KUBI AND OTHERS vs. DALI [1984-86] 2 GLR 501
15 July 1985 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 14 min read
[1985] SLR (CA) 26Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Ilkiw v. Samuels [1963] 1 W.L.R. 991; [1963] 2 All E.R. 879; 107 S.J. 680, C.A.
(2) Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Co. Ltd. [1942] A.C. 601; [1942] 1 All E.R. 657, H.L.
(3) Nance v. British Columbia Electric Rail Co. Ltd. [1951] A.C. 601; [1951] 2 All E.R. 448, P.C.
(4) British Transport Commission v. Gourley [1956] A.C. 185. [1956] 2 W.L.R. 41; [1955] 3 All E.R.
796, H.L.
[p.504] of [1984-86] GLR 501
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against the quantum of damages awarded by the High Court, Ho in favour of the plaintiff for general and special damages arising from a motor accident caused by the negligence of the defendants. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Abban J.A.
COUNSEL
Mrs. Atta-Quayson for the appellants.
Kwame Tetteh for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.
On 21 May 1981 there was a head-on collision between two vehicles on the Asikuma-Frankadua motor road. The vehicles involved were AF 2294 and AZ 5690. The first appellant was in charge of vehicle No AF 2294 as the driver and servant of the second appellant, while the third appellant was the driver of the fourth appellant.
The respondent (hereafter called the plaintiff), a 45 year-old trader, was a fare-paying passenger on vehicle No AF 2294. She was travelling from Frankadua to Dzemani market where she had intended to sell her goods. As a result of the said collision, the two vehicles caught fire and in the ensuing conflagration, the plaintiff sustained serious physical injuries and her goods which were on the said vehicle also got completely burnt. The plaintiff attributed the cause of the accident to the negligent driving of the first and third appellant.
In her statement of claim, the plaintiff set out fully the particulars of the said negligence and the injuries she suffered. The injuries she suffered resulted in the amputation of her right leg above the knee. The plaintiff instituted an action in the High Court, Ho claiming general and special damages.
The appellants (hereafter called the defendants) in their statements of defence denied liability. Each driver put the liability for the negligence on the other. That is the first defendant contended that the accident occurred through the negligent driving of the third defendant, while the third defendant insisted that the first defendant’s negligent conduct brought about the collision. The plaintiff gave evidence at the trial and tendered a medical report, exhibit A, showing the extent of the injuries she sustained. She also tendered a list which, according to her, contained the description of all the goods with which she travelled on the said vehicle.
At the close of the case for the plaintiff, counsel for the defendants intimated to the learned trial judge that the defendants did not intend to offer any evidence. Counsel on both sides then addressed the court. On 16 July 1984, the learned High Court judge gave judgment for the plaintiff and awarded her a global sum of ¢281,076 and concluded in the following manner:
[p.505] of [1984-86] GLR 501
“The plaintiff’s damages therefore break down as follows:
¢ 1 Special damages .. .. .. .. .. 5,500 2 Goods destroyed .. .. .. .. .. 51,576 3 Loss of earnings .. .. .. .. .. 13,000 4 Loss of future earnings .. .. .. .. 180,000 5 Permanent incapacity .. .. .. .. 20,000 6 Pain and suffering .. .. .. .. .. 8,000 7 Loss of amenities of life .. .. .. .. 3,000 Total .. .. .. .. ¢281,076”
It is against this judgment that the defendants appealed to this court. Only one ground of appeal was argued by the learned counsel for the defendants, namely the quantum of damages awarded by the learned High Court judge was excessive and unwarranted. It may be observed that learned counsel for the defendants had no quarrel with the assessments under permanent incapacity (5), pain and suffering (6), and loss of amenities of life (7). Hence her arguments were directed against awards under “special damages”, “goods destroyed”, “loss of earnings” and “loss of future earnings.” In respect of the award under “special damages,” counsel submitted that there was no proof that the plaintiff, in fact, spent the sum of ¢5,500 which the learned trial judge awarded. Counsel contended that special damage required strict proof and so the plaintiff ought to have tendered in evidence receipts covering all the expenses she was supposed to have incurred; and in the absence of those receipts the learned High Court judge ought not to have made any award under that head. In any case, submitted counsel, the figure of ¢5,500 was excessive.
I agree with learned counsel as to the necessity of proving strictly, the special damages. Special damages in the sense of a monetary loss which the plaintiff has sustained up to the date of the trial must be pleaded and particularised and then proved by admissible evidence. Otherwise it cannot be recovered: see Ilkiw v. Samuels [1963] 2 All E.R. 897, C.A. In the present case, the plaintiff as a matter of fact, set out in paragraph 13 of her statement of claim particulars of her special damages in conformity with the requirements of pleadings. But the question here is whether or not the plaintiff proffered evidence which, if accepted, could support her claim under special damages. In my view the answer must be in the affirmative. I do not think, in the circumstances of this particular case, the production of receipts at the trial could be the only legitimate means of proving special damages and she led cogent evidence to that effect. She led evidence to show that she incurred hospital expenses, paid for the cost of the police report and spent on transportation to and from the hospital.
[p.506] of [1984-86] GLR 501
In the course of her evidence, the plaintiff clearly indicated that she had no receipts for some of the items but had receipts in respect of others but had lost them and they could not be traced, and the court was therefore entitled to accept secondary evidence as given by the plaintiff. In respect of those she was not given receipts for it was again a question of fact as to whether or not those expenses were incurred. The learned trial judge believed the plaintiff and found “that the plaintiff’s actual expenses therefore came to ¢5,500.” Since there was a basis for that finding I do not think it will be night for this court to disturb it.
On the award of ¢51,576 for loss of goods, learned counsel for the defendants argued that the plaintiff failed to prove that she had all those goods on the vehicle at the time of the accident. Counsel submitted that the list on which the plaintiff relied was self-serving and that having been prepared soon after the accident was inadmissible under Order 37 r. 62 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). The argument was refuted by learned counsel for the plaintiff who pointed out that the provisions of Order 37, r. 62 of L.N. 140A. have been repealed by section 180 of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 323), and furthermore section 122 of that Decree has now made admissible documents of the kind as was tendered by the plaintiff.
It appears the contention of learned counsel for the plaintiff is right. N.R.C.D. 323 came into effect on 1 January 1976 and this was before the cause of action in the present case arose. Section 180 (2) of that Decree reads:
“(2) The Supreme [High] Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A) are hereby amended⎯ (a) by the revocation of rules 1, 4, 21, 28 and 50 to 84 of Order 37;
(b) by the revocation of Order 37A.”
Thus Order 37, r. 62 on which learned counsel for the defendant relied is no longer in existence. Moreover, documents which were formerly held to be inadmissible as against Order 37, r. 62 can now be admitted under the provisions of section 122 of N.R.C.D. 323. The said section 122 states:
“122. Evidence of a hearsay statement is not made inadmissible by section 117 if⎯ (a) the statement is contained in a writing and constitutes a record of what was perceived by a witness who is present and subject to cross examination; and
[p.507] of [1984-86] GLR 501
(b) the statement would have been admissible if made by the witness while testifying; and (c) at a time when the matter recorded was recently perceived and clear in his memory, the witness recognised the written statement as an accurate record of what he had perceived or the witness stated what he perceived and the written statement, by whomever or however made, correctly sets forth what the witness stated.”
In her evidence the plaintiff stated that she carried those goods as itemised in the said list. She then explained how the said list was prepared by stating as follows, “. . . I caused to be recorded for me soon after the accident.” It is therefore clear that the list contained what the plaintiff herself caused to be written down for her immediately after the accident; and so far as she was concerned it contained accurate information about the goods she travelled with. In the circumstances, the list was admissible under section 122 of N.R.C.D. 323.
However, having properly admitted the list, the learned trial Judge later used expressions which clearly indicated that he did not believe that all these goods in the list were in fact destroyed. That is the learned trial judge felt that the plaintiff had unreasonably inflated her damage under “goods destroyed.” and so he scaled it down to ¢51,576. 1 find it very difficult to appreciate the basis for this. For there was no finding as to which of the goods he believed were in fact destroyed by the fire. Without making any finding to that effect it was not open to the learned trial judge to conclude that the value of goods destroyed amounted to ¢51,576. With due respect to the learned trial judge, he arrived at this figure in an arbitrary manner and without any legal or factual basis. Indeed, in all the circumstances of the case, the ¢51,576 was inordinately high and it was therefore an entirely erroneous estimate of the damages to which the plaintiff was entitled under that head⎯”good destroyed.” This is one of the circumstances under which this court can interfere with the finding on damages made by a trial court: see Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Co., Ltd. [1942] A.C. 601, H.L. and Nance v. British Columbia Electric R.I. Co., Ltd. [1951] A.C. 60 at 613, P.C. As I have indicated the figure of ¢51,576 is wholly out of all proportion and must not be allowed to stand. Of course, this does not mean that the plaintiff cannot recover anything under that head. There was evidence that some of her goods were destroyed and it would be fair and just that the items which the plaintiff specifically mentioned in her evidence should be a guide in finding out those goods from the list. Under cross-examination the plaintiff said, “I cannot mention off-hand the items and these are cloths made up of six pieces, sewing threads the
[p.508] of [1984-86] GLR 501
quantity of which I have forgotten, fishing nets, torch light batteries . . .” Some of these items appeared in the list as follows, “72 pieces of sewing thread at ¢10 each ¢720;
96 bundles of thread at ¢16 a bundle ¢1,536;
15 pieces of cloth dumas at ¢ 950 each ¢14,250.”
It must be observed that the list was silent about “torch light batteries” and their prices. What was recorded in the list was simply “torch-lights.” It is possible that the person who was asked by the plaintiff to record the items omitted to put that down. But it is neither here nor there; and in the circumstances it will be safer that that item should be ignored. In respect of the cloths, the plaintiff stated they were six pieces yet the list contained “15 pieces of cloth dumas at ¢950 each.” Since she herself categorically stated that the number of cloths destroyed was six and not fifteen she should be entitled to the value of the six pieces at ¢950 each” and that amounted to ¢5,700. This will be in addition to the cost of 72 pieces of sewing thread valued at ¢720 and 96 bundles of thread amounting to ¢1,536. Thus the total amount which in my view the learned trial judge in the circumstances of this case, could have legitimately awarded under “goods destroyed” was ¢7,236. Consequently the amount of ¢51,376 ought to be reduced to ¢7,236.
Learned counsel further submitted that the award of ¢13,000 as “loss of earnings” was unreasonable. Counsel argued that the learned trial Judge erred in holding that the plaintiff was earning ¢5,000 a month and wrongly used that figure in calculating the loss of her earnings. Counsel contended that on the evidence the only reasonable, inference to be drawn was that the plaintiff was earning only ¢500.
It must be pointed out that the plaintiff in her statement of claim paragraph (1) and in her evidence, stated that she was earning profit of ¢10,000 a month and the learned trial judge from all the indications did not accept this figure. But he held that having regard to the evidence “an amount of ¢5,000 a month would be a more realistic figure for an active woman engaged in trading in various items in the Volta Region.”
I think there was sufficient evidence to support this finding. Thus there would be no justification in disturbing it. For the three months that the plaintiff was hospitalised she lost ¢15,000 which the learned trial judge scaled down to ¢13,000. This award under loss of earning in my opinion is reasonable, except that the learned trial judge did not take one essential element into consideration when scaling down the ¢15,000. That omission will be discussed at a later stage.
In the mean time, I will deal with the attack of learned counsel for the defendants on the “loss of future earnings”, which was assessed at
[p.509] of [1984-86] GLR 501
¢180,000. The main contention of learned counsel was that the award was excessive and that the learned trial judge did not take into consideration the fact that the plaintiff was nonetheless capable of earning some income.
With due respect to learned counsel, the learned trial judge took into consideration all the factors which in the circumstances of the case were relevant and could assist him in coming to that figure of ¢300,000. Having found that the plaintiff earned ¢5,000 a month (which I have already held to be reasonable) and using five years as years of purchase he arrived at the figure of ¢300,000 which he again scaled down to ¢180,000. The plaintiff was 45 years old and but for the accident she could have engaged in active trading for, at least, another ten years. The five years as the years of purchase used by the learned trial judge was rather on the low side.
However, in the absence of any clear evidence that the learned trial judge acted on some wrong principle it will not be proper for this court to intervene and increase the number of years of purchase simply because if this court had tried the case in the first instance it would have decided on a much higher number of years. I therefore hold that the figure of ¢300,000 was properly arrived at.
However, as I pointed out earlier on, when I was dealing with the award of ¢13,000 under loss of earnings, the learned trial judge, even though he rightly took into account exigencies of life and other relevant factors when scaling down the award, he unfortunately omitted to consider one other essential element, That is in scaling down the awards under “loss of earnings” and “loss of future earnings” the learned trial judge failed to take into account the tax liability of the plaintiff. The income tax laws of this country impose an obligation on all income earners of a certain category to pay taxes on their earnings. The plaintiff, without doubt, falls under that category, and the fact that she stated in her evidence that she had not been paying taxes did not absolve her from that liability. Thus the amount of damages awarded for loss of earnings should take into account the income tax which the plaintiff would have had to pay if she had continued to trade or work: see British Transport Commission v. Gourley [1956] A.C. 185, H.L.
If compensation for loss of earnings were to be assessed on the basis of gross earnings without any diminution for income tax, an injured plaintiff would be receiving more than he would have received if he had not been injured and so would be put in a more beneficial state. This could only mean that the court would be calling upon the defendant in such a situation to pay the plaintiff more than what the plaintiff would have received if he or she had remained able to carry on his or her trade. Obviously this will be against all principles of justice.
[p.510] of [1984-86] GLR 501 In the present case, since the learned trial judge erred in not taking into account the tax liability of the plaintiff in awarding the ¢13,000 as her loss of earnings for three months and the ¢180,000 as her loss of future earnings, these figures should be reduced by the income tax which is exigible on them.
What then is the tax the plaintiff could legitimately have paid on these earnings? It is impossible to assess with accuracy or precision what deductions should be made by reason of her tax liability. Nevertheless, having regard to the circumstances of the case, I estimate that about one-third of the amount could have gone into taxes. Accordingly the ¢13,000 ought to be reduced to ¢8,666.66 and the ¢4,333.34 should rather go to the Commissioner of Income Tax. Similarly, the ¢180,000 being “loss of future earnings” must also be reduced to ¢120,000, and again the ¢60,000 to be paid to the Commissioner of Income Tax.
I am therefore of the view that the appeal should succeed in respect of the awards under “goods destroyed” which should be reduced from ¢51,576 to ¢7,236, under “loss of earnings” which must be taxed down from ¢13,000 to ¢8,666.66 and under “loss of future earnings” which should also be reduced from ¢180,000 to ¢120,000.
Consequently, the global sum of ¢281,076 must likewise be reduced to ¢172,222.66, which has to be recovered by the plaintiff. But the estimated amount which ought to have gone into taxes and which on the whole amounted to ¢64,333, in my opinion, should be paid over to the Commissioner of Income Tax.
I would therefore vary the judgment of the trial High Court in terms as indicated above.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
I entirely concur and have nothing to add.
JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.
I also concur.
DECISION
Appeal allowed in part.
M.C.N.-N.
