failed to direct his mind to and pronounce on the specific issue of the nature and extent, if any, in practical terms of the appellant’s life interest in the other five self-acquired houses of which their father died possessed and in which they could not contemporaneously stay or in which they have not been allotted rooms. The sum total of the argument of learned counsel for the appellants was that in as much as the Fanti customary law was concerned, the children were entitled to be maintained out of their father’s self-acquired property in addition to their right of occupation and that maintenance entitled them to a portion of any income accruing from the property and that the learned High Court judge should have made a declaration to that effect.
We did sympathise with and appreciate the force of the argument. However, it was our painful but bounded duty, in view of the present state of Fanti customary law, to hold that the learned High Court judge was right in rejecting the appellants’ contention.
The appellants, as children, had no right to any specific portion of the estate, neither did they have any right to share the rents accruing from the properties with the respondent. Their right was limited to occupation of their father’s house and also to be maintained by the respondent out of their father’s estate while young.
Thus if the appellants had been infants or young persons, the respondent in his capacity as the customary successor should have been customarily and legally bound to maintain and to educate them to the extent of the estate left by their deceased father: see Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession in Ghana at p 151 where the learned author stated:
“While young, the children are entitled to maintenance. It is the duty of the father or the father’s family to maintain the children, to exercise disciplinary authority over them, to find work for them, such as put them to a trade or profession, to marry for them and find them a place in society, e.g. in the army groups. The father does this because they as his children carry his Ntoro or spirit. The idea that among the Akans children have no claim on their fathers is misleading. What they do not possess is right to inherit the property”
See also Manu v Kuma [1963] 1 GLR 464, SC. In that case, the then Supreme Court constituted by van Lare, Ollennu JJSC and Akufo-Addo JSC (as he then was) held at 469:
[p.108] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 105
We consider that the responsibility of a successor to maintain and train the child of his predecessor is a legal one, and the right enuring therefrom to the child is different in its nature from a right to succeed to or have a share in the estate of deceased father . . .” (The emphasis is ours.)
So that quite apart from the fact that the estate of the appellants’ father was subject to the liability of maintaining them, the appellants could neither claim the right to any specific portion thereof or any rents accruing therefrom. Where the children are sui juris as the appellants are, earning their living by petty trading, and can in fact look after themselves, the question of maintenance is out and the only right that is left is the right to stay in their father’s house, and on their own showing this had never been denied them by the respondent.
There was one observation made by the learned trial judge which calls for our comments. In the course of his judgment the trial High Court judge purporting to be relying on Sarbah’s Fanti Customary Laws, p 105 stated:
“A necessary corollary to the ownership rights of the successor is that in the extreme case where he reasonably requires the house or part of it for the occupation of himself or any member of the matrilineal family, the children may have to quit because they are, in the eyes of customary law, supposed to be entitled to the enjoyment of their matrilineal family’s property.”
This view cannot have any, moral or legal justification whatsoever in the present day Ghana. Since Fanti customary, law recognises that children of an intestate father have a right to occupy their late father’s self-acquired house, it is only fair and just that they should be protected in their possession, peaceful enjoyment and occupation thereof. Thus the fact that the customary successor or a member of the father’s family requires accommodation in that house, should be of no moment and must not under any circumstances be used as a pretext for evicting the children from the house.
Indeed, we consider this view outmoded and not in keeping with the present state of our national development and should not be countenanced by the courts in modern Ghana. In this era of our social development and transformation, progressive thinking demands that the estate of the deceased father should be charged with some of the late father’s obligations towards his children and it will be inequitable to oust the children from their late father’s house on that flimsy ground. Our researches have not revealed any case where the court has ordered ejectment of children from their late father’s self-acquired house on the
[p.109] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 105
ground that persons belonging to the family of the deceased father needed accommodation; and it is our hope that no court would entertain such an unconscionable claim.
The only ground for ousting children from the house of their late father who dies intestate and which ground has been recognised by the courts over the years is that of misconduct. This was emphasised by Earnshaw J as far back as 1909 in the case of Richardson v Fynn (1909) Earn 13 reported in the judgments delivered at Cape Coast Castle. In that case the learned judge in refusing to accede to the plaintiff’s request to eject the defendants from their late father’s house where the said father had lived with them during his lifetime, said at 14:
“The Defendants, the daughters of Fynn, are members of their mother’s family and not of Baidua’s family;
but it is established by at least five reported decisions of the Supreme Court here (V. Sarbah’s volumes) that, as the children of Wm. Christian Fynn, they have the right to continue living in the house their father occupied, if that house is part of the family house belonging to the family of which their father was a member. They can only be ousted for misconduct.”
It must therefore be made clear that the observation in question as stated above cannot in the present state of affairs be tolerated.
Subject to the above observations, we think the learned trial judge was right in dismissing the appellants’ claim; and it was for the above reasons that we dismissed the appeal.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
MCN-N
