DHALOMAL vs. PUPLAMPU AND OTHERS [1984-86] 1 GLR 341
15 July 1985 · OSEI-HWERE JA · ≈ 47 min read
[1985] SLR (CA) 12Other citation styles and permanent link
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[p.344] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Maley v Fearn [1946] 2 All ER 583; [1947] LJR 276; 176 LT 203, CA.
(2) Marcroft Wagons Ltd v Smith [1951] 2 KB 496; [1951] 2 All ER 271, CA.
(3) Goldthorpe v Bain [1952] 2 QB 455; [1952] 2 All ER 23; [1952] 1 TLR 1512, CA. (4) Keeves v Dean; Nunn v Pellegrini [1924] 1 KB 685; 93 LJKB 203; 130 LT 593. (5) Lovibond (John) & Sons Ltd v Vincent [1929] 1 KB 687; 98 LJKB 402; 141 LT 116, CA. (6) Wilkins v Carlton Shoe Co Ltd (1930) 94 JP 207; 46 TLR 415; CA.
(7) Solomon v Orwell [1954] 1 WLR 629; [1954] 1 All ER 874, CA.
(8) Lewis v Reeves [1952] 1 KB 19; [1951] 2 All ER 855; [1951] 2 TLR 958, CA. (9) Darko v Baisie [1964] GLR 271.
(10) Energy Conversion Devices Inc’s application [1982] Com LR 219; [1982] FSR 544; The Times, July 2, 1982, HL.
(11) Abbeyfield Harpenden Society Ltd v Woods [1968] 1 W.L.R. 374n; [1968] 1 All ER 352, CA. (12) Archbolds (Freightage) Ltd v Spanglett (S) [1961] 1 QB 374; [1961] 2 WLR 170; [1961] 1 All ER
(13) Street v Mountford (1984) 81 LS Gaz 1844.
(14) Willmot v Barber (1880) 15 ChD 96; 49 LJCh 792; 43 LT 95.
(15) Shaw, v Applegate [1977] 1 WLR 970; [1978] 1 All ER 123 C.A.
(16) Kammins Ballrooms Co Ltd v Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd [1971] AC 850; [1970] 3 WLR 287; [1970] 2 All ER 871, HL.
(17) Salomon & Co Ltd v Salomon [1899] AC 22 (18) Express Engineering Works Ltd (Re) [1920] 1 Ch 466; 122 LT 790, CA.
(19) Parker and Cooper v Reading [1926] Ch 975; 136 LT 117.
(20) Duomatic (Re) Ltd [1969] 2 Ch 365; [1969] 2 WLR 114; [1969] 1 All ER 161. (21) Cane v Jones [1980] 1 WLR 1451; [1981] 1 All ER 533.
(22) Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] AC 933; [1964] 1 All ER 300. (23) Shackleton v Greenhalgh [1951] 1 KB 725; [1950] 2 All ER 1223; [1951] I TLR 361. (24) Stanley v Compton [1951] 1 All ER 85 9, CA, [p.345] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by a landlord from the decision of the trial circuit court dismissing his action for recovery of possession of a business premises from a sub-tenant. The facts as stated are from the judgment of Osei-Hwere JA.
COUNSEL
Kwakye for the appellant.
E V A Adjetey for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE JA.
The late Lawyer Ate Puplampu held four rooms on the first floor of house No 513/4, Derby Avenue, Accra as tenant of the plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) which he used for his law practice. The rooms were let out in 1969 on what appears to be an oral monthly tenancy. The rooms were described as Nos 2, 3, 4 and 5.
On the death of Lawyer Puplampu on 14 May 1979, the appellant requested the head of his family to wind up his affairs and hand over the possession of the four rooms to him as he believed the tenancy had come to an end with his death. He discovered that the clerk to the late Lawyer Puplampu, the third and the fourth defendants had occupied rooms 2, 3 and 4 and the second defendant had occupied room 5.
By 4 September 1980 (some fourteen months after the lawyer’s death) the appellant had not recovered possession of the rooms and so he caused his solicitor to write to the head of family (exhibit A). Exhibit A complained about the change of user of the rooms and of the rent arrears and warned that the appellant would exercise his common law rights to recover the rooms. Following exhibit A, the head of family released two of the four rooms (Nos.2 and 3) and promised to release the other two rooms within a few months. It would seem that the head of family could not take any positive steps to surrender the other two rooms occupied by the third and second defendants because he had not been clothed with any letters of administration to interfere in the matter. Letters of administration were subsequently granted to him on 19 September 1980.
In the meantime the appellant caused his solicitor to serve notice on the second defendant to vacate the room he occupied within 30 days. Exhibit C is the written notice dated 4 September 1980 which stated that the second defendant had been occupying the room without leave and licence. The second defendant failed to vacate the room on the expiry of the 30 days’ notice and so the head of family, who was obviously in a position to act, wrote on 10 November 1980 to the second defendant calling on him to quit after 30 days. When every effort to get the second defendant, particularly, to give up possession had failed the appellant slapped his writ on the defendants.
When the case came before the trial circuit judge only the second and third defendants filed a defence. The defence of the third defendant
[p.346] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341 disclosed no defence in law as it failed to show in what capacity he occupied the room. At the trial, he failed to give evidence although his counsel cross-examined the appellant. In spite of this and also of the total failure of the first and fourth defendants to enter any appearance the trial judge curiously dismissed the appellant’s action against them and awarded costs even in favour of the third defendant. The appellant was content to fling down the gauntlet at the second defendant before us as the third defendant has surrendered his possession.
The case of the second defendant (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) was that in 1970 the late Puplampu sublet one of the rooms to him to use as his main office. Before he accepted him as a sub-tenant he was introduced to the plaintiff as a sub-tenant at a rent of ¢300 a month. The plaintiff raised no objection and with this approval he took up occupation and paid his rents. After the death of Puplampu he approached the appellant to pay rent to him but he refused to accept it saying that he wanted the room for his restaurant and he even offered him a room downstairs. He refused this room because the appellant was using it as a dumping room. The appellant caused his solicitor to write to him and as he had no place to move to he offered to pay a higher rent. The appellant took him to the rent office and whilst the case was still pending he received the appellant’s writ of summons.
In his judgment, the trial circuit judge dismissed the appellant’s action which sued for recovery of possession of the two rooms (Nos. 4 and 5) and ¢50,000 damages for trespass. His reasons in the main are that: (a) the respondent produced receipts (exhibits 1 and 2) to show that he paid rents to Lawyer Puplampu from 1 January 1971 to 31 December 1978 and it is not true to say that he forced himself to occupy the room after the lawyer’s death; (b) the appellant’s evidence that the respondent was merely introduced to him as a friend and business partner of the late Lawyer Puplampu is not true because the appellant occupied the ground floor and other parts of the house and it is not reasonable to say that he had no notice of the tenancy of the respondent; (c) the defendants (including the respondent) became statutory tenants on the death of the lawyer; (d) the appellant failed to satisfy the conditions imposed by section 17 (1) (h) of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), which required the service of six months’ notice and also the satisfaction of the court that he reasonably required the two rooms for his business purposes.
To my mind the appellant’s appeal poses two main questions for determination. The first is whether or not the trial judge was right in holding that the respondent is no trespasser, and the second is whether or not he was right in holding that the respondent is a statutory tenant. The legal position is that if a sub-letting is contrary to the terms of the tenancy, the landlord is entitled to an order for possession, the occupier
[p.347] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341 being a trespasser and not a sub-tenant: see Maley v Fearn [1946] 2 All ER 583, C.A. The of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341-366 appellant’s plaint of trespass, as pleaded in paragraph 4 of his statement of claim and as contained in his sworn testimony, was that he found the respondent in occupation of Room No. 5 without his leave and licence after Lawyer Puplampu’s death. But as the respondent resisted his trespass by contending that he held a sub-tenancy of the room from the late Lawyer Puplampu the appellant seems to have founded his trespass in the alternative that even if that was so the tenancy ceased on the death of his landlord.
Either way one looked at the respondent’s occupation, the duty was on him to satisfy the court that he came by it lawfully. If he was let in as a sub-tenant he had to prove the payment of rent because it is generally the rent element that creates the relationship of landlord and tenant or distinguishes a mere licence from a tenancy. Or, as it was put by Sir Raymond Evershed MR in Marcroft Wagons Ltd v Smith [1951] 2 All ER 271 at 274, C.A.: “… the law… inferred, when exclusive possession was granted to one of the property of another at a rent payable to that other, that a tenancy had been created.” In my opinion the trial judge’s finding that the respondent paid rent to Lawyer Puplampu was against the weight of the evidence before him.
In paragraph 6 of his defence the respondent pleaded that the rent he paid was “about ¢300 per month”. In his sworn testimony he said that he was introduced to the appellant by the late Puplampu as a sub-tenant at a rent of ¢300 a month. The respondent tendered two alleged receipts from Lawyer Puplampu, exhibits 1 and 2, to support the payment of rent. According to him he paid his rent in advance and he was issued with a receipt immediately he paid his rent.
It would seem that the trial judge relied on exhibits 1 and 2 without the least examination. If he had done so he would have found that it destroyed the respondent’s confident stand that he paid his rent in advance. For exhibit 1 which was issued on 12 January 1978 is for ¢600 “being rent for one office room…for the period 1 January 1976 to 31 December 1977.” Similarly exhibit 2 is dated 13 December 1978 and it covers rent for the period 1 January 1978 to 31 December 1978. More importantly, they disintegrated both his defence and his assertion on oath that he paid rent of ¢300 a month. Little wonder that he was challenged in cross-examination that the receipts are not true, the receipts now say that his rent was ¢300 a year. On top of all this the evasive nature of his pleading that rent was “about ¢300 a month” should have raised a question mark on his credibility. Speaking for myself, I will hold that by these contradictions the respondent failed to prove that he paid any rents whereby he became a sub-tenant and the appellant’s contention that the respondent was introduced only as a friend and business partner to the late lawyer must be preferred.
[p.348] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341
The court has always had the warrant to arrive at its own conclusion on the evidence where the judgment appealed from is not based on the whole of the evidence and all the facts of the case have not been taken into consideration by the trial judge. The result is that the respondent remained a trespasser when he failed to quit the premises after the appellant had gratuitously served on him notice to do so.
The trial judge’s finding that the respondent became a statutory tenant on the death of his landlord agitated much debate. That conclusion was of course, premised by his finding that the respondent paid rent to his landlord and that the appellant knew of the subletting. Having arrived at the independent conclusion that the respondent paid no rent and that he is a trespasser, there should be no need to add my voice to the debate were it not for the important points of law on Act 220 raised for determination. I shall proceed from the assumption that the judgment on appeal is unimpeachable.
As a body of social legislation which regulates the relations of individuals who are in close and regular proximity very few bodies of legislation excite so much passionate dissent among lawyers and lay persons as Act 220. What is sought to be resolved by Act 220 is a problem posed by two extreme and conflicting principles: on the one hand, there is the principle of free enterprise embodied, in the case of landlord and tenant, in the rights of proprietorship and the corresponding common law entitlement of landlord to dispossess his tenant without having to give reasons for it and no more formality than compliance with the contract of tenancy. On the other hand there is the view maintained that there is an absolute right to some form of housing for all. What Act 220 seeks to do is to define in objective terms the conditions upon which a landlord may exercise that common law right and, in so doing, bestow upon a large number of tenants a proportion of that right to housing by ensuring terminal security. Its further objective – indeed, what is termed as the principal objective – is to exercise a degree of social control over rents. An instrument applied by Act 220 to ensure permanence of tenancy is the concept of the statutory tenant.
Judicial attitude towards the Rent Acts of England (which rest on the same policy as our own) has not always been kind. In Marcroft Wagons Ltd v Smith (supra) at 274, CA, Lord Evershed MR attacked the concept of the statutory tenancy as “a new monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, that has come into our ken” and went on to comment at the same page:
“There is no doubt that the intricacies of modern life, as reflected in the rent restrictions legislation, have made, in many respects, the relationship between landlords and tenants assume an artificial, and, indeed, unfriendly, character, which is somewhat to
[p.349] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341 be deplored. In particular, landlords, who may have ordinary human instincts of kindliness and courtesy, may often be afraid to allow to a tenant the benefit of those natural instincts in case it may afterwards turn out that a tenant has thereby acquired a position from which he cannot subsequently be dislodged.”
The Acts have also been viewed, as was said in, for example, Goldthorpe v Bain [1952] 2 All ER 23, CA as a mere series of obstacles which a landlord must overcome in order to reassert that free common law right which existed before the Act. To hold the scales as presented by Act 220, I am of the view that the court should refrain from such interpretation of the Act as will give a substantial beating to the already limited protection to the landlord.
A statutory tenant being a creature of statute, his right under Act 220 is merely a personal right to retain possession of the premises and it cannot be assigned nor does it pass on his death to his personal representative: Keeves v Dean; Nunn v Pellegrini [1924] 1 KB 685; John Lovibond & Sons Ltd v Vincent [1929] 1 KB 687, CA (purported devise); and Wilkins v Carlton Shoe Co Ltd [1930] 94 JP 207, C.A. (purported transfer by declaration of trust). Under the English Rent Acts for instance, statutory tenants by succession are the creatures of statute, e.g. Schedule 1 of the Rent Act, 1968. The death of the appellant’s tenant, in my opinion, brought his statutory tenancy automatically to an end. Denning LJ as he then was clearly elucidated in Solomon v Orwell [1954] 1 All ER 874 at 876-877, CA the effect of the determination of a statutory tenancy on a sub-tenancy when he stated:
“When a statutory tenant sub-lets a part of the premises, he does not thereby confer any estate or interest on the sub-tenant. A statutory tenant has no estate or interest himself, and he cannot carve something out of nothing. The sub-tenant, like the statutory tenant, has only a personal right or privilege. The question is: what is the position of the sub-tenant when the statutory tenancy comes to an end? A statutory tenancy may, of course, come to an end without a notice to quit, e.g., by death (if there are no entitled relatives) or by the delivery up of the premises to the landlord. When the statutory tenancy comes to an end, the sub-tenant’s right automatically comes to an end unless there is some statutory protection afforded to him.
I respectfully differ from the view that holds otherwise. But although the death of a statutory tenant whether original (or by succession within the contemplation of the English Rent Acts) will determine the statutory tenancy (see Lewis v Reaves [1951] 2 All ER
[p.350] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341
855, CA) yet a sub-tenant to whom the premises were lawfully sublet (ie who is protected under Act 220) shall be deemed to become the tenant of the superior landlord: see Darko v Baisie [1964] GLR 271 at 276. This protection I may hasten to add, is not given to a sub-tenant only in the case of the death of the mesne tenant but howsoever the mesne tenant leaves the premises, ie by surrender of the tenancy, by forfeiture, by the giving of notice to quit or by the court’s order for eviction. Indeed, section 17 (5) of Act 220 expressly provides:
“(5) An order or judgment against a tenant for the recovery of the possession of any premises or ejectment therefrom made or given under the provision of this section or of sub-section (2) of section 25 shall not affect the right of any sub-tenant to whom the premises or any part thereof were lawfully sub-let before the proceedings for recovery of possession or ejectment were commenced, to retain possession under this section, and every such order or judgment shall declare whether it shall be enforced against a sub-tenant or not.”
To take advantage of this protection of the Act the sub-tenant must prove that the premises were lawfully sub-let to him. In other words he must prove that his sub-letting complied with section 22 (1) and (2) of Act 220.
Section 22 (1) stipulates that no person in the case of a monthly or shorter tenancy of any premises, shall sub-let such premises without the written consent of his landlord. And section 22 (3) also provides that every person sub-letting his premises shall inform the landlord of such premises in writing within fourteen days after he has so sub-let the premises the fact of such sub-letting and its terms. The plain meaning of these two provisions on the creation of sub-tenancies is clear. It is well to remember the recent comment of Lord Diplock, with the concurrence of his fellow law lords in Re Energy Conversion Devices Inc, The Times, July 2, 1982 that:
“No tribunal and no court of law has any discretion to vary the meaning of the words of primary or secondary legislation from case to case in order to meet what the tribunal or the court happened to think was the justice of the particular case. Tempting though it might sound, to do so was the negation of the rule of law.”
I think that the policy reasons for these two sub-sections requiring written consent of the landlord and the notification to him in writing of the terms of the sub-letting are obvious. If by operation of the law the sub-tenant is to hold of the landlord direct on the departure of the
[p.351] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341 mesne tenant then it stands to reason that the landlord can be so burdened only by an of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341-366 unequivocal prior approval of the sub-letting and he must also know what are the terms.
The respondent plainly failed to show that his immediate landlord complied with these provisions so as to bring himself under the protection of the Act. As section 22 (1) is a statutory prohibition against sub-letting without the written consent of the landlord, the well-known principle that an expressly or impliedly prohibited conduct was void ab initio must apply. In Archbolds (Freightage) Ltd v S Spanglett [1961] 1 QB 374 at 388, Devlin LJ said that one of the effects of illegality was to prevent a party relying on his own illegal act to recover under a contract and that another was to avoid a contract ab initio where its making was expressly or impliedly prohibited by statute. Nothing, therefore, short of the statutory and mandatory requirement of written consent by the appellant can validate the sub-letting. Having failed to bring himself under the protection of Act 220 the respondent disentitled himself from the benefit of section 17 (1) (h) of that same Act.
It has been said (that is taking the respondent’s evidence on its face value) that as by his words and conduct the appellant consented to the letting it would be unconscionable to permit him to rely on section 22 of Act 220 to treat the sub-letting as illegal and the respondent a trespasser. For my part, I do not see anything unconscionable or unclean in the appellant’s conduct which will invite the whip of equity. If, indeed, the appellant gave his oral consent to the sub-letting he gained nothing thereby and the respondent also lost nothing. When the respondent, as found, sought to pay his rent direct to the appellant he refused to accept it. The appellant was never asked for his written consent and such consent as he is shown to have given may as well be compatible with a licence. Nothing in Act 220 prevents the creation of a tenancy at will. As a matter of practice there are now available an abundance of licence agreements designed exclusively for the purpose of evading the English Acts, some of which are upheld in the county courts. In Abbeyfield (Harpenden) Society Ltd v Woods [1968] 1 All ER 352 at, 353, CA it was possible for Lord Denning MR to say that:
“… the modern cases show that a man may be a licensee even though he has exclusive possession, even though the word ‘rent’ is used and even though the word ‘tenancy’ is used …”.
A recent case illustrating such a licence agreement is Street v Mountford [1984] 81 LS Gaz 1844, CA. There the respondent in 1983 entered into an agreement whereby she was given the exclusive right to occupy two furnished rooms belonging to the applicant. The agreement was headed “licence agreement” and at the foot the respondent had
[p.352] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341 signed a written statement accepting that the agreement gave her a mere licence to occupy the rooms and that it did not create a tenancy of the type afforded protection under the Rent Acts. In September 1983 the appellant sought a declaration in the county court that the respondent occupied the rooms under the agreement as a licensee and not as a protected tenant. The court (Mr Recorder Rolf) refused to grant the application on the grounds that the agreement bore all characteristics of a tenancy agreement. The applicant appealed.
Slade LJ said that the conclusion reached by the recorder could not be upheld. The agreement bore only one significant hallmark commonly associated with a tenancy, namely an exclusive right of occupancy. That was not the decisive factor on which the recorder had been able to hold that the effect of the agreement was to create a tenancy. The opening phrase that granted “a right to occupy” was not apt to describe the rights enjoyed by a tenant. Other clauses in the agreement would be most unusual in the context of a tenancy agreement-for instance the obligation imposed on the respondent to keep the rooms tidy and not to have either children or pets. It was possible in law for the owner of a building to grant a person the right of exclusive occupation without creating a tenancy, if he ensured that there was manifested the clear intentions of both parties that the rights granted were to be merely those of a personal right of occupation and not those of a tenant.
Griffiths LJ, agreeing, said that the case showed how easy it was for a landlord to avoid the provisions of the Rent Act, 1977 as they applied to furnished accommodation. He warned, however, that if the device of letting by licence rather than by a tenancy became widespread, Parliament might have to consider bringing licences under the same umbrella of protection as tenancies. The appeal was allowed.
In Willmott v Barber (1880) 15 ChD 96 Fry J stated the broad principle that “a man is not to be deprived of his legal rights unless he has acted in such a way as would make it fraudulent for him to set up these rights.” He then proceeded to set down the five well-known cardinal requisites to establish fraud in such a case: a mistake by the defendant as to his legal rights; expenditure of money by him on the faith of his mistaken belief, knowledge of the plaintiff of his own legal rights; knowledge by the plaintiff of the defendant’s mistake as to his legal rights; and encouragement by the plaintiff to the defendant’s expenditure of money, directly or by abstaining from objecting. This list has, however, been qualified by the Court of Appeal in Shaw v Applegate [1977] 1 WLR 970, CA by saying that whilst the presence of all the five factors would show dishonest and unconscionable conduct entitling the defendant to relief, the absence of some of the factors would not necessarily disentitle him.
[p.353] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341
Whilst I find nothing unconscionable in the alleged conduct of the appellant, I think that his alleged consent can properly be considered in the light of waiver. The question as to whether or not a person can, in the language of the profession, contract out of a statutory provision has cost me moments of solicitude. There is the principle which may be relevant, expressed in the maxim quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se introductio. It is explained in Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed) Vol 9. para 42] as follows:
“As a general rule, any person can enter into a binding contract to waive the benefits conferred on him by an Act of Parliament…unless it can be shown that it would be contrary to public policy to allow such an agreement. Statutory conditions may, however, be imposed in such terms that they cannot be waived by agreement, and, in certain circumstances, it is expressly provided that any such agreement shall be void”.
There may, therefore, be circumstances where the principle of waiver can be applied so as to dispense with the need to comply with formalities attached to the giving of authority for statutory acts. Provided the statutory provision has been enacted solely for the benefit of the parties (or the party) waiving the right, and no question of public policy arises, there is no doubt that it can be waived.
By the application of what is sometimes known as the purposive approach in the interpretation of statutes the courts can reach startling results which corrode the pre-eminence enjoyed by the literal rule of interpretation. For instance, Kammins Ballrooms Co Ltd v Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd [1970] 2 All ER 871, HL related to the protection of business tenancies under Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954. Briefly, the Act provides by section 29 (3) that a tenant who wishes to remain in possession after the expiry of his tenancy should first request a new tenancy from his landlord. If the landlord does not agree, the tenant can then apply to the court for a new tenancy, but “no application … shall be entertained unless it is made not less than two or more than four months after…the making of the tenant’s request for a new tenancy.” In that case, the application to the court was made out of time. Nevertheless it was held that the application could be entertained. Lord Diplock acknowledged at 892 that:
“ . . . semantics and the rules of syntax alone could never justify the conclusion that the words ‘No’ application . . . shall be entertained unless meant that some applications should be entertained notwithstanding that neither of the conditions which follows the word ‘unless’ was fulfilled.
[p.354] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341
But the court applied the purposive approach to achieve this result, since the overall purpose of the statute was to encourage landlords and tenants to reach agreements between themselves. This being so, provisions as to time limits were merely procedural and capable of being waived by the party for whose protection the provision in question had been enacted. In the Kammins case, the provision was for the benefit of the landlord, so the court felt justified in considering whether or not he had in fact waived compliance.
Decisions on the Companies Acts afford fertile examples of waiver of statutory requirements. It is now firmly established that all the shareholders acting together can do anything intra vires the company, even though the Acts specify a particular procedure by which the thing may, or is to be done. This principle was stated by Lord Davey in Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 at 57, where he said that “the company is bound in a matter intra vires by the unanimous agreement of its members.” It has been decided: (a) that where the directors are all the shareholders, a board resolution passed with all the directors present is effective to bind the company, notwithstanding that what is done is beyond the powers of the directors: Re Express Engineering Works Ltd [1920] 1 Ch 466, (b) that it is sufficient for all the members informally to ratify an act of the directors without a meeting: Parker & Cooper Ltd v Reading [1926] Ch 975; (c) that it is necessary only that all the members entitled to vote should give their assent: Re Duomatic Ltd [1969] 2 Ch 365; and (d) that the articles of association may be altered by such an agreement of the shareholders, notwithstanding the provision in section 10 of the 1948 Act that the alteration may be made by special resolution: Cane v Jones [1980] 1 WLR 1451.
What was decided in those cases was not that such an agreement between the shareholders took effect as a special or extraordinary resolution imposed by the Acts, but that such an agreement exercised an overriding power, which could be exercised as an alternative to the power conferred by the Acts, which enables less than all the shareholders to act by resolution of a specified majority at a general meeting. It is as if to the statutory provisions has been added the rider, “But, if all the shareholders entitled to vote agree upon the matter, there is no need to convene the meetings or to pass the resolution.” But this principle has to be qualified where what is to be done affects the interests of persons other than the shareholders, such as debenture holders.
In Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] AC 993 at 10 16-1017 it was observed:
“General social policy from time to time require the denial of legal validity to certain transactions by certain persons. This may
[p.355] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341 be for their own protection, as in the case of the infant or other category of persons enjoying what is to some extent a protected status, or for the protection of others who may come to be engaged in dealings with them, as, for instance, the creditors of a bankrupt. In all such cases there is no room for the application of another general and familiar principle of the law that a man may, if he wishes, disclaim a statutory provision enacted for his benefit for what is for a man’s benefit and what is for his protection are not synonymous terms. Nor is it open to the court to give its sanction to departures from any law that reflects such a policy, even though the party concerned has himself behaved in such a way as would otherwise tie his hands”.
But there may be provisions in a statute which cannot be waived because waiver is expressly prohibited. In other cases, the presence of a public interest precluding waiver is evident from the imposition of penalties for non-compliance with prescribed formalities. In summation, statutory provisions can be waived if (a) they have been enacted solely for the benefit of the person or class of persons waiving them; (b) they are procedural; (c) the statute does not expressly prohibit waiver; and (d) the waiver is not contrary to public policy.
After everything that can be said for waiver has been said, I come back to the same position that the violent clash between the respondent’s pleadings and sworn testimony on the one side and the purported receipts he tendered on the other side completely discredited his evidence that he ever paid rent to the late Puplampu. The possibility of any mistake in stating the rent as ¢300 per month or ¢300 per year must be discountenanced because the amount in each case is repeated separately, ie the rent stated in the pleading is confirmed on oath and that stated in exhibit 1 is confirmed in the subsequent receipt exhibit 2. There is the pervading element of deliberateness in all those statements on the rent which when ranked against each other, none can stand.
There was no evidence aliunde to salvage the respondent’s conflicting evidence. If it is true that he was in occupation of the room for many years before the death of Puplampu then the probability, in the face of this inconsistency, is that he only shared the premises with the deceased tenant. But a sub-tenant who has been sharing with the tenant is not protected: see Shackleton v Greenhalgh [1950,] 2 All ER 1223 and Stanley v Compton [1951] 1 All ER 859.
For the reasons I have stated, I have come to the conclusion that this appeal succeeds and the judgment of the court below ought to be set aside, and judgment pronounced for the appellant for recovery of possession and damages for trespass.
[p.356] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.A.
I have had the advantage of reading beforehand the draft judgment put up by the learned Chief Justice and even though I cannot help but admire the short period within which it was produced and the brilliance in style characteristic of him, I have nonetheless had some difficulty in going along with his reasoning and conclusion in affirming the judgment appealed from and feel that this appeal ought to be allowed.
The main legal question before us, apart from the issue of the rent element about which I share the views expressed in the judgment of my brother Osei-Hwere JA as unproved, is whether the premises had been lawfully sub-let by the late Ate Puplampu to the second defendant respondent (hereafter referred to as the respondent) as a sub-tenant within the meaning of Act 220 (hereafter referred to simply as the Act). In other words whether the respondent can by the terms of his agreement with the late Ate Puplampu be described as, a protected tenant under the Act.
The relevant provision of Act 220 is section 22 (1). Under this section no person in the case of a monthly or shorter tenancy of any premises could sub-let such premises without the written consent of his landlord. The evidence shows that in this case no written consent of the plaintiff-appellant (also hereinafter referred to as the appellant) was obtained. The obvious inference is that the sub-letting falls outside the statutory requirement and therefore is unlawful. The person in occupation therefore cannot be regarded as a sub-tenant within the meaning of the Act.
The respondent’s case as accepted by the learned trial circuit judge shows that he was introduced to the appellant before he became a sub-tenant. He pleaded in paragraph 4 of the statement of defence as follows:
“4. The second defendant further says that the late Ate Puplampu was a solicitor for the plaintiff in many matters and that he (the second defendant) got his sublease from the late Ate Puplampu with the consent and approval of the plaintiff. The second defendant says that he was formally introduced to the plaintiff by the late Ate Puplampu on taking the tenancy.”
In his evidence this is what he said:
“In that year I approached the late Ate Puplampu, a sub-tenant to the premises, for one of the rooms. Before he accepted me he told me that the plaintiff was owning the place as the landlord and so he introduced me accordingly. The plaintiff was in the office and Mr Puplampu told him that I am a subtenant at a rent of ¢300 a month. The plaintiff did not say anything. He said he had no objection.
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With this approval, I started using the place and I was paying rent”.
On the crucial issue as to whether the respondent went into occupation of the premises with the consent and approval of the appellant, this is what the learned trial circuit judge had to say:
“The plaintiff had occupied the ground floor and other parts of the house. It is therefore not reasonable to say that he had no notice of the tenancy of the second defendant. Therefore the evidence of the plaintiff that the second defendant was merely introduced by the lawyer as a friend and a business partner is not true”.
The questions which arise from a consideration of the above are (a) whether the appellant’s mere notice or knowledge of the tenancy agreement between the respondent and the late Ate Puplampu was sufficient to make the respondent a sub-tenant within the language of Act 220, and (b) under what circumstances would non-compliance with the requirement for a written consent be sufficient to afford a sub-tenant protection under the Act?
It is my considered view that the Act imposes a statutory duty on the late Ate Puplampu, the respondent’s landlord, to have sought for a written consent of the appellant (his own landlord) before admitting the respondent into occupation. This statutory duty is mandatory and is not one over which any person can compromise. The late Ate Puplampu as a lawyer ought to have known and must be deemed to have known that that was what was required of him under the Act before his tenant could seek protection under it.
The evidence that the respondent was introduced orally to the appellant as a sub-tenant and the latter’s silence over the matter as well as his assertion that he had no objection as testified to by the respondent did not relieve Ate Puplampu of the statutory duty imposed, nor was this a licence to him to ignore or gloss over the mandatory provisions of the Act. It is similarly not within the competence of the appellant, in my view, to waive this statutory requirement. The court may however come to the aid of the respondent if by any conduct of the appellant he had been led to act in disregard of this statutory requirement in circumstances which would constitute either fraud on the part of the appellant or would make it unjust to deny the respondent protection under the Act. Otherwise the provisions of the Act must be applied to the letter.
On the issue of waiver, even if the view I have expressed above is wrong, I think that issue not having been raised at the trial level where different evidence might have been led, it will not be fair to raise it at this stage.
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I have not been able to find on the evidence before us any conduct or representation on the part of the appellant on which the respondent had acted to his detriment or any unjust advantage the appellant had obtained over the respondent to call in aid equity to protect him.
In my judgment the respondent who is seeking protection under the Act had not shown himself to have contracted within its provisions. He cannot therefore claim the protection afforded under it. I further find in my judgment, following from the above that the respondent is not a statutory tenant within the meaning of the Act. His occupation of the premises therefore is unlawful and constitutes trespass against the appellant’s right to immediate possession. Having found the respondent a trespasser the appellant succeeds in his claim against him. The appellant is therefore ordered to recover his possession of the room in his occupation.
On the issue of damages, I am of the view that on the facts of this case the appellant will be entitled to recover damages assessed at ¢300 per month from the date the personal representative of the late Ate Puplampu asked him to vacate the premises to the date of this judgment.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO CJ.
I have the misfortune of reaching a conclusion diametrically opposite to that reached by my brothers. As I would endeavour to show, the decision of the court below was right.
The appellant is a businessman of Indian origin. Some twenty years or so ago, he obtained a lease of what appears to be business premises from one Agnes Armah, since deceased. The premises is situated at Derby Avenue in Accra and is numbered 513/4. Although the initial term was for five years, it was renewed from time to time.
The evidence shows that sometime in 1969, he let four rooms on the first floor to the late Ate Puplampu, barrister-at-law. It appears that the tenancy was oral only and was on a monthly basis. But Puplampu occupied the premises continuously till his death in May 1979 – a period of ten years. Although an attempt was made on the part of the second respondent to show that the appellant was not the owner of the premises but was only himself a headlessee, that description of him, though technically accurate, is of no legal consequence. Vis-à-vis Puplampu the appellant was his landlord.
It seems plain that soon after letting the rooms from the appellant, Puplampu himself sub-let part of it to three other persons. The only letting relevant to this appeal, is that of the second respondent, Samuel Poku. I shall hereafter refer to him as the respondent. In 1970, Puplampu sub-let to him one room which he uses as an office. He paid
[p.359] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341 rent to his landlord Puplampu regularly until his death. He has been in the premises continuously ever since.
Upon Puplampu’s death, the appellant seems to have taken the view that his tenancy determined upon his demise and the sub-tenancy of the respondent went with it. As it was put in paragraph 6 of the appellant’s pleadings: “The plaintiff says that even if the second defendant holds a sub-tenancy of the room from the late Ate Puplampu, the tenancy ceased on the death of the said Puplampu”.
The appellant said in evidence about Puplampu:
“He is dead. It was on 14 May 1979 that he died in a car accident. I requested the head of his family to close his affairs and hand over the possession of the rooms to me as the tenancy came to an end with his death”.
The respondent did not accept that his tenancy came to an end automatically on Puplampu’s death. He did not quit from the room. In an attempt to get him out, the appellant took a plaint against him to the rent officer. For a reason which is not entirely clear, he did not pursue that complaint but sued him in the circuit court and sought recovery of possession and damages against him on the ground that he was a trespasser.
Whether or not the respondent was a trespasser vis-à-vis the appellant, evidence was led from both sides on which a decision could be reached. Although there is conflict between the appellant and Poku on some factual matters, there was agreement on at least one point. That is the appellant was aware that the respondent Poku was in occupation of a room in the premises. Indeed, he admitted that Puplampu introduced the respondent to him. He said it was a long time ago and that the respondent was only introduced as a friend and business partner of Puplampu. The respondent’s version was different. He swore that he was introduced to the appellant as a sub-tenant at a monthly rental of ¢300. The respondent is alleged to have said he had no objection. The respondent said as the appellant approved of his tenancy, he began using the premises for his business and regularly paid the agreed rent to his own landlord, Puplampu. The learned circuit judge resolved the conflict in favour of the respondent. The judge did not believe that the respondent was introduced to the appellant “merely as a friend and business partner”.
Although he did not say so in express terms, he used language which suggests that he preferred the respondent’s version of the matter, namely that Puplampu introduced him to the appellant as his sub-tenant and that this was with the tacit approval of the latter. The judge also dismissed, as a misconception, the applicant’s contention that
[p.360] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341
Puplampu’s death per se put an end not only to the deceased’s tenancy but those of his sub-tenants as well. The judge was of opinion that at “the worst the defendants became statutory tenants” and rejected the argument that they were trespassers. At all events, the judge held that the appellant had not shown that he reasonably required the premises for his own business within the meaning of section 17 (1) (h) of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), which, in the judge’s view, was the only relevant statutory provision which governed the matter. He accordingly dismissed the action. The appellant says the learned judge was in error and invites us to reverse him and order possession of the premises and damages in his favour.
The notice of appeal listed three grounds on which it was sought to contest the judgment; the third ground is only a variant of the second and was hardly argued. The two grounds on which argument was advanced were:
“(a) That the judgment is against the weight of evidence; and (b) that having found as a fact that the predecessor of the first defendant was a monthly tenant the . . . judge failed to resolve the issue whether in law a monthly tenant could grant a sub-tenancy without the written consent of his landlord.”
On the first ground of appeal, it was contended for the appellant that the respondent and indeed all the other respondents to whom the late Puplampu sub-let the premises, were trespassers inasmuch as they were not protected tenants under Act 220. The basis on which the “trespass of statute”, so to speak, of the respondent was put did not harmonise with the one put up both in the appellant’s pleading and evidence. The basis there was that as Puplampu died, his death per se put an end to his monthly tenancy as well as that of his sub-tenants who thereafter became trespassers.
How sound is that argument as a matter of law and on the facts of this particular case? It is plain to me that a tenant has a definite estate which can subsist after his death. Assuming that Puplampu’s tenancy began on the first of and ended on the last day of a calendar month, what position resulted when he died on 14 May? As it seems to me, his interest devolved on his personal representatives. That is clearly the provision of section 1 of the Administration of Estates Act, 1961 (Act 63). It says clearly, “1. (1) The movable and immovable property of a deceased person shall devolve on his personal representative with effect from his death.” It cannot be gainsaid that a tenant’s interest in a lease or letting is a species of property in law. It follows that the deceased’s interest in the tenancy devolved on his personal representatives. The
[p.361] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341 evidence shows that Puplampu died intestate and letters of administration were not taken by his personal representatives until 19 September 1980. There is no evidence that a customary successor was appointed. So in the interval between 14 May 1979 and 19 September 1980, his interest in the tenancy devolved under section 1 (2) (b) of Act 63 in the Chief Justice.
I think it is a misappreciation of the legal position to say that Puplampu’s interest determined automatically on his death. This would have been the case, if he had not been a tenant but the grantee of a revocable licence. As it is put in Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant (26th ed) Vol 1, p 12, para 22:
“A revocable licence is determined by the death of the licensor or of the licensee, or by an assignment of the land over which, or the subject-matter in respect of which, the licence is to be enjoyed”.
If Puplampu’s interest in the tenancy did not come to an end upon death, the same must hold good for his sub-tenants. To say this, does not imply that that tenancy cannot be brought to an end. There is no such thing as a lease in perpetuity. Being a monthly tenant, Puplampu’s tenancy can be brought to an end by a valid notice to quit. And the normal length of such notice at common law, is one month.
As however, Puplampu was a protected tenant under Act 220, he or his personal representatives could only be ejected by judicial intervention on any of the grounds specified under section 17 of the said Act. But even under sub-section 9 of that section, an order for possession made against Puplampu’s successors or personal representatives cannot automatically operate against sub-tenants to whom the premises were lawfully sub-let before the making of the order.
That brings me to the second ground of appeal argued. It was urged by counsel that the sub-tenancy granted by Puplampu to the respondent was unlawful as it offended against section 22 (1) of Act 220. Accordingly, it was contended that as the sub-letting was not lawfully granted, the sub-tenants were not protected under the Act. The sub-section on which reliance is placed reads: “No person, in the case of a monthly or shorter tenancy of any premises shall sublet such premises without the written consent of his landlord”.
The appellant did not, in terms, say in evidence that Puplampu did not obtain his written consent. That is only being implied in this court. It must be borne in mind that Puplampu is no more. The allegation that as a lawyer, he acted in breach of section 22 of Act 220 is being made, so to speak, behind his back, in circumstances in which he could not dispute it. The appellant did not plead that Puplampu did not obtain his
[p.362] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341 written consent. Whether he obtained the appellant’s consent or not, is an issue of fact and had the appellant pleaded this fact as a basis for impugning the validity of the sub-letting to the respondent, the latter would have been put on notice to proffer evidence, if he were so minded, on this aspect of the case.
On the state of the pleadings, the respondent was entitled to assume that Puplampu, a lawyer, took all the necessary legal steps to grant him a valid sub-tenancy. This is the more so, when there is evidence produced to the court and accepted by the judge, that Puplampu introduced the respondent to the appellant as his sub-tenant and the latter acquiesced. That view of the matter is further buttressed by the appellant’s own pleading. This was that the respondent’s sub-tenancy determined ipso facto on Puplampu’s death. In these circumstances, it would be plainly unjust to hold in this court that Puplampu did not obtain the written consent of the appellant before sub-letting the room to the respondent and that therefore the sub-letting which lasted for upwards of nine years before Puplampu’s death, was illegal.
There is also the fact that the appellant himself admitted that on occasions, he saw the respondent in the premises. He had been there since 1970. Puplampu died in 1979. He made no issue of the fact that the respondent was in trespass. On the contrary, he did acts which on any fair view of the evidence, show that he regarded him as a lawful tenant. When he required the respondent’s room for his own purposes, he offered him an alternative room which did not suit him. In an attempt to recover the room from the respondent, he took a plaint against him to the rent officer in accordance with section 28 of the Rent Regulations, 1964 (LI 369). Such plaint could only be made against tenants. How well does the appellant’s admitted conduct sit with his claim that he regarded the respondent as a trespasser?
Even if in actual fact, Puplampu did not obtain the appellant’s written consent before granting the sub-tenancy to the respondent, it would be an inequitable use of section 22 of Act 220 to permit the appellant to contend that the sub-letting was unlawful and that he was entitled to treat the respondent as a trespasser. The appellant, on the proved facts of this case, would be saying something like this to the respondent:
“I may have led you to believe that I consented to Puplampu granting you a sub-tenancy and you may have taken the tenancy on that basis, but I say that under section 22 of Act 220, Puplampu should have obtained my written not oral consent. As he did not do so, I say the sub-tenancy granted to you is illegal and I am entitled to treat you as a trespasser and eject you on that basis.”
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To think that such a position could be countenanced, seems to me to offend against one’s ideas of propriety and fairness. If the appellant should make such plea in a court of equity, I cannot doubt what reply he would receive. It clearly would be that it would be contrary to his good conscience to take that position or that he was seeking to use section 22 of Act 220 as a cloak for fraud.
As is well-known, a court of equity will not permit a statute to be used in a manner that is unconscionable. That is the policy basis of the well-known doctrine of part-performance and the enforcement of secret trusts. The allowance of these equitable remedies would seem, prima facie, to conflict with section 4 of the Statute of Frauds, 1677 (29 Car 2, c 3) and section 9 of the Wills Act, 1837 (7 Will 4 & 1 Vict, c 26) which forbade the granting of certain leases or the making of testamentary dispositions save in writing and in accordance with laid down formalities. Nevertheless, equity has never allowed a defendant to take advantage of these statutory provisions if it would offend good conscience to do so.
In Keeton’s The Law of Trust (9th ed) p 67 the rationale for equity’s attitude is explained with special reference to secret trusts, in these words:
“In permitting such obligations to be regarded as binding, it would seem at first sight that Equity is interfering very directly with statutory requirements, and it therefore becomes necessary to appreciate the nature of equitable intervention in these cases. Equity cannot nullify the requirements of a statute; it can merely ensure that a statute is not permitted to operate in an inequitable manner.”
In other areas, this principle is expressed by saying that equity will not allow a statute to be used as a cloak for fraud. And as is well known, the concept of fraud in equity is much wider than in the common law. It covers all kinds of cases in which it would be said a party was taking a position which good conscience forbid him to. In Hanbury and Maudsley’s Modern Equity (9th ed) at 650-651, the learned authors say:
“Fraud in equity cannot be defined. There are certain types of cases with which it is particularly associated, but it is not to be confined to them, and the notion of fraud is embedded more deeply in equity than even a detailed consideration of them would suggest … Its lack of definition is thus no defect.”
Sitting as a court of equity, I think we should not admit the appellant to rely on section 22 of Act 220 to found a contention that the sub-letting which he knew and approved of to the respondent was
[p.364] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341 illegal. We have legislative warrant to proceed on well-established equitable principles. The Constitution, 1979, art 4 (2) as preserved by section 9 of the Provisional National Defence Council Establishment Proclamation, 1981 defines the common law which is applicable in our courts, as:
“the rules of law, generally known as the common law, the rules generally known as the doctrines of equity and the rules of customary law including those determined by the Superior Court of Judicature.”
And acting on well-known equitable principles, we should shut our ears to any contention by the appellant that section 22 of Act 220 should be invoked in his aid.
If that view be right, what legal position resulted from Puplampu’s death in so far as it affected the respondent’s sub-tenancy? There is evidence that Puplampu’s personal representatives surrendered two of the rooms to the appellant. This did not include the one room occupied by the respondent. Although they gave him notice to quit, clearly under pressure from the appellant, that was not a valid notice to quit which brought the tenancy to an end at common law. As Puplampu was himself a tenant protected by Act 220 and could not be ejected without judicial intervention, so was the respondent. Act 220 defines a tenant as… “any person who leases premises from another person in consideration of the payment of rent and includes … a sub-tenant.” And the Act says, lease includes every agreement for the letting of any premises whether oral or otherwise.
The resultant position is that the late Puplampu let one room to the respondent in consideration of the payment of rent. The latter said he paid his rent regularly to Puplampu until his death. Indeed, there is no evidence that there had been any cleavage between Puplampu and the respondent on any issue of rent in the former’s lifetime. Even after Puplampu’s death, the respondent swore that he paid rent to his personal representatives and obtained a receipt. When he sought to tender this in evidence, it was opposed by the appellant on the insubstantial ground that the receipt purported to be issued by a company called Puplampu & Co. The appellant tendered in evidence two receipts signed by Puplampu and the payment was described as in respect of rent.
The respondent seems to have slipped a little as to the actual quantum of the rent. One receipt records that he had paid “¢600 being rent for one office room occupied by him for the period 1 January 1976 to 31 December 1977.” And the second acknowledged a payment of “¢300 being rent … for the period 1 January to 31 December 1978.”
[p.365] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341
A mere arithmetical calculation shows that the agreed rent was ¢300 per annum. But in evidence-in-chief, the respondent said he paid rent of “¢300 a month.” This can only be a mere slip of no consequence. He in fact corrected this slip in cross-examination. He said: “The rent was ¢300 a year and so two years advance will be ¢600.” The learned trial judge accepted that the respondent paid rent in the manner stated in the two receipts (exhibits 1 and 2). That the respondent paid rent, was not the subject of any complaint made before us. Yet as I understand it, one of the grounds on which the trial court’s decision is to be reversed, is that “the respondent failed to prove that he paid rents whereby he became a sub-tenant . . .”
For my part, I fail to see how this insignificant slip, which was not the subject of any complaint by the appellant, can be used as a basis for a holding that the respondent never paid rent and was therefore not a sub-tenant of Puplampu. The latter himself was a tenant and paid rent. He introduced the respondent to the appellant as his sub-tenant.
The respondent swore he paid rent. This is supported by receipts covering a period of three years, apparently those the respondent could readily lay hands on. Puplampu who was a lawyer, must at least be credited with a knowledge of the meaning of that elementary term “rent”. In the two receipts which he himself signed, he acknowledged that the payments were “rent” for one office room occupied … etc. Unless Puplampu was talking nonsense, he received monetary consideration for letting one room to the respondent and that consideration is properly called “rent.” It would offend against reason to suggest that the respondent remained in the room sublet to him by Puplampu for nine years carrying on business, but paid nothing for it and was therefore a trespasser. With great respect, I do not think it is a proper function of this court to appear to be astute in scooping out insubstantial discrepancies in a witness’ testimony for the purpose of justifying the reversal of a factual finding of a trial court. Indeed, it would come as a painful surprise to the respondent to be told that one of the grounds on which the judgment in his favour was reversed, was that he never paid rent to his landlord, Puplampu, and had always been a trespasser in his one-room office.
I think on the evidence, the proper finding and the one which the trial judge made, was that the respondent was a sub-tenant of Puplampu and paid him rent at the rate of ¢300 per annum. Although the evidence is imprecise on this, if Puplampu’s personal representatives renounced all their interest in the demised premises, the respondent only ceased to be their sub-tenant and instead, became a tenant of the appellant: see the Supreme Court judgment in Darko v Baisie [1964] GLR 271 at 276, SC. That being the legal position as I see it, the appellant can only obtain the court’s assistance to throw out
[p.366] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 341 the respondent from the room if he brings the monthly tenancy to an end by a valid notice to quit and also satisfied the court that he reasonably required the room for his own business purposes.
I am by no means satisfied that the letters which both the appellant’s solicitor and Puplampu’s personal representatives wrote to the respondent, are valid common law notices which determined the tenancy. At all events, the appellant’s counsel admitted frankly before us, that the six months’ notice that section 17 obliged an intending applicant to give was not given. Furthermore, the learned judge after reviewing the evidence concluded that the appellant failed to show that he reasonably required the premises for the purpose of his own business. That, to me, is the end of this appeal.
For my part, I have not felt the need to enter into any scholarly excursus or a descriptive analysis of that creature called a “statutory tenant’ or engage myself in enumeration of his rights and responsibilities. I am content to take the definition of him as given by section 36 of our Act 220 which says, in so far as it is material,”. . . a tenant who remains in possession of premises after the determination by any means of his tenancy and cannot by reason of the provisions of this Act be deprived of such possession by his landlord ..”
Puplampu was plainly a contractual tenant. There is no evidence that his monthly tenancy was brought to an end before his death. Indeed, on the appellant’s own showing, it was his death that determined the tenancy. That view, I could not accept. So the garb of a statutory tenant simply did not fit him. He had an estate which was transmissible to his successors on his death. The respondent, who was his sub-tenant with the appellant’s full knowledge and approval, merely stepped into Puplampu’s shoes. And he, like Puplampu, was a tenant protected under our rent legislation and can only be dispossessed of his one-room on due compliance with the requirements of that law. That in substance, was the holding of the judge below. I respectfully agree with him. If this matter had rested with me, there can be no doubt about the fate of this appeal, However, my brothers think otherwise. The judgment of this court will be, of course, as my brothers say. But I would, for my own part, dismiss this appeal with costs.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
D R K S
