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[1985] SLR (CA) 16Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

DOMFE vs. ADU [1984-86] 1 GLR 653

15 July 1985 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 34 min read

Cite as[1985] SLR (CA) 16
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OSCOLADOMFE v ADU [1984-86] 1 GLR 653 [1985] SLR (CA) 16
APADOMFE v ADU [1984-86] 1 GLR 653, [1985] SLR (CA) 16 (Ghana).
BluebookDOMFE v ADU [1984-86] 1 GLR 653, [1985] SLR (CA) 16 (Ghana Ct. App. 1985).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Reindorf v Amadu [1962] 1 GLR 508, SC.

(2) Paquin Ltd v Beauclerk [1906] AC 148.

(3) Adorkor v Gatsi [1966] GLR 31, SC.

(4) Nixon v Nixon [1961] 1 WLR 1676; [1969] 3 All ER 1133, CA.

(5) Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886, [1970] 3 WLR 255; [1970] 2 All ER 780, HL.

[p.656] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 653

(6) Achiampong v Achiampong [1982-83] GLR 1017 CA.

(7) Rimmer v Rimmer [1953] 1 QB 63; [1952] 2 All ER 863, CA.

(8) Spokesman (Publications) Ltd v Attorney-General [1974] 1 GLR 86.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against a judgment of the High Court, Accra declaring the plaintiff-respondent beneficially entitled to a half-share of all assets in the business registered in the defendant-appellant’s name and properties acquired with profits from the business. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Abban JA.

COUNSEL

Dr Seth Twum for the defendant-appellant.

C E K Kumado for the plaintiff-respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN JA.

Abban J.A. delivered the first judgment at the invitation of Sowah CJ. In the High Court, Accra the plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) sought three reliefs. That is a declaration that she was beneficially entitled to a half – share of each and every asset movable and immovable standing in the name of the defendant (hereinafter referred to as the appellant). Secondly, a declaration that she was entitled to share equally with the appellant all goods in the stores popularly known as “Asuo Gyebi Stores” and located at house No 140/144, Odum Street, Kumasi and the profits that accrued from the running of the said stores as well as any other proceeds from the business activities carried on by the parties in Kumasi and Accra between 1970 and 1980. Thirdly, any other relief as in the circumstances might be just including an order for accounts or inquiries and for an order calling upon the appellant to make the necessary vesting assents to give effect to the above declaration.

There was no dispute that the parties met for the first time in 1968 and in due course they became friends; and by 1969 they had formed an intimate association in the sense that for all practical purposes they were living under one roof as man and wife. The respondent said the association was regularised in 1970 when the appellant formally performed the customary marriage rites. The appellant gave the date for performing the marriage rites to be in 1974.

However, at the time they met in 1968, the respondent was already in business. She was engaged in substantial trading activities while the appellant had practically nothing. To put it simply, the appellant was then a man of straw. He was earning ¢10 a month as a produce clerk at a place called Npasaaso in Ashanti. In 1969 the appellant resigned as a produce clerk to work with his brother as a store boy or attendant. He

[p.657] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 653 was not paid regular wages, but was given irregular allowance every day, depending on the sales of that day. In fact, the, appellant was finding life very tough.

The respondent, conscious of the financial plight in which the appellant found himself, invited the appellant to join her in her trading business. The appellant accepted the invitation with alacrity. This was in or about 1971. Thus, the parties from then on agreed to do business together. Following that agreement, and for the Joint business, the respondent first obtained a loan of ¢200 from the Government of Ghana Small Business Loan Scheme in or about October 1971: see exhibit A. She gave this amount to the appellant to start the joint business. Two months later in December 1971, the respondent obtained a second loan of ¢800 from the same source – Small Business Loan Scheme – and again gave it to the appellant. The respondent obtained further a loan of ¢1,500 from her brothers and another ¢200 from her sister. All these loans were given to the appellant for the joint business. Altogether, the respondent contributed ¢2,700 as the initial working capital to start the said joint business. The appellant, as already indicated, was a man of straw and could not contribute any portion of the initial working capital. It was later on when the business had taken off and was flourishing that he also obtained loans from banks for its expansion.

The respondent could neither read nor write. She was an illiterate woman. While the appellant was an educated young man. There was no formal agreement as to how the profits from the business were to be shared. But according to the respondent the following agreement was made by them and here I quote the evidence of the respondent:

“I continued to work with him. We then agreed that the first building we put up would be for our child Abena Akyeampomaa, he would keep the second house and the third house would be for me. We traded in Kumasi. We organised our business in such a way that he kept the store while I came to Accra to buy goods for the store. The business was for both of us.”

All this time the joint business was being run under the name of Pathway Enterprise. However, in due course the respondent who believed in fetish went to Larteh to consult the priestess Oparebea of Akonode fetish to pray for the prosperity of the business. The respondent also sought from the priestess a new trade name for the business. After performing the necessary rites the name “Asuo Gyebi” was granted to the respondent. The parties then changed the business name from “Pathway Enterprise” to “Asuo Gyebi Stores.” Prosperity continued to smile on the business and so between April 1973 and

[p.658] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 653

1979, overdraft facilities were granted by certain banks, in the name of the appellant, for the expansion of the business: see exhibits 5-7C.

As I have stated these overdrafts were granted in the name of the appellant, just as the various loans which formed the initial working capital were obtained in the name of the respondent. The business in Kumasi was carried on in rented premises known as OT8 140/144, Odum Street. The respondent said she rented the premises and the receipts for rent paid were issued in her name. According to the respondent the appellant caused the said receipts to be issued in the name of “Asuo Gyebi Stores” during the absence of the respondent from Kumasi for some months. The respondent went to Accra to deliver her baby and it was during that period that the appellant managed to effect the said change. On her return to Kumasi the respondent queried the appellant about the change but the appellant apologised.

The parties continued to live together as man and wife and they also continued to work together as business colleagues. The business made considerable profits out of which they put up a house for their said daughter – in terms of their agreement – on Atonsu Road, Kumasi, and to quote from the respondent’s evidence:

“We have since bought seven vehicles (cars) and two buildings. I came and bought a house at Mataheko with money from the business. There is another house at Kwaadaso Estates in Kumasi … we had ¢500,000 worth of goods in the store. The business kept accounts at the Commercial Bank, Kumasi and the Social Security Bank also at Suame, Kumasi. The SSB account was in the name of Safo Domfe. He brought a form for me to thumbprint which he took to the bank. He told me the account was in our joint names.”

It is significant to note that the name “Safo Domfe” was a combination of the surnames of the appellant and the respondent. The business no doubt proved a success and the parties could be said to be living in some measure of affluence. Then without any quarrel or apparent dispute between them the appellant one day in 1980 went to the family of the respondent and informed them that he would no longer marry the respondent. All attempts by the respondent and certain elders to persuade the appellant to reverse his decision proved abortive. Consequently, the marriage had to be dissolved in November 1980. But the appellant refused to give the respondent her share of the business and also her share of the properties acquired with the profits and proceeds from the joint business. After various attempts to settle the property issue had failed the respondent brought the present action.

[p.569] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 653

The appellant did not dispute most of the facts as stated above. He agreed that he met the respondent in 1968. He was then earning only ¢10 a month. He said the respondent became his girl – friend from 1969 and they continued in that association until 1974 when he performed the customary marriage rites. In any case, during the period between 1969 and 1974 they were living together as man and wife. The appellant said when he left his brother’s store where he was then being given irregular allowance, he teamed up first with a Nigerian called Ade. This was in 1972. He traded with this Nigerian under the business name of “Pathway Enterprise” and this business was carried on in the same store, OTB 140/144, Odum Street, Kumasi, and which store the appellant said he rented from its owner through one Frempong Manso, and he paid the rents to the landlord through the said Frempong Manso. The appellant tendered the receipts for the rents paid from 1972 to 1980: see exhibit 2A to Z, AA to ZZ and AAA to ZZZ.

The appellant said he broke up with the Nigerian in 1973 and it was then that he called upon the respondent to help him in his trading business which was being run under the name “Pathway Enterprises:” I will here quote the words of the appellant when giving his evidence – in – chief:

“I married the plaintiff in 1974 according to custom. We lived together. Before I married her she was trading in clothes, charcoal, beer, etc at Takyiman, Nkoranza, Atebubu and several other places. Later in 1973, I broke up with Ade. I invited her to help me and my brothers in my business.”

Pausing here for a moment, on the appellant’s own showing, he and the respondent, in fact, started doing business together in late 1973 and at a time when, according to the appellant, he had still not customarily married the respondent and when the business was still being carried on under the name “Pathway Enterprise.”

As regards the changing of the name from “Pathway Enterprise” to “Asuo Gyebi Stores”, the appellant contended that when he broke up with that Ade, Ade threatened his life and his business. Consequently, he needed the protection of a fetish. So he requested the respondent to take him to the Akonode Fetish at Larteh. This was in 1973 and he went back to the same fetish in 1974 and obtained the name “Asuo Gyebi” from the priestess Oparebea. He denied that it was the respondent who obtained or was given that name. He also denied that the respondent contributed financially towards the business. On the contrary, he maintained that he got the overdrafts from banks to improve and expand the business and he was therefore the sole owner thereof. The appellant concluded his evidence – in – chief as follows:

[p.660] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 653

“Mr Kwarteng Amaning, brother of the plaintiff (the respondent) came to me and pleaded if I could not marry his sister … I should give her some amount to trade with. After about a month I agreed to give her ¢100,000. So I issued two cheques for ¢50,000. One for 1 March 1981 and one for 30 June 1981. After this the plaintiff (the respondent) insisted on getting the store back. So I took the cheques back and returned the receipts. The plaintiff (the respondent) is not entitled to anything she is claiming.”

The appellant called two witnesses to testify on his behalf. On 9 May 1984, the High Court in a considered judgment held that the respondent was entitled to the declarations sought and in terms of the third relief appointed the chief registrar of the High Court, Accra “to be a referee to see to the equal sharing of the assets listed in paragraph 17 of the statement of claim.”

It is against this judgment that the appeal was brought. Various grounds of appeal were filed and the first ground which learned counsel for the appellant argued was that the judgment was unsatisfactory since it did not resolve important primary issues. Counsel submitted that the learned trial judge summarised the evidence of the parties and without assessing the evidence and without making definite findings of fact on major issues raised both on the pleadings and in the evidence, he proceeded to give judgment. Learned counsel referred to some of the issues on which, according to him, the learned trial judge failed to make pronouncements. These included failure to pronounce on the appellant’s counterclaim, on the ¢30,000 alleged to have been advanced to the respondent to carry on a separate business, the circumstances under which the appellant issued the two cheques for ¢100,000 and the actual date of the marriage between the parties since the date would determine the time when the parties started the joint business. In the absence of findings on these matters, learned counsel urged the court to send the case back for retrial.

I have to state that the primary facts which a trial judge may find as having been proved to his satisfaction are those necessary to establish the claim of a party or in some cases the defence and which have been alleged on one side and controverted on the other. It must also be borne in mind that the trial judge is not required to make findings of fact in respect of irrelevant matters on which the parties have led evidence when such findings would not assist in the determination of the issues involved in the case. In the case of Reindorf and Ankrah v Amadu, Braimah and Nikoi O’Lai [1962] 1 GLR 508, SC the Supreme Court refused to approve of the contention that the

[p.661] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 653 trial court should make findings of fact on all matters upon which the defendant had adduced evidence. At 513-514 Korsah CJ said:

“Counsel for appellant has urged that it was the duty of the learned commissioner to have made specific findings of fact on all the matters upon which the defendant had adduced evidence, and as that has not been done the case should be remitted to the court below for re-trial.

I am unable to accede to this request, for the simple reason that the passage in the judgment clearly shows that the court accepted the evidence of plaintiffs and their witnesses, and found “That they (plaintiffs) have proved that they are owners of all the land known as Dome land as shown in exhibit C by their possession and occupation, and trespass has been committed’. With regard to the defendants’ case, the learned commissioner having come to the conclusion that the traditional evidence led by the co-defendants and their witnesses is inconsistent and unreliable also that it does not show evidence of possession and occupation, there was no need for him to discuss in detail what each witness said. In my view having found that the plaintiffs are in possession and occupation, and having accepted their traditional evidence he had made the basic findings upon which he came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration sought.”

In the present case, the most important question is, did the learned trial judge make basic findings on the relevant issues, the determination of which would dispose of the respondent’s claim in one way or the other? I think he did, and the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant was totally misconceived. What were the relevant issues which the learned trial judge was called upon to resolve? Several issues were set down in the summons for directions but most of them could hardly be described as relevant. In my view, the main issues for determination as can be gathered from the pleadings and from the summons for directions were whether the parties established joint business and whether the respondent financed or contributed substantially towards establishing that joint business; and whether the appellant and the respondent jointly operated the business, and whether in the circumstances the respondent, was entitled to a half-share of the profits from the business and the properties acquired with such profits.

To my mind, findings on these issues should dispose of the case in one way or the other. As a matter of fact, learned counsel for the appellant in his written address filed in the court below after both parties had closed their case, stated that in his opinion the main issues

[p.662] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 653 for the court to decide were just three and no more. I may here quote from the said written address:

“My Lord, the plaintiff by her writ of summons issued on 18 May 1981 claimed the four reliefs indorsed thereon … The defendant by his statement of defence filed on 4 June 1981 denied the several allegations in the said statement of claim and thereby joined issues with the plaintiff. In our opinion, the main issues that the plaintiff called upon this honourable court to consider were:

(a) Whether Asuo Gyebi stores was a sole proprietorship or a partnership and if a partnership, who the partners are?

(b) Who financed the business of Asuo Gyebi?; and (c) Who was the tenant in house No OTB 140/144, Odum Street?”

It can be seen from this portion of the written address that after learned counsel for the appellant had heard the evidence which both parties adduced before the trial court, counsel felt that the alleged advance of ¢30,000, the date on which the parties got married, the circumstances under which the ¢100,000 was paid were all irrelevant matters to be belaboured upon. That was the more reason why learned counsel did not see the need to include them in the issues he set out in the said written address.

I therefore find it rather strange that in this court learned counsel suddenly realised that they were so important that the learned trial judge should have made findings on them. I think learned counsel should not be allowed to blow hot and cold.

As I have said, the real issues were those I have set out above. All the other issues which learned counsel for the appellant complained of were of no moment. A casual glance through the judgment would not fail to reveal that the learned trial judge made findings of fact on all those important and relevant issues and, in fact, did pronounce on them in favour of the respondent. I will refer to some of those findings. After he had discussed at length the rival stories of the parties, he weighed and assessed the evidence as a whole and in the course of it stated:

“Under cross-examination he (the appellant) said when he left working with his brother in 1972 all he had was ¢200 which was money he had given to his brother to keep for him and which he used to finance Pathway. Put side by side with the plaintiffs story, the plaintiff’s story sounds more probable. I therefore find that not only did the plaintiff finance the defendant’s business but operated that business jointly with the defendant.”

[p.663] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 653

The learned trial judge then made reference to certain authorities and to the properties in dispute and continued:

“It is clear that the plaintiff not only financed the business venture from the start but practically stopped her trading in foodstuffs and traveled to Accra to make purchases for the store from which the profits were made…”

The learned trial judge again made reference to more authorities and then stated “In this case not only did the plaintiff contribute business expertise, she also contributed financially and substantially to the establishment of the business.”

In view of those positive findings it is very difficult to appreciate the attack which learned counsel launched against the judgment under this ground. The ¢30,000 which the respondent denied receiving, was supposed to have been given to her during the operation of the joint business because in the course of cross-examining the respondent the following questions were asked.

“Q. Do you remember that during the operation of this business the defendant advanced you ¢30,000 to buy things to sell?

A. I don’t remember.

Q. The defendant out of the generosity of his heart advanced you ¢30,000 to buy plastic wares to sell for yourself?

A. It is not correct.”

As for the appellant’s brother, the first defendant witness, he merely mentioned this amount because the appellant told him about it. This is what the appellant’s brother stated:

“Q. How much did the defendant give to the plaintiff to do her own trading?

A. I don’t know.

Q. So what you told the court was what the defendant told you?

A. Yes.”

The portion of the evidence quoted above showed that the so-called ¢30,000 was supposed to have been paid long after the joint business had, in fact, been established by the couple and was being run jointly by them. So that the issue as to whether or not that amount was paid could not assist in any way in deciding the main issue, that is whether the business was established jointly by the parties. As regards the ¢100,000, the circumstances under which it was paid was irrelevant to the case. In any case, on the appellant’s own showing the said amount never reached the respondent at all.

[p.664] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 653

In respect of the counterclaim it appears counsel for the appellant in his written address misled the learned trial judge into believing that the appellant was no longer pursuing the said counterclaim, namely a declaration that the appellant was the tenant or lessee of house No OTB 140/144, Odum Street, Kumasi. In the said written address filed after the case for the parties had closed the following submission was made on behalf of the appellant: “It is, therefore crystal clear that what is at stake is not who is the tenant of OTB 140/144.”

I therefore agree with learned counsel for the respondent that this submission could clearly be interpreted as amounting to an abandonment of the counterclaim; in which case the learned trial judge was right in not making any pronouncement on it. In any event, it is clear from the judgment that the learned trial judge preferred the evidence of the respondent to that of the appellant and held that on the major issues the story of the respondent “sounds the more probable” and therefore accepted it. Having rejected the evidence of the appellant, the only reasonable and logical conclusion was that the appellant had failed to prove his tenancy of the said house No OTB 140/144, Odum Street, Kumasi; and the learned trial judge could have dismissed the counterclaim in one sentence. This court has the power to do just that.

The power flows from the rule that the appeal to the Court of Appeal is by way of rehearing; and although the appellate court is not at liberty to usurp the province of the trial court, yet if the evidence be such that only one conclusion can be properly drawn, as in the present case, the appellate court will be entitled to draw that conclusion: see Lord Loreburn LC in Paquin Ltd v Beauclerk [1906] AC 148 at 161, HL.

In Adorkor v Gatsi [1966] GLR 31, SC the Supreme Court at 34 stated the legal position in the following words:

“The law governing this is that while findings of specific facts are within the competency of the trial court alone, a finding of fact which is an inference to be drawn from specific facts found is within the competency of an appeal court no less than the trial court; in other words, an appeal court is in as good a position as the trial court to draw inferences from specific facts which the trial court may find.”

On the findings as made by the learned trial judge, the only conclusion that could have been drawn in respect of the counterclaim, was that the appellant failed to prove the said counterclaim; and this court is at liberty to say so. Thus, in my view, the counterclaim should stand dismissed. The next ground of appeal was that the learned trial judge erred in law and, in fact, in as much as he substituted suo motu a new case for

[p.665] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 653 the respondent which was inconsistent with the pleadings. Learned counsel submitted that of [1984-86] 1 GLR 653-673the respondent’s case was based on contract and that she claimed that she was entitled to a portion of the profits and that the appellant had not distributed the profits, and had acquired assets with those profits and she was therefore entitled to a half-share of those assets.

Counsel contended that the judgment did not proceed on that basis, but rather on the basis that the business was for the appellant that the respondent financed the appellant, that the respondent had made substantial contribution and she was therefore, by English law of trusts or implied trust, entitled to a half-share. Learned counsel contended that this was wrong in law and the judgment should not be allowed to stand.

The submission, with respect to learned counsel, was devoid of merit. In the first place, there is nothing in the judgment which indicated that the learned trial judge substituted a new case for the respondent. It is true that the respondent contended that the parties agreed to set up a joint business and to enjoy together the benefits that would accrue from the joint venture; and in that respect the action was based in contract. The respondent was an illiterate woman while the appellant was an educated man; and according to the respondent, she knew the appellant had registered the business in their joint names as the owners. But it turned out that the appellant did the registration in his name as the sole proprietor without reference to the respondent, see exhibits 1 and 4. So on the face of it, the appellant was the sole legal owner of the business and the learned trial judge was obliged to say so.

However, having made that finding, nothing prevented the learned trial judge, sitting as a court of law and equity, to “pierce through the veil” to find out who were the real beneficiaries of the business; and the learned trial judge having found that the respondent and the appellant were the beneficial owners of the business – both of them having contributed towards establishing it and, in fact, the respondent having provided the initial working capital – concluded that even though the business stood in the name of the appellant as the sole owner, the appellant held the business as well as the profits and the proceeds accruing therefrom in trust for himself and the respondent. It was because of those findings and the conclusions he reached that the learned trial judge applied equitable principles and referred to certain English authorities bearing on the point. I therefore fail to see anything wrong with this. In my view, this was a proper case where the court should invoke equitable principles and refer to decided cases, both English and local, to elucidate or to explain how the parties stood to each other in relation to the business itself as well as the profits and the proceeds realised therefrom.

[p.666] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 653

I will at this juncture refer to some of those authorities and to demonstrate that they were properly and correctly applied to the present case. In Nixon v Nixon [1969] 3 All ER 1133, CA, the English Court of Appeal held that where a wife had helped her husband regularly and continuously in a business which prospered by their joint efforts and received no wages, she was entitled to a half-share in the main asset represented by the matrimonial home. Lord Denning MR at 1136 said:

“The case raises this point of principle. What is the position of a wife who helps in the business? Up and down the country, a man’s wife helps her husband in the business. She serves in the shop. He does the travelling around. If the shop and business belonged to him before they married, no doubt it will remain his after they marry. But she by her work afterwards should get some interest in it. Not perhaps an equal share, but some share. If they acquire the shop and business after they marry – and acquire it by their joint efforts – then it is their joint property, no matter that it is taken in the husband’s name. In such a case, when she works in the business afterwards, she becomes virtually a partner in it – so far as the two of them are concerned – and she is entitled, prima facie, to an equal share in it.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

The learned trial judge after making his findings in favour of the respondent applied the above principles. Another principle of interest, so far as this case is concerned, was enunciated by Lord Diplock in Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886. At 904-905 the learned Lord said:

“Any claim to a beneficial interest in land by a person, whether spouse or stranger, in whom the legal estate in the land is not vested must be based upon the proposition that the person in whom the legal estate is vested holds it as trustee upon trust to give effect to the beneficial interest of the claimant as cestui que trust. The legal principles applicable to the claim are those of the English law of trusts and in particular, in the kind of dispute between spouses that comes before the courts, the law relating to the creation and operation of ‘resulting, implied or constructive trusts.”’

(The emphasis is mine.)

This dictum was approved by this court in the case of Achiampong v Achiampong [1982-83] GLR 1017, CA. In Rimmer v Rimmer [1953] 1 QB 63, CA Romer LJ stated the principle in a very lucid manner. At 76, he said:

“It seems to me that the only general principles which emerge from our decisions are, first, that cases between husband and wife

[p.667] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 653 ought not to be governed by the same strict considerations, both at law and in equity, as are commonly applied to the ascertainment of the respective rights of strangers when each of them contributes to the purchase price of property, and, secondly, that the old – established doctrine that equity leans towards equality is peculiarly applicable to disputes between husband and wife, where the facts, as a whole, permit of its application.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

The facts in the present case clearly permitted the application of the above stated equitable principles and the learned trial judge, in my opinion, was right in giving consideration to those authorities which have set out the said principles in unambiguous terms.

Another complaint made under this ground was that the respondent failed to prove the allegation of fraud as contained in her paragraph 18 of the statement of claim. It was submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that an allegation was made to the effect that the appellant defrauded the respondent by not registering the business in the joint names of the appellant and the respondent; and yet, no evidence was led to establish or prove that allegation.

I do not really see the purpose for this argument. Fraud was not one of the issues to be tried and so whether evidence was offered in support thereof or not was of no consequence. The learned trial judge did not, in fact, and rightly so, attempt to make any finding on it. Of course, exhibits 1 and 4 tendered by the appellant, showed that the appellant did register the business in his sole name and left out the respondent’s name. But the learned trial judge refrained from pronouncing on the appellant’s conduct as fraudulent, since it was needless for him to do so. And since the judgment could not be said to have been based on fraud, this particular argument was unnecessary.

The third ground of appeal argued by the learned counsel for the appellant was that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence. Counsel submitted that the finding that the joint business commenced in 1970 could not be correct because the appellant had no business of his own in 1970 and that until 1972, the appellant was rather working with his brother; and it was much later in 1972 that the “Pathway Enterprise” was established. Learned counsel further contended that the exhibits tendered by the appellant, the correspondence from the banks, showed that the business was established with overdrafts from the banks and that it could not seriously be suggested that the respondent made substantial contribution in as much as she failed to call as witnesses her brothers and sister from whom the respondent obtained the loans which were supposed to have been given to the appellant to start the business.

[p.668] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 653

One point must be made clear. The parties had been living as man and wife since round about 1969 and the respondent put the year in which the appellant formally performed the customary rites of marriage as 1970, while the appellant said it was in 1974. The learned judge accepted that of the respondent. Again, the respondent herself was already in business long before and at the time of the marriage; and according to her she invited the appellant to join her. The appellant contended that it was rather he who invited her to join him in his business in 1973. The learned judge rejected the appellant’s version and accepted that of the respondent.

The implication here is that the idea of the joint business came about in 1970; and it was in 1971, as shown in the Small Business Loan Scheme Agreements, exhibits A and B, that the respondent borrowed various sums of money and gave same to the appellant to start the business. The fact that the appellant briefly did business of some sort with the Nigerian did not mean that no money was given to the appellant in or about 1971 for the joint business.

The learned trial judge found the evidence of the appellant unreliable, but accepted that of the respondent as credible, and again the fact that the respondent did not call her brothers and sister to testify on the loans did not mean that those loans were not obtained. The trial judge was entitled either to believe or disbelieve the respondent; and he chose to believe her and there is little this court can do. On all the material issues the learned trial judge found against the appellant on the facts as he was entitled to do and I am unable to say that he was wrong in his findings on any of the issues. Indeed, on the evidence, he could hardly have found otherwise. For instance, there was abundant evidence to support the finding that the respondent did not only make substantial financial contribution towards establishing the joint business but that she also took active part in running it. It was much later that the appellant also obtained overdraft facilities in his name for its expansion; and that was not surprising, for after all the respondent too at the initial stages obtained, in her own name, loans which were used as the working capital. Indeed, there was overwhelming evidence that the respondent was a moving force in the operation of the joint business.

It is important to observe that the said overdraft facilities were granted as a result of a viability report compiled by a company called General Business Consultants Ltd based in Accra and on the instructions of the appellant. Portions of the said report, exhibit D, which the appellant accepted and presented to the bank to obtain the overdraft facilities read as follows:

[p.669] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 653

“The store deals in sundry goods. It is being operated by two experienced traders, a husband and wife. Their turnover is about ¢325,000. They intend to expand their operation to reach about ¢480,000 or ¢600,000 per annum with a corresponding gross margin to about ¢50,000 to ¢65,000 and net profit of about ¢30,000 to ¢40,000. Their operational statement gives every indication of the viability of their operation. It is anticipated that if the couple secures a loan for the anticipated expansion, the target set will be reached without much difficulty … Thus negotiation for a loan to carry out their expansion is recommended.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

In view of this how can the appellant be heard to say that he alone ran the business and that its successful operation was not the joint efforts of himself and the respondent! The learned trial judge was right when he held:

“It is clear from the above that although the consultants were engaged by the defendant as sole proprietor of Asuo Gyebi Stores, they became aware that they were dealing with a business operated by the defendant and his wife the plaintiff.”

And I would add that it was also plain that the banks in granting those facilities in the name of the appellant appreciated that the loans would be used and managed by a couple – the appellant and the respondent – to expand their business.

It should be remarked that the fact that Pathway Enterprise was not registered in 1970 or 1971 but in 1972 did not mean that before 1972 Pathway Enterprise was not doing business. After all the normal practice was for the business to operate for some time before its registration would be allowed. This was even made manifest in the “Instructions” attached to the registration form exhibit 1. Paragraph (F) thereof stated: “(F) Here state the date of the commencement of the business. The business must have commenced before registration is effected.” (The emphasis is mine.)

Again, as found by the learned trial judge, it was the respondent who was instrumental in getting the name “Asuo Gyebi” from the fetish priestess of Akonode which name the parties later substituted for “Pathway Enterprise.” Thus, as I have already held, there was sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to support the finding that the respondent made substantial contribution both in money and in kind in establishing and running the joint business venture which undoubtedly prospered. In the circumstances it would not be right for this court to disturb those findings.

[p.670] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 653

The forth ground of appeal was that the learned trial judge, in material respects, completely misconceived the evidence before him and in consequence drew conclusions wholly at variance with the facts. Learned counsel submitted that the learned judge wrongly found that the receipts CI to C18 showed that they were issued during the period when “Pathway Enterprise” was in existence when, in fact, those receipts were for periods after the divorce, in 1980.

The portion of the judgment being complained of under this ground reads:

“He (the appellant) said that he and Ade paid the rents for the store and tendered the receipts exhibits in support of this. The exhibits C1 to C18 however bear the name Asuo Gyebi and not Pathway. The receipts were issued in the name of Mary Domfe. The defendant did not explain how the receipts for rents paid by Pathway Enterprise came to be issued in the name of Mary Domfe at the time he was teaming up with Ade.”

A careful examination of the receipts showed that the term “exhibits 2” used in the judgment meant all those exhibits which were numbered as 2A to 2Z, AA2 to AAAA2. They were quite a lot and it would have been burdensome to make mention of each and every one of them. All that the learned judge was saying in that passage was that some of those receipts in “exhibits 2 group” covered the period when, according to the appellant, he and the said Nigerian, Ade, were running the “Pathway Enterprise” and that period stretched from 1972 to about September 1974; and yet some of those receipts bore the name of the respondent – Mary Domfe.

I have gone through those receipts and I am convinced that the finding was correctly made because, for example, exhibits 2X dated 6 May 1974, 2Y dated 5 June 1974, 2Z dated 3 July 1974 and AAA2 dated 2 August 1974, were all issued in the name of Mary Domfe. According to the appellant, the respondent was not in the business when it was being run under the name “Pathway Enterprise”, and yet the receipts which were supposed to have been paid for rents issued paid by “Pathway Enterprise” were rather issued in the name of Mary Domfe as the person who made those payments. Surely this called for explanation. But the appellant failed to give any and this was precisely what the learned judge was commenting upon; and I do not see anything wrong with that. As for exhibits C1 to C18, they truly covered a period outside 1 September 1974 but they were also issued in the name of “Asuo Gyebi” and still with the name “Mary Domfe” in brackets on most of them.

[p.671] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 653

The fifth ground of appeal was that the respondent’s claim in so far as it related to a half-share of everything owned by the appellant did not disclose any cause of action and the same should have been dismissed in limine. Learned counsel submitted that the declaration sought was too wide and the learned trial judge should not have granted it. With due respect to learned counsel, there is no substance in the contention. In the first place, the respondent did not claim everything the appellant had in the world. The claim was limited in scope. The claim was in respect of specific properties movable and immovable and these were clearly spelt out in paragraph 17 of her statement of claim. These properties, according to the respondent, were acquired with profits which accrued from the joint business and during the period they were running the joint business together.

Incidentally, the appellant in his paragraph 19 of the statement of defence admitted that those properties as listed in the respondent’s said paragraph 17 were, in fact, acquired during the period between 1970 and 1980. What the appellant disputed was the values the respondent put on some of them; and he further contended that the respondent had no interest in them. The appellant admitted paragraphs 15 and 16 of the respondent’s statement of claim which read as follows:

“15 The business under the name Asuo Gyebi Stores prospered considerably. The profits were however never shared but ploughed back into the business to expand the operations and investment in new ventures. Out of the said profits the plaintiff and defendant paid for their business and domestic expenses but did not draw salaries.

16 In due course the business was expanded. Thereafter the defendant spent five days in Accra on the Accra end of the business and returned to Kumasi over the week-end. The plaintiff spent three days in Accra and the rest of the week in Kumasi attending to their business.”

(The emphasis is mine.) The appellant as I have stated, admitted the above paragraphs 15 and 16 in his statement of defence, paragraph 16, where the appellant stated:

“(16) Save that the business did not belong to the plaintiff and the defendant (It being the defendant’s sole proprietorship) paragraphs 15 and 16 are admitted. The defendant made all the domestic expenses and generally provided for the plaintiff.”

It was therefore obvious from the pleadings that a factual situation existed which entitled the respondent to seek a relief from the court

[p.672] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 653 against the appellant; and to that extent she had a cause of action against the appellant. In Spokesman (Publications) Ltd v Attorney-General [1974] 1 GLR 88 at 91, the full bench of the Court of Appeal explained what is meant by cause of action as follows:

“A party has a cause of action when he is able to allege all the facts or combination of facts which are necessary to establish his right to sue. Lord Esher M. R. in Read v. Brown (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 128 at p. 131, C.A. defined a cause of action as ‘every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court.”’

(The emphasis is mine.) In the same case and at the same page of the report, the full bench approved the definition of “cause of action” as given by the High Court of Australia in Williams v. Milotin (1957) 97 C.L.R. 465 at p 474 where it was stated as follows:

“When you speak of a cause of action you mean the essential ingredients in the title to the right which it is proposed to enforce. The essential ingredients in an action of negligence for personal injuries include the special or particular damage – it is the gist of the action – and the want of due care.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

The gist of the action in the present case was the unreasonable refusal of the appellant to give the respondent her due share of certain specific properties which were acquired by the joint efforts of both of them. The action was therefore maintainable in every respect.

The final ground that was argued was that the learned trial judge erred in law by failing to admit in evidence the document marked exhibit R1, which the appellant sought to rely on to prove his business relationship with his Nigerian friend, Ade. Learned counsel submitted that the document showed that the appellant was in business with the said Ade and the trial judge ought to have accepted it. I think R1 was properly rejected as it contained irrelevant matters. Secondly, the fact that the appellant and the said Ade executed exhibit R1 could not in itself establish that they, in fact, carried on business as partners under the business name of Pathway Enterprise in view of exhibit 1. Exhibit 1—Registration of Business Name of Pathway Enterprise—clearly indicated that Ade was not a partner in Pathway Enterprise at all and that the appellant was the sole proprietor. Thus R1 was plainly in conflict with the official document, exhibit 1. So that exhibit R1 was not only irrelevant but was also an unreliable piece of document, and its rejection did not cause any injustice to the appellant.

[p.673] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 653 On the whole, I am of the opinion that the appellant has totally failed to assail the judgment appealed against. In the circumstances, I would dismiss the appeal.

JUDGMENT OF SOWAH JSC I agree.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI- HWERE JA I also agree.

DECISION Appeal dismissed J A A

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