DARKE IV vs. DARKE IX AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 144
2 June 1980 · CHARLES CRABBE JA · ≈ 13 min read
[1980] SLR (CA) 13Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Practice Direction [1973] 2 G.L.R. 39.
(2) Zip Zabrama (alias Walla) v. The Republic [1967] G.L.R. 785, C.A.
(3) Au Pui-Kuen v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1979] 2 W.L.R. 274; [1979] 1 All E.R. 769, P.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for an order that a written judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered on 30 July 1979 in open court be declared null
[p.146] of [1981] GLR 144 and void or in the alternative be set aside. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Charles Crabbe J.A.
COUNSEL
E. D. Kom (with him, Akyea Djamson, Dr. E. C. Djamson and T. Ofori) for the applicant.
Tetteh (with him, Mawudoku) for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF CHARLES CRABBE J.A.
This is an application “praying for an order for the judgment of 30 July 1979 to be declared null and void [or] in the alternative be set aside and for such further or other orders” which in the opinion of this court is, or are, appropriate.
The facts, for the purposes of this application, are really simple. On 30 July 1979, this court delivered a written judgment. It was in respect of an appeal argued on 5, 6 and 7 July 1979. Consequent upon that judgment, read in open court, an order was made that:
“The appeal by the defendants-appellants is allowed. The judgment of the High Court, Ho, dated 11 November 1975, declaring the plaintiffs-respondents as the owner in possession of the land edged in pink or red in colour on the survey plan, exhibit Z is set aside. Instead, there will be judgment in favour of the defendants-appellants allowing the counterclaim for a declaration of title and possession of the land they claim edged green on the plan. As to costs the defendants-appellants are entitled to costs of this appeal fixed at ¢407.52 and also the costs in the court below assessed at ¢350. Costs in the court below if paid, should be refunded.”
In his affidavit in support of the application, Togbe Ayim Darke IV, the applicant, stated, inter alia:
“That I am informed by my counsel and verily believe same to be true that a court is bound to give reasons for its decisions and not to make oracular pronouncements. That the court is also bound to reduce its judgment into writing and make same available to the parties to the suit and the whole world. That nine months after the delivery of the judgment, the written judgment incorporating the reasons thereof is not available. That I am advised by counsel and verily believe same to be true that the non-availability defeats the ends of justice and brings the administration of justice into disrepute. That the impression being created amongst my subjects is that, if really written reasons for the judgment were read then it should have been available long ago and that the judgment is being re-written to forestall the points raised in my application for review. . .”
[p.147] of [1981] GLR 144
Togbe Gobo Darke IX, the first defendant-respondent, admitted most of the facts stated in the affidavit of the plaintiff-appellant, adding that:
“I am advised and verily believe same to be true that the absence of the reasons for judgment does not detract from the efficacy of the judgment of the court; nor has it adversely affected the applicant who has filed copious arguments in support of his applications for review and stay of execution, based on notes he took at the delivery of the judgment. I am further advised that the application herein is incompetent, it being presented in the wrong forum.”
Before this court, counsel for the plaintiff-applicant (hereafter called the applicant), in asking for the judgment delivered on 30 July 1979 to be vacated stated that all attempts to secure a certified true copy of the judgment had proved abortive. It was about ten months since the judgment was delivered. By the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D. 101), reasons must be given for any judgment delivered. Reasons were given in this case; but then, copies of the reasons as delivered had not been forthcoming after ten months. That amounted to no reasons having been given at all and therefore the judgment was a nullity.
At the time the judgment was delivered, the Constitution, 1979, had not come into force. Their case was one for review. And the rules required that the judgment must be exhibited. There was a Practice Direction to this effect: see [1973] 2 G.L.R. 39. The party aggrieved by the judgment was incapacitated in applying for a review without the judgment.
Counsel for the defendants-respondents (hereafter called the respondents) argued that the matter was pending before the Supreme Court. As such, this court could not make any order that would stultify the appeal. The reasons for the judgment had been delivered. The committal of those reasons on paper was merely an administrative act which should not affect the efficacy of the judgment. The Court of Appeal was under a duty to deliver its judgment within a period of eight weeks after the hearing of the appeal. Where the reasons for a judgment had been given but copies of it were not available that did not invalidate the judgment. If for some reasons both the judge who wrote the judgment and the written judgment were not available that would not affect the validity of the judgment.
Were he on the other side—and this was in response to a question put from the bench—counsel for the respondents would assume, rightly or wrongly, that for all purposes time had began to run from the date of the delivery of the judgment in open court. He would
[p.148] of [1981] GLR 144 take advantage of the oral judgment or the written judgment read in court and file the necessary application for a review. He would consider his application for a review as an appeal pending before the Supreme Court because this court had so ruled that the matter was pending before the Supreme Court. In his view, the absence of the written judgment did not avoid the judgment. The reasons would enhance the proceedings but the reasons did not make the judgment right or wrong—there could be a faulty reasoning but a correct judgment. He concluded that the problem lay in the absence of the written judgment and there would have to be a repetition of the arguments all over again in the Supreme Court.
The record book has this entry of 30 July 1979:
“Written judgment delivered. Order of the court is that the appeal by the defendant-appellant is allowed. The judgment of the High Court, Ho, dated 11 November 1975 declaring the plaintiff-respondent as the owner in possession of the land edged in pink or red colour on the survey plan, exhibit Z is set aside. Instead there will be judgment in favour of the defendant-appellant allowing the counterclaim for a declaration of title and possession of the land they claim edged green on the plan. As to costs the defendants-appellants are entitled to costs of this appeal fixed at ¢407.52 and also the costs in the court below assessed at ¢350. Costs in the court below if paid, should be refunded.”
Paragraph 7 of the affidavit supporting the application also states, “That on the day of the judgment. . ., the President read a written judgment . . .” Indeed, one other Justice of Appeal, as stated in the affidavit of the applicant, read “a judgment whereby he concurred with the judgment of his brother…” Counsel for the applicant added his own affidavit in support of the application in which, inter alia, he stressed the fact that a “written judgment was delivered.” On this aspect of the matter, therefore, there is complete agreement, at least, as far as the applicant is concerned that the court delivered its judgment, i.e. the presiding justice read his judgment in open court and one other justice of the court read a judgment concurring with the judgment of the presiding Justice of Appeal. It is not known whether the third member of the panel of justices read a judgment. It is stated in the affidavit of the applicant that, that justice of the panel “was not present on the day of delivery of the judgment and there was no indication that he also concurred in the judgment delivered by the president of the court.” Assuming for the moment that, that Justice of Appeal did not concur and dissented from his brother justices, it would then be a question of a majority judgment. So for
[p.149] of [1981] GLR 144 our present purposes, the absence of a judgment read by the third Justice of Appeal cannot, one way or the other, affect the issue now before us. I have had sight of the other written judgment delivered on the same day as that delivered by the presiding Justice of Appeal. I am satisfied that it does support the judgment read by the presiding Justice of Appeal.
There is considerable merit in the argument of counsel for the applicant that his hands are tied so that he is unable to comply with the provisions of rules 6 and 13 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), in that, in the absence of a copy of the main judgment of the court he is unable to deal fully, effectively and efficiently, as demanded of him as counsel representing the interests of his client, with the presentation of the review. I sincerely sympathise with him —and with his client. He really has a difficulty.
The provisions of rule 6 (2) (b) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), demand of counsel for the applicant to state, in his notice of appeal, “whether the whole or part only of the decision of the Court below is complained of and in the latter case the part complained of.” Whether the applicant is complaining only of part of a judgment or of the whole of a judgment, it is necessary, it is essential, that he reads, cogitates and reflects on the judgment, if his counsel is worth his salt, before he sets about to complain of the judgment or a part of it. The provisions of rule 6 (4) demand that an applicant, “. . . set out concisely and under distinct heads the grounds upon which the appellant intends to rely at the hearing of the appeal . . .” The task of the applicant is not only to file a notice of appeal. More is demanded of him. And that demand requires that he is precise, distinct, and I may add, lucid, in setting out the grounds of appeal. For, his failure so to do may lead to the dismissal of his appeal on the ground that, in the words of rule 6 (5) his, “[grounds] of appeal . . . [are] vague or general or [discloses] no reasonable [grounds] of appeal . . .”
To satisfy the combined effect of sub-rules (2), (4) and (5) of rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970, an appellant needs a close and sustained study of the judgment of the court in order to discharge this important obligation which the rules mandatorily place upon his shoulders. Not only that. Under the provisions of rule 13 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970, the applicant is required to state his case. The statement which the applicant is obliged to file should set out, in the words of rule 13 (6):
“(a) the full case and arguments to be advanced by the party including all the relevant authorities and references to the
[p.150] of [1981] GLR 144 decided cases and the statute law upon which the party intends to rely. . .”
The intendment of these provisions are reflected in the Practice Direction [1973] 2 G.L.R. 39, in respect of reviews by the full bench of the Court of Appeal, which states in part at p. 40:
“All applications for review will first be considered by the Justices of Appeal in chambers; and it is only if they decide that the case is worth going on with that the application for review will be listed for hearing.
Otherwise the application will not be considered in open court at all. It is therefore very important that practitioners in this court should set out their cases in full, citing all relevant authorities …
Any failure to set out a full case in this manner will result in inadequate consideration being given to the application in chambers, and no complaints will be entertained on a rejection consequent upon such action. . .”
Hence the importance of the reasons for a judgment being made available. For, in the absence of such reasons how else can an appellant read, study and digest a judgment in order, firstly, to make up his mind whether, in fact, he should appeal at all, and secondly, having taken the bold step to seek for a review, how far he can tear to pieces the judgment under consideration.
Moreover, the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules, 1977 (L.I. 1128), enjoins upon Justices of Appeal, under the provisions of rule 32A (2), an obligation “. . . to deliver judgment as soon as possible after the close of each case before it [the Court], and in any event not later than eight weeks after the close of any such case. . .” This provision emphasises the difficulty of the applicant in this case. There has been no complaint that the requirements of the law had not been met. It has not been argued that a judgment had not been delivered. Within the limit imposed by the rules the written judgment had been delivered. Such cases as Zip Zabrama (alias Walla) v. The Republic [1967] G.L.R. 785, C.A. and Au Pui-Kuen v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1979] 2 W.L.R. 274, P.C. stress the importance of the need to give full reasons for a judgment. The reasons serve the purpose of a “kindly light” on the dark paths of litigants. The reasons serve as a warning to lawyers as to what they are likely to be up against. The reasons provide for judges a wealth of information to guard and guide them—all for the efficient administration of justice.
It is a dominant purpose of our law that we do justice between man and man. This ideal of justice is subserved by the idea of the
[p.151] of [1981] GLR 144 binding force of a precedent. Where precedent fails, we look for some other help for save other enlightenment. Tennyson in Aylmer’s Field was harsh on:
“. . . the lawless science of our law.
That codeless myriad of precedent.
That wilderness of single instances.”
Yet, he was quick to observe of his country as a land:
“Where Freedom slowly broadens down.
From precedent to precedent.”
From the ius respondendi in Roman law and the Emperor’s responsa to our own day, the ratio decidendi of a case has always explained the principles which run through the case explaining the peculiar circumstances of the case, and according to which the case had been decided. Without that, there can be no development of our law. Without that we cannot have our own distinct jurisprudence. It was a fundamental tenet with Lord Mansfield that, “The reason and spirit of cases make law, not the letter of particular precedents.” And so it is imperative, as has been demonstrated, that the reasons for a judgment should always be made available.
That stated, can this court now declare as null and void a written judgment which, in the words of the applicant, was read—and read in open court? Can this court vacate a written Judgment which, in the words of counsel for the applicant, was delivered—and delivered in open court? Can this court set aside, as prayed for, a written judgment which, as the parties are agreed, had been delivered, had been read in open court? I doubt that. And very much so.
This doubt is based on the fact that once the written judgment was delivered and indeed was supported by another written judgment this court had finally dealt with the matter. And under its present jurisdiction this court has no legal basis for acceding to the prayer of the applicant. The powers of this court and the limitations of its jurisdiction are set out in articles 121, 122 and 123 of the Constitution, 1979. Section 5, Part III of the First Schedule also takes away from this court the powers it once exercised in respect of reviews. Those powers have been given to the Supreme Court.
Behind the present applications the much more important matter of an appeal before the Supreme Court. The applicant, as an appellant before the Supreme Court, is not enabled to comply with certain provisions of the law due to the absence of a copy of the main written judgment. It is upon his acquisition of the main written judgment, and a study of it that the applicant, as an appellant, would seek to present his case before the Supreme Court. In the circum-
[p.152] of [1981] GLR 144 stances of this case, I come to the firm conclusion that in the absence of the main written judgment of this court, the applicant needs an admission card to enter the forum of the Supreme Court. Sitting as a subordinate court, this court cannot direct the Supreme Court what to do. But I doubt very much whether an assurance from this court that the applicant, as an appellant before the Supreme Court, had not been able fully to comply with the law and exhibit the judgment because of the absence of the main written judgment of this court, would not be acceptable in the sight of the Supreme Court. This ruling, in my view, could therefore serve as an assurance—if such were needed—from this court for the benefit of the applicant as an appellant before the Supreme Court for the purposes of his appeal before the Supreme Court.
Reluctantly, I would dismiss the application. I make no order as to costs. I cannot award costs against this court.
JUDGMENT OF JIAGGE J.A. I agree.
JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A. I also agree.
DECISION Application dismissed.
J. K. E. E.
