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[1980] SLR (HC) 23High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

DAKAR LTD. vs. INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD. AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 453

28 April 1980 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 20 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 23
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OSCOLADAKAR LTD. v INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD. AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 453 [1980] SLR (HC) 23
APADAKAR LTD. v INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD. AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 453, [1980] SLR (HC) 23 (Ghana).
BluebookDAKAR LTD. v INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD. AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 453, [1980] SLR (HC) 23 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Goggs v. Huntingtower (Lord) (1844) M. & W. 503; 1 Dow & L. 599; 13 L.J. 352; 2 L.T.O. 330; 8 Jur. 66; 152 E.R. 1297.

(2) Redpath v. Williams (1826) 3 Bing 443; 130 E.R. 583.

[p.455] of [1981] GLR 453

(3) Rose v. Kempthorne (1910) 103 L.T. 730; 75 J.P. 71; 27 T.L.R. 132; 55 S.J. 126; 22 Cox C.C. 356.

(4) Heath v. White (1844) 2 D. & L. 40; 13 L.J.Q.B. 218; 8 Jur. 575.

(5) Jay v. Budd [1898] 1 Q.B. 12; 66 L.J.Q.B. 863; 77 L.T. 335; 46 W.R. 34; 14 T.L.R.1; 41 S.J. 859, C.A.

(6) Hanmer v. Clifton [1894] 1 Q.B. 238; 42 W.R. 287; 10 T.L.R. 12; 38 S.J. 10; 10 R. 55, D.C. (7) Sloman v. Government of New Zealand (1876) 1 C.P.D. 563; 46 L.J.Q.B. 185; 35 L.T. 454; 25 W.R. 86, C.A.

(8) Hillyard v. Smyth (1888) 36 W.R. 7.

(9) O’Connor v. The Stars Newspaper Co. (1891) 30 L.R. Ir.1 (10) Bawa v. Oyegoke [1977] 2 G.L.R. 412.

(11) Kombat v. Bediako; Ex parte Kombat [1971] 1 G.L.R. 196.

(12) Myerson v. Martin [1979] 3 All E.R. 667, C.A.

(13) Hope v. Hope (1854) 4 D.G.M. & G. 328; 2 Eq. Rep. 1047; 26 L.J.Ch. 682; 24 L.T. 29; 2 W.R.

698; 43 E.R. 534.

(14) Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] A.C. 22; 66 L.J.Ch. 35; 75 L.T. 426; 45 W.R. 193; 13 T.L.R.

46; 41 S.J. 63; 4 Mans. 89, H.L.

(15) Porter v. Freudenberg [1915] 1 K.B. 857; 84 L.J.K.B. 1001; 112 L.T. 313; 31 T.L.R. 162; 59 S.J.

216; 20 Com. Cas. 189; 32 R.P.C. 109, C.A.

(16) White v. Land and Water Co. (1883) W.N. 174.

(17) Wood v. Anderson Foundry Co.(1888) 36 W.R.918.

(18) Supplies (T.O.) (London) Ltd. v. Jerry Creighton [1952] 1 K.B. 42; [1951] 2 All E.R. 992; [1951] 2 T.L.R. 993; 95 S.J. 730.

(19) Theodohos, The (1977) C.L.Y. 2394; The Times, 23 May 1977.

(20) Saga of Bond Street Ltd. v. Avalon Promotions Ltd. [1972] 2 Q.B. 325; [1972] 2 W.L.R. 1250;

[1972] 2 All E.R. 545, C.A.

(21) Gurtner v. Circuit [1968] 2 Q.B. 587; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 668; [1968] 1 All E.R. 328, C.A. (22) Byrne v. Brown (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 657; 58 L.J.Q.B. 410; 60 L.T. 651; 5 T.L.R. 255, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION under the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), Order 9, r. 8 (2) for an order of substituted service on a limited liability company. The facts are fully set out in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Sam Okudzeto for the plaintiffs-applicants.

[p.456] of [1981] GLR 453

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.

This is apparently a simple application for substituted service. Within my experience, however, it is a novel application, involving, as it does, substituted service against a limited liability company. In my view, it also gives rise to some complex issues which I propose to canvass and so although in normal applications for substituted service the facts founding the claim are strictly not necessary, in this case it seems it is necessary to give an indication of the facts.

By their specially indorsed writ of summons, the plaintiffs claim against the defendant-company ¢4,402,700 being the balance of the price of goods sold and delivered by the plaintiff-company to the defendant-company,

In this motion ex parte, the plaintiff-company on 21 April 1980 moved this court for an order of substituted service and for such further order or orders as to this court may seem just. By an affidavit in support of the motion, a clerk in the chambers of the solicitor of the plaintiffs has deposed as follows:

“(1) Having been directed to serve direct on the above named defendants with a copy of the writ of summons in this action which appeared to have been regularly issued out under the seal of the Supreme Court of Judicature by the above named plaintiffs against the above named defendants and dated 15 January 1980, which said writ and copy were subscribed and indorsed in the manner and form prescribed by the Rules of the Supreme Court, and a true copy of which said writ is now produced and shown to me marked A, I did on 23 January 1980, in the company of the court bailiff, Ebenezer Abotchi Mensah, attend for the purpose of serving a copy of the said writ at the registered offices of the company of the defendants, being at the Light Industrial Area, Labadi, in the city of Accra. That on inquiring as of the management of the defendant-company, I was informed by persons whom we believed to be employees of the said defendant-company that there was no manager or person of authority at the said place to receive the said writ. That we stated to the said persons there, the nature of our business and told them that we had called to serve the said defendant-company with a copy of the said writ and that we will call again for that purpose at the office of the defendants on 22 February 1980.

[p.457] of [1981] GLR 453

(2) That we did accordingly attend at the above address on 22 February 1980, for the purpose aforesaid of serving the writ and then again none of the employees accepted service of the writ and directed us to the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation (G.I.H.O.C.) which company is alleged to be in charge of the management of the company whereupon we went to the said G.I.H.O.C. to effect service and they also refused to accept service and directed us back to the company’s premises.

(3) That I have made all reasonable and practical efforts and used all due means in my power to serve the said writ but, I have not been able to do so and for the reason aforesaid, I only believe the said writ has come to the knowledge of the defendants and that they wilfully evaded the service of the said writ.

(4) In the circumstances, I respectfully ask that an order for substituted service of the said writ be made by advertisement in one issue of the Daily Graphic and I verily believe that the writ would probably come to the knowledge of the defendants by such service.”

When the motion first came before me a week ago, I had nagging feelings that it was a misconceived application because of existing statutory provisions regulating service of process on limited liability companies. I was in the process of giving a final decision when in the course of additional submission in support of the motion, counsel for the plaintiffs pointed out to me that the defendant-company, hereinafter referred to as the defendants, are affected by the provision of the Transfer of Shares and Other Proprietary Interests (Babylos Co. Ltd. and Others) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 38). In the circumstance as I had not had the opportunity of considering the said Decree and as I found my doubts as to the propriety of the motion mounting I adjourned for a considered ruling which I now proceed to give.

The defendants in this case are, as I have pointed out, a limited liability company and service of process on the company must therefore depend on the existing statutory provisions regulating service on a company. Before considering the procedure of substituted service which the plaintiffs propose to adopt, it seems to me that the existing statutory provisions need to be examined.

The High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L. N. 140A), Order 9,r. 8 (2) provides:

“(2) In the absence of any statutory provision regulating service on a company carrying on business in the Gold Coast

[p.458] of [1981] GLR 453 or on any society or fellowship in the Gold Coast whether corporate or incorporate, service may be effected, by sending the writ or other document to be served, by prepaid registered post to the secretary or other corresponding officer at the head office in the Gold Coast of such company, society or fellowship, as the case may be, or by serving the writ or document on such secretary or corresponding officer personally of such office as aforesaid.

For the purpose of this rule, society or fellowship includes any registered Trade Union or Co-operative Society.”

This rule it seems is now obsolete for section 263 of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179), provides under “Service of documents on Company”:

“263. (1) A document may be served on a company by leaving it at, or sending it by post to, the registered office of the company, or the latest office registered by the Registrar as the registered address of the company.

(2) Any document to be served by post on a company shall be posted in such time as to admit of its being delivered in due course of delivery within the time, if any, prescribed for the service thereof; and in proving service it shall be sufficient to prove that a letter containing such document was properly addressed, prepaid and posted, whether or not by registered post.

(3) If a company has no registered office, service upon any director of the company or, if the company has no director or if no director can be traced in Ghana, upon any member of the company, shall be deemed good and effectual service upon such company.

(4) If it shall be proved that any document was in fact received by the board of directors, managing director or secretary of a company such document shall be deemed to have been served on the company notwithstanding that service may not have been effected in accordance with the foregoing subsections of this section.

(5) Nothing in this section shall derogate from any provision in this Code relating to the service of any document, or from the power of any court to direct how service shall be effected of any document relating to legal proceedings before that court.”

It seems to me therefore that service of a document on a company ought to be effected by leaving the document at, or sending it by post to the registered office of the company or the latest office

[p.459] of [1981] GLR 453 registered by the Registrar-General as the registered address of the company. The provision that a document may be served by post on a company finds further elaboration in section 13 (2) of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4). The subsection reads:

“13. (2) Where an enactment authorises or requires a document to be served by post, whether the word ‘serve’ or some other word is used, service may be effected by prepaying, registering and posting an envelope containing the document, addressed to the person on whom the document is to be served at his last known postal address; and, unless the contrary is proved, the document shall be deemed to have been served at the time at which the envelope would have been delivered in the ordinary course of post.”

Of course “person” as is defined by section 32 of C.A. 4 includes a body corporate, whether a corporation aggregate or a corporation sole. The procedure for and effect of serving a limited liability company which has a registered office is therefore clearly indicated by the combined effect of section 263 of the Companies Code, 1963, and the relevant provision of the Interpretation Act, 1960, noted here.

In the case before me the plaintiff-company are asking under Order 10 of L.N. 140A for substituted service by advertisement in one issue of the Daily Graphic. Now upon what principle do the courts proceed to order substituted service and is substituted service an applicable mode of service in the circumstances disclosed by the affidavit of the plaintiff? To answer this question it is in my view necessary to appreciate the true ambit of Order 10 which provides:

“1. Where it appears to the Court (either after or without an attempt at personal service) that for any reason personal service cannot be conveniently effected, the Court may order that service be effected either— (a) by delivery of the document to some adult inmate at the usual or last known place of abode or business of the person to be served; or (b) by delivery thereof to some person being an agent of the person to be served, or to some other person, on it being proved that there is reasonable probability that the document will, through the agent or other person, come to the knowledge of the person to be served; or

(c) by advertisement in the Gazette, or in some newspaper circulating within the jurisdiction; or

[p.460] of [1981] GLR 453

(d) by notice put up at the Court House or some other place of public resort of the Judicial Division or district wherein the proceeding in respect of which the service is made is instituted, or at the usual or last known place of abode or of business of the person to be served; or (e) by prepaid registered letter addressed to the defendant at the address indicated in the affidavit filed by the plaintiff in support of his application for substituted service, whereat there is reasonable ground for believing that it will reach him.”

A close reading of the provision seems to indicate that by personal service is meant service on the person of the defendant. The case law on the matter provides ample support for this. Illustrative of this is the interesting case of Goggs v. Lord Huntingtower (1844) 12 M. & W. 503 at pp. 503-504, where Alderson B. said of personal service, “Service means serving the defendant with a copy of the process, and shewing him the original if he desires it,” It seems to me therefore that personal service is applicable only to service on human beings as parties in whatever capacity, whether as plaintiffs or defendants or the human agents and servants of such parties, not on dehumanised, artificial entities like governments or companies. A host of cases lend considerable support to this view. A few of them are Redpath v. Williams (1826) 3 Bing 443; Rose v. Kempthorne (1910) 13 L.T. 730; Heath v. White (1844) 2 D. & L. 40; Jay v. Budd [1898] 1 Q.B.12, C.A. and Hanmer v. Clifton [1894] 1 Q.B 238, D.C.

In the 1970 English White Book at p. 993, the editors commenting on the corresponding Order 10, r. 3, of our rules quoted Sloman v. Government of New Zealand (1876) 1 C.P.D. 563, C.A.; Hillyard v. Smyth (1888) 36 W.R.7 and an Irish case, O’Connor v. The Stars Newspaper Co. (1891) 30 L.R. Ir. 1 as authorities for the following proposition, “Substituted service can only be had in cases in which (if there were no difficulties on the way) personal service could be had. Therefore the defendant must be a person or a corporation.” Of course by the English Rules service on a corporation is made by serving “the Mayor” or other “head officer” or on the “town clerk,” “clerk” “treasurer” or “secretary.” And all these are human beings. A firm also as is well known is made up of individual human beings. A company, however, is a creature of statute and therefore in the absence of statutory provisions, it is not easy to know how service is to be effected, since it has not the requisite human attribute capable of satisfying the personal service prescription of our rules, which

[p.461] of [1981] GLR 453 is that personal service is service on the person. The significance of this meaning of personal service is that substituted service under Order 19, r. 1 of L.N. 140A is prima facie not intended to apply to a company like the defendant-company in these proceedings.

In Bawa v. Oyegoke [1977] 2 G.L.R. 412, I held, following my previous decision in Kombat v. Bediako; Ex parte Kombat [1971] 1 G.L.R. 196, that where at the date of the issue of a writ, personal service cannot be made, then substituted service will, as a general rule, be refused. The jurisdiction to order substituted service therefore depends on failure of the prescribed process of personal service in the circumstance: see Myerson v. Martin [1979] 3 All E.R. 667, C.A. If the prescribed procedure is not personal service but another mode of service then it seems to me that prima facie there will be no jurisdiction to order substituted service in terms of Order 10, r. 1. It would seem therefore that the present application, founded as counsel contends in his motion paper and supporting affidavit on Order 10, must be considered to be misconceived.

In so holding, however, I do not wish to be understood as saying categorically that substituted service can never in any circumstance whatsoever be ordered against a company; that would be too rigid a view and an unnecessary limitation on the powers of the court. Every case must be decided on its own facts because the probable combination of circumstances that may necessitate substituted service cannot be exhaustively anticipated by any a priori formulation of a dogmatic principle.

Afterall what is the whole purpose of service whether personal or substituted? In Hope v. Hope (1854) 4 D.M. & G. 328 at p. 342, Lord Cranworth L.C. attempted to answer this question when he said:

“The object of all service is of course only to give notice to the party on whom it is made, so that he may be made aware of and may be able to resist that which is sought against him; and when that has been substantially done, so that the Court may feel perfectly confident that service has reached him, everything has been done that is required.”

I think perhaps in appropriate cases in order to satisfy the purpose of service as is so laid down by Lord Cranworth L.C., substituted service may very well be prayed in aid by the courts even against a company, but then that will be under the inherent jurisdiction, not Order 10, r. 1 of L.N. 140A. Nevertheless, the circumstances that would justify a court in ordering substituted service on a company must be rare indeed. I suppose in cases where a company has no registered office and where the directors and the members endeavour

[p.462] of [1981] GLR 453 to evade service, a court may very well consider substituted service as an appropriate mode of effecting service where personal service cannot be effected on the directors and members. Were such a situation to arise, however, I expect the affidavit in support to indicate that the company has no registered office, and that its directors and members are evading service or cannot be traced. That situation has certainly not arisen in this case, if the affidavit is any guide.

In my opinion, for substituted service of the nature envisaged by the plaintiffs to be ordered against the defendants, if indeed such a procedure is feasible, then all other available normal processes pertaining to service on a company ought to have been exhausted. This is because substituted service on a company with a registered office is an abnormal process and to say of a limited liability company that it is evading service, when it has a genuine registered office is to misconceive the nature of a limited liability company in contemplation of company law as has been accepted by the common law world ever since the famous decision of the House of Lords in Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] A.C. 22, H.L.

In this connection it is perhaps worthy of note and significant that there is not a single reported case of a substituted service on a limited liability company with a registered office in all the various English reports I have come across in my researches. Be that as it may, in the normal run of cases and within the experience of the common law courts, substituted service is only resorted to on failure of personal service. No doubt Lord Reading C.J. had that in mind when in reading the judgment of a strongly constituted Court of Appeal in Porter v. Freudenberg [1915] 1 K.B. 857 at p. 888 he said:

“In order that substituted service may be permitted, it must be clearly shown that the plaintiff is in fact unable to effect personal service and that the writ is likely to reach the defendant or to come to his knowledge if the method of substituted service which is asked for by the plaintiff is adopted.”

In this application for substituted service, which is being made to this court, the plaintiffs’ solicitor made it clear that he knew the registered office of the company. In such a case the statutory mode of service is as is indicated in section 263 (1) of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179). This mode was not shown to have been used by the plaintiffs and it is therefore difficult to appreciate the reasons why another mode of service is sought to be substituted for this statutory mode.

[p.463] of [1981] GLR 453

In the corresponding provisions in the various English Companies Acts that have existed from time to time, it has been consistently held that service on companies in the manner indicated by the said Companies Acts must be strictly followed: see White v. Land & Water Co. (1883) W.N. 174; Wood v. Anderson Foundry Co. (1888) 36 W.R. 918 and the judgment of Devlin J. in T.O. Supplies (London) Ltd. v. Jerry Greighton Ltd. [1952] 1 K.B. 42. Indeed, in The Theodohos (1977) C.L.Y. 2394, Brandon J. held (in my view rightly) that service on a company carrying on business within the jurisdiction is to be effected under the provisions of the Companies Act and not the rules of court.

I can understand the reason for this view of Brandon J. and I think if Order 9, r. 8 (2) of L.N. 140A is read in conjunction with section 263 of the Companies Code, 1963, then the implication is irresistible that service on a company registered in Ghana or with a registered office in Ghana is to be effected under the provisions of the Companies Code, 1963, and not under the rules of court.

I notice that in the affidavit in support of the motion for substituted service, the plaintiffs were searching for the manager of the defendants and those in charge of management. It seems to me that that is an unnecessary and burdensome exercise. If the company has a registered office I have already indicated what the plaintiff is required by statute to do. If, however, there is no registered office then there is no need to look for a manager. The plaintiff would then be obliged to find out who the directors and members are, and the right place to direct the inquiries is not necessarily the premises of the company but the office of the Registrar of Companies.

In fact, I have grave doubts as to whether it is proper to speak of personal service in regard to companies with registered offices. It seems Winn L.J. shares my doubts for when speaking of the corresponding service provision in the English Companies Act of 1948 in Saga of Bond Street Ltd. v. Avalon Promotions Ltd. [1972] 2 W.L.R. 1250 at p. 1253, C.A. he said:

“The Companies Act 1948 provides that documents (including … writs) may be served on bodies corporate not personally, if one can speak of personal service upon a company, but by service through the post …”

There is however another matter of extreme importance in this case. Section 1 of the Transfer of Shares and Other Proprietary Interests (Babylos Co. Ltd. and Others) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 38), s. 1 provides:

[p.464] of [1981] GLR 453

“1. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary all shares, debentures, securities and proprietary rights of the companies specified in the Schedule to this Decree or held in or for and on behalf of those companies by any person are hereby transferred to the State.”

The defendants in these proceedings are one of the companies specified in the said Schedule. This means in my view that the properties of the company are now vested in the Republic and the company itself has no proprietary rights in anything. The plaintiffs have ostensibly sued the defendant-company but the substantial defendant is the Republic. Order 16, r. 11 of L.N. 140A provides:

“11. No cause or matter shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, and the Court may in every cause or matter deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. The Court or a Judge may, at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court or a Judge to be just, order that the names of any parties improperly joined, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, be struck out and that the names of any parties whether plaintiffs or defendants, who ought to have been joined, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the case or matter, be added. No person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any disability, without his own consent in writing thereto. Every party whose name is so added as defendant shall be served with a writ of summons or notice in manner hereinafter mentioned, or in such manner as may be prescribed by any special order, and the proceedings as against such party shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of such writ or notice.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

Under section 4 of A.F.R.C.D. 38, the Minister responsible for Industries has responsibility for the implementation of the provisions of the A.F.R.C.D. 38. In the circumstance it is clear that the defendant-company are merely nominal defendants with no substantial interest in the outcome of the action. In Gurtner v. Circuit [1968] 1 All E.R. 328 at p. 332, C.A. Lord Denning M.R. in his usually homely language following in the steps of Lord Esher M.R. in Byrne v. Brown (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 65 gave an indication

[p.465] of [1981] GLR 453 of the criteria the court should adopt in applying Order 16, r. 11. He said:

“. . . when two parties are in dispute in an action at law and the determination of that dispute will directly affect a third person in his legal rights or in his pocket, in that he will be bound to foot the bill, then the court in its discretion may allow him to be added as a party on such terms as it thinks fit. By so doing the court achieves the object of the rule. It enables all matters in dispute ‘to be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon’ between all those directly concerned in the outcome.”

Clearly since all the proprietary interests of the company are now vested in the State, any judgment given against the company cannot be satisfied by the company and further proceedings must be pursued to compel the Republic to satisfy the judgment. Such multiplicity of actions must be avoided by recourse to Order 16, r. 11 which is designed, inter alia, to achieve the purpose of avoiding multiplicity of suits. Consequently, in order to enable the court at the trial to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in this case, it seems to me that the State per the Minister responsible for Industries ought to be made a party to the proceedings. Accordingly, I hereby suo motu order that the Minister responsible for Industries be joined as a defendant in this suit.

In the result, the application for substituted service is refused but an order is hereby made suo motu for the Republic per the Minister responsible for Industries to be joined.

Order accordingly.

DECISION Application dismissed.

Order accordingly.

D. R. K. S.

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