GYAMERAH vs. BREFO [1984-86] 1 GLR 110
7 November 1984 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 9 min read
[1984] SLR (CA) 21Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Swan v. North British Australasian Co. (1863) 2 H. & C. 175; 159 E.R. 73.
(2) Scholfield v. Earl of Londesborough [1896] A.C. 514; 75 L.T. 254, H.L.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the decision of the trial court granting recovery of possession of the disputed house in favour of the plaintiff and calling upon the defendant to account for rents collected. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court delivered by Abban J.A.
COUNSEL
Dr. Prempeh for the appellant.
No appearance by or for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.
Abban J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. The house in dispute was the self-acquired property of one Opanyin Yaw Senyah who hailed from Ejisu in Ashanti. He died intestate on 1 March 1963, and the respondent (hereafter called the plaintiff) was customarily appointed by the family to succeed to the house and four other houses left by Opanyin Yaw Senyah. The disputed house is situated on plot No. 20, Block 4, Dichemso Layout, Kumasi.
When the late Yaw Senyah was alive he appointed his son J.K. Senyah, to take charge of the house as caretaker to collect rents and to account to him. The plaintiff had been living and working in Accra so
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when he became successor he asked J.K. Senyah to continue his caretakership of the house as he had been doing during his father’s lifetime. J.K. Senyah agreed and for the next seven years he collected the rents and accounted for them to the plaintiff. In 1970 the plaintiff’s maternal uncle, Kwaku Nimo, was in financial difficulty. Nimo needed money to complete a project. He approached the family. The family appealed to the plaintiff to help Nimo out. As already indicated, the plaintiff had succeeded to five houses, and so he could conveniently assist. The plaintiff therefore decided to give the rents accruing from the disputed house to Nimo to finance his so-called project.
Accordingly, the plaintiff requested J.K. Senyah to stop collecting the rents and instead allowed Nimo to collect the rents and utilise same to finance the alleged project . It was in July 1970 that Nimo was permitted to collect the rents. After about six years, the plaintiff, thinking that by that time Nimo must have completed the said project, called upon Nimo for accounts and obviously to end his caretakership.
A date was fixed for the accounts but Nimo asked for postponement for two weeks, to which request the plaintiff readily obliged. But before the expiration of the two weeks Nimo committed suicide. The plaintiff later on went to the disputed house to see to arrange matters concerning the future collection of rents. But to his utter surprise the tenants informed him that Nimo, the deceased, had sold the house to one Gyamerah, the appellant herein, hereafter called the defendant.
A search at the Lands Department, Kumasi revealed that Nimo sold the house on 21 July 1970 to the defendant by a deed of assignment. He impersonated the late Yaw Senyah in the transaction, for in the deed of assignment the late Yaw Senyah was supposed to have signed as the assignor. Looking at the dates it was obvious that the fraudulent Nimo sold the house a few months after he had been permitted to take over the collection of the rents from the house.
In the court below, the plaintiff asked for a declaration that the said deed of assignment dated 21 July 1970 and purporting to be made between Yaw Senyah (who died on 1 March 1963) and the defendant in respect of the disputed house was a forgery and should be rescinded on grounds of fraud. The plaintiff further claimed accounts and recovery of possession.
The defendant’s main defence was that he bought the house from a man who styled himself as Yaw Senyah; and according to the search made by the defendant at the Lands Department, Kumasi, the house was in the name of Yaw Senyah as the lessee. So he negotiated with this ostensible Yaw Senyah in July 1970 and agreed on a purchase price of ¢4,000 which he paid. The defendant said he and the said Yaw Senyah went to see a lawyer at the Lands Department, Kumasi and a
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deed of assignment, after it had been prepared by the said lawyer, was executed by Yaw Senyah. The defendant therefore pleaded that he was a bona fide purchaser for value without any knowledge of the fraud.
The learned trial judge on the evidence did not find it difficult in coming to the conclusion that the said deed of assignment dated 21 July 1970 was a forgery. We think that finding is not only justified but is fully supported by the evidence. Yaw Senyah having died on 1 March 1963, it was not humanly possible for him to execute personally the assignment on 21 July 1970. Kwaku Nimo impersonated Yaw Senyah who had died for more than seven years before 21 July 1970. Following this finding the learned High Court judge granted the recovery of possession and called upon the defendant to account for the rents he had so far collected from the disputed house.
It appeared that the defendant had no quarrel with the declaration that the deed of assignment was a forgery. He launched the appeal because of the order for the recovery of possession and for accounts. The following two grounds were argued:
(i) That the judgment of the trial court is against principle of law.
(ii) That the learned trial judge failed to consider adequately the applicability to the plaintiff-respondent of the well-known principle of law that where two innocent persons have to suffer for the fraud of a third party, it is the one who by his indiscretion has enabled such third party to commit the fraud who has to suffer.
The two grounds were argued together by learned counsel for the defendant. His main contention was that it was the plaintiff who aided the late Nimo to commit fraud on the defendant. For the plaintiff granted Nimo permission to collect rents and generally to deal with matters in connection with the house and the plaintiff neglected to visit the house and generally conducted himself as if the house, in fact, belonged to the late Nimo.
Counsel therefore submitted that the plaintiff and not the innocent defendant should suffer the consequence of the fraud committed by the said Nimo; because the well-established principle is that wherever one of two innocent parties must suffer, he who “has enabled such a person to occasion the loss must sustain it.”
We think the argument is misconceived and that this general principle has no application in the present case in view of the undisputed findings made by the learned trial judge. In the first place, there was nothing on record to indicate that the plaintiff aided the late Nimo to perpetrate the fraud on the defendant. In other words, whether or not the plaintiff “enabled” the defendant to “occasion the loss” or facilitated the late Nimo to enter into the fraudulent sale transaction
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with the defendant was a question of fact; and on that issue the learned trial judge made a positive finding. In the course of his judgment the learned judge stated as follows:
“I hold without hesitation therefore that exhibits A and C are forged documents so far as they represent that Yaw Senyah personally executed them. Likewise I hold that exhibit I is a forged document in so far as it represents that Yaw Senyah personally executed it and received an amount of ¢4,000. These three forged documents are, I hold, the works of Kwaku Nimo and perhaps his accomplices in which the plaintiff cannot be said to have had a hand or facilitated merely on the grounds that he never visited the house during Kwaku Nimo’s caretakership.
(The emphasis is ours.)
As already stated, this finding is supported by the evidence and we wholeheartedly endorse it. The plaintiff could not be blamed for the fraud committed by the defendant’s so-called vendor which fraud the plaintiff became aware of only after its commission. It will be inconsistent with the general spirit of the law to hold an innocent person, like the plaintiff, responsible for taking measures to prevent the commission of a crime of forgery which he could have no reason to anticipate. We must however observe that the rule that wherever one of two innocent parties must suffer by the act of a third person “he who has enabled such person to occasion the loss must sustain it”, is a broad general principle but it must be understood in all its generality. The expression “he who has enabled a person to occasion the loss” must be understood to mean by some act, conduct, default in the transaction itself, and be the proximate cause of leading the party into that mistake.
Learned counsel for the defendant relied on the principle not because of any fraud on the part of the plaintiff in the sale transaction but because of the plaintiff’s neglect to visit the house which negligence enabled the defendant to believe that no one other than Kweku Nimo, who styled himself as Yaw Senyah, was its owner. But with due respect to learned counsel, as we have already pointed out, the principle has no application in such circumstances. Mere carelessness where there is no duty to be careful creates no estoppel. A person who does not lock up his goods, which are consequently stolen, may be said to be negligent as regards himself, but inasmuch as he neglects no duty which the law casts upon him, he is not in consequence estopped from denying the title of those who may have, however innocently, purchased the goods from the thief, unless it be in a market overt: see Swan v. The North British Australasian Co. (1863) 2 H. & C. 175 at 181 per Blackburn J. and Scholfield v. The Earl of Londesborough [1896] A.C. 514 at 521-522, H.L. where Lord Halsbury L.C. said:
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“ I cannot myself understand why the particular form of fraud adopted in this case should have any different operation in giving validity to a forged instrument rather than other forms of fraud to which instruments are subject … A man, for instance, does not lose his right to his property if he has unnecessarily exposed his goods, or allowed his pocket-handkerchief to hang out of his pocket, but could recover against a bona fide purchaser of any article so lost, notwithstanding the fact that his conduct had to some extent assisted the thief. It is true that stolen goods sold in market overt could be retained by a bona fide purchaser for value, notwithstanding they had been previously stolen; but the same result would follow equally whether the owner had been careful or careless in the custody of his goods.
(The emphasis is ours.)
As matters stood, the defendant’s right to the house was based on documents which were proved to be nothing but forgery and we do not see how any court of law or equity could allow the defendant to hold on to the disputed house, notwithstanding his protestations that he was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of Nimo’s fraud, and what was worse his purchase was not in a market overt.
In the final analysis, we have been unable to find any fault with the judgment appealed from. We are therefore of the opinion that there is no merit in the appeal and it is accordingly dismissed.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
