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[1980] SLR (HC) 56High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK vs. CAMB MOTORS LIMITED AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 489

28 May 1980 · AMUA-SEKYI J · ≈ 9 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 56
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OSCOLAGHANA COMMERCIAL BANK v CAMB MOTORS LIMITED AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 489 [1980] SLR (HC) 56
APAGHANA COMMERCIAL BANK v CAMB MOTORS LIMITED AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 489, [1980] SLR (HC) 56 (Ghana).
BluebookGHANA COMMERCIAL BANK v CAMB MOTORS LIMITED AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 489, [1980] SLR (HC) 56 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Standard Bank of West Africa Ltd. v. Boaitey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 308.

(2) Amo-Mensah v. Owusu [1972] 1 G.L.R. 251.

(3) Narnor v. Palm Grove Estate Ltd. [1964] G.L.R. 521.

(4) R. v. Akiwumi and Bannerman; Ex parte Dako (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 14.

(5) Atsiavishie v. Tsili, Land Court, 7 June 1955, unreported.

(6) Schafer v. Blyth [1920] 3 K.B. 140; 89 L.J.K.B. 671.

(7) Bradshaw v. Warlow (1886) 32 Ch.D. 403; 55 L.J.Ch. 852; 54 L.T. 438; 34 W.R. 557, C.A. (8) Michell v. Wilson (1877) 25 W.R. 380.

(9) R. v. London County Council; Ex parte Swan and Edgar (1927) Ltd. (1929) 141 L.T. 590. (10) Eku alias Condua III v. Acquah [1963] 1 G.L.R. 271.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for review of the decision of the High Court extending the time for review laid down under Order 39, r. 8 (3) in favour of respondents. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.

COUNSEL

M. Atadika for the applicants.

T. A. Tagoe for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.

On 19 November 1979, four applications for judgment under Order 14 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), came before me in the following suits: No. 847/79, Ghana Commercial Bank v. Camb Trading Co. Ltd.; No. 848/79; Ghana Commercial Bank v. Camb Knitting and Garment Factory Ltd.; No. 849/79; Ghana Commercial Bank v. Camb Knitting and [p.491] of [1982-83] GLR 489 Garment Factory Ltd. No. 732/79 and Ghana Commercial Bank v. Camb Motors Ltd. The applications not being opposed by the defendant-respondents (hereafter to be referred to as the respondents), who were all represented by the same counsel, I entered judgment in favour of the plaintiff-applicants (hereafter to be referred to as the applicants) as follows:

“in No. 847/79 for ¢541,689.66 with ¢6,000 costs, in No. 848/79 for ¢81,898.62 with ¢3,000 costs, in No.

849/79 for ¢686.200.18 with ¢7,000 costs, and in No. 732/79, for ¢188,089.51 with ¢4,000 costs.”

Following this, the respondents applied for a stay of execution and an order for the payment of the judgment debt and costs by instalments. The applications were strongly resisted by the applicants whose counsel went so far as to suggest that the High Court had no power to order payment of a judgment debt by instalments. He probably had in mind the decisions in Standard Bank of West Africa Ltd. v. Boaitey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 308 and Amo-Mensah v. Owusu [1972] 1 G.L.R. 251 delivered by Taylor J. (as he then was), but did not press the matter to the point of a ruling. If he had, I would, in view of the clear provisions of Order 42, r. 16 (1) (b) of L.N. 140A, have felt obliged to disagree with those decisions and overrule the objection. Order 42, r. 16 (1) (b) states:

“(b) The Court or a Judge may, at or after the time of giving judgment or making an order, stay execution until such time as they or he shall think fit.

An order that a judgment debt be paid by monthly instalments is an order staying execution conditionally. The orders I made on 4 February 1980 on the applications were that the respondents, being sister companies, should make an immediate payment of ¢200,000 and then pay the balance by monthly instalments of ¢50.000; and that if they made default in paying any of the sums ordered, the applicants were to be at liberty to go into execution for the unpaid balance.

It is conceded by the applicants that the orders of the courts have been scrupulously observed by the respondents. It appears, however, that the respondents themselves were not wholly satisfied with those orders and sought to have them reviewed. Having regard to the provisions of Order 39, r. 8 (3) of L.N. 140A, they thought it proper as a first step, to apply, under Order 64, r. 6 of L.N. 140A, for an extension of time in which to apply for a review of the orders made by the court. Order 39, r. 8 (3) provides:

“3. Applications for review under this order shall be made within 14 days from the date on which the judgment or order in

[p.492] of [1982-83] GLR 489

respect of which review is sought was entered or made: Provided that where the review sought is in respect of a final judgment, the Court or Judge may on such terms as seem just, grant special leave to apply for review at any time within three months from the entering of such final judgment.”

Order 64, r. 6 also provides:

“6. Subject to any provisions to the contrary in these Rules a Court or a Judge shall have power to enlarge or abridge the time appointed by these rules, or fixed by an order enlarging time for doing any act or taking any proceeding, upon such terms (if any) as the justice of the case may require, and any such enlargement may be ordered although the application for the same is not made until after the expiration of the time appointed or allowed . . .”

After hearing counsel for the parties, I decided to extend the time within which to apply for a review. Four applications for review were subsequently filed but before they could be heard, the applicant also filed four applications (the subject-matter of the instant action) inviting me to review my decision extending the time within which to apply for a review of the orders I made for the stay of execution and payment by instalments. The notice of motion stated that the decision to extend time was given in error.

Mr. Atadika, for the applicants, contended that the court had no power under Order 64, r. 6 to extend the time for review laid down under Order 39, and that the orders made were, consequently, null and void. He relied on the decision of Archer J. (as he then was) in Narnor v. Palm Grove Estate Ltd. [1964] G.L.R. 521. In that case, Archer J. (as he then was) dismissed an application for stay of execution brought by a judgment debtor. More than fourteen days later, the judgment debtor applied for a review of the order dismissing the application.

When the application was objected to on the ground that it was out of time, he invited the court to enlarge time under the powers conferred on it by Order 64, r. 6. Taking his cue from an editorial note to R. v. Akiwumi and Bannerman; Ex parte Dako (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 14 at p. 15, Archer J. (as he then was) refused the application on the ground that the opening words of Order 64, r. 6, that is “Subject to any provisions to the contrary in these Rules,” were a reference to Order 39 and had the effect of denying to the High Court any power under Order 64, r. 6 to enlarge any of the periods laid down in Order 39.

He found support for the view he took in an unreported ruling of Korsah Ag. C.J. in Atsiavishie v. Tsili, Land Court, 7 June 1955, unreported where the learned Chief Justice said that the High Court had no power under Order 64, r. 6 to extend time for applying for a

[p.493] of [1982-83] GLR 489

review under order 39. According to Archer J. (as he then was) the learned Chief Justice did not give reasons for this ruling which Windsor-Aubrey J. declined to follow in Ex parte Dako (supra). I am therefore only left with considering whether the reasons given by Archer J. (as he then was) are persuasive enough to induce me to hold that I had no power under Order 64, r. 6 to extend time within which to apply for a review.

In substance, those reasons come to this: that unlike the Ugandan rule on which it is based, our Order 39 lays down time limits within which applications may be brought to the High Court for an extension of time under Order 64, r. 6. Indeed, a comparison of our Order 39 with Order 42 of the Ugandan Civil Procedure Rules, 1928, shows that all other provisions, such as that the application be heard by the same judge or judges and within six months of the application being made, are the same. May it not simply be that with the benefit of the Ugandan experience before them, our Rules Committee thought it expedient to insert time limits in our Order 39 where the Ugandan Rules were silent?

It seems to me to be rather far-fetched to suggest that because of this, we can substitute for the words “Subject to any provisions to the contrary in these Rules” some such words as “subject to Order 39, r. 8 (3).”

Order 39, r. 8 (3) is not the only rule which imposes a time limit for making an application to the court. Another example will be found in Order 36, r. 18 which provides:

“18. Any verdict or judgment obtained where one party does not appear at the trial may be set aside by the Court or a Judge upon such terms as may seem fit, upon an application made within fourteen days after the trial.”

This rule was taken from the English Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, Order 36, r. 33, which stipulated a time limit of six days. In Schafer v. Blyth [1920] 3 K.B. 140, the Court of Appeal, following Bradshaw v. Warlow (1886) 32 Ch. D. 403, C.A., which was decided under a similar rule of the Palatine Court of Lancaster, expressed the opinion that the judge had the power under Order 64, r. 7 (our Order 64, r. 6) to enlarge the time, and also that it was not necessary to make a substantive application for such enlargement. In Michell v. Wilson (1877) 25 W.R. 380, the time for applying to set aside a judgment was extended. There is in my opinion nothing in Order 39, r. 8 (3) to suggest that it is entitled to be treated differently from Order 36, r. 18. If the court has power to enlarge time in the one case, it has power to enlarge time in the other.

A stronger case might have been made out for excluding Order 59, r. 3 from the ambit of Order 64, r. 6. Order 59, r. 3 provides:

“3. Leave shall not be granted to apply for an order of certiorari to remove any judgment, order, conviction or other [p.494] of [1982-83] GLR 489

proceeding for the purpose of its being quashed, unless the application for leave is made not later than six months after the date of the proceeding or such shorter period as may be prescribed by any enactment; . . .”

Although the rule says that the application must be made within six months or such shorter period as may be prescribed by any enactment, it has never been doubted that the High Court has power under Order 64, r. 6 to enlarge time. see Annual Practice, 1963, note to Order 59, r. 4 (2)—”Extension of Time.” See also R. v. London County Council; Ex parte Swan and Edgar (1927) Ltd. (1929) 141 L.T. 590 and Eku alias Condua III v. Acquah [1963] 1 G.L.R. 271.

In my opinion, the words “Subject to any provisions to the contrary in these Rules” refer to all those rules where there is a specific limitation on the power of the court to enlarge time. In the limited time at my disposal, I have been able to discover only one, namely Order 58, r. 3 (1) and (4) but no doubt, a more leisurely examination of the rules may reveal others. Order 58 deals with civil appeals from magistrates. Rule 3 (1) and (4) provide as follows:

“(1) Subject to the provisions of Rule 2 of this Order no appeal shall be brought after the expiration of fourteen days in the case of an appeal against an interlocutory decision or of three months in the case of an appeal against a final decision, unless the Court below or the Court shall enlarge the time.

(4) No application for enlargement of time in which to appeal shall be made after the expiration of one month from the expiration of the time prescribed within which an appeal may be brought . . .”

These rules provide not only time limits within which to appeal, but also within which to apply for enlargement of time. There is no corresponding provision in Order 39, which imposes a time limit for applying for enlargement of time. From the foregoing, I have come to the conclusion that the High Court has power under Order 64, r.6 to enlarge the time limited by Order 39, r. 8 (3) and that the orders enlarging time made by me in the four suits were valid orders. The applications to review those orders are, therefore, refused.

DECISION

Application refused.

J. K. E. E.

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