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[1980] SLR (HC) 41High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

REPUBLIC vs. EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN, KUMASI CITY COUNCIL; EX PARTE GYIMAH AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 466

5 May 1980 · JONES-MENSAH J · ≈ 6 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 41
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN, KUMASI CITY COUNCIL; ex parte GYIMAH AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 466 [1980] SLR (HC) 41
APAREPUBLIC v EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN, KUMASI CITY COUNCIL; ex parte GYIMAH AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 466, [1980] SLR (HC) 41 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN, KUMASI CITY COUNCIL; ex parte GYIMAH AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 466, [1980] SLR (HC) 41 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

Gyimah v. Agyeman [1981] G.L.R. 427.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for leave to issue a writ of quo warranto against the Executive Chairman of the Kumasi City Council, Nana Akwasi Agyeman. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Hayfron-Benjamin for the applicants.

JUDGMENT OF JONES-MENSAH J.

This is an application filed by fourteen Honourable Councillors of the Kumasi City Council for leave to issue a writ of quo warranto directed against Nana Akwasi Agyeman, to show by what authority he is presuming to exercise office of the Executive Chairman of the Kumasi City Council and exercising the functions thereof. The grounds on which the application is founded are:

1. That by virtue of the judgment of the High Court, Kumasi, dated 14 April 1980, in Gyimah v.

Agyeman [1981] G.L.R. 427 the right resides in the Councillors of the Kumasi City Council to elect or appoint one of their number the Chairman of the Kumasi City Council. The respondent not having been so appointed, the appointment is void.

2. That by virtue of the decision of the High Court dated 14 April 1980, the term of office of the respondent has expired on 18 January 1980, the respondent’s term of office could not in terms of section 7 (2) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, be renewed.

3. That the appointment of the respondent is in any case irregular and without authority.

4. That the office of executive chairman being unknown to the Constitution, 1979, it is contrary to the letter and spirit of the provisions of article 182 of the said Constitution for the respondent to presume to exercise the office and functions of an Executive Chairman of the Kumasi City Council.

[p.468] of [1981] GLR 466

From these grounds they seek to pray for the following reliefs:

1. An order of injunction restraining the respondent, Nana Akwasi Agyeman, from exercising the office and functions of Executive Chairman of the Kumasi City Council.

2. An order declaring the office of Chairman (whether executive or regular) of the Kumasi City Council vacant.

In moving the motion, Mr. Hayfron-Benjamin was not, as usual, guilty of tedious repetition. With commendable brevity he nursed and nurtured the grounds on which he relied following the track set out in papers filed in support of his application. With befitting courtesy Mr. Hayfron-Benjamin prayed for leave for writ of quo warranto to issue to the offending Nana Akwasi Agyeman about whose re-appointment to the office of Executive Chairman of the Kumasi City Council with effect from 20 January 1980, made subsequent to the judgment of 14 April 1980 to which the applicants cling tight, he does not profess to doubt.

In praying this court for leave for writ of quo warranto to issue, the applicants flag this court’s judgment of 14 April 1980 in Gyimah v. Agyeman [1981] G.L.R. 427 delivered by Roger Korsah J., and held it out as having declared that the right to appoint one of their number as Chairman of the Kumasi City Council resides in the Councillors of the Kumasi City Council exclusively. Accordingly, they argue that the purported re-appointment of the respondent, Nana Akwasi Agyeman, by the government as chairman is invalid and so Nana Akwasi Agyeman has usurped office and should be enjoined by this court.

That apart, they also argue that section 8A of the Local Administration Act, 1971 (Act 359), which gives the President an overriding power of appointment of the Executive Chairman of the Kumasi City Council is in conflict with the letter and spirit of article 182 (1) and (4) of the Constitution, 1979, which contemplates nothing short of an elected chairman for all district and local councils in the country from among member councillors when a new Local Administration Act prescribed by the Constitution is eventually enacted.

That in a nutshell is the perimeter of the applicants’ case, respecting which, the applicants seek leave to call on the respondent to answer before this court. The writ of quo warranto, like some other prerogative writs, is a writ of grace and not a writ of right. In considering whether to grant leave, the court’s discretion to do so must circumspect the full turn circle of many matters including the benefit the applicants are likely to achieve from the proceedings

[p.469] of [1981] GLR 466

they seek to set in motion, i.e. in this case a quo warranto proceedings. It is also open to the court to consider the alternative remedies open to the applicants.

In this case the applicants base themselves on the judgment of 14 April 1980 which, they say, upheld their right to appoint the Chairman of the Kumasi City Council from among the elected members. Indeed, that judgment so declared that such right vested in the councillors as matters stood then. But can it be said that that judgment could possibly have, in one and the same stroke, erased the overriding powers conferred on the President by the Local Government (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (S.M.C.D. 219), to appoint an Executive Chairman for the Kumasi City Council? In my view, the answer is No! To attempt to do so is to attempt, in this court, to invalidate section 8A of the Local Government Act, 1971 (as amended by S.M.C.D. 219).

It may well be disappointing to the applicants to know that there is a total want of jurisdiction in this court to make such a declaration. If the applicants are so disappointed, they can, happily take solace in the facts that all hope is not lost and that such power rests exclusively with the Supreme Court by virtue of article 118 of the Constitution, 1979, and also article 2 (1) of the Constitution which reads:

“2. (1) A person who alleges (a) that an enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that or any other enactment, or (b) that any act or omission of any person,is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of, a provision of this Constitution, may at any time bring an action in the Supreme Court for a declaration to that effect.”

They will, no doubt, be welcomed on a pilgrimage to Accra to test the validity of section 8A of the Local Government Act, 1971.

In the light of the foregoing, since three essential matters are admitted by the applicants, namely, (1) that the respondent has been duly re-appointed by the President of the Republic after the expiry of the respondent’s previous term of office; (2) that S.M.C.D. 219 amending the Local Administration Act, 1971, is carried into force by the Constitution, 1979; and (3) that the respondent has been duly appointed under statutory power, the vestiture of which remains, for the time being, in the President of the Republic, any challenge to the validity of the existing Local Administration Act, 1971, as amended, the source of power under which the President acted, cannot be impugned in this court, I therefore cannot see

[p.470] of [1981] GLR 466

what competent remedy the applicants were in search of when they set out to file their application in this self-same court. As far as the competence of the High Court goes, the exercise of powers conferred by existing enactments have full force and potent legal effect unless and until the Supreme Court declares otherwise in a proper proceeding.

The application of the applicants for leave to issue the writ of quo warranto would therefore seem to me a mis-spent effort because the area of relief sought by the application is incompetent before this court and in any case misconceived. It ought therefore to be refused and dismissed for the reasons given.

Accordingly, I reject and dismiss the application.

DECISION

Application dismissed.

D. F. L.

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