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[1980] SLR (HC) 44High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

REPUBLIC vs. KOMENDA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL AND ANOTHER; EX PARTE PRAH II [1981] GLR 759

28 May 1980 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 44
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v KOMENDA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL AND ANOTHER; ex parte PRAH II [1981] GLR 759 [1980] SLR (HC) 44
APAREPUBLIC v KOMENDA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL AND ANOTHER; ex parte PRAH II [1981] GLR 759, [1980] SLR (HC) 44 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v KOMENDA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL AND ANOTHER; ex parte PRAH II [1981] GLR 759, [1980] SLR (HC) 44 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Adoko v. Edu (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 441.

(2) Republic v. Central Regional House of Chief; Ex parte Anfoh VIII, High Court, Cape Coast, 29 June 1979 unreported.

(3) Republic v. Ekumfi Traditional Council: Ex parte Okae [1974] 1 G.L.R..412.

(4) Ashong v. Ashong [1967] G.L.R. 135, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for an order of prohibition to stop proceedings of the judicial committee of the Komenda Traditional Council in a dispute relating to the destoolment of a head of family on the ground that the council had no jurisdiction. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling of the court.

COUNSEL

J. B. Short for the applicant.

Sam Baddoo for the first respondent.

J. D. Hammond for the second respondent.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.

Kwesi Essiah, the plaintiff, issued a writ against Nana Kweku Prah II, the defendant, for a declaration that his purported destoolment as the Ebusuapanyin of the Nsona Stool Family of Dominase by the defendant is null and void. The action was commenced before the judicial committee of the Komenda Traditional Council and it was pending there as a part-heard suit, when the defendant, the applicant herein, brought the instant motion seeking an order of prohibition to stop the judicial committee of the Komenda Traditional Council from further hearing the suit. The ground on which the relief is sought (as amended) is stated as:

“The subject-matter of the suit not being a matter of constitutional nature within the meaning of section 66 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), the council cannot invoke the provisions of section 28 (1) as on attached writ of summons.”

The main argument of the applicant’s counsel is that the plaintiff, Kwesi Essiah (hereinafter to be referred to as the respondent) not being a chief, his removal as head of family would not entitle him to issue a writ before the judicial committee of the traditional council, as its jurisdiction is limited to causes or matters affecting chieftaincy within the definition in section 66 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971. Counsel for the applicant does not deny the inherent jurisdiction of the traditional council to go into the respondent’s complaint in a customary manner, but contends that the exercise

[p.762] of [1981] GLR 759

of this jurisdiction should be without recourse to initiating proceedings by a writ to compel the attendance of the defendant in the suit as contemplated under section 28 (1) of Act 370.

It is axiomatic to state that nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal save that which has been expressly conferred on it by statute. It was, however, recognised by Ollennu J. (as he then was) in Adoko v. Edu (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 441 that a state council, as the highest council in the state, had inherent jurisdiction and powers to hear and determine matters which cannot be described as “matters of a constitutional nature” (as defined under the then relevant Ordinance, i.e. the Southern Ghana) States Councils Ordinance, 1952 (c. 8 of 1952), and which were in no way affected by the enactment of the said States Councils Ordinance. He thought, however, that the procedural means for exercising such inherent jurisdiction which is over and above that conferred by the Ordinance might be found within section 32 of the Ordinance which imposed a duty on every person who is subject to the jurisdiction of a state council or a chief, to assist in carrying out the duties imposed upon such state councils or chiefs by the Ordinance or by customary law when required to do so, on pain of committing the offence prescribed in section 32 (2). These relevant provisions are now preserved in section 17 of Act 370.

This pet proposition of the applicant’s counsel about the inherent powers of traditional councils which Ollennu J. adumbrated in Adoko v. Edu (supra) was also brought up by counsel before me in the case of Republic v. Central Regional House of Chiefs; Ex parte Anfoh VIII, High Court, Cape Coast, 29 June 1979, unreported. There I expressed the view that where an enactment has excluded the judicial committee of the Central Regional House of Chiefs from exercising jurisdiction in a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy, it cannot pretend to assume jurisdiction over the matter under its inherent jurisdiction.

The decisive question in this motion is whether or not the respondent, as the Ebusuapanyin of the Nsona Stool Family of Dominase, is a “chief “ whose removal or destoolment can be the subject of inquiry and adjudication by the judicial committee of the traditional council. The Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), which is the parent Act, gives its own definition to certain matters relating to chieftaincy. In answer to the question “Who is a chief?” section 48 (1) states, inter alia:

[p.763] of [1981] GLR 759

“48. (1) A Chief is an individual who has, in accordance with customary law, been nominated, elected and installed as a Chief or as the case may be appointed and installed as such and whose name

for the time being appears as a Chief on the National Register of Chiefs …”

In the enumeration of the categories of chiefs, section 49 (e) of Act 370 includes among that number “such other Chiefs not falling within any of the preceding categories as are recognised by the Regional House of Chief.” In Republic v. Ekumfi Traditional Council; Ex parte Okae [1974] 1 G.L.R. 412, Edward Wiredu J. (as he then was) expressed the view that to decide who are the other chiefs in the contemplation of section 49 (e), that section must be read alongside the first schedule of the Chieftaincy (Proceedings and Functions) (Traditional Councils) Regulations, 1972 (L.I. 798), which prescribes the table of fees payable in respect of proceedings to be initiated in traditional councils. He referred to the fees laid down in respect of proceedings initiated against the nomination, election and installation of (a) a divisional chief, (b) any other chief, and (c) a family head and came to the conclusion that the combined effect of section 49 of Act 370 and L.I. 798 showed that not all heads of the family were chiefs and that section 49 (e) included only those family heads who held positions analogous to stool fathers, obaapanyin and ohemaa. He, however, found on the facts of the application before him that the dispute did involve the nomination of the kind of head of family contemplated by section 49 (e) of Act 370; and that the judicial committee therefore, had jurisdiction to entertain the action.

Whatever claim the decision in Republic v. Ekumfi Traditional Council; Ex parte Okae (supra) has as a judicial precedent, it is my view that the decision must be confined to the peculiar facts of that case. The trial judge was, undoubtedly, swayed by the peculiar facts of that case where the respondent, Sam Dadzie, was installed as Ebusuapanyin of the Ebiradze Family of Otuam under the stool name of Nana Kwame Ano II. Nana Kwame Ano II may well be a chief in the contemplation of section 49 (e) of Act 370, but I hold the view that it was entirely wrong to have spelt out jurisdiction for a traditional council by considering L.I. 798 which regulates procedure. Amissah J.A. observed in Ashong v. Ashong [1967] G.L.R. 135 at p. 138, C.A. that, “The extent of a court’s jurisdiction is a fundamental matter which cannot be characterised as a matter of practice or procedure.” Edward Wiredu J. happily seems to have recognised this when he said in Ekumfi Traditional Council case at p. 416:

[p.764] of [1981] GLR 759

“L.I. 798 was passed pursuant to the powers conferred on the commissioner responsible for chieftaincy affairs by section 62 of Act 370 and therefore does not itself confer jurisdiction nor can its provisions extend the jurisdiction already conferred by section 15 of Act 370. Where therefore it purports to confer jurisdiction unknown to section 15 of Act 370 that jurisdiction will be void as being inconsistent with the substantive Act.”

What section 49 (e) of Act 370 postulates is that the categories of chiefs enumerated before, are not exhaustive but that there may be other types of chiefs who are recognised by the regional house of chiefs. This is factual but not speculative. If the respondent, Kwesi Essiah, is such a chief who is recognised by the regional house of chiefs, he should have disclosed it in his affidavit. Nothing short of this can so satisfy the court that he is a chief under section 49 (e) of Act 370. It was for the above reasons that I allowed the applicant’s motion on 19 May 1980 and prohibited the judicial committee of the Komenda Traditional Council from further hearing the suit entitled: Kwesi Essiah of Dominase v. Nana Kweku Prah II of Dominase.

DECISION

Application for prohibition granted.

J. K. E. E.

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